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ABSTRACT 
The focus of this thesis is the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia since the 
late 1990s. The arguments outlined in the existing works about the recent Islamic 
fundamentalism can be categorised into four topics: Islamic politics, interpretation of 
religious teachings, global Islamic radicalism and endogenous militant Muslims in 
the past. This thesis suggests an alternative approach. Based on theories developed 
within the studies of social movements, identity politics and consumer culture, it is 
argued that Indonesian Islamic fundamentalism is a form of resistance to problems of 
oppression and domination and, essentially, reflects social antagonism. The 
resistance takes the path of the struggle for identity because oppression and 
domination work at the level of self and everyday life. This kind of oppression and 
domination takes away one's critical abilities to take independent action and to 
produce one's own meanings oflife in order to create a sense of certainty. 
The source of oppression is the rapid flow of images and signs that 
increasingly colonise the fabric of everyday life in modern societiy. The flowing 
images reflect the consumer culture, which constitutes the increasingly dominant 
social and cultural order. Capitalist development contributes significantly to its 
emergence. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism can be seen as a negation of 
consumer culture. The resistance, moreover, is an attempt to reject the occupation of 
self and everyday life by the saturating images and is a challenge to the consumer 
culture's dominating power. The way the fundamentalists resist, however, is 
influenced by their location within the class divisions created by the same capitalist 
development that produces the consumer culture. 
Throughout this thesis the intention is not to treat knowledge as a neutral and 
objective instrument for passively disclosing reality. Instead, knowledge is used not 
only to describe a given phenomenon, but also, more importantly, to shape and 
produce it. Specifically, the knowledge produced here attempts to expose 
contradictions and conflicts within the existing socio-cultural order in which Islamic 
fundamentalism emerges. My aim is to produce a different reality of the phenomenon 
in order to promote a more critical understanding of the current structural conditions. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The focus of my study is the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia since the 
late 1990s. My goal is to explain this recent religious radicalism and to understand its 
development in the context of larger social structures and historical changes 
associated with the way contemporary Indonesian society is instituted. I start from 
the following simple question: "Why does Islamic fundamentalism emerge in 
Indonesia?" I argue that Islamic fundamentalism is a form of resistance that responds 
to oppression and domination and, significantly, reflects social antagonism. The 
resistance appears in the form of the fundamentalists' struggle for their identity 
because oppression and domination work at the level of self and everyday life. This 
kind of oppression and domination creates the problems of inauthenticity and 
disenchantment. It takes away one's critical abilities to act independently and to 
determine one's own understanding and direction of life. 
The source of oppression, inauthenticity and disenchantment is the rapid flow 
of images that increasingly saturate and, in effect, colonise the fabric of everyday life 
in modem society. The saturating images portray and reflect consumer culture, which 
constitutes the increasingly dominant social and cultural order. Its emergence is a 
major result of capitalist development and signals major transformation within 
capitalism. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism can be seen as a negation of 
consumer culture. The resistance is an attempt to reject the occupation of self and 
everyday life by the saturating images and to challenge and disrupt the dominating 
power of consumer culture. The way the fundamentalists resist, however, is 
influenced by their location within the class divisions created by the same capitalist 
development that produces consumer culture. 
This Introduction discusses the theoretical framework. In the next section I 
will outline the existing works on the issue and the location of my study within the 
recent debates. Following this, the focus will be on theories and perspectives that 
inform my studies, particularly those derived form studies of social movements, 
identity politics and consumer culture. This leads me to make certain propositions. I 
then discuss the methodological approach adopted in this research project before 
outlining the thesis structure 
1 
THE EXISTING WORKS ON THE RISE OF ISLAMIC 
FUNDAIVIENTALISM IN INDONESIA 
The arguments outlined in the existing works on recent Islamic fundamentalism can 
be categorised into four areas. Increasingly, scholars and lay observers alike become 
accustomed to the way the issue is portrayed as either a sort of Islamic politics, a 
problem of interpreting religious teachings, a part of global connections of Islamic 
radicalism, or the child of endogenous militant Muslims in the past 1 In the following 
pages I will discuss these four topics respectively as they are revealed in the existing 
literature. I will then provide my own critical assessment and i11troduce the way my 
studies will approach the issue. 
Islamic Politics 
The term Islamic politics represents the main view developed within the 
existing works. By this I mean that Islamic fundamentalism is largely seen as a 
movement that seeks to establish an Islamic state based on a strict adherence to 
Islamic values and norms. 2 Closely associated with an Islamic state is the idea of 
comprehensive implementation of shari'a, a sort of Islamic way of life, which has to 
be the sole source of law and to supply the norms and codes of conduct for the 
umma, the community of the believers.3 It is argued that the demand for the 
implementation of shari 'a represents the holistic nature of Islam in their worldview. 
As Islam provides knowledge about everything Muslims find in the world, the very 
idea of separation between the tnmscendental and the temporal is strongly denounced 
and renounced. An autonomous political sphere, through which the formation of a 
(secular) state separated from the influence of religious dogmas, is unthinkable. This 
leads not only to the rejection of the secular state of Indonesia, but also to the 
rejection of democracy, human rights and pluralism.4 
1 Abuza (2002; 2003; 2004); Barton (2004; 2005); Batley (2003); Bubalo and Fea!ey (2005); Eliraz 
(2004); Fealey (2004); Hasan (2002); ICG (2001; 2002b; 2003; 2004a; 2004b; 2005); Jamhari and 
fahroni (2004); Singh (2003); van Broinessen (2002a; 2002b); Wright-Neville (2004), 
2 Fea!ey (2004); Eliraz (2004); Jamhari and Jahroni (2004); !CG 2001; Barton (2004; 2005); van 
Bruinessen (2002a; 2002b ). 
3 Feaiey (2004); Eliraz (2004); Jamhari and Jahroni (2004). 
4 Eiiraz (2004 ). 
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Nevertheless, the movement is hardly united when it comes to the question of 
how to execute the ideas.5 By and large, they all accept the virtue of jihad. As noted 
by Eliraz,jihad is loosely understood as " ... one's duty to strive to follow God's path, 
by spreading belief in God and making His word supreme in this world ... "6 
However, as the concept of}lhad is a broad one, including both peaceful and violent 
means, its real practices can va1y from one group of ftmdamentalists to another. In 
fact, the existing works infonn us that we should distinguish groups which use 
explosion to register their demand from other groups which consistently distance 
themselves from any form of violence. 
Interpretation oflslamic Teachings 
Many observers argue that the rise of Islamic fundamentalism is a product of 
a specific interpretation of Al-Qur'an and hadith.7 As indicated above, the 
fundamentalists tend to believe in the holistic nature of this religion. According to 
Machasin the fundamentalists' interpretation is based on a strong belief that Al-
Qur' an is divine revelation, which is transferred to humans through His Prophet. The 
revelation, which is eternal and hardly bounded by history and culture, consists of 
orders and prohibitions as divine guidance for humans on how to Jive their life 
correctly. a The authority to interpret and decide the standard meanings of verses 
inside the Holy Book rests on Islamic scholars and classical Islamic thought, which 
has been standardised during the course of divinely purified Islamic history.9 For 
their part, humans are obliged to obey and be loyal to Him and His teachings. rn As 
the divine revelation does not need human intervention in its formation, the proper 
attitude towards Islamic teachings is following strictly and literally everything that 
has been mentioned in Al-Qur'an. Here we find the label "literalist" which is 
frequently applied in the recent studies to categorise the activists for their habit of 
5 Barton (2004; 2005); van Bruinessen (2002a}; Fea!ey (2004); Wright-Neville (2004); lCG (2001; 
2004b). 
6 Eliraz (2004: 126), 
1 Abdala (2003); Machasin (2003); Jamhari and Jahroni (2004); Bubalo and Fealey (2005); Eliraz 
(2004); Barton (2004; 2005), 
' Machasin (2003). 
9 \1achasin (2003). 
'° Machasin (2003). 
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literal reading of the teachings. Another similar label is "textualist", which implies 
their preoccupation with the religious text and its historical divine status. 
More importantly, these labels emphasise the significant contribution of 
religious interpretation in the emergence of religious radicalism. We can understand 
why a number of observers often refer to "salafism" as another category widely used 
to refer to activists of this movement. 11 Basically, sa!afism is an attempt to revive 
lslamic's fundamentals by returning to the practice of this religion by the pious 
generations. As-salaf as-sa/ih, that is, these faithful forefathers, is commonly seen as 
the Muslims who lived during Muhammad's lifetime until the tenth century after He 
passed away. 
It seems that the terms "literalist", "textualist" and "salafism" also bring other 
implications to how we make sense of Islamic fundamentalism. Since the 
fundamentalists rely on the literal reading of Islamic texts and on blind loyalty to the 
old religious practice of the so-called pious generations from some hundred years 
ago, they can be seen as both traditionalist and conservative. 12 They are traditionalist 
for maintaining the old traditions and, hence, conservative in a sense that the 
preservation of out of date religious practices can potentially prevent Muslims from 
being positively exposed to change, iI111ovation and progress experienced by the 
other parts of the world. 
Global Connections 
The other main theme in the current studies on this subject is global 
connections. The argument is that the rise of Islamic fondamentalism is not an 
isolated process in which the discussion of the phenomena can be confined within 
factors and elements found inside Indonesia's boundaries. The movement should be 
seen as having some connections with similar radical groups in other countries and as 
being part of the community of radical Muslims at the global level. 13 The recent rise 
of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia in this respect should be better located 
within the active and very often deliberate attempt to forge strong links between like 
'
1 See, for example, Bubalo and Fealey (2005) for the meaning of salafism. See also !CG (2004b). 
"See, for example, Abdala (2003). 
13 Bubalo and Fealey (2005); Eliraz (2004); Abuw (2002; 2003; 2004); Batley {2003); Singh (2003); 
JCG (2002b; 2002c). 
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minded radical Muslims across continents. It then makes sense to speak of such a 
thing as the global community of radical Muslims. For the connections allow Islamic 
fundamentalists from different countries to build a network through which they share 
ideas, cause and resources to help each other in fighting for their goals. 
Initially, connections to figureheads, groups and organisations outside the 
country are taken as decisive. Shortly after the first Bali bombing, a number of 
Indonesian Muslim leaders still clung to the view that the act of terrorism in the 
name of Islam is an entirely foreign ingredient added into theological teachings of 
local groups. This view found a common ground with arguments outlined in a few 
writings, which emphasise the decisive role played by Al-Qaeda in various terrorist 
attacks across the Archipelago. 14 However, the majority tends to argue that the global 
connections do inspire ideas and provide resources. But Indonesia has its own history 
of Muslim radicalism. It is a combination of these two factors that gives rise to the 
'5 recent movement.' 
Local Context 
Under the rubric of local context we can identify at least three major threads 
of analysis within the existing works. 16 First, the origins of the recent radical Muslim 
groups can be traced to the emergence of some militant Islamic organisations and 
movements in the Archipelago during the first half of the twentieth century. lvfasyumi 
and Dami Islam (DI) are perhaps the most important and relatively indigenous 
political movements. The former was initially created by Japanese colonialists as an 
umbrella organisation that merged all Muslim associations in the country, before 
transforming itself into a political party until it was disbanded in the 1960s.17 DI is an 
indigenous rebellion movement in the name of Islam, which arose originally from 
Muslim militias who fell out with the new born Indonesian government over their 
14 Abuza {2002; 2003; 2004). 
"Bubalo and Fealey (2005); Eliraz (2004); Barton (2004; 2005); !CG (2002b; 2002c; 2003; 2004b; 
2005). 
16 van Bruinessen (2002a; 2003); Barton (2002; 2004; 2005); Davis (2002); Eliraz {2004); !CG (200 I; 
2002b; 2002c). See also Hefaer (2000); Aragon (2001); van Klinken (2001), 
17 
van Bruinessen (2002a). See also Nasution (1965) and Hefner (2000) for the rise ofMasyumi and 
its historical transformations. 
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decision to accept an agreement with the Dutchrn It is argued that the two 
movements are the forefather of the current one. 
The second thread of the analysis argues that the recent rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism is preceded by changes and transformations in the political, social 
and cultural life of Indonesian Muslims.19 In the social and cultural sphere the 
country has witnessed the rapid development and dissemination of radical Islamic 
ideological views among the Muslim students in university campuses across the 
Archipelago since the early J 980s.20 Basically, the Islamic revivalism provides the 
current movement with a social and cultural basis. It produces a new generation of 
activists who are not necessarily connected to the older militant groups, but adopt a 
similar world view, It is also during the time of revivalism that the young Muslim 
students were exposed to ideas, thoughts and ideologies of various radical Islamic 
thinkers. 
In the sphere of politics, the most important change is in the relations 
between the incumbent political regime and the radical Muslim community. Since 
the rise of Soeharto's New Order in the late 1960s, the radical Muslim community 
has always been put under strict control.21 However, near the end of Soeharto's New 
Order, the tide changed dramatically. Soeharto and the most prominent members of 
the highest New Order political elite turned to the radical Muslim community for 
support. It is argued that such change has not only given them resources, but also 
opened the way for them to enter politics.22 
The third thread of analysis specifically focuses on the structural contingent 
following Soeharto's resignation which is seen as having produced favourable 
conditions for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. The country was suddenly free 
from political oppression and the freedom has led to the emergence of many 
organisations and groups from various ideological and social backgrounds. Within 
such a political dynamic, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism is made possible. In 
addition, Soeharto's fall negatively transformed the state into chronic disarray, which 
equally contributed to the emergence of religious radicalism. 23 Perhaps, the most 
"van Bruinessen (2002a); !CG (2002b; 2005). See also van Dijk (1983) for more detail discussion on 
DI. 
"van Bruinessen (2002a; 2003). See also Hefner (2000); Schwartz (1999). 
'°van Bruinessen (2002a); Rah.mat (2005); Hasan (2002). 
21 See, for example, Hefner (2000); Schwartz (1999); van Bruinessen (2002a); Rahmat (2005). 
"See, for example, Hefuer (2000); Barton (2004; 2005); !CG (200 I). 
"See !CG (2001; 2002b; 2002e). See also Barton (2002). 
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important thing is that much of the state apparatus failed ro function properly. This 
has, for example, prevented the state from applying legal sanctions to civilian 
militias, including those of radical Muslims, who use violence illegally to achieve 
their ends. 
Religio-political, Resistance and the Expressive Dimension 
The problem of the existing works is that they tend to treat Islamic 
fundamentalism as a religious phenomenon, at first, which then turns political during 
the course of its development. It is a religious phenomenon in two senses. First, those 
who are involved in this movement want to implement what they believe are the 
truest teachings of Islam. Second, the movement is inspired by a specific 
interpretation of religious values and norms. Nevertheless, Islamic fundamentalism is 
not entirely a matter of religiosity as it is involved in the power struggle. The 
movement is hence political because, according to the fundamentalists' 
interpretations, the truest teachings of Islam imply the replacement of the existing 
secular state with the one based on shari'a. This is why the notion "Islamism" is 
logical. For the movement is not only a matter of religiosity at the personal level, but 
also a religious inspired political ideology aimed at controlling and dominating 
society as a whole. As an inspired political ideology, Islamism can then be portrayed 
as being part of the global community of radical Muslims. The movement emergence 
can also be related to the existence of similar groups in the past, which come to life 
when the socio-political changes provide the opportunity. 
Islamic fundamentalism is certainly a religious phenomenon. It is simply too 
obvious to say otherwise as !slam as a religion appears everywhere, not only in their 
appeals, but also in their daily conversations, their fashions and, even their body 
movements. Nevertheless, religiosity is neither an isolated phenomenon nor a self-
sufficient organism. Religion is always part of and interact~ with the larger social 
context where it exists. How it emerges, grows and develops cannot be understood 
by referring to its internal logic, as defined and explained by its own texts. Instead, 
the relationship between religion and its social context, in my view, forms a sort of 
ontological base through which we can understand various types of religiosity. The 
line of argument proposed in the existing works mentioned here could be in danger 
7 
of drawing our attention to portray Islamic fundamentalism as an isolated religious 
phenomenon. My studies, on the other hand, start by locating religiosity into the 
larger socio-historical context. Religiosity is not therefore the starting point. It is 
more an effect rather than the cause. 
The arguments of religious interpretations, global connections and local 
contexts did try to explain and, hence, treat the movement more as an effect. Yet, in 
my view, the arguments tend to be tautological. That is to say, we cannot explain the 
rise of Islamic fundamentalism in terms of the fight for an Islamic state and shari 'a 
because of, for example, the way one reads Al-Qur'an: the interpretation of religious 
texts is itself the fundamentalism. Similarly, being part of the global community of 
radical Muslims and of endogenous radical movements is the process of becoming 
fundamentalist that needs an explanation rather than explaining. 
In this regard, the way the current studies describe the political nature of 
Islamic fundamentalism should also be carefully scrutinised. As already mentioned, 
the political is the power struggle, which is unavoidable as the fundamentalists' 
interpretation of Islamic teachings leads them to fight for the establishment of an 
Islamic state. Here we encounter at least two problems. First, politics is hence 
nothing more than an appendage to religiosity. The power struggle can only be 
understood by referring back to interpretations of religious texts. It has little to do 
with factors such as the socio-cultural backgrounds of activists other than the fact 
that they are Muslim: it is not seen as their material interests and their location within 
the existing economic structure, or, simply put, the more worldly appeals related to 
problems they face either as a human being or a citizen. As a consequence the 
political tends to be withered away because the power struggle is just another form of 
religiosity in metamorphos' s. 
Second, let us assume that there exists a power struggle, which is relatively 
independent from the consequential logic of religion as a self-sufficient system, with 
the implication that we should consider factors other than Islam and open the 
analysis to the wider socio-historical context. Yet, even this theoretical modification 
does not bring much help. For a power struggle is merely a form of conventional 
political practice that appears to us as a fact of politics. Instead, a power struggle 
cannot be taken for granted. It is not a given and self-constituted phenomenon, but 
the result of real politics, which is, I argue, located in the very way society is 
structured. In other words, the power struggle and Islamic fundamentalism are facts 
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about politics whose meanings and essence can be understood if we look at the social 
structure that produces them. 
Why do those shortcomings outlined above occur? While a number of works 
m the current studies rightly point out the collectively organised nature of the 
movement, the studies fail to give more attention to the protests that are inherently 
attached to the movement actions. By protests I mean that in the various actions, both 
legal and illegal, taken by the movement we can easily see how the fundamentalists 
express their disagreement with and rejection of certain issues and conditions. Protest 
implies that the fundamentalists' preoccupation with religiosity and their appeals for 
a new system {i.e. Islamic state, shari 'a) that protects pietisrn is a fonn ofresistance 
to the existing social order. The resistance is nothing less than an attempt to change 
radically the way contemporary Indonesian society is structured. Simply put, Islamic 
fundamentalism is better viewed as a fonn of resistance that tries to transfonn the 
existing order. We should focus our investigation on this issue if we want to unveil 
the political nature of the movement. 
The other important issue ignored by the existing works is the symbolic 
dimension of Islamic fundamentalism. While religion is too obvious to be ignored, 
the ubiquitous presence of a specific physical appearance, body movements, 
fashions, banners and colours attached to the fundamentalists can also be hardly 
unnoticed. In fact it is on the symbolic dimension that we make sense of the religious 
nature of the movement. We recognise the fundamentalists not only by their appeals, 
but also and very freqnently by what they wear. For their part, the fundamentalists 
seem to have deliberately used the movement to perfonn their specific cultural 
image. The movement and its various actions then become a medium through which 
this symbolic expression is publicly accentuated. At this point, we need to deal with 
several questions. "How important is this expressive dimension?" "How is it related 
to the resistance and the attempt to transform the existing social order?" ''ls it the 
main locus of resistance tbe movement is involved in?" "If it is so, how and why has 
the resistance ended up being preoccupied with the expressive dimension?" "What 
kind of social transfonnation are we witnessing, and, indeed, should the locus of 
resistance be these cultural symbols and images?" 
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ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
As indicated in the previous section, my argument is that the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Indonesia following Soeharto' s resignation should be seen in two 
ways. First, it is a form of resistance that tries to transform the existing social order. 
Second, it is a medium through which the movement's cultural symbols and images 
are accentuated. This approach leads me to two groups of theories. The first is 
derived from a wide range of studies on social movements. The second is closely 
associated with the discussion and analysis of the issue of identity politics. In this 
section I will focus on the theories of social movement. Identity politics will be 
discussed later. 
To begin with, I understand a social movement to be a collectively organised 
form of protest and resistance. This collective form of action deploys uncommon 
methods (whose legitimacy can be debateable) of influencing the socio-political 
process and of changing the existing institutionalised power relations.24 A social 
movement is different from other fonns of collective action such as panic, riot, fad, 
craze and outburst as well as organised actions taken by actors such as a political 
party. To borrow Melucci's argument, the main difference is in the orientation of 
actions.25 He specifically identifies three basic orientations of social movements: 
solidarity, conflict and "breach of the limits of compatibility of the system of social 
relationships". Solidarity refers to the ability of actors who are involved in a social 
movement to recognise, and in return to be recognised by, their fellow activists as 
being part of the similar social collectiveness. In contrast to this is collective action 
which is based on aggregation of atomised behaviours. Conflict-oriented social 
movements involve antagonism between two or more actors over the control of 
valuable social resources available to society at large. The opposite of this is 
collective action based on consensus on the rule and procedure regarding the 
distribution of valuable resources. The "breach of the limits of compatibility" is 
Melucci' s description of the transfonnation of the way the society is structured. On 
the other hand, collective action that does not belong to the category of a social 
movement tends to maintain the existing social structure. 
24 See, for example, della Porta and Diani (2006); Tilly ( 1986); Melucci (1996); Buechler (2000); 
Goodwin and Jasper (2003). 
25 Melucci (l 996: 23-5). 
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Debate within Social Movement Studies 
Inspired by the works of Buechler, della Porta and Diani, Melucci, and 
Pakulski, I will now identify various theories and perspectives within the social 
movement studies.26 This identification is based on the debate between Marx, Lenin 
and Gramsci. 27 One thing is for sure, these Marxist ancestors would not have posed 
the question about what makes people involved in social movements. They would 
rather have focussed on issues such as social structural change, domination and 
oppression created by the social structure that lead to resistance and revolution by the 
oppressed, and how resistance arises and develops. Nevertheless, their accounts on 
these issues precede and seem to have inspired the contemporary theories concern on 
resistance, solidarity, conflict and social transformation which explain social 
movements. 
In short, these three authors put a different emphasis on factors that lead to 
resistance. Marx brings in the issue of the large social structure, Lenin is preoccupied 
with organisation and Gramsci relies more on the power of culture. Within the 
contemporary studies of social movements these differences are reflected in the 
debate between "structure" (macro-level of analysis), "organisation" (meso-level of 
analysis) and "ideology" (micro-level of analysis). Based on this I will review what I 
understand to be the three prominent approaches within the studies: collective 
behaviour (CB), resource mobilisation (RM) and social constructionist (SC). 
Collective behaviour 
CB is perhaps the oldest and the most established approach within the 
tradition of social movement studies.28 It basically comprises several theories of 
collective action influenced by symbolic interactionism, structural-functionalism, 
mass society and totalitarian movements and relative deprivation. One thing that 
unites this range of approaches is the use of CB as a unitary concept to describe and 
explain various forms of collective action. Riot, mob, panic, craze, outburst and 
movement are merely various manifestation of CB that can be explained by using the 
26 Buechler (2000); della Porta aud Diaui (2006); Melucci (1996;1989); Pakulski (1991). 
27 See, for example, Tarrow (1994). 
28 Buechler (2000); Melucci (1996; 1989); Pakulski (1991). 
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same logic.29 Unlike normal daily life which moves according to some patterns and 
rhythms, the approach views this range of actions as less institutionalised and 
spontaneous. Unsurprisingly, CB is commonly taken to be less political than 
psychological. It is further seen as less purposive and an irrational form of behaviour 
which is largely categorised as a form of deviance. 30 
Similar to Marx's preoccupation with the larger social structure, the core of 
the CB approach is its emphasis on the important role of "structural 
strain/breakdown" in explaining the rise of collective action. It is broadly argued that 
such structural breakdown creates social instability and alienation, which may then 
pave the way for the emergence of various CB forms. The hreakdown allows 
individuals to join collective action because it makes them feel anxious and angry.31 
Neil Smelser, for instance, proposes six hierarchical steps of movement development 
from its first articulation to its final appearance at the end of the process. 32 The 
process starts from (1) general structural conduciveness, which refers to the presence 
of structural conditions that encourage--though do not necessarily determine-
various forms of CB. This is followed hy (2) structural strain, which refers to 
ambiguities, deprivations, discrepancies and conflicts, and (3) generalised belief in 
terms of widespread definition and understanding of situation. The next process is ( 4) 
triggering events and actions, the precipitating factors which provide the direct 
catalyst for collective action, before ( 5) the participants of action are mobilised. The 
final step concerns ( 6) the operation of social control, which must be temporarily 
absent if CB is to be fully manifested. 
Resource mobilisation theory 
CB is frequently criticised for its preoccupation with structural strain. While 
such strain creates grievances and tensions, people who are alienated, experience 
anxiety and discontent do not automatically decide to join actions. A new approach 
that emerged during the time when CB dominated the way social movements are 
understood was RM theory which takes away our attention from structural 
breakdown, anomie and frustration. The theory's main concern is the meso-level 
structure of movements, how movements are organised, how this allows movements 
29 Melucci (1996); Buechler (2000). 
30 Buechler (2000); Pakulski (1991 ). 
31 Buechler (2000); Melucci (1996); Pakulski (1991). 
32 Quoted in Buechler (2000). See also Pakulski ( 1991 ). 
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to mobilise resources necessary to achieve movement goals, and how movements 
respond to new situations and opportunities. 33 
The pioneers of RM theory, McCarthy and Zald, outline the importance of 
meso-level structure in an economical tone.34 They argue that the decisive factor that 
contributes to the rise of collective action is the control that people possess over 
resources necessary for successful movement actions. By implication the aggregation 
of resources is crucial to social movement activities and requires some form of 
movement organisation as the most basic condition for protest to occur. However, 
the role of groups outside a given social movement significantly influences the way 
resources available in society are distributed. The flows of resources towards or away 
from a given movement entity works according to supply and demand principles. 
Here social movement organisations are often seen as operating like firms competing 
for resources and followers. 
The other original model of RM proposed by Charles Tilly is oriented 
towards the issue of power struggle.35 His model should be understood against the 
background of the division that he makes within a bounded population, such as a 
nation state, between polity members on the one hand, who have easy access to 
power, and challengers on the other, who must be involved in collective action to 
enjoy the same access. Tilly outlines, in particular, four elements without which 
collective action will hardly take place: group interests, organisation, mobilisation of 
resources and opportunity 
Different from CB, RM theory does not treat social movements as deviance. 
They are part of the normal political process and aimed at influencing policies by 
deploying, transferring, exchanging and converting both material and non-material 
resources. 
36 RM theory also describes social movements as a specific form of 
collective action that pursues specific goals and no longer portrays them as merely 
unregulated and shapeless behaviour symptomatic of structural breakdown. Instead, 
they pursue their goals through various forms of action that are skilfully organised 
and based on careful consideration. 37 Finally, RM theory views individuals who 
33 Pakulski ( 1991 ); Buechler (2000); della Porta and Diani (2006). 
34 McCarthy and Zald (1977; 1973). See also Buechler (2000: 35-6) for a summary of McCarthy and 
Zald's model. 
35 Tilly (1978). See also Cohen (1985: 677-90) and Buechler (2000: 36-7) for Tilly's model. 
36 Pakulski ( 1991 ); Buechler (2000); Cohen (1985). 
37 Pakulski (1991 ); Buechler (2000); Cohen (1985). 
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participate m social movements as rational, relying on the gains and losses 
calculation before making the decision. 38 
Social constructionist approach 
As can be expected, RM is most commonly criticised for its exclusive focus 
on the meso-level structure of social movements. In particular, the model tends to 
view social movements as a sum total of individualised cost-benefit calculations. 
However, according to Melucci, those involved in movement actions can hardly 
consider the potential gains and the anticipated losses unless they have developed a 
shared yardstick that can be used to recognise which benefits belong to their 
expectation. 39 Such yardstick in tum requires a shared understanding of who they are 
and what they are doing. That is to say, solidarity, through which a sense of unity and 
of having similar directions is constructed, precedes and makes possible any sort of 
rational action.40 We can also add here that solidarity is not based on gain-loss 
considerations. It is instead built through the process of identification with "friend" 
and "enemy". 
This criticism, especially the notion of solidarity, destabilises the very 
foundation of the RM model in three ways. First, the decisive element of social 
movements is no longer organisation and resources but a symbolic exchange between 
movement activists and followers that produ_ces meamngs and shared 
understandings. Second, a given social movement is not an aggregation of 
individualised rational considerations but is based on a shared identity of those 
involved. Third, formal organisation is less significant than informal networks 
among individuals and groups inside a given social movement that is constructed 
during the course of social interactions. This, in effect, brings the issue of culture into 
the discussion. The SC approach is developed within the new preoccupation with 
cultural process associated within social movements. 
By and large, SC understands social movements as a cultural process 
involving symbolic exchange and construction of meaning and identity among 
participants and followers. Perhaps the most significant theoretical contribution of 
SC is its use of the concept of framing in understanding social movements. 
38 Melucci (1996); Buechler (2000); Pakulski (1991). See also Olson (1965). 
39 Melucci (1996). 
40 Melucci (1996). 
14 
According to Hunt et al, the term is borrowed from Frame Analysis written by 
Erving Goffman, a key figure of symbolic interactionism.41 They note that a number 
of social movement scholars have adopted Goffman's ideas to make sense of how 
movement actors understand their social worlds. Framing refers to the way 
individuals and groups inside social movements construct and attach meanings to 
their activities through an interactive and collective process. The concept is designed 
to discuss issues such as the social construction of grievances, individual motivation 
and recruitment into a given social movement, and collective identity. In terms of 
grievances, framing is a matter of how those involved identify problems, suggest 
possible solutions and activate motivation for actions. When it comes to the issue of 
motivation and recruitment, framing is about how movement organisations reach 
people who already share their orientation; how they appeal to values and beliefs 
strongly held by society in general; how they extend the number of sympathisers by 
describing the movement as a logical response to concerns of some segments of the 
population; and how they create and nurture new values. On the issue of collective 
identity, framing defines those who are involved in social movements, recognises 
their antagonists and identifies those that must be categorised as audience. 
Explaining Islamic fundamentalism 
How can these approaches and theories inform this study? We learn from 
Marx and CB that, as a form of resistance, Islamic fundamentalism is better 
understood against the backdrop of a larger social structure and historical change. 
Marx would specifically emphasise the importance of structural contradictions. 42 It 
means that the movement is a product of tensions and conflicts that characterise and 
reproduce contemporary Indonesian society. Furthem10re, resistance is led by those 
who are oppressed, who are basically on the less fortunate side of contradictions. 
Marx in particular uses the term alienation to explain how resistance is a response to 
the problems of oppression and domination. In Marx's sense alienation is a state 
when a person becomes alien (I) to the products of one's own activity, (2) to the 
nature in which one lives, (3) to other human beings and (4) to one's own historically 
created human possibilities. Alienation for him, however, is not merely a descriptive 
concept, but more importantly a call for a revolutionary change (de-alienation) of 
41 Hunt et al (1994). See also Buechler (2000). 
42 Marx and Engels (1967); Marx (1970). 
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social structure and history that produce alienation.43 Resistance is in this sense de-
alienation. In CB's standard idioms, it is an expression of anger, anxiety, frustration 
and discontent by those who are in the state of anomie. 
Nevertheless, social movements are not entirely a result of some natural 
mechanism working at the level of social structure that can be objectively identified. 
Rivi theory opens our eyes to the fact that social movements are nothing less than 
normal and collectively organised activities. We learn that without some level of 
organisation anger, anxiety and frustration can lead to various forms of unregulated, 
shapeless and less patterned behaviours such as riots, panic and outbursts. 
Finally, the cultural dimension of collective action is also important m 
understanding the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. SC helps us to understand that the 
main process within this cultural foundation is framing. That is to say, the rise of 
Islamic fi.mdamentalism is also a product of how the fundamentalists make sense of 
their grievances, how they motivate and recruit their followers and how they 
recognise themselves as one collective unit. 
This leaves us with at least two problems which CB, RM and SC fail to deal 
with, First, one thing that enables us to learn so much from these prominent 
approaches is the combination of various theoretical insights in each of them. If 
looked at separately as an isolated framework of analysis CB, RM and SC only 
provide a partial explanation. What we need is an approach that can combine all 
three level of analysis. Second, and more importantly, none of the approaches 
discussed thus far touch upon the issue of expressive dimension I noted before. SC' s 
preoccupation with the role of culture in collective action could give us some clues 
as to how to deal theoretically with this issue. However, SC is in my view slightly 
biased toward RM. What I mean is that it emphasises the importance of culture 
because it wants to complement the importance of organisation and resoutces with 
cognitive aspects of motivation and recruitment into collective action. 
Unsurprisingly, culture here refers to abstract things such as meanings, shated 
understanding and collective identity. TI1e more concrete fom1s of cultural symbols 
attached to fashion, physical appearance and body movements are hardly taken into 
consideration. 
43 Marx (l 964: espe<:iaUy on the topic Estranged Labor). See also Bottomore et a! (1985: 9-15). 
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These two problems lead to another group of theories and models derived 
from studies on contemporary social movements such as environmentalist 
movements, feminist movements, peace movements and counter culture movements. 
I will use the controversial tenn "new social movements" (NSM) theories. For me, 
NSM theories are more about an approach which can be significantly distinguished 
from CB, RM and SC. 
New Social Movement Theories 
NSM theories are the works on contemporary social movements produced by 
Touraine, Melucci, Offo, Habennas, Pizorno, Eder, Inglehart and Pakulski.44 This 
new approach is commonly seen as a reaction to the economic reductionism of 
conventional Marxism and to the privilege of proletarian revolution. Even though 
they retain Marx's preoccupation with the larger social structure and historical 
change, the authors I mentioned above have also included elements such as politics, 
ideology, identity and culture in unfolding the logic of collective action. Social 
movements for them are forms of organised action, while the privilege enjoyed by 
the proletariat as the most important agent of change is challenged as other bases of 
identity for resistance in ethnicity, gender and sexuality are discovered. 
By and large, NSM theories restore the macro level of analysis by linking 
collective action to a historically specific social formation. The contemporary 
movements are largely seen as responses to the capitalist free-market, state 
administration, bureaucratised society, scientific and technological-imposed social 
interactions, or instrumental rationality-characterised life.45 Even though they 
disagree over the use of the terms "modern" or "postmodern" in naming the societal 
totality defined by this range of social institutions, the theories share similar views 
that social movements in the late twentieth century respond to the dominating nature 
of these advance modem systems. "6 The domination is argued as manifesting in the 
oppression of everyday life, which at the same time turns the same everyday life into 
44 Touraine (198!; 1985); Me!ucci (1985; 1989; 1994; 1995; 1996); Offe (1985b); Habennas (1981); 
Pizzomo (l 978); Eder (1985; 1993; 1995); Inglehart (l 990); Paku!ski (1991; ! 995). See also Buechler 
\2000); Cohen (1985); Larana et al (1994). 
5 Touraine (1981); lv1e!ucci (1989; 1994; 1996); Offe (1985b); Habennas (1981); Paku!ski (1991 ). 
"'Habermas (!981); Melucci (1989; 1994; 1996); Pakulski (1991). 
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a new arena of political action. In this sense, the contemporary movements rarely 
operate within the area of redistributive struggle in the conventional political sphere. 
Instead, to borrow Habermas' expression, the movements are "to defend or reinstate 
endangered life styles ... ,"47 to free one's everyday life from being dominated and 
controlled by these systems. 
The oppression of everyday life, the very terrain of identity, leads to the 
centrality of the latter within the contemporary movements. The argument is that the 
advanced modem institutions are equally intrusive and invasive. Their power to 
dominate and control life renders obsolete public-private and collective-individual 
divisions and opens fom1erly intimate and personal aspects of one's life to political 
intervention.48 This fosters the struggle for (collective) identity because personality 
becomes the locus of conflict and resistance. Retaining SC preoccupation with the 
micro level of analysis, the centrality of identity further means that the ability of 
people to take part in movements depends on their ahility to define who they are in 
the first place. And wbo they are has little to do, for example, with one's class 
background. The construction of (collective) identity is a matter of resisting the 
capitalist free market, state administration or scientific and technological imposed 
social interactions by providing, for instance, alternative meanings and knowledge 
which are locally bounded to the intrinsic formation of identity.49 
Since the issue is everyday life and personality, the movements are viewed as 
being highly preoccupied with "post-materialist" values.50 Instead of seeking power, 
control or economic gain, they are more inclined to seek autonomy, recognition and 
democratisation and to defend values such as civil liberty, gender equity, pluralism, 
peace and sustainability. It is argued that this range of appeals is not only to be 
transformed into policies and regulations through the classical power struggle, either 
through protests or parliament. But more importantly it is achieved by the very 
activists themselves through strong commitment and willingness to adopt and 
practise these values.51 In this regard several models within the new approach, 
especially the more cultural variant of NSM theories, 52 treat social movements in 
completely different manner compare to the one proposed by CB, Ri\.1 and SC. While 
47 Habennas (!981: 33). 
43 Touraine (1981); Melucci (1989; 1994; 1996); Offo (1985b) 
49 Melucci (1989; 1994; 1996). Sec also Hunt et al (1994); Johnston et al (1994). 
50 Ingiebart ( 1990). 
51 See, for example, de!la Porta and Diani (2006). 
52 See, for example, Buechler (2000). 
18 
CB tends to portray collective action as the end form of structural breakdown without 
any goals other than representing deviance and abnormal behaviour commonly found 
in the condition of anomie, RM and SC take social movements first and foremost as 
a tool to achieve movement goals. In contrast to this, NSM theories' preoccupation 
with everyday life and identity and with post-materialist values and the activists' 
commitment to them leads to the view of a given social movement and its goals as 
coinciding. Put differently, the movement is the goal in-itself. 
In fact, the new approach sees organisation less as a strategic instrument than 
as a symbolic expression of movement values and member identities. According to 
Melucci, NSMs function less as standing armies than as a laboratory of culture that 
vacillates between latency and visibility. They are not only involved in street protests 
and battles on specific demands, but are also involved in politicised subcultures that 
sustain movement values and orientation. 53 Pizzo mo arrives at the same conclusion 
when he identifies the expressive dimension of the contemporary movements. He 
argues that such expressiveness makes "real claims", commonly associated with 
social movements, absent in actions. Instead, the real appeal is the recognition of the 
actual subject who is involved in the movement.54 In this respect, movement 
organisation in the view of NSM theories is somewhat different from RM. The 
former emphasises the decentralised, egalitarian, participatory, pre-figurative and ad 
hoc nature of collectively organised actions. This type of organised collective action, 
instead of a highly entrepreneurial and bureaucratic kind of movement organisation 
emphasised by IUvl, is more appropriate to the contemporary movements' concern 
with values such as autonomy, liberty and democracy. 
The other significant implication is that the use of the movement as a medium 
to express movement values signifies the role of cultural and symbolic fonns of 
action. This cultural dimension is to affirm the existence of a new or unrecognised 
collective actor. While several scholars within the new approach criticise the 
apolitical and romantic nature of this cultural and symbolic action,55 several others 
defend such unconventional forms of resistance as embodying the contemporary 
movements' rejection of the instrumental rationality of advanced capitalist society 
SJ Melucci (1996; 1989). 
54 Pizzomo ( 1978). 
55 See. for example, Habennas (1981); Eder (1985; 1993). 
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and its systems of social control and cooptation.56 Indeed, if the problem is the 
domination of everyday life and the intrusion and invasion of advanced modem 
institutions into one's own self, any form of symbolic expression that can be taken as 
a challenge to, for example, the scientific and technological imposed social 
interactions should be viewed as a form of resistance. 57 
What do we learn from this? It looks odd to use NSM theories to understand 
religious radicalism. Islamic fundamentalism is commonly seen as conservative, 
reactionary and traditional. It stands against the post materialist values such as 
democracy, civil liberty and human rights, which are strongly associated with 
contemporary movements. The way the new approach builds its theories is also 
deeply preoccupied with the tendency to assign the new movements with the 
historical task of transforming society into a better future, either in terms of 
democracy, egalitarianism, participation, peace, or being ecologically friendly. 
Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia is hardly taken as having such a historical task 
and, instead, is frequently seen as representing the bleak future of emerging 
democracy in that country. 
Nevertheless, the concern with post materialist-or, rather non materialist-
values is by no means the monopoly of the new movements. We can easily see that 
the issues of identity, recognition and autonomy, in particular, are also inherently 
attached to religious and ultra-nationalist inspired collective action. 58 Instead, the gist 
ofNSM theories, in my view, revolves around not only the emphasis of identity as a 
political issue, but also and more importantly cocems the argument that 
contemporary movements are involved in the struggle for identity in response to the 
problem of domination and oppression that work at the level of self and everyday 
life. The contemporary movements are better understood as a reaction to the social 
structure and historical change, but the intrusive and invasive nature of the latter 
works at a sphere of cultural reproduction and social integration as well as at the 
level of personality and intimacy. In this regard, we can rely on NSM theories to 
understand the recent Islamic fundamentalism in the Archipelago. We can portray 
the resistance that lies at the heart of the movement as taking the form of a struggle 
56 See, for example, Melucci (l996; 1989; 1994); Pakulski (l99!). 
" See Bue~hler (2000). 
"See, for example, Castells (2004); Hetherington (1998). See also Eder(! 985; 1993); Calhoun 
(1995). 
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for identity as long as such resistance can be related to domination and oppression 
that works at the level of everyday life and self of those involved. 
In addition, the new approach argues that, within the very struggle for 
identity, resistance and transformation coincide. Hence, in contrast to the existing 
studies on Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia, I do not treat the movement itself 
and its actions as a tool to achieve movement goals. The movement actions and its 
goals are not two separate moments in time that reflect the internal logic of 
movement development from one stage to another. Instead, the movement, resistance 
and transformation coincide. Resistance is not only aiming at establishing an Islamic 
state based on shari 'a, but more importantly it is conducted in a manner which is 
taken by the fundamentalists as being based on divinely legitimised teachings. It has 
to be this way because resistance is significantly associated with a strong 
commitment to specific values and norms that imply a transformation at the level of 
personality of those who involved in the movement. This kind of transformation is as 
crucial as the fight for an Islamic state. In fact, I argue that the attempt to establish a 
new state based on shari 'a is above all a matter of adopting and demonstrating one's 
commitment to specific values and norms. At this point, to use a more popular 
notion, we can then say that the movement itself is the message. 
Finally, based on arguments developed within NSM theories, both the 
struggle for identity and the coinciding of resistance and transformation tum social 
movements into a medium through which those involved express who they are. This 
view significantly touches upon the expressive dimension of the Islamic 
fundamentalism movement in Indonesia. In fact, it helps me to understand the 
movement's expressive dimension. Since commitment to what the fundamentalists 
take as Islamic values and norms is as important as the goal to establish an Islamic 
state based on shari 'a, the movement becomes the medium through which one's 
commitment is expressed. Being involved in the movement implies not only 
demonstrating specific values and norms, but also practising certain conducts, 
behaviours and attitudes. The movement and, especially, the various fonns of its 
collective actions are then hardly different from a site of performance, which is 
marked with cultural symbols and images attached, for instance, to the 
fundamentalists' physical appearances, fashions and body movements. 
Simultaneously, as a site of performance, the movement enables the 
fundamentalists to tell others who they are. The movement allows them to accentuate 
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their existence and valorise it as real and significant to an Indonesian audience in 
particular. Hijab can be easily seen as a cultural symbol representing the 
fundamentalists. Yet, even the demand for the full implementation of shari 'a can 
also be treated more as an expression of who they are rather than the demand itself 
with its substantial implications on specific policies and regulations. At frrst, the 
fight for shari 'a is a result of strong commitment to what they take as the truest 
values and norms. Then, the demand for its implementation is to tell others how to 
define the identity of those who are involved in the movement. In short, the 
accentuation of the movement's symbols and images through its expressive 
dimension informs us that the struggle for identity is at the heart of the recent Islamic 
fundamentalism. 
Nevertheless, NSM theories fail to deal successfully with the following 
issues. "How exactly is the struggle for identity a form of resistance that transforms 
the existing social order?" "How can we associate identity with the issue of 
autonomy and freedom from oppression?" To answer these questions "is it necessary 
to unfold the process through which identity is constructed and produced?" If the 
answer is yes and regardittg the argument tl1at the movement is the message, "how 
can the construction of identity be a form of resistance that tries to transform the 
oppressive social structure?" Furthermore, "are the expressive dimension and the 
process of identity construction two separate issues in which the former simply 
demonstrates the substance of the latter?" "How does the expression contribute to the 
very construction of identity?" "How can these various possibilities existing in the 
relations between the expressive dimension and identity construction be understood 
in terms of resistance and an attempt to transfonn the existing dominating order?" To 
deal with these unresolved problems I now tum to other approaches and theories 
derived from studies on identity politics. 
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AS IDENTITY POLITICS 
The term identity politics refers to a sort of political movement that seeks to defend 
and promote the interests of a specific group of people who are oppressed because of 
the identity they share. It is commonly argued that the interests of groups and 
individuals who are defined by categories such as race, ethnicity, religion, gender 
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and sexual orientation are/cannot be advanced by agencies such as class or nation-
state. Identity politics is then a matter of struggle for recognition and the defence of 
minority rights. It celebrates cultural diversity and the right to be different, and for 
that difference to be recognised as legitimate. As it takes the centre stage, it is further 
argued that contemporary politics should also be understood as being organised 
around struggles over identity. 
However, there is also another sensibility that questions the assumption 
previously outlined. TI1is kind of identity politics is seen as being based on the 
contention that groups and individuals act on behalf of and for the interests of self. 
defined identity which is fixed and stable. The problem is that the notion of identity 
as a unified, fixed and stabilised entity is believed to represent the old form of 
identity which is in crisis. Nevertheless, this sensibility does not entirely reject the 
idea of identity politics. It merely wants to discard any form of essentialism within 
the struggle for recognition and minority rights. Such essentialism can potentially 
end up in a new oppression and marginalisation of other identities. Here, the question 
is: "in what sense should Islamic fi.mdamentalism in Indonesia be better understood 
as a fonn of identity politics?" However, it is important to first establish how identity 
and the struggle for identity are defined and understood within the existing studies. 
Approaches to Meanings ofldcntity and the Struggle for identity 
Stuart Hall identifies three different conceptions of identity, which he names 
"Enlightenment subject", "sociological subject" and "post-modem subject".59 The 
Enlightenment subject refers to the conception of the human subject as a fully 
centred and unified individual, who possesses capacities of reason, consciousness 
and action. TI1e person is endowed with a substantial content which first emerged 
when born, is attache<l to the same person throughout development and continues to 
he the same throughout the person's existence. This substantial content hides inside 
one's inner self, that constitutes the centre of the self, and is a person's identity. 
The sociological subject is based on a conception that questions the 
autonomous and self-sufficient nature of a human's substantial content. Following 
59 Hall (l 992: 275-7). 
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the rise of new social sciences, the individual subjeet is increasingly seen as located 
within the larger structures of modem society. Sociology, in particular, criticises the 
Cartesian subject for its emphasis on rationality and individualism. The subject is 
instead placed in group processes and collective norms. It argues that individuals are 
formed through their membership of, and taking part in, wider social interactions. 
The person's identity is constructed in relation to their significant others. These 
significant others help the subject to learn, adopt and internalise the culture of the 
world in which one lives. In return, social processes and the larger supporting 
structures are kept working by various roles which individuals play. 
Hall conceptualised the post-modern subject as having an identity which is 
hardly fixed and essential nor remains the same throughout the subject's existence. 
Rather, it is historically produced and constantly in the process of transformation in 
relation to the way it is represented in the context of the cultural system where one 
lives. Identity has never been a unified entity consisting of an inner core that 
constitutes one's substantial content as an individual human subject. It is inherently 
fragmented as the subject selects different identities at different times. The fully 
unified self and a stable meaning of one's identity is a fantasy. It has never been a 
complete and coherent unit as it is constantly exposed to the multiplicity of various 
identities one can identify with. 
Based on Hall's conceptions I identify two approaches in understanding 
struggles over identity.60 The first sees the struggle for identity as an attempt to 
rediscover identity already existing in the past, seen as true and original and waiting 
to be excavated. This yet-to-be-discovered identity is a sort of collective true self, 
hiding inside many others. It is something that the people who share the same history 
and are assumed to be the offspring of the same ancestors hold in conunon. The 
struggle for identity often involves the promotion of its positive images and to fight 
against inadequacy and distortion created by its existing negative images. 
The second approach views identity as something that has to be produced. 
The struggle for identity involves the politics of representation, that is to say, the 
politics of how identity is produced and adopted through the practices of 
representation. This means that identity has never existed in the past nor waits to be 
discovered. Instead, identity is produced through the play of difference. Its meaning 
60 See Hall (1990); Calhoun (1994; 1995); Grossberg (!996). 
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depends on its difference from and its negation of some other terms and identities. 
The positivity of any given identity is only achieved through the negativity of its 
differences and its negating others. This constitutive relation of negativity implies 
that identity is always (in the process of being) destabilised. The instability is due to 
the fact that its formation always incorporates its negation, which becomes the source 
of disruption that prevents the former from being fixed and stable.61 Identity is also 
contradictory and is made out of partial fragments. The production of identity is 
hence another kind of "play", not with difference, but with selecting and moving 
from one type of identity representation to another.62 
The fundamentalists' struggle for identity 
l argue that the fundamentalists' struggle for identity takes the path of the 
politics of representation. The struggle is a matter of producing their identity through 
petitions, statements, sermons and jargons; through fashion, banners and colours; and 
through physical appearance, body movements, demeanour and emotion. Perhaps the 
most important thing is the play of difference. There is no such thing as an original 
and true fundamentalists' identity hidden in the past within the shared history and 
culture. Rather, it is within difference the fundamentalists' identity is constructed. 
The positivity of their identity can only be produced through the relation to other, to 
basically what they are not and what they lack.63 
However, I argue that the positivity should be more than the negativity of 
other terms. It is about the root and the depth of the merely flattened surface of 
identity produced through the play of difference. It is important to note, however, 
that the root and the depth, the very positivity, are created after the formation of 
identity rather than vice versa. This is because the construction of identity never 
occurs within a political vacuum. It always takes the issue of power and domination 
into consideration. Therefore, the production of the fundamentalists' identity is not 
only the art of making difference and of negation, but also the act ofresistance and of 
making boundaries. 
In this regard, Castells' view on identity in his seminal work, The Information 
Age, is instructive. Since the construction of identity always occurs within power 
"See Lyotard (1990); Bhabl!a (2004); Said (2003). See also Derrida (198i}; Laclau (!990), 
"See Harraway (l99J); Hall (1990). 
63 Hall (1996; 4). 
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relations, Castell contends, we could make a distinction between three different types 
of identity formation. 64 The first is "legitimising identity," which is generated by the 
dominant institutions of society to maintain their domination of social actors. The 
second one is "resistance identity," which is produced by the subordinated group, 
through the formation of a fortress of resistance and survival, based on values and 
principles different from, or opposed to, those permeated by the dominant groups.65 
The third form is "project identity," which is introduced by social actors to build a 
new identity which simultaneously redefines their location in society and attempts to 
transform the entire social structure. 
For Castells, it is natural that ideniities that start as resistance may end up in 
project identity and may be equally, through a long historical period, becomeng the 
dominant identity. Islamic fundamentalism, as he understands it, is a form of 
resistance identity. The identity of this movement, as he nicely puts it, is an 
expression of "the exclusion of the excluders by the excluded." By this he means 
"the building of defensive identity in terms of dominant institutions/ideologies, 
reversing the value judgment while reinforcing the boundary."66 In the longer run, 
this Islamic resistance identity could become a project that produces subjects, which 
he understands as the collective social actors through which individuals within the 
movement reach the meanings of their being in the world. At this point, the building 
of a fundamentalist identity is an attempt to write a different life, a life based on 
shari 'a, not for the fundamentalists alone and only, but also for the whole society. 
Castells' argument is useful, as it confirms the act of resistance and of 
making boundaries in the production of identity mentioned above. His discussion on 
project identity, particularly his emphasis on this form of identity building as the next 
logical sequence of resistance identity, is equally helpful. It tells us significantly how 
the construction of identity could end up in the formation of subject, that, I will 
shortly explain, constitutes the root and the content of initially an empty signifier of 
identity. Nevertheless, there are a couple of issues that still concern me. First, how 
can the act of resistance and of making boundaries, the very exclusion of the 
excluders by the excluded, exist in real life and not always be trapped inside the 
prison of discourse? Second, why does resistance identity end up in project identity 
64 Castells (2004: 7-12). 
65 See also Calhoun ( J 994 ). 
" Castells (2004: 9). 
26 
that produces a subject? To answer these questions I now tum to the work of Judith 
Butler. 
Identity Performance and the Production of Subject 
The following discussion is based on Butler's most widely celebrated-as 
well as criticised~ssay, Gender Trouble. In my view her essay is a response to the 
issue of female identity and Foucault's works on how discourse produces a subject 
Butler starts her inquiry by challenging the sense of coherent self and identity 
commonly adopted by feminist theories and practices.67 It is necessary to address this 
issue as she encounters some conceptual problems in the existing approaches. Jn 
particular, she is concerned with the fact that feminists commonly assume the pre-
established sexed body. Feminists such as Simone de Beauvoir are correct in 
portraying gender as social construction. Yet, they recklessly connect the fabricated 
gender with an already sexed hody, as if such connection is given and needs no 
further investigation. Butler argues in contrast that the body is itself socially 
produced and can hardly exist before the formation of gender differences. For her, 
we should not treat the body as passive medium waiting to be lived by the marking 
of gender, but see it as "come into being" in and through the construction of 
identity.68 
Following Foucault, Butler comes up with the argument that the production 
of gender is a "discursive effect''.69 She means that the construction of male and 
female identities takes place through their involvement with, and subjection to, 
cultural and linguistic code. However, the work of discursive power on individuals is 
not as direct and automatic as one thinks. Adding to the Foucauldian premise that 
discourse produces and destabilises subjects, she proposes the notion of 
"perforrnativity" as the specific "aspect of discourse that has the capacity to produce 
what it names". She then takes a Derridian tum to suggest that performativity occurs 
through a certain kind of repetition and recitation. 70 In this sense, rather than as a 
result of inner desires and reason, identity is produced in the act of perfomting 
6
' Butler (2007). See also Elliot (2007: 124-8). 
68 Butler (2007: 11-8). 
"" Butler (2007); Bntler (1996). See also Elliot (2007). 
"Butler(1996: 112). 
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sexuality, doing gender and enacting desires. This set of repeated performances is 
largely fashioned after the cultural representations of masculinity and femininity 
found in the modem life. 7l Butler timber argues that the performances of gender 
identity are highly regulated forms of power. She notes in particular how 
heterosexual relations regulate and dominate practices of gender. A son of rigid 
social norm with the power to discipline and control is established from this, which 
shapes decisively performed identity of a sexed bodyn 
I have argued that the fundamentalists' struggle for identity takes the form of 
the politics of representation in which their identity is produced mainly through the 
play of difference. The problem is that the play of difference creates identity as 
nothing more than an empty signifier. We can add the issue of power and domination 
to the argument as Castells did, but the resistance and the making of boundaries 
associated with this politics of representation is hardly real and remains trapped 
within the practices of discourse. Butler on the other hand portrays the formation of 
identity as a process involving performance. Identity in here is a set of real, repetitive 
and disciplined practices. Based on this view, we can now see that the expressive 
dimension discussed thus far is the site through which the fundamentalists produce 
their identity by conducting specific performances. The practices and performances 
could be seen as the mark of identity and could also be taken as the site where 
identity is present. However, by the same token, the practices are the real politics of 
identity. It is here the actual act of resistance and of making boundaries takes place. 
We can further say that it is through practices associated with the constructed identity 
that the human subject is produced. 
Allow me to develop my point in more detail. In the initial stage the play of 
difference produces identity as an empty signifier. It is empty because its meaning is 
less than the negative meaning of its other. In the later stage, identity is signified by a 
number of practices. The fundamentalists' identity, for example, is associated with 
practices such as adopting busana Muslim (Muslim dress) through which the 
individuals concerned as well as others recognise those who are involved in the 
movement. Certainly, wearing the hijab could be hardly understood, for example, 
without taking the fundamentalists rejection of other styles of fashion into account. 
Nevertheless, identity is now more than just an empty signifier, as its emptiness is 
" Butler (2007); Elliot (2007). 
" Butler (2007); Elliot (2007) 
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filled in with real action, that is, the act of taking up a particular dress code. While 
the construction of identity involves a politics of negating others at a purely 
discursive level, the practice of wearing Muslim dress transforms this discursive 
politics iuto a fotm of action in real life. It is through this kind of real action that we 
can sense the depth and the substance of identity. 
More importantly, the practices, the real action that forms the substance of 
constructed identity, are the key foundations of the subject being constructed. It is 
through these practices, identity produces subject which is adopted by individuals in 
the movement. I have to stress tliat the subject is produced through the practices. 
This implies that the subject is not some abstract entity, and it is not a matter of what 
one's position in the whole society is, as implied by Castell's argument above. 
Instead, the subject is as real as about how one should behave, what kind of conduct 
one should engage in and what type of attitude one should adopt. 
Inspired by Foucault, l also argue that the practices implied by identity are 
better seen as disciplinary practices, 73 These practices are strictly regulated in purely 
negative terms, particularly through limitations and prohibitions. At the heart of 
disciplinary practices is regulation of the body. The body is effectively controlled 
and protected through a constant process of surveillance and by a range of 
punishments. Regulations of the body and practices then result in specific conducts, 
behaviours and attitudes attached to identity. Regulations further materialise in 
particular skills of body movement~ implied by disciplined conducts, behaviours and 
attitudes. Here, I should reiterate my previous statement: identity is more about 
performing specific practices. And the practices, which are based on discipline and 
control of the body, do not form, hut are the subject itself. In other words, the subject 
is produced in the course of its materialisation. 
Agency and Embodied Self 
Butler reluctantly uses the term perfom1ance and prefers performativity 
instead. The reason is that, while the former presumes a subject, the latter contests 
the very notion of the subject and tends to locate it at the end of process.74 Such 
73 Foucault (1991; 2003; l96S; 1998). 
74 Butler (1996), 
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contention has led critics to label her as an anti-humanist. The theory of 
performativity in fact leaves no place for any form of agency at the level of selr.75 
Butler in this sense inherits the Foucauldian effect of de-centring the human subject. 
Clearly, even though identity is always relational and depends on its relations 
to its significant others, its construction presumes some fonn of action on self 
however limited it is. If we take action on self as the most basic form of 
consciousness, some sort of agency should have existed before the formation of 
one's identity. Take as an example, Lacan's mirror stage in the development of the 
individual subject when, as a small infant, it first establishes a sense of self through 
visual identification with its image in a mirror. 76 The mirror lies because it provides 
an image of bodily wholeness, of oneness and unity which contradicts the lack of 
physical coordination that the infant experiences in the real life. Hence, the reflecting 
mirror leads to misrecognition of selfhood. While Lacan is correct that the mirror 
lies, the mirror could only misguide if as a small infant the individual subject notices 
something in it. The subject then misinterprets this thing inside the mirror as the 
image of its fully united and constituted self. Put differently, the subject is relatively 
independent in recognising an image that it misrecognises as its true projection. 71 
Similarly, the discipline and control of the body could only work if tbe 
fundamentalists first take a note of it. However, they consciously recognise and 
accept it as something desirable, as part of the attempt to fight oppression and 
domination. 
More importantly, by assuming the existence of some level of consciousness 
I can see how the disciplinary practices imply a form of action on self. However, we 
should remember that resistance is here is no longer understood negatively in terms 
of "being free from something". It is more positively taken as "desire to be 
something". Resistance ceases to free---or rather protect~,one's self from oppression 
and domination. It is more about producing and reproducing one's self as a (new) 
person. The question is "how the disciplinary practices imply this kind of action on 
self?" 
Let us once more go back to Butler. Her theory of performativity implies the 
centrality of tbe body as a site where routine and repeated identity performances take 
75 See. for example, Eltiot (2007); Halt (1996). 
76 Lacan (2006). 
77 See Hall (1996). 
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place. If we agree with her that performances produce subject, the body should then 
be the main medium through which one makes sense of who one is. The body and 
the self are hence more connected than we think. Biyan Turner is the leading figure 
in sociological theories on how the body implies some inner process within human 
selr.78 He contends that it has become a tradition in social science to discuss and 
analyse the self as a disembodied entity. The body is commonly conceptualised as 
the biological limit constrained upon human agency. Turner by contrast finds self as 
a more embodied unit and this embodied self is necessaiy for social interactions. 
Above all, the body defines what being human is. It is something that one possesses 
and one does and lives with on a daily basis. The body is in fact central to how we 
make sense of our self and how we engage in interactions with others. Nevertheless, 
he does not see the embodied self as the passive result of structural and discursive 
power, but is instead integrally part of being and agency. 
I have previously argued that the subject is produced through the practices 
implied by identity. Now, this constructed subject, which is produced during the 
course of its materialisation, is further adopted by every individual within the 
movement through the process of learning the disciplinary practices, exercising and 
making them routine and of inventing their meanings. The process paves the way for 
the subject and the disciplinary practices to be transposed into one's inner self and, in 
the process, remake the self, The end result is the rise of a (new) personality formed 
through and by regulations of the body and everyday life. 
THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL CONTEXT: CONTRADICTIONS AND THE 
OPPRESSIVE STRUCTURE 
I have thus far discussed the Islamic fundamentalism as a form of resistance that tries 
to transform the existing socio-cultural order. More specifically, the fundamentalists' 
struggle for identity is an outcome that responds to the problem of oppression and 
domination originated in structures and institutions that are produced by and sustain 
an established dominant formation of a particular societal totality. Jn this section my 
focus will be on the source of oppression and domination and how they take place. I 
"Turner (1984; 1991; 1992); Featherstone et al (1991 ); Elliot (2007: 1004-6). See also Featherstone 
(199lb), 
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will also discuss what kind of contradiction that is revealed through the way society 
is structured and how it is reflected in the fundamentalists' struggle for identity. 
Against Oppression: Freedom and Certainty 
As previously indicated, the NSM theories can be regarded as an attempt to 
reformulate Marx's argument by viewing the rise of contemporary movements as a 
response to the problem of oppression and domination. They identify modem 
structures and institutions such as domination of the mass media, the expansion of 
state administration, the rapid growth of bureaucratisation and the rise of information 
technology as the main source of what I refer to as alienation. The works of 
Habermas and Melucci in particular can help us to make sense of how social 
movements are better seen as a response to the issue of oppression and domination. 79 
Habermas's main intellectual enterprise is preoccupied with a general 
framework of how to understand modemity.80 Nevertheless, he did find the new 
social movements as a significant aspect of modem life and its dynamics. He argues 
that these movements' main concerns are strongly related to the conflict over issues 
such as quality of life, equality, individual self-realisation, human rights and 
demoeratic participation. 81 According to Habermas, the source of conflict is the 
growing domination of the economic-administrative complex, associated with the 
state of welfare capitalism. Such a process bas led to the colonisation of the life-
world by rationalising the economic and administrative process. 82 The problem is 
that the life-world, which Habennas refers to as areas of cultural reproduction, social 
integration and socialisation, is his associated sphere for communicative action and 
communicative reason.83 Unsurprisingly, he portrays new social movements as a 
response to the domination of instrumental rationality~which originates in the 
production process and the interests to maintain capital growth--of everyday life 
through value reason and expressive means. We should add that identity is central 
because the life-world--which I prefer to call everyday life-is its very terrain. The 
79 Habermas (1981); Mclucci (1989; l994; 1996). 
'° See Habermas (t 984; l 99 l ). 
"Habermas (1981: 33). See also Hetherington (1998: 33). 
82 Habermas (I 98 I). 
"Habermas (1984); Baynes (2004: 204-5). 
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struggle for identity indicates the oppression and domination that works at this 
particular level of social life. 84 
Melucci shares Habermas' view in seeing new social movements as being 
deeply intertwined with everyday life. He is also in agreement with Touraine in 
understanding new social movements as a form of collective action that emerges at a 
specific historical point within contemporary society characterised by the growing 
dominating role of information. 85 He specifically emphasises the important role of 
information technology and communication, which provides individuals and groups 
with a large amount of information resources, which people use to define their selves 
and construct their life spaces. 86 As a consequence, such intrnsion and invasion of 
information puts dimensions of eve1yday life traditionally regarded as private, 
subjective and biological under social control and manipulation. Resembling 
Habennas's life-world, Metucci argues that this is exactly the sphere where 
individuals and groups lay claim to their autonomy. This is also the place where they 
search for identity "by transforming them into a space where they reappropriate, self-
realize, and construct the meaning of what they are and what they do.''87 In short, for 
Melucci, Habermas and other scholars who work on NSM, 88 the struggle for identity 
is au outcome that responds to oppression by modem structures. What is at stake is 
one's autonomous consciousness, which allows one to reproduce oneself as au 
independent agent. The struggle is hence to serve one's desire for freedom. 
The problem is that the idea of identity proposed by NSM theories is always 
tom by au inner contradiction between individuality and belonging. According to 
Bauman, it vacillates between the desire for uniqueness that implies an assertion of 
distinction and the bid for membership in a collectivity that undermines individual 
idiosyncrasy and points toward sameness. 89 While uniqueness and distinction relate 
to the issue of freedom, autonomy and emancipation, belonging and sameness reflect 
the fear of loneliness and represent the need for security and certainty in life. 90 
Relying on psychoanalysis, Erich Fromm also discovers this contradictory nature of 
identity. Fie argues that the social history of humanity is marked by the formation of 
"'Hetherington (1998: 33). 
25 Melucci (1996; 1994). See also Touraine (1981); Cohen (1985). 
86 Melucci (1994: 101). 
87 Melucci (1994: 1001-2). 
"See Touraine (1981); Offc (1985b); Pakulski (1991 ); Castells (2004). 
s• Bauman (2005). See also Bauman (!998a). 
90 Bauman (2005: 30). 
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subjective self-consciousness and the need to "belong".91 In the stage of, figuratively 
speaking, ties with the umbilical cord, one Jacks freedom and is yet to be called 
individual. But these "primary ties" provide one with security and the feeling of 
belonging and of having roots somewhere. Once the next stage of complete 
individuation is reached, one is not only free from these ties, but also faces a new 
task to tie oneself in the world and to look for the feeling of belonging and 
rootedness in a different sense to those of one's pre-individualistic existence.92 
In this sense, the struggle for identity, that serves the desire for freedom as 
argued by NSM theories, should at the same time serve the desire for certainty in life. 
Oppression at the level of self that works through ihe colonisation of everyday life by 
modern structures should have not only stripped off one's critical ability to act as an 
autonomous individual, but also severed the ties that one has with some meaningful 
rootedness. If we refer to Marx's concept of alienation, the struggle for identity is 
hence a response to the last two types of alienation: being alien to one's fellow 
human beings and to one's self. According to a contemporary Marxist analysis, 
critics of these two types of alienation focus their attention not only on the general 
state of oppression, but also on the issues of inauihenticity and disenchantment. 
\Vhile inauthenticiy is closely related to the problem of uniqueness discussed above, 
disenchantment is more about a lack of certain meanings and directions in life. That 
is to say, capitalism is condemned for its violation of one's self-autonomy and one's 
capacity to live and to give meaning to a life that one has chosen.93 Therefore, the 
rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia can be seen as a response to the 
problems of oppression, inauthenticity and disenchantment The movement is to 
serve the desire for freedom and certainty in the life of those involved. 
It seems, however, that we can hardly move further than this argument There 
remain a number of question that need to be addressed. Above alt, "why is identity in 
the first place?" According to Hetherington, within the tradition of NSM theories, 
identity is used to denote something else seen as more important.94 That is to say, 
identity is to serve as a symbol for the meaning of such things as autonomy, freedom, 
equality and certainty. It is not surprising that scholars such as Habermas and Eder 
91 Fromm (1960: 16-7). 
92 Fromm (1960), in particular, tbc chapter "The Emergence of the Individual and the Ambiguity of 
Freedom". 
" C:allinicos (2006: 60). 
94 Hetherington (1998: 29-32). 
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are ambiguous towards the expressive dimension of contemporary movements. For 
this expressiveness, from Habermas's point of view in particular, hardly denotes any 
form of communicative rationality which he believes is endowed with the 
revolutionary potential to revive modernity emancipatory credentials.95 
Such a denotative move brings two consequences. First, it makes NSM 
theories fail to see that the contemporary movements' struggle for identity occurred 
at the specific historical juncture when the stake of identity, as a set of cultural 
attributes attached to individuals and groups, is high. However, the problem is not 
who one is, but how one constructs who one is. It is not a matter of how oppression 
by modem structures marginalises a specific identity; but how the oppressive 
structures takes away one's ability tc produce one's own identity and influences the 
way of identity formation. The oppression by modern structures also turns one's 
identity into less lll1ified cultural attributes; discards any substances, contents and 
originality of one's identity; and makes one's identity less stable. The issue is clearly 
freedom and certainty, as oppression and domination on the construction of identity 
significantly challenges one's critical abilities to take actions on self and to associate 
those actions with some substantial meanings and goals. 
In the case of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia, as noted before, the 
struggle for identity takes the path of the politics of representation. Following the 
same way of thinking just indicated above, I argue that the struggle also takes place 
during a specific historical period when the practices of representation are a 
significant issue. The struggle ends up in the importance of the expressive dimension 
because oppression by modem structures should have also worked at the same level. 
To put it differently, the struggle for identity appears in the form of the politics of 
representation because cultural expressions, images and symbols must have been 
taken as the main battleground. 
Second, the denotative move also makes NSM theories largely fail to 
discover the power of identity, borrowing Hethetington's expressions, to connote 
what it denotes. By this I mean that the struggle for identity through the politics of 
representation allows those who are involved in the struggle to deal with the problem 
of oppression, inauthenticity and disenchantment. More than merely an indication, 
the construction of identity and its representation sii;,'llificantly implies the feeling of 
95 Habermas (1981); Eder (1993; 1985); Hetherington (!998). 
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being free from oppression and of having certain meanings and goals in life. As 
already discussed, it takes place during the process through which the fundamentalist 
subject is produced and the fundamentalist self is remade. 
Saturating Images, Consumer Culture and Capitalism 
Before discussing the source of oppression and domination and how it relates 
to capitalism, we should bear in mind three key issues outlined in the previous 
section. First, oppression that creates the problems of inauthenticity and 
disenchantment works through the colonisation of everyday life. Second, oppression 
problematises the way that identity is constructed. Third, oppression also works in 
the form of cultural expressions, symbols and images and which has turned this 
cultural sphere into the battleground. 
Aestheticisatio11 of everyday life 
Allow me to start by arguing that the rise of Islamic fundamentalism is better 
understood against the background of the growing aestheticisation of everyday life. 
The term aetsheticisation of everyday life indicates the rapid flows of images that 
saturate the fabric of everyday life. 96 This is a result of the new and central role 
which images and signs play in contemporary society which turns culture into an 
unprecedented important aspect of life.97 Jameson in particular notes how society has 
been increasingly fascinated by TV series and Readers' Digest culture, advertising, 
the television late show, and 1he grade B Hollywood movies,98 which are all 
associated with the overproduction of images. For Baudrillard, this overload of 
information provided by the media, particularly television, which confronts society 
with an endless flow of attractive images and signs, brings a profound change. 
People now live in a qualitatively new society in which the distinction between 
reality and image no longer exists. The effacement of such a boundary is the main 
characteristic of postmodern culture.99 
96 Featherstone (1991a: 65·7). 
97 Jameson (!983; l 984; 1991 ); Baudrdlard (1983a; l983b; 1998). See also Featherstone (199la). 
"Jameson (1984: 54-5). 
99 Baudrillard (1983a; !983b). 
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More importantly, in the place of effaced boundary Baudrillard describes a 
new world constructed out of simulation. JOO Since art ceases to be a separate sphere, 
it starts to be involved in the process ofturning the everyday and banal reality into its 
projection. The result is the end of real as the imagery and the aesthetic simulations 
are the only reality left to us to deal with. "TV is the world," cried Baudrillard. 
People now live in "an aesthetic hallucination ofreality."101 It is at this point, I argue, 
that we can make sense of how the satw·ating images and signs can be oppressive and 
dominative. In my view, the end of real is nothing more than a process through 
which images provide us with a new reality, a new world and a new life we can 
hardly escape from. Our critical abilities to act independently are significantly 
undermined as our actions are increasingly dependent on what and how images tell 
us to act. 
This new reality consists of images and signs which, according to 
Baudrillard, are able to float free from objects. They get their meanings not from 
reference to some hidden and independent structure, but from their relations between 
each other.102 Baudrillard, in effect, promotes the importance of the surface 
appearance of things in determining human actions and rejects Marxism and other 
structuralist approaches' preoccupation with latent underlying structurew3 The 
notion surface appearance indicates how the rapid flows of images and signs have 
significantly challenged the legitimacy of any form of deep structure, rootedness and 
substantial contents in providing meanings and directions for human actions. In its 
place is the play of difference among images that constitutes a sort of system of signs 
from which meanings are produced, but meanings which are no longer stable and 
hardly fixed. 
Simply put, the overproduction of images and signs takes away one's ability 
to produce action on self, shatters any remaining underlying structures and replaces 
them with a flattened appearance on the surface expressions of things. They also lead 
to a loss of stable and fixed meaning in a postmodern jungle of images which play 
off one against another. As a consequence, the rapid flows of signs and the 
reproduction of images and simulations seriously undermines one's ability to 
produce one's own identity. On behalf of one's capacities of reason, consciousness 
"~ Baudriilard ( l 983a ). 
101 Baudrillard(I983a). 
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' Baudrillard (l 983a; ! 983b; 1988). 
103 Baudrillard (I 983a; 1983b). 
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and action, the TV world and the simulational world in general tell who one is and 
what kind of identity one should adopt One is left with no choice other than to 
embrace a new sense of oneself as a less centred and integrated subject. 
It is impmtant to note that the saturating images and signs do not merely 
create the problems of inauthenticity and disenchantment. Since oppression and 
domination work in the form of cultural images and symbols, the colonisation of 
everyday life has also set the cultural sphere as the main ground through which any 
form of resistance against them takes place. In this sense resistance is, for instance, 
more than just a matter of turning off the TV. It also significantly involves a strong 
sign of rejecting being controlled by the imposing reality through adopting different, 
often very contrasting, cultural symbols and expressions. As a result resistance can 
end up in a battle of images. 
Consumer culture and capitalism 
For both Jameson and Baudrillard, the saturating images and signs are central 
to the development of consumer culture. Above all, images, styles and representation 
are always the important part of promotional aspects of economic products. The 
overproduction of signs is a logical consequence of modern consumption patterns. 
However, Jameson discovers a qualitatively different role culture plays in what he 
calls "late capitalism". He notes that culture has become integrated into commodity 
production as it is commodified and consumed. 104 ft means that styles and 
appearance are not only the promotional tools, but also the products themselves. In 
fact, the rapid flows of images that occupy the everyday life of contemporary society 
are the embodiment of consumer culture. The colonising images indicate the growing 
importance of cultural associations and symbols which consumer culture attaches to 
commodities. 105 As indicated strongly by Jameson-and less so by Baudrillard~·~the 
rise of consumer culture should then be related to the specific transformation within 
capitalism. He boldly argues that the rapid flows of images, which constitute the 
main feature of postmodern ism, are nothing more than the cultural logic of the latest 
form of three phases of capitaJist development. 106 
"" Jameson ( 1984: 56). 
1°' Baudri!lard (1998). 
1°' Jameson (1984; 1991). 
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I argue that consumer culture constitutes the established social and cultural 
order in which the problems of oppression, inauthenticity and disenchantment 
originated. The oppressive, intrusive and invasive nature of saturating images 
represents the growing domination of consumer culture. The domination undermines 
cultural values and norms other than its own, and challenges any sense of stable and 
fixed meanings. Consumer culture also gives rise to the new significance of culture 
through the overproduction of images and signs. More importantly, it has 
transformed culture into a new site through which its domination and destabilising 
effect on any form of deep structure and hidden reality takes place. Put differently, it 
sets culture as the main field of oppression, conflict and resistance. 
I understand consumer culture as a specific form of how humans relate to 
physical objects. 107 The term suggests the significance of consumption in everyday 
life in which the act of consuming material things does not occur within the vacuum 
of cultural meanings and symbols. Two aspects characterise consumer culture. The 
first is the use of material things as a message. Consumption becomes a sort of 
language through which communication between individuals take place. This is 
possible because in consumer culture commodities start to possess what Baudrillard 
refers to as "sign-value". ios I understand sign-value to be the value of a commodity 
which is derived from cultural associations and illusions attached to its image. As the 
commodity turns into merely a sign, its meaning detaches from the object it 
represented, and increasingly depends on its relations to the other meanings 
springing from the cultural image of other commodities. In this sense, consumption 
is a sign manipulation activity. It is comparable to a language, Baudrillard notes, in 
which individuals are forced to use to communicate with one another. 
However, the most important thing for me is that messages transmitted 
through consumption are mainly about the identity of consumers. The act of 
consuming material things helps people to tell others who one is and to which part of 
society one belongs to. The identity that is communicated can be the one attached to 
the image of commodities by, for example, advertisements. It can also be the one 
derived from cultural associations of consumer goods invented and constructed by 
consumers themselves. The underlying fact is that people start to rely on 
consumption to create social bond~ and distinctions. And these social bonds and 
'"'See, for example, Lury (l 996); Sassatelli (2007). 
108 Baudrillard (1998). 
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distinctions are not based on some substantial contents and qualities of one's social 
origins, but more on what one consumes, on one's appearance, style and self-image. 
In this respect, consumption is hardly different from a play with commodities. 
l use the term play because in consumption people adopt meanings and symbols, 
identity so to speak, attached to consumer goods that are rarely stable and fixed. 
Consumption can then become a game of adopting, moditying and changing identity 
from time to time. Consumption is also a play in another sense of the metaphor. As 
people consume more than one category of consumer goods, they are more open to 
the adoption of more than one cultural association and illusion. As a result, 
consuming commodities in terms of adopting meanings and symbols attached to 
them appears more like a collage of various identities stitched to one's body. 
The second is the use of consumption as leisure activities in which the act of 
consuming is a matter of celebration. This mainly relates to the function of 
consumption which is to fulfil human needs and desires. People use commodities 
because they enjoy the pleasure of consuming material things. 109 Clearly, the use of 
consumption for pleasure is not a new phenomenon and not only associated with 
consumer culture. It has long been regarded as highly necessary for work. It helps 
people to retain many displaced orientations, which are created by discipline, control, 
hardship and sacrifices necessitated by the world of work. 110 However, I argue, in 
consumer culture, consumption is no longer to serve work and production. People no 
longer consume food and drink because they need sufficient energy to work, but 
more importantly because they want to enjoy the pleasure of having a meal. 
Consumption is about celebrating the bodily pleasure and the celebration is the main 
goal. Instead, work has tended to become the au,'Ciliary to consumption. People work 
hard and earn as much money as possible so that they can have more pleasure 
through spending and using up consumer goods. 
The rise of the consumer culture is closely related to capitalism. To begin 
with, capitalism is based on eommodification, which I understand is a process to 
create a commodity. In conventional Marxist theories, it is broadly argued that every 
human society must produce their own material condition of existence. The products 
take the form of commodities when this production is organised through exchange. 
In this regard, a commodity has the power not only to satisfy human needs, that is, its 
"''Featherstone (!99la), 
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use-value; but also to direct other commodities in exchange. When confronted with 
other commodities in exchange, its value appears in the fonn of exchange-value, 
which exists independently from use-value as money. The amount of money that can 
be used to buy or sell a commodity is then commonly known as the price of a 
commodity. 111 
Commodification contributes significantly to the rise of the consumer culture. 
First, since capitalism is based on this commodity system of production, the 
expansion of capital presumes the expandiog process of commodification to every 
comer of the world and every aspect of human life. Not only does this include thiogs 
that are used to survive one's material surroundings, but also increasingly those that 
are needed to engage in symbolic exchange with other fellow human beings. 
Commodification, in this sense, creates consumer goods and makes more aspects of 
human interactions available through the market. I argue that it is only through the 
availability of a large quantity and variety of commodities and the places where the 
commodities can be purchased that a consumer culture can emerge. 
Nevertheless, the availability of consumer goods alone is hardly sufiicient. 
As discussed above, !lie rise of a consumer culture is about a different approach to 
consumption in which the emphasis is on celebrating and playing with commodities. 
In this regard, the rapid proliferation of beautiful and fascinating images and signs 
associated with consumer goods in the latest development of capitalism is 
noteworthy. These proliferating images and signs tell us vividly that producing 
attractions and spectacles is as impo1tant as the availability of a large amount of 
consumer goods. On the one hand, beautiful and fascinating images have the power 
to seduce and, hence, to influence people's desire to consume. On the other hand, the 
attractiveness makes consumption more enjoyable. As a consequence, consumption 
increasingly becomes a matter of fulfilling one's desire and of having more fun in 
life. So as desire and enjoyment tend to be limitless, consumption will end up in a 
new drive for more consumption. 
Second, commodification that leads to the domination of exchange-value at 
the expense of use-value weakens the significance of particularities, essential 
differences and qualities that mark human societies and transform them into mere 
exchangeable quantities through the price mechanism. For example, a car and a 
rn Marx (1976); Bottomore et al (1985). 
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painting are two totally different things. Nevertheless, the price that is attached to 
and represents the value of the respective products renders obsolete their respective 
particularities. The price that exists independently in the fo1111 of money makes both 
items theoretically the same. The difference between them is not in essential quality, 
but in the quantity of money. As capitalism expands, this process of reification 
through the independeney of money from any form of use-value also expands to 
almost every aspect of life, 112 More importantly, the domination of exchange-values 
has successfully allowed people to forget about the utility dimension of consumer 
goods, their significant particularities. The commodity is then ready and has more 
freedom to adopt the secondary use-value. This value is the sign-value, the cultural 
associations and illusions attached to the commodity. Here, the role of proliferating 
images and signs is once again crucial. Through the media and advertisements what 
is accentuated is a wide range of images such as beauty, romance, exotica, fitness, 
freshness, youth, energy, science and piety that are attached to mundane consumer 
goods. People no longer buy a pair of shoes, but consume its cultural associations 
and illusions. 
Clearly, people have for a long time attached cultural meanings and symbols 
to physical objects. Using and consuming things always produce meanings, which 
can be communicare.d to others.1 IJ The rise of consumer culture does not create this 
social habit. It only accentuates and promotes the habit of associating physical 
objects with cultural symbols, illusion, emotion and fantasy. Nevertheless, the sheer 
scale of availability and variety of consumer goods seems to have allowed consumer 
culture to dominate the way people use physical objects to communicate. Department 
stores, for example, become more like a dictionary in which a wide range of 
available commodities area similar to the words and vocabularies people can select 
to express the meaning of beauty, youth, fitness, piety and revolution. 
It is important to note that the rise of consumer culture does not occur within 
some natural process. Its rise is to serve the interests, needs and desires of specific 
social classes, at least, in its initial phase. During the course of its formation, the 
classes that benefit the most not only promote, but also deliberately use consumer 
culture as a new way to dominate the entire society through cultural means. By and 
'"Adorno (1974; 2001); Horkbeimer and Adorno (1972'); 'V!arcuse (1964). For the summary oftbe 
Frankfurt School view on consumer culture see Featherstone (!99la); Sassatelli (2007). 
'" See, for example, Lury (l 996); Sassatelli (2007); Featherstone { l 991 a). 
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large, these are the upper and middle classes. They include those who possess 
income beyond what they need to survive their daily lives. The income hence 
provides them with more freedom to use a commodity for other than its use-value. In 
this sense, l argue that capitalism contributes significantly to the lise of consumer 
culture through not only commodification, but also the creation of social classes who 
are preoccupied with celebrating and playing with commodities. 
Contradictions and Conflicts 
I have argued that the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia is 
better understood against the background of the socio-historical context where the 
movement is born and develops. The movement is a response to the problems of 
oppression, inauthenticity and disenchantment which have their genesis in the rising 
consumer culture explained above. I will now take the discussion a step further by 
investigating the type of contradictions created by Indonesian capitalism and how it 
relates to the alienation created by consumer culture. 
As we know, within the conventional Marxist theories, it is broadly argued 
that capitalism is based on, and constantly produces, contradictions. The class 
conflicts and antagonism are inevitable and can only become deeper as the capitalist 
system is highly dependent on the social cleavages to produce further capital 
accumulation. Capitalism is hence a fragile system because it is always undermined 
from within. In the longer run, Marx argues, this will bring the system to its knees. 114 
To understand the rise of collective action in the forms of discontent, protest and 
resistance under the capitalist system, it makes sense to look at this main 
contradiction. The emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia should also be 
related to tensions and conflicts originating in the class divisions constantly produced 
by the country's capitalist development. In this regard, the fundamentalists represent 
the Indonesian subordinated classes. Their rejection of consumer culture can be 
understood in terms of the financial power they possess at their disposal. 
Nevertheless, I find two problems inherently attached to the classical Marxist 
argument. First, the argument is preoccupied with the production side. The class 
'"See Marx (1964; 1970; 1976); :..U.rx and Engels (!977) 
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conflict originates in the production of an economic surplus through the 
appropriation of the means of production by the ruling class. This, I think, can hardly 
explain conflicts and contradictions, which are more associated with the consumption 
side I have discussed thus far regarding Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia. It can 
cenainly be argued that, since the conflict at the level of consumption is perhaps 
better seen as the conflict between rich and poor, it only reflects and is an 
unavoidable consequence of the production-based class division. However, even 
though the material base contributes significantly to the conflict, I believe that the 
consumption side, as previously demonstrated, can have its own logic of domination 
and oppression that provokes resistance. 
At this point, the notion of consumption-based social cleavages proposed by 
Bauman might be usefnl. 115 He broadly argues that based on the way people satisfy 
their needs either by the market or the state we can divide society into two groups, 
the seduced and the repressed. The first group has more freedom to make decisions 
and to enjoy the market. They are absorbed by the consumer culture as their lives are 
largely devoted to the acquisition and display of commodities they possess. The other 
group is excluded from the market. Their lack of sufficient economic and cultural 
resources is a hindrance that prevents them from being part of consumer culture. 
Their lives are instead entrapped by and depend on the bureaucracy of the state. For 
Bauman, contemporary society is oo longer constituted by the tensions between the 
exploiter and the exploited or the rich and the poor, but between those who are 
seduced by the market and follow freely their desires and those who can hardly do 
so. Bauman's argument significantly illustrates how society is characterised and 
dominated by the consumer culture. Clearly, not everyone can enjoy the consumer 
culture and participate at the same level. Yet, it is exactly the relationship with the 
consumer culture that defines to what group one belongs. To borrow Bauman's term, 
the fundamentalists are the repressed. Their lives might not be intricately entangled 
with the state, but their power to participate in the market is limited. They are not 
entirely free from the seduction aroused by the rising consumer culture. But they 
certainly have less freedom to follow their desires and to celebrate and play with 
consumer goods. The resistance in this regard reflects the conflicts between the 
fundamentalists and the seduced. 
"'Bauman (1987). See also Lury (!996) fora summary of Bauman's view. 
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Despite his inspiring proposition, it can be seen that, at least, the repressed is 
another term for the have-nots. In so doing, the seduced-repressed divisions argued 
by Bauman can hardly escape the production-based class cleavages. vVhile 
consumption could define one's social position, it seems that the material basis 
makes the social groupings possible. The notion of being less seduced can be further 
seen as a sort of false consciousness that fails to con-ectly make sense of exploitation 
and subordination suffered by the repressed. 
Here lies the second problem of the conventional Marxist analysis. The 
analysis tends to relate the class conflict only to the issue of exploitation, poverty and 
misery created by the bmtal process of capital accumulation. It makes this type of 
alienation the most important concern and subordinates any type of resistance and 
protest into the service of the fight against exploitation, poverty and misery. Even 
though these are crucial issues, Marx himself notes that alienation takes various 
different paths-"" Oppression, inauthenticity and disenchantment are among the 
other important forms of alienation, which are not subordinated to, nor cultural 
dimension of, the former. As I have argued thus far, in tenns of the struggle for 
identity the fundamentalists are more concerned with this second type of alienation. 
The question is how this type of alienation relates to capitalist production without 
being subordinated to the issue of exploitation, poverty and misery. 
As previously discussed, the manipulation of consumers' desires and the 
commodification of symbolic exchange through the production of a sign-value are 
the main sources of alienation that take the form of oppression, inauthenticity and 
disenchantment. It seems that everyone can potentially suffer from this type of 
alienation regardless of one's financial power, as it largely depends on how far the 
consumer culture has developed. The social division is in turn based more on how 
people respond to the problem. There are some people who deal with the problem of 
inauthenticity, for example, by adopting the new identity provided by the consumer 
culture. They are also more ready to modify and change the adopted identity as they 
follow, and devote themselves to the acquisition of, modifications and changes 
within cultural images and illusions produced by the consumer culture. For this 
group, the resistance against the problems of oppression, inauthenticity and 
disenchantment is hardly different from the celebrating and playing v1ith 
116 See, for example, Marx (1964). See also Bottomore et al (1985); Callinicos (2006). 
45 
consumption. On the other side of division are those who fight this type of alienation 
by negating and demonising the consumer culture. They question the manufactured 
cultural meanings, values and signs that occupy their lives through the saturating 
images. They also try hard to discover what they take to be an authentic and true 
identity, for instance, that they think provides them with both a sense of autonomy 
and of having roots in some substantial and eternal meanings and goals. 
I by no means downplay the role of exploitation, poverty and misery. The 
classical production-based class division remains important, but in terms of 
provoking resistance it is no longer decisive. As mentioned above, everyone can be 
potentially oppressed--0r seduced to use Bauman' s expression-and, hence, can 
also be potentially involved in some sort of resistance regardless of how much 
money one possesses. The level of income, however, contributes to the way people 
react. For those who have discretionary income, the struggle for identity, for 
example, can easily find its way to excessive consumerism. For the poor, rejecting 
consumer culture, learning not to be easily seduced and disciplining desires is the 
much better choice. The poor can also play with imitation and the second hand 
market should they find the temptation aroused by advertisements and the media is 
too hard to resist. And should they have enough money it might be okay to enjoy 
some fruits of consumer culture. In this sense consumer culture can be seen as 
deepening and aggravating tbe existing class division created by exploitation and 
poverty. It accentuates the division between the upper and the lower class through 
the acquisition and display of commodities. It also provides different opportunities 
for the rich and the poor. The fundamentalists, as can be seen in this study, represent 
the second group. They fight against the oppression, inauthenticiy and 
disenchantment by rejecting the consumer culture and by trying hard-sometimes 
unsuccessfully-to distance themselves from any type of celebrating and playing 
with consumption. Their financial base explains why they choose this path as most of 
the activists come from the lower-middle and the lower classes. 
PROPOSITIONS 
Based on the theoretical background discussed in the preceding pages, how should 
the rise of Islamic fundamentalism be understood? First, I argue that Islamic 
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fundamentalism is a political phenomenon, which appears in the form of religiosity. 
The political nature refers to the fact that the movement is a resistance to the 
established social and cultnral order, which those involved seek to transform. The 
resistance is an outcome that responds to the issue of alienation. It is produced within 
contradictions and antagonisms which are closely associated with the way society is 
instituted. In this sense, Islamic fundamentalism is a collectively organised action. 
Those who are involved in the movement develop and share the same feeling of 
being alienated, the same goal of transforming the existing order as the source of 
alienation, and the same sense of belonging to a similar collectivity. 
Second, the religious aspect of Islamic fundamentalism is not simply one of 
faith and knowledge of Islamic teachings, that constitute a hidden structnre and an 
independent reality from which the movement is merely a surface representation. 
The religiosity is the actual surface appearance, the dress code, the symbols, the 
colours, the body movements and the body language, through which the 
fundamentalists accentuate who they are an~ at the same time, through which 
observers and bystanders make sense of what fundamentalism is. It means that the 
Islamic fundamentalism is not only a form of resistance, but also a form of symbolic 
expression. The resistance in fact involves and ends up in the expression of who the 
fundamentalists are. 
Third, what is expressed through such religiosity is the fundamentalists' 
identity. The resistance, through the movement's cultnral symbols and images, takes 
the form of the fundamentalists' struggle for identity. However, the struggle is not a 
matter of rediscovering their original and true identity which existed in the past 
transcending time and space, but takes the path of politics of representation. Their 
identity is produced through the practice of discourse, in which the movement is the 
main media where the fundamentalists construct who they are through the play of 
difference. The struggle for identity is a response to alienation, which is present in 
the form of oppression and domination. This kind of oppression and domination, 
which works at the level of self and everyday life, creates the problems of 
inauthenticity and disenchantment They strip off one's ability to take independent 
action of self and undermine the meaning which one needs to structure and direct 
one's life. Identity hence denotes the desire for freedom and certainty in the life of 
those involved in the movement 
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Fourth, it is my contention, however, that the struggle for identity is not only 
an indication of oppression, inauthenticity and disenchantment. By the same token, 
identity equally implies freedom, autonomy, certainty and security in life. Above all, 
the fundamentalists' identity, produced through the movement's expressive 
dimension, is not only an empty signifier, whose positivity is nothing more than 
negativity of its negated other. More importantly, this constructed identity also 
implies specific practices and bodily performances, which are largely based on 
regulations, limitations and prohibitions on the body. During the course of identity 
practices and perfoimances involving a highly disciplined and strictly controlled 
body, the fundamentalists' subject is produced. The discipline and control gives the 
subject values, meanings and goals, which create a sense of certainty for the 
fundamentalists and of having a direction in life. 
Furthermore, the fundamentalists consciously undertake the implied practices 
and performances, which in effect allow their body to be strictly regulated, because 
they recognise it as part of resisting the oppression. This simple recognition based on 
a desire to reject oppression and domination paves the way for them to take an 
independent action on self, in the form of adopting a deliberately new personality 
implied by the produced subject. This results in the remaking of self in which the 
body, instead of being a hindrance, plays an important role. In this sense, rather than 
defending an identity, subjectivity and personality already existing and in danger of 
collapse through the oppression and domination, the resistance is a matter of 
producing something new. The newly constructed identity, newly produced subject 
and newly remade self is not only a challenge to oppression and domination, but also 
the solution itself. For it serves the desire for freedom and certainty in life by 
allowing the fundamentalists to regain their self and reclaim their everyday life, 
which gives them some sense of autonomy with meanings and directions in life. 
Fifth, the source of oppression, inauthenticity and disenchantment is the rapid 
flow of images and signs that occupy the fundamentalists' fabric of everyday life. 
These occupying images provide them with a new reality, new world and new life 
they can hardly escape from. This significantly undermines their critical abilities, as 
images replace one's autonomous consciousness in deciding action. The saturating 
images and signs also accentuate the importance of appearance, which is detached 
and fully independent from the control of any underlying structure. This eqnally 
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challenges any fonn of rootedness and substance in providing directions and goals 
for human actions. 
Sixth, the rapid flows of images indicate and are produced by consumer 
culture. The oppressive, intrusive and invasive nature of saturating images and signs, 
which colonise everyday life and work deep into self, represent the growing 
domination of consumer culture. As consumer culture constitutes the established 
social and cultural order in which the problem of oppression, inauthenticity and 
disenchantment originated, its domination undermines cultural values and norms 
other than its own and disrupts any sense of stable and fixed meanings. Furthermore, 
through the overproduction of images and signs, consumer culture gives rise to the 
new significance of culture. It transforms culture into a new site through which its 
domination and its destabilising effect on any form of deep structure takes place. 
Consumer culture in effect sets culture as the main field of oppression, conflict and 
resistance. In this respect, the fundamentalists' resistance that takes the form of 
struggle for identity is more than just an attempt to prevent being exposed to images 
in one's everyday life. It also significantly involves adopting different cultural 
symbols and images and lifestyles. 
Seventh, capitalism significantly contributes to the emergence of consumer 
culture and its further development. The celebrating and pla:ying with commodities, 
which constitutes the core of consumer culture, is closely related to specific 
transformations within capitalism, which manifests itself in the centrality of images 
and signs. There is a need to reduce the turnover time of capital by using beautiful 
and attractive images to manipulate consumers' tastes and desires. In addition, 
capital expands to the sphere of symbolic exchange in which producing cultural 
associations and illusions of consumer goods increasingly become more important 
than producing their use-value. 
Finally, I argue that the strnggle for identity should also be seen as being 
produced within the contradictions created by and reproducing capitalism. The way 
fundamentalists' respond to the dominating consumer culture, which is mostly 
present to them in the form of saturating images and signs, is strongly influenced by 
their location within the existing class division and social antagonism. 
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Fundamentalism 
I am using the tenn "fundamentalism" because even though in the coming 
chapters I will also use other tenns such as "radical" and "militant", those who are 
involved in this movement are first and foremost "fundamentalist". I understand 
fundamentalism as an attempt to return to the fundamentals of religion, to what the 
fundamentalist interprets as the true and original teachings of a given religion. 117 
Fundamentalism's main concern is religiosity. The fundamentalists want to be good 
Muslims by adopting and implementing what they see as Islamic values and norms. 
Such concerns can easily eud up in radicalism because being pious implies radical 
change not only in one's conduct, behaviour and attitude, but also in one's 
personality and one's entire life. It also leads to militancy, as being faithful equally 
requires strong commitment, consistency and endurance. 
In this sense, the tenn fundamentalism seems to contradict my emphasis on 
the political nature of the movement. As noted above, some observers will prefer to 
use "Islamism" to describe it as political ideology, which implies political and social 
acts necessary for the establishment of a state based on Islam. 118 However, the term 
will only look odd if we think that politics is entirely a matter of struggle for 
promoting specific policies and regulations or is an attempt to change a political 
regime. On the contrary, politics can also mean resistance, conflict and oppression, 
which do not necessarily work at the level of public sphere and state and, instead, 
operate at the level of privacy, self and everyday life. Hence fundamentalism does 
not automatically mean the absence of politics. In fact religiosity and pietism is a 
form and effect of resistance, which implies radical transformation, even though in 
the area conventionally taken as non-political. 
It is important to note that the tenn fundamentalism used here should not be 
treated as a sort of inner structure that has the power to command actions for four 
reasons. First, fundamentalism is a form and result of resistance. Second, the 
meaning of fundamentalism is based on the play of difference that is hardly fixed and 
stable. Third, the state of being fundamentalist refers to surface appearance, practices 
and performances. Fourth, since appearance, practices and performances need to be 
learned and adopted, fundamentalism is a matter of"becoming" rather than "being". 
rn See Marty and Appleby ( 1991); Roy (2004); Castells (2004). 
"'See Bubalo and Fealey (2005); Barton (2004; 2005). 
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METHODOLOGY 
r take methodology to be a question of how the knowledge produced in this project is 
approached and treated, which is to say, how it is revealed and constituted. I believe 
that knowledge is not something which exists out there already waiting to be 
excavated. Knowledge is not present in a form of immutable facts which can be 
revealed once theories are able to discover the natmal law and mechanism that 
produced them. Knowledge is instead more about our intention to produce our own 
understanding of a given phenomenon in which our own experience, values and 
interests and the historical contextualised beliefs and assumptions that we already 
possess can hardly be put aside. Hence, the knowledge produced in my study does 
not only describe reality, but also and more importantly shapes and produces it. It is 
not my intention to treat knowledge as a neutral and objective instrument for 
passively disclosing reality. Instead, I try to use knowledge to propose alternative 
ways of constructing and reconstructing the given phenomena. 
In this regard, the best starting point for discussing the issue of methodology 
is perhaps to restate the aim of this study, which is to attempt to explain the rise of 
Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia, particularly in the years following Soeharto's 
resignation. My goal is to provide an answer as to why people, Indonesian Muslims 
in this case, become fundamentalist. However, to deal with this question, I try first to 
understand how they become fundamentalist. Inspired hy the debate between 
Chomsky and Foucault,119 I set my study along the lines of"why" and "how" for the 
following reason. "'Nhy" is a question of substance, of something hidden deep 
inside, as an independent structure and true reality that has the power to act and to 
speak. "How", on the other hand, is a question of form, of surface appearance, which 
is commonly seen as representing, acting and speaking on behalf of, the real thing 
inside. My study by and large takes a different approach. I prefor to start from the 
question "how" because "form" in my view is not only a symbol we give to name the 
true underlying reality, but also and more significantly implies what we used to take 
as "substance". Fom1 in this sense produces substance, rather tban vice versa. 
In practical terms, my study starts from the surface appearance of 
fundamentalists. I focus more on the "form" of being fundamentalist, on dimensions 
"
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such as fashion, physical appearance and body movements, which constitute the 
cultural symbols and images through which we commonly make sense of them. 
Instead of uncovering the hidden structure such as the interpretation of religious 
teaching and viewing it as the determinant factor that produces human actions, such 
as wearing the hijab, I try to treat the surface appearance as an independent entity. 
The meaning of hijab, for example, is relatively free from the control of those who 
adopt this specific kind of dress. For it depends on how the hijab is compared and 
contrasted with other items within the same category. The next step is to know and 
understand how the surface appearance such as wearing the hijab and growing a 
beard is adopted and for what purpose. This is just a bridge to a more important 
issue, which is, how wearing the hijab and growing a beard influence and bring 
consequences to their self, their behaviours and their attitudes. 
In so doing, I can hardly treat human actions as being detached from human 
experience. By this I mean that human action is not a result of some natural 
mechanism. We interpret and define our own actions and attach meanings to it. 
Within the tradition of symbolic interactionism, it is even argued that we seriously 
take into consideration how others will interpret and give meanings to our actions. 120 
Similarly, to understand how the fundamentalists' surface appearance implies their 
substantial content hidden inside their self, I have to understand how they 
experience, for instance, the act of adopting Islamic fashion. How they define it, how 
they learn it, how they manage it, how they become used to it, what kind of feelings 
they have gone through and what they think about other people's reactions are 
among the relevant questions that can lead me to produce an alternative knowledge 
about Islamic fundamentalism in the Archipelago. In this sense, the act of adopting 
Islamic fashion is similar to a written text, whose main content is a story of how they 
become what we know as fundamentalist. 
It is important to note, however, that interpretation is not only made by those 
who produce the action-the fundamentalists in this case-but also by the 
observer-which is myself. This is because I intend to produce knowledge which is 
more than just verification of reality as it is, but as a critique of the current condition. 
In my view, the current condition, the socio-historical context where the Islamic 
fundamentalism emerges, is largely characterised by domination, oppression and 
120 See Elliot (2007). 
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injustice. I am deeply concerned with addressing the issue of alienation associated 
with the cultural., political and economic establishment, which represent nothing 
more than replication of power relations with negative effects on the alienated. 
Inspired by the philosophical approach of the Frankfurt School, 121 the koowledge 
produced in this study is then an attempt to expose contradictions and conflicts 
within the existing social and cultural order. In this regard, I base my analysis on the 
surface appearance of fundamentalists in the context of domination, oppression and 
injustice originating within the larger social structure. The question is how the act of 
growing a beard, for instance, can tell us something about the problem of alienation; 
how it indicates the feeling of being alienated and, at the same time, implies de-
alienation. At this point it is my turn to interpret and give meanings to the already 
meaning bounded human actions. My aim is to produce a different reality of Islamic 
fundamentalism with the intention of promoting a more critical approach to the 
existing structural condition and, hopefully, to provide a clue about possible social 
transformation. 
Research Method 
I select five fundamentalist groups as the main target of investigation. They 
are the salafi group, particularly, those associated with Forum Komunikasi Ahlu 
Sunnah wal Jamaah (FKASWJ or Communication Forum for the Adherents of the 
Prophetic Tradition and the Community) and its paramilitary wing Laskar Jihad (LJ 
or Jihad Troops); Front Pembela Islam (FPI or Islamic Defenders Front); Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI or Islamic Community); lvfajelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MM! or 
Indonesian Islamic Warriors Assembly); and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HT! or 
Indonesian Party of Liberation). Above all these five organisations have been the 
most prominent figures within the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the last decade. 
The groups were heavily involved and were often the main player in various types of 
both violent and non-violent actions associated with the movement. The 
organisations' leading figures are very often taken by the media and the Indonesian 
audience in general as representing the community of Islamic fundamentalists. 
121 Horkheimer and Adomo (1972); Marcuse (1964); Hahermas (1991); Rush (2004); Thompson and 
Held (1982); West (2004); Giddens (2000). 
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Finally, at least until some of the groups were banned, paralysed by the Indonesian 
authorities, or internally divided, they were relatively well organised with significant 
numbers of members, followers and sympathisers. 
I use several research methods in investigating these fundamentalist groups. 
My study begins by conducting extensive research of various types of related reading 
materials (books, articles, reports, pamphlets and brochures), including articles and 
reports presented by both printed and electronic mass media. The most important 
ones, however, are reading materials produced and published by the fundamentalist 
groups themselves. 
I also conduct a dozen interviews with both the movement leaders and the 
rank-and-file. By and large interviews are more like conversations that I have with 
fundamentalists. The structure of guiding questions is loose as I allow the 
fundamentalists to speak in general terms and, during the course of conversation, I 
follow certain issues that seem to be important and pursue further information. The 
main purpose of the interviews is to gather relevant information at first hand 
regarding issues and topics in the argument I develop in this study. 
However, the interviews are also important as a forum for debating the 
fundamentalists. Debating here means two things: first, debating their views on 
topics such as capitalism, liberalism and democracy, and, second, debating their own 
interpretation of the actions they take such as wearing the hijab by proposing my 
own interpretation. This strategy is very useful not only in understanding meanings 
they attach to their conduct, behaviour and attitude, but also in allowing a sort of 
critical evaluation of the given form of their action. Such critical evaluation is an 
important step in uncovering how the form of their actions and the movement's 
expressive dimension in particular might have potential implications, which are yet 
to be discovered should action remain taken as representing some inner substance. 
In relation to debating the fundamentalists, and inspired by the method 
applied by Fromm, 122 I also use the interviews to make sense of the fundamentalists' 
subjective motivation, which allows them to understand, interpret and define a 
specific question I ask and to provide answers with particular directions. The basis of 
this subjective motivation, I argue, is resistance in the form of struggle for their 
identity. My concern here is not the rational judgement that we can pursue to validate 
'"' Fromm (l 960). 
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statements they give during the conversations and thereby measure their logic. 
Instead, their statements are a confirmation of their desire to resist what they take as 
oppression and domination and the conversation is the medium through which they 
produce their identity. 
Interviews are not the only direct interaction I have with the fundamentalists. 
During the fieldwork for this project I was involved in a number of the movement's 
activities and actions. I visited the organisation offices regularly and stayed in place 
such as Al-Mukmin for some period of time; participated in seminars and small 
group discussions conducted periodically; and frequently attended sermons provided 
by leading figures and both daily and Friday prayer held in the organisation 
associated mosques. In general this type of observation allows me to getting closer to 
the fundamentalists. During the regular visit to the organisation offices, for example, 
there were a number of small and short conversations on various issues which 
provided useful information. These observations also helped me to know many 
things hardly revealed during the interviews. 
Finally, it is important to note that the knowledge produced in this study is 
also based on my personal experience unnecessarily related to the research project of 
the thesis. My own encounter with Islamic fundamentalism started in the early 
1990s, when the movement was beginning to re-emerge. As an undergraduate 
student, Islamic fundamentalism for me was one among a few less attractive 
ideologies debated within the circle of student activists. The research conducted for 
this study only reactivates the knowledge, perceptions and views I already possessed 
not only during the encounters that I had with the fundamentalist~ in the past, but 
also through present activities mostly outside my academic life, such as my regular 
Friday prayer. Such knowledge, perceptions and views might be seen as part of a 
pre-existing assumption that influence the way I understand the movement. 
However, at the same time, the research that I conducted for this project equally 
persuades me to revisit and redefine them. 
THESIS ORGANISATION 
I divide my thesis into seven chapters. This Introduction contains the theoretical 
framework of this thesis. The next one focuses on the organisation and the forms of 
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collective action taken by the fundamentalist groups. The main argument of chapter 3 
is that the fundamentalists' struggle for identity is to serve their desire for freedom 
and their bid for certainty in life. In chapter 4, I will try to show how the struggle for 
identity implies their desire for freedom and certainty in life. Chapter 5 discusses the 
rising consumer culture in Indonesia, how it relates to the saturating images and the 
capitalist development, and how it can provoke the fundamentalists' struggle for 
identity. Chapter 6 will further demonstrate how the process of being fundamentalist 
can be taken as a response to the rising consumer culture in the Archipelago and how 
this response should be understood in terms of class antagonism. The final chapter is 
the Conclusion which contains a review of my analysis and how the knowledge this 
study produces opens the way for further research. 
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Chapter2 
THE ISLAl\'IIC FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR IDENTITY 
Islamic fundamentalism is better seen as a form of organised collective action which is 
different from irregnlar, unpatterned and spontaneous forms of behaviour. The 
movement is based on specific organisations and followers, pursues certain goals and 
uses several types of actions to register its appeals. More importantly, the movement is 
the production of some internal process. Preceding the action is the construction of 
movement collectiveness that provides some degree of intemal unity and coherence and 
some directions. During the process of creating this internal unity and, hence, 
boundaries, the fundamentalists define who they are, what they are doing, for what 
reason and purpose, and who the enemies are. 
This chapter also draws on the importance of identity as put forward by NSM 
theories. I argne that, as a form of social movement, the fundamentalists are involved in 
the struggle for identity. Actions carried out by the fundamentalists are not merely 
means to achieve their instrumental goals, but should also be comprehended as the way 
they make their existence visible, the way they accentuate who they are. Their existence 
and identity is something that is non-negotiable since it is a matter of being a 
fundamentalist. In this sense I treat fundamentalist action as a goal in itself The focal 
point is not on why they select specific forms of collective action, but on how they use, 
for instance, protests as a meditun for expression, performance, identification and 
demonstrating strong conunitment to specific values and norms. 
In this chapter I will discuss three issues. First, I will briefly sketch the 
movement and its main organisations. Second, I will demonstrate how this movement is 
an end process of the construction of the movement's ''we-ness". Third, I will explain 
the logic behind fundamentalists' actions through which we can understand the nature of 
their struggle for identity. 
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THE FUNDAMENTALISTS 
My study focuses on five Islamic fundamentalist groups: FKASWJ, FPI, MMI, HTI and 
n. Even though they are not the only fundamentalist organisations, they are relatively 
the largest in terms of the size of participants and sympathisers and in terms of the 
number of branches throughout the archipelago. Hence, the movement is not an isolated 
entity. Its ethical projects are embedded in ideological views of some part of the Muslim 
community. Its participants and sympathisers can be, to some extent, linked to the 
modernist and the conservative Muslims in Indonesia. 166 
The Salafi Group 
FK..t\SWJ was founded on 14 February 1998 during tablig akbar (religious mass 
rally) at Manahan Stadium in Solo, Central Java as a response to what it perceived as the 
growing threat to the Indonesian Islamic community following the increasing economic 
and political turbulence brought about by the currency crisis.167 Apart from a number of 
mass rallies, the organisation activity that has attracted wide domestic as well as 
international public attention is its involvement in waging jihad war on Christians in 
Maluku and in the other communal conflict regions in Indonesia. The main figure of 
FKASWJ was its flamboyant leader, Ja'far Umar Thalib. Since the mid- l 990s he had 
been active as a leader and a teacher in several salafi pesantren (Islamic boarding 
schools), in Solo, Jember, Balikpapan and Pekanbaru. i 68 Thalib claimed that he had 
prepared the formation of FKASWJ for ten years before its official foundation. In fact, 
FKA.SWJ's existence could be traced back to the development of Thalib's jamaah 
(community), lhya al-Sunnah, in Degolan, Yogyakarta in 1993.169 It was this community 
that became the backbone of FKASWJ when it was formally established. The members 
of lhya al-Sunnah served as the organisation members and filled up the positions of the 
166 See van Bruinessen (2002a); Hefner (2000); Schwartz (!999). 
m See Baker (2000); Jamhari and Jahroni (2004). 
168 See Baker (2000); Jamhari and Jahroni (2004). 
169 Hasan (2002); Baker (2006). 
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FK/\SWJ organisational structure. They also helped to create and manage activities of 
the organisation. 
The paramilitary division, Laskar Jihad (LJ or Jihad Troops), was the leading 
element ofFKASWJ. It was formed on 30 January 2000 as a reaction to what FKASWJ 
took as the persecution of Muslims by Christians in the communal conflict in Maluku. In 
April 2000 its first armed units were sent to Maluku to engage in fighting as well as 
educational and welfare activities. The command structure of LJ is similar to the 
military. The commander-in-chief was Thalib himself who was assisted by several field 
commanders. The total number of LJ members was approximately ten thousand people. 
At the height of its war campaign against Christians in Maluku, LJ sent more then three 
thousand personnel. 170 
FKASWJ tried to reach the Indonesian public and looked for potential recruits 
through publications. Apart from several books, FKASWJ published a daily, Berita 
Laskar, and a periodical, Salajj; journal. There were also two weeklies, Jum 'at al-Jihad 
and Jum 'at Nushroh bulletins issued every Friday. 171 Three websites were operated 
containing news, the official statements and information on the FKASWJ humanitarian 
activities. The sites disappeared shortly after the Bali bombings. In addition to this, 
FKASWJ produced a set of cassettes and CDs containing sermons and lectures 
presented by Thalib and his fellow preachers such as Muhammad As-Sewed, Usamah 
Mahri and Dzul Akmal. Its activists set up stands in near mosques, schools, traffic lights 
and other public venues to address passers by in order to express their Islamic views. 172 
FKASWJ maintained close relations with a number of pesantrens and salafi 
foundations across the archipelago, the maj01ity of which conducted dauroh (training 
program in Islamic subjects) and A1ajelis Ta'lim (more general religious teachings). The 
subjects taught included the theories of Al-Qur'an and hadith (the words and acts of the 
Prophet Muhammad), Islamic theologies, Islamic jurisprudence and Arabic. Some 
pesantrens and foundations provided a special program to train salafi preachers. Others 
focused on educating children, especially orphans and neglected children who were old 
• 
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enough to go to school. 173 The teachings are strongly influenced by wahhabism, a 
religious revivalist movement that has a strong influence in the Arabian Peninsula.174 
This is due to the fact that most salafists, including those of FKASWJ, continued their 
studies with salafi teachers in Saudi Arabia such as Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, Mohammed 
bin Saleh al-Uthaimeen, Nasir ad-Din al-Albani, Salih ibn Fa\V-zan al-Fawzan and Salim 
al-Hilali. At the same time, in the last two decades Saudi Arabian religious institutions 
have played key roles in supporting the global salafi networks. 175 
It seemed that FKASWJ was a growing force. In less than four years it had 
successfully established seventy branches throughout Indonesia. In Maluku it built its 
own hospital and a radio station and possessed a number of speedboats and military 
weapons. It also claimed to have around eighty thousand to ninety thousand members, 
but a more accurate number was approximately forty thousand. 176 FKASWJ had 
sufficient financial backing. 171 The spokesman of FKASWJ stated that its funds were 
from its sympathisers among Indonesian Muslims. But the most important sources of 
donations were from overseas such as Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Singapore and the 
USA. 178 Nevertheless, FKASWJ showed signs of decline in mid 2001 after Thalib was 
arrested by the Indonesian police. He was accused of the torrure and murder of one of 
the FKASWJ members and of fuelling criminal violence. The accusation was in fact 
related to the implementation of a shari 'a type punishment of one of the LJ fighters who 
committed rape in Ambon. The sentence was rajm, a sort of capital punishment by 
stoning to death. 179 In mid 2002 Thalib was arrested for the second time with the charges 
of insulting the president and inciting religious conflict before eventually being found 
not guilty. After the Bali blasts, the disbanding of FKASWJ and its paramilitary wing 
was made known to the Indonesian public. 180 
Many factors contributed to the dissolution of the organisation. The US-led war 
on terrorism apparently brought considerable damage to all Islamic fundamentalist 
173 !CG (2004b); Hasan (2002). 
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groups in Indonesia, including FKAS\VJ, as the Indonesian authorities were under 
international pressure to hunt doWll suspected Muslim activists and Islamic 
organisations. Thalib tried hard to distance himself from Osama Bin Laden. He stated 
that he met Bin Laden in Afghanistan but questioned Bin Laden's Islamic credentials. It 
was clear that Thalib and FKASWJ were committed to a fatwa (religious legal response) 
issued by a leading salafi preacher in Saudi Arabia, the late Abd Aziz bin Baz, declaring 
Bin Laden as an example of a bad Muslim. 181 Another factor was the growing 
disaffection within the salafi community which denounced Thalib's popularity as against 
salafi principles. His former allies isolated him and took further action by looking for 
support from a leading salafi preacher, Rabi' ibn Hadi al-Madkbali. Thalib admitted that 
it was the fatwa from Madkhali that led to the dissolution of FKASWJ. 182 Since the mid 
2000s, the salafi group has been represented by a number of different groups, which are 
led by some former FKASWJ and LJ members. These groups maintain more or less 
informal contacts and focus more on dakwah and publications, including several 
websites. 
The Islamic Defenders 
FPI was established on 17 August 1998 during a meeting al Pesantren Al-Umm 
in Ciputat, Tangerang, attended by hundreds of Muslims from Jakarta and its 
surrounding areas to commemorate Indonesia's Independence Day. Among the 
attendees were several local Muslim leaders such as Cecep Bustomi, Habib Idrus 
Jamalullail, Damanhuri, Habib Muhammad Rizieq Shihab and Misbahul Anam. These 
leaders were haunted by what they believed as the continuing and systematic assault on 
Indonesian Muslims in the last two decades. The meeting resulted in a declaration to 
establish a front to defend Islam and to uphold the honour of Muslims. 183 The FPI's 
activists first received public attention when they were involved in P AA1 Swakarsa, a 
civilian security unit sponsored by some factions within the government and its security 
'" Umam (2006); van Bruinessen {2002a); Fealey (2004). 
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apparatus. The establishment of this unit was aimed at challenging the growing student 
demonstration opposing, by then, the administration of President B.J. Habibie and 
demanding the military withdrawal from politics. It seemed that FPI together with other 
radical Islam organisations such as Hizbullah Front and Gerakan Pemuda Islam (GPI or 
Islam Youth Movement) threw their support behind Habibie because the President was 
viewed as a Muslim leader. The most prominent activity of the organisation was, 
however, its range of attacks on the so-called places of vice such as night clubs, cafes, 
pubs and billiard parlours. Similar to FKASWJ, FPI formed its own militia, Laskar 
Pembela Islam (LPI or Islam Defender Troops) with the main task being to execute the 
organisation's programs. 184 In practice LPI was the backbone of FPI's mass rallies and 
its attacks on the places ofvice.185 
By August 2002 FPI claimed that it had significantly developed and was 
successful in establishing representatives in eighteen provinces across Indonesia. 186 This 
was hardly proved since nearly all FPI activities took place in Jakarta and its 
surrounding areas. The truth seems to be that FPI is a Jakarta based organisation with a 
strong presence in approximately forty sub-districts of this city. 187 Indonesia's media 
reports show that the real number is close to 170 thousand. The highest number of FPI 
members is in Jakarta followed by East Java, Sumedang, Lampung, Madura and 
Cirebon. 188 But even this figure, according to another investigation, is still exaggerated 
as the number of participants involved in demonstrations staged by the FPI was only 
several hundred and never exceeded a thousand. 189 
FPI is a unique organisation in terms of the Islamic background of its members. 
The elite of the organisation is dominated by Arab-decent-Muslim scholars; some of 
them are from the family of sayyid (descendants of the Prophet Muhammad), who have 
a strong salafi background. Its leader, Habib Rizieq, is a young Arab who studied at 
LIPIA and at King Muhammad ibn Saud University in Riyadh. Another sajyid in the 
elite circle is Husein al-Habsyi, the leader of the Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood who 
''' Jamhari and Jahroni (2004); Yunanto (2003); Pumomo (2003). 
'" Jamhari and Jahroni (2004); Purnomo (2003). 
"' Yunanto (2003). 
'"See Purnomo (2003). 
"
8 Yunanto (2003). 
180 Yunanto (2003 ). 
62 
was in jail for ten years of a twenty-year prison sentence because of his involvement in 
the bombing of the Borobudur in 1985.190 On the other hand, some members of the FPI 
elite, such as Misbahul Anam, do not have salafi elements. Salafi here means a 
movement within Islamic tradition that seeks to return to what the salafists see as the 
purest form of Islam, they believe, practiced by Muhammad, His Companions and the 
earliest generation of His Followers. The background of Anam and the majority of the 
organisation rank and file are traditional Islam. Many of them are Betawi and Bantenese 
and come from the NU (the largest traditional Islam organisation in Indonesia) family. 191 
Nonetheless, FPI formally described itself as ahlus sunnah waljamaah (adherents of the 
Prophetic tradition and community). Although the term for many Muslims is longhand 
for Sunni, FPI orientation is strongly influenced by salafi teachings.192 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and especially after the Bali bombings, FPI 
had also been in decline. The major blow came in October 2002 when Rizieq was 
detained by the police over an FPI attack on a billiard parlour. Rizieq was accused of 
inciting hatred. He was found guilty and received a seven month prison sentence. In 
November 2002 the FPI leadership decided to "freeze" the organisation. Shortly in 
February 2003 FPI resumed some of its activities. The organisation was recently 
involved in a number of mass rallies demanding the government and the parliament to 
legislate an anti-pornography law in 2006. They were also at centre stage in the street 
demonstration that ended up in a violent clash with the groups who supported 
Ahmadiyah in 2008. Ahmadiyah is another movement within Islamic tradition founded 
towards the end of 19th century and originating with the life and teaching of Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad. 
The Mujahidin Assembly 
.MMI was formed on 7 August 2000 in Y ogyakarta. Its foundation was a result of 
what it declared as Kongres .A1ajelis Mujahidin Indonesia I (the First Congress of 
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Indonesia's Jihad Fighter Assembly) beginning two days earlier. The congress was 
attended by around eighteen hundred participants from approximately twenty-four 
provinces throughout Indonesia and some Muslim activist representatives from overseas. 
The very name Maje/is Afujahidin (an assembly of jihad fighters) demonstrates that the 
foundation ofMMI was aimed at bringing together all Muslim activists who fight for the 
implementation of shari 'a and the establishment of an Islamic state. '93 
The congress appointed Abu Bakar Ba' asyir, the alleged JI leader, as the leader 
of its supreme religious body. The congress also selected Irfan Suryahardi A wwas as the 
head of the executive board. The organisation makes it clear to the public that MMI is 
continuing the sttuggle of DI. The day of its foundation was in fact the fifty-first 
anniversary of the DJ's declaration of a Negara Islam Indonesia (NII or Indonesian 
Islamic State). 194 The strong DI background of a number of its leading figures further 
proves the links between the two. Ba' asyir himself, apart from his connections with JI, 
was arrested by the New Order government in the early 1980s because of the association 
of his political activities with the cause of DI. Awwas also served nine years in jail for 
publishing ar-Risalah, a radical Islam bulletin in the late 1970s that demonstrated its 
sympathy to the DI's ideals. However, not all key persons of the organisation have DI 
elements. Some of them are more close to Masyumi; others are simply veterans of 
radical Muslim activists who had been oppressed by the New Order regime; and there 
are also a number of activists who relate to Al-Mukmin. 
In contrast to DI, it seems that MMI does not use an armed struggle to achieve its 
ultimate goal. The organisation conducts public advocacy and involves itself in a 
number of non-violent activities such as seminars, public education, publishing and 
rallics. 195 Nevertheless, MMI is not entirely a peaceful organisation. For it is closely 
associated with a paramilitary unit, Laskar lvfujahidin (LM or Jihad Fighter Troop). In 
addition to its main task to ensure the security of MMI and its leaders, the Laskar also 
waged war on Christians in the communal conflict areas in Maluku and Central 
Sulawesi. 
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MMI has been partly damaged since the Bali blasts as its senior fignres were 
detained for their activities associated with the terrorist attacks. The supreme leader of 
MMI, Ba'asyir, is the accused terrorist religious leader. The Indonesian government did 
arrest him for subversion with the aim of overthrowing the government and for the 
infringement of emigration law.196 But he has not been found guilty on the terrorist 
charge. Another key figure is Agus Dwikarna, the secretary of the MMI's executive 
board, who has been detained by the Philippine authorities since March 2002. He was 
accused of being involved in the bombing of the Philippine embassy in Jakarta in 
August 2000. He is also believed to be involved in Al-Qaeda cells in Southeast Asia. 
However, Dwikarna was sentenced to ten years prison for possessing explosives. 197 In 
2008, the organisation suffered a further setback. The growing internal rift resulted in 
the open conflict between Ba' asyir and his followers, on the one hand, and Awwas and 
his friends, on the other hand. The former left MMI and established a new organisation 
called Jamaa 'ah Anshorut Tauhid. 
The Party of Liberation 
Hizbut Tahrir was originally established by Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, a Palestinian 
religious scholar, in 1953 in Jerusalem. l9s It became active in Indonesia in the early 
1980s, took the name of HTI and went underground during most of the New Order 
period. The organisation reached the shore at the same time as another transnational 
Islamic movement, Ikhwanul lvfuslimun (the Muslim Brotherhood) started to influence 
Indonesian Muslim activists. The Brotherhood seemed to become more popular as a 
number of books written by its prominent figures such as Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb 
and Said Hawwa were widely read. Even many HTI's activists made their way to the 
organisation after being introduced initially to the Brotherhood ideas.199 
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Two figures that helped the foundation of HTI in the early 1980s were M. 
Mustofa and Abdurrahman al-Baghdadi, a Lebanese Australian.200 In the early 1980s 
both men began to disseminate the Hizbut Tharir ideas and thoughts through halaqah 
(religious study circle), initially, at Pesantren al-Ghazali. The first participants of 
halaqah were mostly the students of Institut Pertanian Bogar (IPB or Bogor Agriculture 
Institute )w1 In 1985 HTI started to spread to other university campuses outside Bogor. 
Since the late 1990s, HTI has reached the Islamic community outside university 
campuses. It claims to have approximately ten thousand members with representatives in 
twenty provinces of Indonesia. The largest number of HTI activists is in Java. South 
Sulawesi and South Kalimantan are the strongest non-Java based members.202 In 2000 it 
seems that HTI has been confident enough to reveal itself to the public. 
Ideologically, HTI is strongly influenced by salafism, Islamic reformism of the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the ideas of pan-Islamism of Jamaluddin al-Afghani.203 It is a 
salafi organisation in a sense that it is preoccupied with the idea of returning to the 
pristine Islam as practised, in its view, by Muhammad and His Companions. However, 
HTI departs from conventional salafi such as FKAS\VJ and FPI, in its emphasis on the 
importance of struggle for power in order to ensure the implementation of shari'a. HTI 
also goes even further than the Brotherhood in its goals to establish a world caliphate. 
The inspiration does not come entirely from al-Afghani's pan-Islamism of cooperation 
between independent states to achieve common goals, but also rests on the notion of 
caliphate as practised by the Prophet Muhammad and the first generation ofMuslims.204 
The organisation uses the media, publications and seminars to reach its 
supporters and bystanders. It publishes weeklies and operates websites that mainly 
contain the organisation's official statements and views on domestic and international 
issues and produces several books that explains its cause. The organisation also 
maintains its presence in street protests, but it distances itself from the use of violence 
and has never established a militia unit.205 HTI is also the most active element within the 
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movement which registers its demand> through small discussions, seminars and 
conferences. 
HTI has not suffered any serious damage following the 9/11 attacks and the Bali 
bombings. Its non-violent appearance has probably made many Indonesians believe that 
the organisation has nothing to do with terro1ism. It has worked hard on ideas and 
thoughts to provide the Indonesian audience with complex concepts and theories not 
only on why the establishment of a world caliphate is inevitable, but also on how the 
goal is to be achieved. This seems to have impressed a number of bystanders, 
particularly within university campuses, as the organisation succeeds in persuading them 
to become members and supporters. 
The Islamic Community 
I view JI, the alleged transnational terrorist organisation, as an informal network 
of like-minded activists with a loose organisational framework across several countries 
in Southeast Asia. The recruitment process to this network is reportedly based on 
personal links.200 A Muslim activist initially has contacts with JI through his religious 
teacher or through his religious study colleagues and becomes a member of the 
organisation by ba 'iat (taking oath). Since there is no formal binding rules an activist 
can withdraw from the organisation at any time by not attending JI' s religious 
activities.207 
The origins of this informal network can be traced back as far as the political and 
religious activities of its two most prominent leaders, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar 
Ba'asyir, in the mid-1960s.2°8 The two men were members of an Islamic youth 
organisation and were involved in dalnvah activities. In 1967 they founded Radio 
Dakwah Jslamiyah Surakarta, a pirate radio station for dakwah, before establishing Al-
Mukmin four years later. By the time Al-Mukmin was founded both men had become 
the leading Muslim opposition figures and soon attracted the New Order regime's 
206 See Abas, N (2005). 
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attention. In 1975 the dakwah radio station was disbanded by the security apparatus for 
its anti-government tone. Two years later Sungkar was anested for urging his followers 
to disregard the 1977 election. In the late 1970s their activities began to have 
connections with the remaining DI movement.209 Although they were arrested in 1978 
for their meetings with a DI leader, it was not entirely clear whether both men were 
involved in the movement. 
Upon their release in late l 982, Sungkar and Ba' asyir attempted to redefine their 
political strategy by putting more emphasis on indoctrination at the individual level. 
They reminded their followers that the struggle for an Islamic state should be a 
piecemeal process. At the first step the Muslim activists have to commit themselves to 
moral self-improvement. This is said to lead to a development of a true Islamic 
community of committed Muslims, a jamaah Jslamiyah in a generic sense. Jamaah 
Jslamiyah in tum is a step toward the establishment of an Islamic state. 210 Inspired by the 
Muslim Brotherhood movement, they started to develop a network of small groups 
devoted to the implementation of shari'a. Both men aimed to regroup Muslim activists 
who had been scattered and went underground because of New Order repression by 
organising them into a cell of like-minded people who guide, control and assist one 
another. Each cell, called usroh, consists of eight to fifteen members that are required to 
uphold the Islamic way of life and to follow Islamic law as instructed in a manual 
. b B ' . 'll written y a asy1c 
In 1985 the two men decided to leave for Malaysia as their rearrest appeared 
imminent. The network of usroh suddenly collapsed and most of its activists were 
detained. Later, the government spoke of "the usroh movement" and the jamaah 
Jslamiyah. The latter refen-ed to a new organisation that, according to the government, 
had been set up by DI. But the government had never been able to provide sufficient 
evidence thatjamaah Islamiyah was in fact a real organisation.212 By the time of their 
escape, Sungkar and Ba'asyir had succeeded in consolidating a network of like-minded 
activists. The first node of the network was the remaining DI members and their new 
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followers. The second was the Muslim youth activists centred at the Sudirman Mosque 
in Y ogyakarta. The third component was the remaining usroh network and the Al-
Mukmin network of students and alumni. 213 
The fleeing played a key role in further development of what is to be understood 
as JL Sungkar and Ba'asyir were able to rebuild their political basis by bringing together 
Muslim activists who sought refuge in Malaysia in order to avoid regime's repression. 
They also maintained eontacts with the remaining network of DI members, Sudirman 
Mosque activists and Al-Mukntin' s students and graduates in Indonesia who had mostly 
fled to Jakarta following a wave of arrests by the security apparatus. Later, this network 
of activists reportedly constituted the main basis of recruitment for n's operations. 
Another significant development occurred in the mid- l 980s as both men, by making use 
of the links with the like-minded activists in Indonesia, started to send Muslim youth to 
wage jihad war in Afghanistan. The battle experience had also substantially improved 
their skills in using explosives, in producing a terrorist attack with huge damage and in 
conducting a clandestine operation. It is also argued that the war in Afghanistan had 
paved the way for JI' s figures to build co1111ections with international terrorist groups 
such as Al-Qaeda.214 As the war in Afghanistan subsided the JI figures attempted to 
create other jihad grounds, at first in Mindanao, then in the communal conflict areas in 
Malnku and Central Sulawesi in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. 
Since the Bali bombing the condition of JI has apparently deteriorated badly. The 
majority of terrorist suspeets associated with JI have been arrested. The three Bali 
bombers, Ali Ghufron, Abdul Aziz and Arnrozi were executed in late 2008. Another 
leading figure, Encep Nurjaman alias Hambali, has been detained by US intelligence. 
The organisation explosive's expert, Fathur Rohman al-Gozi, managed to escape from 
his prison in Philippines, before being gu1111ed down by the security apparatus in October 
2003. The Bali bombings and other JI violent attacks have also created internal rifts. 
Some JI activists who reject the use of violent means in the name of Islam are believed 
to have withdrawn from the organisation.215 Since the bombing of the Mariott hotel in 
Jakarta in 2003, JI has been represented by two Malaysian figures, Dr. Azhahari Husein 
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and Noordin Muhammad Top. The former, another JI explosive's expert, was killed in a 
raid by the Indonesian police in 2005 in Malang. In the following years, the Indonesian 
authorities also made a number of arrests involving other remaining key figures of the 
organisation. 
MAKING SENSE OF FUNDAJVIE:"iTALISTS "WE"-NESS 
I argue that the Islamic fundamentalist movement is not a given reality, but the result of 
how it constructs an internal coherence. This internal unitary element is created through 
two framing processes. First, the activists of this movement define who they are and 
who the enemies they fight against which culminates in the shared feeling of belonging 
to the same collectiveness. Second, they also build a shared collective identity by 
defining the problem they face and how to deal with it. In the following pages I will 
show how this framing process produces a sort of fundamentalist movement's "we"-
ness. 
The Holy Mission 
The fundamentalists, as we know, have used various names to call themselves: 
adherents of the prophetic traditions and community, mujahidin, Islamic community. 
Even though some activists show no strong objection to the terms fundamentalis 
(fundamentalist) and radikal (radical), they commonly question the use ofthcse terms.216 
For them, since Islamic values and norms constitute one united self of Islamic doctrines, 
it is not logical to make distinctions between, for example, Islam radikal (radical Islam) 
and Islam moderat (moderate Islam) as if the teachings of this religion are 
compartmentalised. The only legitimate distinction is between Muslim and non-Muslim. 
Within the world of Islam members of umma are classified according to the quality of 
their Muslim-ness, between, for example, bad and good Muslims. Therefore, instead of 
'
16 Interviews with a number of activists from MM!, HT!, FPI, the salafi group and those in Al-Mukmin. 
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fundamentalist or radical, the fundamentalists prefer to call themselves either "Islamic" 
or "Muslim" activists implying that they represent the righteous and authentic Islam217• 
Equally important, the fundamentalists share a feeling of being chosen (by God), 
of being the only hope left within the community of believers and, hence, of having a 
huge responsibility to uphold the honour of Islam. Thalib claims that he and FKASWJ 
are called [by God] to fulfil their responsibility as members of umma and can no longer 
depend on [the help of] the government and other Islamic groups to deal with the serious 
threat faced by Moluccan Islamic umma.218 He thanks Allah for selecting LJ to lay the 
groundwork for the resistance against the enemies of Islam in this area. Aziz also 
believes that he and a few Muslims are called on [by God] forjihad against the terrorist 
nation [that is, the US], who started the war against Muslims.219 In the contemporary 
world, he argues, Muslims are increasingly in serious difficulty to make a clear-cut 
distinction between what is right and what is wrong. Only a small number of believers 
still have the capability of making such a fundamental distinction. This capability, which 
Aziz calls tabayun, is the main reason why they are so lucky for being chosen (by God) 
for jihad. 
Now, this feeling of being the most prominent member of the Indonesian Islamic 
umma, in order to be more legitimate, should also be enriched with a sort of holy 
mission. As mention above, the fundamentalists believe that they are obliged and are 
willing to take responsibility for the implementation of shari 'a, the establishment of an 
Islamic state and the practice of jihad and dakwah. 22° For the fundamentalists, 
implementing shari 'a is probably the most significant religious duty. In fact, they 
believe that shari 'a has a number of intrinsic values. Ba'asyir claims that it purifies 
humans from the evil influence of natural desire and provides guidance about the goals 
of life. He also believes that shari 'a will be capable of resolving the so-called multi-
dimensional crisis faced by Indonesia. 221 Echoing this claim A \\'Was points to the fact 
that after more than fifty years under non-Islamic ideologies Indonesia has failed to 
become the greatest nation in the world stage. He thinks that it is the time to give shari 'a 
217 See, for example, Al-Anshari (2003); Gatra, 16 August 2006. 
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a chance to prove that as a "divinely guaranteed" ideology it will bring prosperity and 
happiness and will create disaster for umma who abandon it. 222 In a similar tone, HTI 
portrays shari 'a as a kind of Islamic third way, the only alternative to capitalism and 
socialism. 
It is interesting to see how the fundamentalists develop their argument to defend 
implementing shari 'a as their primary duty. According to Ba'asyir,223 the only reason 
why God creates humans is so that they can worship Him. Ibadah (worshipping God), 
he continues, covers every aspect of life, every act and speech that are in accordance 
with God Teachings. Allah sends His Prophets and hands Them His Doctrines so that 
They can guide humans to the righteous act of devotion. In this sense implementing 
Allah's Teachings, that is, implementing shari'a is the only way every Muslim can folfil 
his/her principal duty-that is, ibadah-assigned to him/her sinee the first human was 
created. Shari'a should direct not only activities such as praying and fasting but also 
how Muslims run their economic and political systems. Ba'asyir then redefines ibadah 
as implementing shari'a in every aspect of Muslim life, at the level of individual, family 
and society affairs. 
The mission of implementing shari 'a is closely related to the duty of establishing 
an Islamic state. Since it covers every aspect of life, shari'a must also become the 
inspiring principle for any type of political regime that exercises sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, not all fundamentalists accept this idea. FKASWJ, particularly, 
emphasises the importance of creating a devoted Islamic community instead of an 
Islamic state. Ba'asyir, on the other hand, insists that shari 'a can hardly be implemented 
without what he calls tamqin and sulthan, that is, political authority.224 Political 
authority will ensure that shari 'a is the sole source of law that provides nonns and code 
of behaviour for the community of believers. He claims that the Prophet Muhammad 
himself established an Islamic authority when he migrated to Madina to secure the 
manifestation of God's law. Consequently, the fundamentalists such as Ba'asyir and 
those of MMI, HTl and JI consider the existing political regime in Indonesia as 
religiously unlawful and should be replaced either peacefully or violently by a new 
222 Awwas (2001). 
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system with strict adherence to shari'a. Nevertheless, HTI has a different view on the 
issue of political authority. It sees the idea of nationalism and the concept of nation-state 
as out of date and contradicting Islamic values. It proposes, instead, a caliphate as a 
world state, the sole political authority, for Muslims of the whole world. 225 
Hand in hand with the missions of implementing shari 'a and establishing 
political authority based on Islamic doctrines is jihad and dakwah. According to a MMI 
activist, Abdul Rahman, jihad and dakwah are historically the way Islam is upheld. He 
insists that the Prophet Muhammad himself uses these two methods when He 
disseminates Islamic teachings in Mecca (by dakwah) and in Madinah (by jihad).226 
Therefore, Rahman insists that it is forbidden for Muslims to discard jihad and dakwah. 
Jihad generally means making supreme Allah's words in the world and spreading His 
teachings, including, for the fundamentalists, making all people convert to Islam. Tl.7 How 
jihad is applied in the real world does not necessarily imply physical fighting against 
Muslim enemies. According to hadith it can be fulfilled either by heart, tongue, hands or 
sword. It indicates that the concept is a broad one and can be implemented by both 
peaceful and violent methods.228 Jihad should also be applied at first at the level of the 
Individual to improve one's religiosity and to fight against evil temptations. At the next 
level jihad is applied to fight the unbelievers and the hypocrite and to fight unjust 
authorities. However, while Indonesian moderate Muslims prefer to pursue jihad at the 
individual level and by peaceful means,229 the fundamentalists urge what they call a 
comprehensive jihad that includes fighting against the enemies of this religion by violent 
means. 
Dakwah is not exclusive to the fundamentalists. Even though organisations such 
as DDII have used this concept to name its proselytising campaign, particularly in the 
1970s, many Indonesian Muslims widely regard it as an attempt made by prominent 
Muslim leaders and teachers to refresh and improve the faith of umma. But it is the 
activists of Islamic fundamentalism and likeminded Muslims from other groups that 
225 Jamhari and Jabroni (2004). 
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create dakwah as a holy mission closely integrated with jihad. In practice, the 
fundamentalists even see both as identical. It implies that dakwah may also be a violent 
act to defend Islam. Thalib, for instance, regards the actions of his troops in Maluku, 
waging jihad war against the Moluccan Christians, as part of dakwah. Similarly Rizieq 
categorises FPI's actions in battering down violently the so-called places of vice as 
dakwah. He argues that such violent conduct is a kind of dalnvah by example.230 
Finally, these holy missions will have worldly meanings if there are problems 
that need to be addressed. The fundamentalists always insist on the urgency of shari 'a, 
an Islamic state, jihad and dakwah because they believe that Indonesia in general and 
Indonesian Muslims in particular are on the brink of disintegration. 231 Economic and 
political crises are seen as the main source of the current deteriorated condition. The 
activists of this movement are deeply concerned with problems such as the rise of 
poverty and the increase of foreign debt which indicates the current economic crisis in 
Indonesia. 232 JV1MI, in particular, believes that the cause of the crisis is currency 
speculation by figures such as George Soros.233 The fact that Soros is a Jew is essentially 
highlighted to justify the view that he is deliberately aiming at destroying the economy 
of Southeast Asian countries, including the majority Muslim Indonesia. More 
complicated than that, HTI argues that Indonesia's economic debacle is marked by the 
collapse of production and trade sectors. 234 The collapse is due to the highly unstable, 
chaotic-like, condition of the financial sector which originates in the free exchange rate 
of the currency system and the function of money as a source of profit accumulation. In 
other words, the problem is the monetary system that operates independently and is 
separated from the actual economic production and distribution. As this system enables 
the making of money from money itself, HT! condemns it as riba (sort of usury) and 
believes that the system contradicts Islamic teachings. 235 
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Under the rubric of political crises the fundamentalists speak of problems such as 
human rights abuses, communal conflicts and the threat of national disintegration. 236 It is 
important to note, however, that their concerns about human rights abuses only refer to 
what they perceive as a systematic state attack on Muslims, which often occurred in the 
past, such as in the Tanjung Priok riot.237 They are interested in communal conflicts 
because they think that Muslims in cont1ict areas such as Maluku are on the defeated 
side.238 Meanwhile, the threat of national disintegration is related to the independence of 
"the majority Catholic" East Timar that in their view is made possible by the support of 
the Western countries that are intent on destabilising the "majority Muslim'' 
Indonesia. 239 The fundamentalists do not seem to have built an argument to explain this 
political turmoil. The origins of these problems are simply in the lack of moral quality of 
the current national leaders. Neither the political elite nor religious figures pay sufficient 
attention to implementing shari'a.249 Rather, they allow the prevalent iniquity and adopt 
a non-Islamic ideology. 
The fundamentalists frequently warn about Allah's anger in which the cmTent 
crisis should be seen as a sort of punishment. The problems enlisted above for HTI are 
evidence of fasad, the appearance of evil because of the human's own making.241 
According to Ba' asyir, it demonstrates that the Allah Blessing is not upon Indonesia, 
because this nation does not oblige Him and refuses His Law.242 Logically, for Ba'asyir, 
the only way out from this multi-dimensional crisis is not only to repent and ask Allah's 
Pardon, but more importantly gain His Blessing by establishing His Authority and 
making His Words supreme in the world. 
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It seems that HTI is the only group within this movement that attempts to explain 
how the current crisis can actually be resolved by implementing shari'a. The 
organisation proposes, for example, what it views as an "Islamic" financial system. This 
seems to me to be more like a version of embedded capitalism243 as it is based on two 
things: the sole function of money as the medium of exchange and the peg of money to 
gold and silver.244 HTI believes that this will end the instability of the financial sector 
and put the economy back under the command of production and distribution. By 
pegging money to gold and silver, these two in effect become the tmiversal currency. 
HTI then uses the term dinar for gold and dirham for silver and provides them with a 
religious legitimacy by claiming that both have been widely used within Al-Qur'an as a 
unit of measurement. For the rest of the fundamentalists in my studies, crisis and 
prosperity is, as Ba'asyir claims above, a matter of Allah's Blessing. They seem to be 
more concerned with obeying Allah's teachings rather than with a complex argument 
such as provided by HTI. A> long as they dedicate themselves without reserve, without 
asking for some rationality, they seem to believe that the good things and happiness will 
come in the end. 
The Constructed Enemies 
Images of enemies significantly help the fundamentalist movement to 
consolidate its internal coherence in three ways. First, enemies are what the activists of 
this movement have in common through which they can understand what they are doing. 
As discussed later, to justify their actions the fundamentalists, for example, redefine the 
meaning of jihad by making difference of adversarial terms such as terrorism. Second, 
enemies accentuate the boundaries that enable the movement to draw the lines between 
its self and its environment. The lines can be easily spotted when one looks at, for 
instance, physical performance. Third, images of adversaries are often described as 
standing in the way of implementing shari 'a and establishing an Islamic state. This 
243 See, for example, Hoogvelt (200 I), 
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makes fighting enemies is another important and inevitable goal for jihad and dakwah. 
The fundamentalists even believe that the problems that should be addressed which are 
listed above are partly created by enemies in order to prevent them from establishing 
God's Authority in the world. 
The fundamentalists creatively construct a number of enemies. Christianity is 
probably regarded as the most dangerous enemy to Islam that has to be fought. 245 This is 
highlighted in the Christmas Eve bombings when activists related to JI blow up dozen of 
churches across the Archipelago. In fact the violent attack on churches has been the most 
conventional manifestation of animosity toward Christians within this movement in 
during recent years. In another case, FKASWJ tries hard to reframe local conflict in 
Maluku and Central Sulawesi into an inter-religious war between Islam and Christianity. 
By claiming that the Moluccan Muslims are prosecuted and, at the same time, labeling 
the Moluccan Christians as kafir harbi (unbelievers who belong to war territory), the 
organisation practically provides its paramilitary troops with a sort of religious licence to 
kill. 246 The Christians, above all, represent the hostile religion. The fundamentalists 
quote and reinterpret Al-Qur'an verses to justify their enmity toward Christians and 
portray Christianity as the eternal enemy of Islam until the end of the world. 247 By the 
same token, the image of Christians is frequently associated with the crusaders. It 
provokes the activists of this movement who are always oriented themselves to some 
Islamic past. Groups such as MMI, HTI and JI tirelessly remind Indonesian Muslims to 
be prepared for the so-called perang salib baru (New Crusade).248 In this new war, 
according to the fundamentalists, the Christians will attempt to destroy Islam by creating 
public opinion that demonises Muslims as, for example, terrorists, by controlling 
economic resources and by supporting and financing Muslim groups who do not have 
animosity towards them. The image of Christians also refreshes earlier memories of the 
Dutch colonial enmity towards Islam. Unsurprisingly, Thalib compares the war for 
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Indonesia's Independence with the war between Muslims (Indonesian) and the 
unbelievers (Dutch).249 
The other dangerous enemies are the Zionists and the West 250 \Vithin the world 
of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia anti-Jewish sentiment is relatively new. Even 
though the size of the Jewish community in this country is too small to be politically 
significant, the fundamentalists seriously consider them as among the top rank 
adversaries partly because they believe that is what Al-Qur'an says. The other reason is 
that the Zionists represent Israel whose atrocities, for instance, upon Palestinians, is 
taken by groups such as JI as an humiliation of Muslims around the world. 
The US is at centre stage when the fundamentalists construct the West as another 
dangerous enemy. Activists such as Ba'asyir and Awwas hardly make a distinction 
between the US and eitller the Christians or tlle Jews, implying that they are all identical 
or at least work closely in a conspiracy against Islam. 251 On the other hand, a number of 
HTI's activists explained to me that the US is not necessarily identical with but is more 
dangerous than the Christians and the Jews. One of the reasons put forward is that the 
US is currently the world superpower and increasingly relics on values and ideologies 
other than those of Abrahamic religions such as liberalism, democracy, pluralism and 
secularism to destroy Islam.252 The recent anti-American feeling is mostly connected to 
the US led war on Iraq and Afghanistan. The war justifies the fundamentalist rhetoric 
that the US is intent on destroying the Islamic world. Figures such as Ba'asyir further 
blame Washington for its war on terrorism which is seen as a systematic attack on 
Muslim activists. 253 The fundamentalist groups also condemn Washington for, what they 
see, as its intervention into internal political affairs in countries such as Indonesia. They 
believe that the Indonesian government is under a heavy Washington pressure to arrest 
Ba'asyir. The US is also labelled hypocrite for it pays no attention to the unjust 
overturning of the legitimate victory of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, to the 
249 Thalib (200 l). 
250 Thalib (2001); Awwas (2001 ); Al-Anshari (2002); Aziz (2004). See also Nunli (2005): Saidi and 
Ridyasmara (2006). 
251 Intervie\v with Ba~asyir, 
252 Interviews with Yogya-hased HTl's activists. 
253 Al-Anshari (2002). 
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difficulties faced by the Saudi population being oppressed by the corrupt royal family, 
and to the killing of Muslims in places such as Bosnia and Chechnya. 
The Indonesian Chinese and the Communists are a less important adversary. The 
Chinese minority, constituting less than five per cent of the Indonesian population, has 
long been the target of hatred. The fundamentalists portray them as an ally of the 
Christians. The fact that a number of Indonesian Chinese are Christians justifies this 
stereotype, and makes the attack on churches, in many cases, hardly distinguished from 
anti-Chinese sentiment. 254 This ethnic minority also represents the Indonesian capitalists. 
Groups such as MMI blame this class for plundering Indonesia's natural resources for 
their own benefit at the expense of the whole society.255 The communists embody the 
rival ideology, Communism. The fondamentalists describe Communism as a dangerous 
ideology because they think that it is based on atheism.256 The local context is also likely 
to deepen the fundamentalists' enmity toward the Communists. The image of the 
Communists as being responsible for the attempted coup in 1965 has long dominated the 
Indonesian collective memory. Although the exact role of Partai Komunis Indonesia 
(PKI or Indonesian Communist Party) in this incident has been widely debated, this 
historical stigma has been frequently used to condemn, for example, activists from 
within the contemporary student movement in Indonesia who are oriented to some leftist 
ideas. 
It should be added here that the list of the fondamentalists' adversaries can also 
be expanded to include other actors in Indonesia such as the government, the armed 
forces, the national police, political parties, NGOs, politicians, national figures, 
intellectuals and student activists. Since the world in the fundamentalists' eyes is simply 
divided between "us" and "them" these actors can easily become an enemy not only by 
criticising this movement but even by trying to be neutral. In many cases the 
fondamentalists will accuse without hesitation those who denounce their actions of being 
controlled either by the Christians, the Zionists or the West. Thalib, for example, 
254 See Eliraz (2004). 
255 Awwas (2001). 
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"' l was once invited by a group of young fundamentalist activists in Yogya to give a speech on socialism. 
When I asked the participants how they define socialism, the majority gave a similar answer. That is, 
socialism is a Western ideology that rejects the existence of God. Some also underline their suspicions by 
pointing to the fact that one of socialist prime philosophers, Karl Marx, is a Jew. 
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sarcastically calls a professor from the University of Indonesia as an intellectual from 
within the group of hypocrite Muslims who is bribed by the Church to criticise Muslims, 
simply because the professor asked the government to withdraw FKl\SWJ's troops from 
Maluku. 257 Thalib was also deeply disappointed with the armed forces (TNI) when in 
one communal conflict incident in Maluku its troops refused to help the under siege 
Muslim fighters.258 Similarly, activists of JI and MM! accuse the government of being 
compromised by the Western powers, particularly the US government. Their 
disappointment refers to the arrest of Ba' asyir and to the hunting down of a dozen 
Muslim activists who are associated with JI. 
In this sense Muslims themselves can be the subject of envy and suspicion as 
long as they question the fundamentalist Muslim-ness or embrace a different type of 
theology from that of the fundamentalists.259 Munafik (hypocrite) is the name often used 
by the fundamentalists to label these people, implying that they can sometimes be more 
dangerous than the Christians, the Zionists and the West. Their U11derstanding of Islamic 
teachings provides them with better knowledge of how to destroy Islam from within. In 
the contemporary Indonesian context the group of activists of Liberal Islam embodies 
the fundamentalist image of dangerous Muslims. This group comprises a number of 
Muslim intellectuals who emphasise the significant role of reason and defend 
individualism in interpreting Al-Qur' an and hadith. The fundamentalists regard their 
proposal as an act of heresy, simply calling them sekuler (secular) and accuse them of 
being infiltrated by the interests of the Christians, the Zionists and the West.260 
THE FUNDAMENTALIST ACTIONS 
In the previous sections I have discussed the general profile of the Islamic 
fundamentalist movement m Indonesia. I have showed that the movement is a 
157 Thalib (2001: 56). 
258 See Davis (2002), Shoelhi (2002) and Thalib (2001). 
259 Yusanto ( l 998); Al-Anshari (2003); Thalib, M. et al (2004). See also Husaini and Hidayat (2002); Jaiz 
and Bashori (2004). 
260 Al-Anshari (2003); Thalib, M. et al (2004). See also Husaini and Hidayat (2002); Jaiz and Bashoti 
(2004}. 
80 
collectively organised action and it is a result of those who are involved in the 
movement constructing internal unity and coherence through the process of framing. I 
will now focus on the fundamentalist's actions. I will try to understand the logic behind 
the actions and how it leads us to the struggle for identity which I argued in the 
Introduction lies at the heart of the fundamentalist movement 
The fom1 of fundamentalist collective action ranges from violent and deadly 
attacks to peaceful street demonstrations and mass gatherings. In the last six years the 
rise of this movement has been largely associated with a series of bombings and 
explosions across the country. The use of such lethal means by Islamic radical groups is 
not a new phenomenon. In the past, the blowing up of several public venues had been 
connected to the activities of the remaining DI's members. Recently, JI is the most 
prominent group that has been involved in this type of collective action. The 
organisation introduces itself to the world tlrrough its deadly attacks in various places in 
Indonesia which have killed more than three hundred people. In fact IT has launched 
more than fifteen bombing raids to accentuate its existence since 1999 in which the first 
Bali bombing was the most catastrophic. 261 
At around the same time as JI started its bombing campaign across me country, 
other Islamic fundanlentalist activists became involved in the communal conflicts in 
Maluku and Central Sulawesi. In the name of defending Muslims in this area FKASWJ, 
particularly, sent at least three thousand fighters to fight the local Christians. JI and other 
groups such as MMI also participated in the battle by sending a much smaller contingent 
of troops. In particular, JI takes a different approach by sending only a group of activists 
who are regarded as military skilful. They then train local militias as well as 
indoctrinating them withjihadist ideology. However, the relations between LJ's troops 
and JI's fighters have rarely been in good shape. 262 One factor that contributes to this is 
the fact that both sides took different strategies. While LJ's troops often made their 
presence publicly known, JI' s fighters preferred secretive actions. In many cases this had 
misled the authorities as they condemned Ll for attacks made by n. 
261 See Tempo, 14 January 2001; 15 February 200 l; 27 October 2002; 17 August 2003; 19 September 
2004; 16 October 2005; !CG (2001; 2002b: 2005). 
262 !CG (2002a; 2004a). 
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Apart from bombings and sending fighters to communal conflict areas, the 
fundamentalists also carry out campaigns against prostitution, pornography, alcohol, 
drugs and gambling. In the past, the campaigns, frequently resulted in physical assaults 
on places such as bars, pubs, cafes, night-clubs, discotheques, massage parlours, casinos 
and billiard halls-the so-called places of vice-and were spontaneously implemented 
by local Muslims living in the areas where such venues have been established. Recently, 
FPI is the leading element of this kind of action.263 Since 1999 this anti-vice campaign 
has frequently occurred during the period leading to, and during, Ramadhan, the Muslim 
fasting month. As the fundamentalists consider it as the holy month they usually ask the 
local government to close places of vice. Should the government fail to meet their 
demands groups such as FPI will take the initiative by themselves. On one occasion FPI 
even dared lo occupy the office of the Jakarta regional government when this local 
authority decided to close entertainment centres only for the first two days of Ramadhan 
instead of the entire month as demanded by the organisation. 264 In many cases, however, 
FPI and other like-minded groups often carry out the campaigns without making any 
appeal to the government. 
The fundamentalist groups also conduct mass rallies to voice their appeals and to 
introduce themselves to, mainly, the Indonesian public. In recent years HTI and FPI 
have played significant roles in mobilising radical Muslims to protest on the streets. The 
rallies sometimes involve intimidation and violence as in the case of FPI's attack on the 
office of the National Commission of Human Rights. The organisation is disappointed 
with the way the Commission, in its view, failed to set up enquiries into human rights 
violations in the communal conflict in Maluku hut has been successfol in doing so in 
East Timor where Christians are the main victims. 265 The rallies generally addressed 
three main issues. First, they are part of anti-vice campaigns as organisations such as 
FPI, MMI and HTI make appeals to the government to, for example, ban any type of 
pornography.266 Second, the rallies are often carried out to show the fundamentalists' 
support and sympathy to Muslims in other countries who become victims of war and 
263 See !CG (201}2a); Tajuk, 22 January 2000; The Jakarta Post, 4 September 2000; 27 November 2000; 8 
December 2000; Kompas, 18 December 2000" 
'"' Pumomo (2003); ICG (2002a). 
265 See ICG (2001); Pumomo (2oon 
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communal conflict and to condemn those who are accused of being responsible for the 
misery. The US and Israel have been always the main targets of condenmation. The 
building of the US embassy in Jakarta has been frequently visited by a mass of 
demonstrations protesting against the war in Afghanistan and Iraq.267 Third, the 
fundamentalists frequently protest against what they perceive as a systematic attack on 
Islam. FPI and MMI, for example, reject blasphemy such as, in their view, the 
publication of cartoons of Mnhammad by a weekly published in Denmark.268 HTI also 
conducts a number of mass rallies that condemn what it sees as the terrorist stigma 
applied by Western media to label the Islamic fundamentalist activists. 269 
The Logic of Fundamentalist Action 
How could this range of collective action outlined above be better understood? I 
argue that at the heart of this collective action is a struggle for identity. Its logic can be 
viewed in three ways: as an accentuation of their existence, as a practice of identification 
with both fundamentalists' positive and negative other, and as a practice of specific 
Islamic values as interpreted by the fundamentalists. 
Logic of symbolism and performance 
I have used the term expressive dimension to demonstrate that the actions taken 
by the fondamentalists are not merely a way to voice their appeal, but also to assert the 
actual subject involved in the actions. Actions become a medium through which a 
specific identity is produced in a number of symbols and performances. Above all, the 
fuudamentalists always symbolise their actions as a conflict between two identities. It is 
a fight between "the good", that is, the fuudamentalists themselves, and "the evil", that 
is, their constructed enemies. If ''the good" is represented by FKASWJ, "the evil" will 
be either the Moluccan Christians, the Indonesia's security apparatus who in their view 
favour the Christians, or what they believe as the Crusade.cum-Zionist international 
267 See KCA!f, 10 August 2006. 
268 KCM, 3 February 2006. 
269 KC.'.1, 11 September 2004; 18 December 2005. 
83 
conspiracy. When "the good'' side is JI, the most important identity of evil is seen as the 
West. The actions conducted by MMI and HTI also express the clash between "the 
good" and the West as the prominent evil, apart from other evil identities such as the 
liberal Muslim. For FPI, the enemy is more abstract, that is, the practice of sins which is 
exemplified by venues such as bars and massage parlours. 
The personification of the confrontation as between "the good" and "the evil" 
makes some actions tend to be violent. Since "the evil" is a sort of illegitimate enemy, 
its existence is, for the fundamentalists, morally and religiously unacceptable and has to 
be eliminated. In this sense violence is an important dimension for groups such as FPI 
because it expresses the strong commitment to fight against immorality and shows FPI's 
rejection of compromise with those who commit the practice of sins and with those 
places where such practices are carried out.270 Azis also believes that fslamic teachings, 
according to his interpretation of an Al-Qur'an verse, allow its followers to use violence 
in fighting against the enemies of Islam.27 ; Furthermore, the battle against this 
illegitimate enemy is part of a purifying process of the protagonist identity. Taking part 
in action involves transformation at a personal level from being a "bad" Muslim, one 
who does nothing against "the evil", to a "good" Muslim who does something. The 
sense of a true Muslim identity is accentuated by Thalib when he defends the sending of 
LJ troops to wage jihad war in Maluku. As a (good) Muslim he claims that it is his 
moral duty to protect the Moluccan Muslims from the proseeution.272This Muslim-ness 
is also expressed by Aziz, when he outlines the rationale of his terrorist acts. For Azis, 
how one can be a true Muslim ifs/he does not fight against those who create damage in 
places such as Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq?273 Similarly, Rizieq questions the very 
Muslimness of those who are iguorant of iniquity and believes that FPI's actions uphold 
the honour of Muslims who have been partly contaminated by the prevalent 
. l' 274 1mmora 1ty. 
270 See, for example, Eferrdi (2006). 
271 Aziz has made use of verse 54 of Surah Al-Maidah to legitimate his atrocities. In fact he only quoted a 
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The expression of identity within the fundamentalist aetions is, however, more 
easily observed by looking at the physical performance of its activists. The Muslim-ness 
is no longer accentuated within the construction of the abstract identity of "the good" 
and "the evil", but in perfonning a specific style and in wearing a particular type of 
clothing. Here, the action becomes an expression of true and original Muslim identity 
that not only rejects evil identities, but also adopts, for example, a "Muslim dress code". 
Even though a number of items of this dress code, such as long dresses worn by the 
fundamentalist activists during a street campaign looks at odds with the tropical climate 
of Indonesia, it is, in their view, in accordance with the views of Muhammad and the 
pious generation. By implication, adopting such a style is religiously legitimised, is a 
part of strong commitment to Islamic values and can be categorised as an act of good 
deeds. 
In actions such as tabligh akbar and street protests the activists of this movement 
can be easily recognised by a number of trademarks related to their fashion. 275 The 
fundamentalist male activists always cover their head with either sorban (turban), 
kopiah (traditional Indonesian male Muslim head cover), or a combination of both. The 
use of a turban is as old as the history of the salafi movement in Indonesia. Whereas the 
recent prominent salafi leaders, such as Thalib and Rizieq, have never made public 
appearances without a turban, it is the LJ fighters, among others, that play an important 
role in creating and popularising the image of the turban as a symbol of Islamic 
fundamentalism following their frequent street campaigns. Kopiah is widely used by 
Indonesian Muslims regardless of their Islamic background. The black kopiah is even 
regarded as the national head cover and is also frequently used by non-Muslim 
Indonesians. However, the habit of wearing the kopiah, especially the white one, by the 
fundamentalist activists has created this item as another trademark of the movement. 
Traditionally, white kopiah was worn only by those returned from the haj. However, 
according to a teacher in Al-Mukmin, Muslims should now wear the white kopiah, even 
though they are not haj retumees, so that they can distinguish themselves from the 
Christians who sometimes wear black kopiah.216 
275 See .• for example, Tempo, 23 January 2000; 19 May 2002; 1 December 2002; 8 December 2002. 
276 Interview with Yahya. 
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The fundamentalist male activists also wear gamis (long flowing robe) and baju 
koko (literally "koko shirt"). Gamis is an imported style from the Middle East and 
Central Asia (Pakistan and Afghanistan). The message of wearing robe is that, according 
to a number of activists, Muslism are not allowed to wear pantaloons as it imitates the 
way the Jews dress.277 Similar to kopiah, baju koko is widely regarded as a common 
Indonesian male Muslim dress. Its model is interestingly similar to and seems to have 
been influenced by the style of the Chinese male traditional dress. However, regardless 
of its origins, the activists prefer to wear it when either praying, attending religious 
sermons, or participating in street demonstrations. For the female activists the main 
trademark is the hijab. This type of fashion is a combination of a long and loose 
headscarf and a long and loose dress that covers the whole body, except for the face and 
the palm of hand. Some activists also add the veil and leave the eyes as the only part of 
the body that is uncovered. The idea of the hijab is that the style of women's dress 
should not accentuate the parts of the body that have to be concealed. 
Amrozi seemed to have taken fashion as a way to express his identity seriously. 
Having looked at one picture of him when he was first arrested and at another when he 
was in detention, the contrast between the two is palpable. 278 The first picture is the 
Amrozi with a modem style of haircut and with the smile that shocked the Australian 
audience. The second picture is the Amrozi with kopiah and baju koko. He keeps his 
famous smile but his face looks a bit different. He grows his beard as growing a beard is 
also another trademark of the fundamentalists. This changing appearance shows that for 
Amrozi the dress code signifies what he is and his identity is an important issue 
otherwise he would not change his style. In contrast to this is his younger brother, Ali 
Imron, another Bali bomber. In one of his public appearances several months after he 
was arrested, Imron chose a modem style of fashion with suit and tie. This is in 
accordance with his confession that he feels guilty and wants to apologise for what he 
has done. It seems that the suit and tie help him to express himself as a newly different 
person, the one who does not belong to the fundamentalist world anymore. 
277 Interviews with Safruddin and Supri. 
278 For the pictures of Amrozi see Tempo, 17 November 2002; 21 September 2003. His image can also be 
seen in a number of footages broadcasted by TV channels in Australia (particularly ABC and SBS) and in 
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Logic of identification 
The fundamentalists also manipulate the idea of the other to accentuate their 
existence. The other becomes the point of reference that enables the activists of this 
movement to construct their identity as representing both oppressed Muslims and 
Muslim heroes. The term "logic of identification" indicates that their collective action is 
a mode of identification with other Muslims through which they valorise their identity as 
real, original and true. The idea of other as a symbol of identification is dominantly 
represented by Muslims that in the fundamentalists' view are the victims of atrocities 
conducted by the enemies oflslam. Thalib, for instance, makes it clear to the public that 
he sends his troops to Maluku to defend the honour of Moluccan Muslims who in his 
view have been prosecuted by Moluccan Christians who are supported by international 
forces such as the US and some factions of the Indonesia's military.279 This type of 
sympathy that invokes actions is also expressed by other fundamentalist groups. Laskar 
Mujahidi, which is closely associated with MMI shares, the grievances of Muslims in 
Maluku and Poso as they send fighters to fight the Christians in these areas. 
n broadened the notion of oppressed Muslims to include those far from 
Indonesia. Ali Ghufron claimed that he was motivated by the death of six hundred 
thousand babies in Iraq and half a million Afghan children and mothers. 280 His fellow 
bomber, Azis, says that he was shocked by the picture of " ... [the body of] babies 
without their heads and hands ... bombarded by the Crusade troops of America ... "281 In 
fact, in the last ten years the global arena has become the main source of subjects and 
causes with which almost all Islamic fundamentalist groups in Indonesia find the symbol 
of identification with oppressed Muslims. The misery suffered by these Muslims, for the 
activists of this movement, is caused by a continuing attack on Islam by what they 
frequently call the Crusade-cum-Zionist international conspiracy.282 This includes 
279 Thalib (2001); Yunanto (2003); Jamhari and Jahroni (2004). 
280 Quoted in Batley (2003). 
281 Aziz (2004: l 00). 
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Muslims who, in the fundamentalists' eyes, face injustice in places such as Palestine, 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia and the southern Philippines.283 
The identification with oppressed Muslims is, for the fundamentalists, religiously 
legitimised. They use the concept such as ukhuwah islamiyah, a sort of religious credo 
claiming that all Muslims are brothers and sisters, to frame an attack on one Muslim as 
an attack on all Muslims.284 Aziz makes the following analogy. "Aren't we like one 
body, should one part is hurt the other will feel the same? Isn't their blood also our 
blood? Isn't their honour also our honour?"285 Therefore, the Bali bombings, Aziz 
believes, is a materialisation of ukhuwah Islamiyah. 286 This terrorist attack is, in this 
sense, the way they speak on behalf of the grievances of Muslims in countries such as 
Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. This is just reaksi seimbang (an equal reaction) by 
mujahidin (jihad fighters), claims Aziz, for the murder of millions of Muslims.287 It is 
simply a revenge to uphold the honour of their identity that they believe has been 
embarrassed and shattered by what happened to their Muslim brothers and sisters in 
other countries. The attack on every Muslim regardless of nationality and ethnic 
background is taken as an attack on their identity. Aziz vividly expresses this as he says 
that his Muslim-ness is being annoyed and his faith would be (if he does nothing) put in 
question, when he looks at the picture of heavy casualties in Afghanistan following the 
US air raids. 288 
The fundamentalists also associate themselves with a kind of "Muslim heroes", 
that is, those who fight the enemies of Islam. This source of admiration and duplication 
for the fundamentalists is, as can be easily predicted, those who are on the other side of 
George W. Bush's war on terrorism. Azis calls them international mujahidin, a name 
that he has promoted to replace the label of terrorist given by many governments around 
the globe to a number of his heroes such as Muhammad Omar from Taliban; Osama bin 
Laden, Aiman Azh-Zhawahiri, Sulaiman Abu Ghaits and Muhammad Athef from Al-
283 See Eliraz (2004). 
284 Batley (2003). 
285 Aziz (2004: 99). 
286 Once again Aziz cites an Al-Qur'an verse to support this. The verse is Al-Anja/ 73: "And those who 
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Qaeda; Ahmad Yasin, Abu Marzuq and Abdul Aziz Ar-Rantinsi from Hammas; and 
Salamat Hasyim and Abu Sayyaf from southern Philippines.289 Bin Laden is an 
interesting figure. While Thalib publicly questions his Islamic credentials, Bin Laden is 
widely regarded as the icon of the Muslim resistance against the West, particularly the 
US.290 It can be understood why his image, either on a T-Shirt, banner or poster, is often 
part of fundamentalist street campaigns. 
More importantly, Bin Laden represents the identity of the Muslim that is being 
harassed by the label of terrorist. The fundamentalists who identify themselves with him 
will take his grievances as an offence against their very identity. Their reactions to 
defend him, to elevate him to the level of hero and symbol of resistance, is not so much 
for the cause of bin Laden himself, but more on the accentuation of their own identity. 
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir clearly explains that "Osama bin Laden is part of the Islamic 
umma ... Hurting Osama is [similar to] hurting Islamic umma." Hence, Ba'asyir warns 
that "accusing Osama of conducting terror without accurate evidence is similar to 
accusing Islamic ummah .. . as a terrorist."291 At the same time activists such as Aziz 
compare their actions with those of bin Laden and the like. Here, bin Laden and figures 
such as Mullah Omar and Ahmad Yasin represent the identity of a good Muslim, that is, 
the identity of a role model that should be copied by other Muslims. By identifying with 
these figures, activists such as those of n valorise their existence as part of broader, 
borrowing Aziz's expression, international mujahidin movements that defend the honour 
of Muslims and fight the enemies oflslam. 
The other symbol of identification is a number of legitimate figures in the history 
of Islam including the Prophet Muhammad. As noted by Batley, the majority of JI's 
activists believe their actions duplicate the attempts made by Muhammad either to fight 
oppression, injustice and attacks on Islam or to broaden the dar al-Islam, the sphere of 
Islam. 292 Aziz claims that all Imams of the four Sunni legal schools, including Ibn 
Taimiyyah and his disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jauziyah, also engaged in a dozen armed 
struggles to defend the glory of Islam. In so doing, the JI activists accentuate the 
289 Aziz (2004: 173). 
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righteousness of their actions and tell the public what a real Muslim is, a Muslim that is 
ready to die for Islam. 
Logic of bearing witness 
I borrow the term "logic of bearing witness" from della Porta and Diani, who use 
it to make sense of movement actions that demonstrate " ... a strong commitment to an 
objective deemed vital for humanity's future."293 I find this term useful to describe the 
way the fundamentalists make use of their action to accentuate their identity. The 
activists of this movement always justify what they have done either by quoting Al-
Qur'an and hadith or by referring their actions to similar events in the history of Islam, 
particularly that of the pious generation. Being involved in actions is not merely a matter 
of achieving goals, but more importantly a matter of practising specific values and 
norms. Here, the activists express their identity by showing their strong commitment to 
Islamic doctrines. 
First of all, the fundamentalists always believe in the religious validity and 
righteousness of their goals and actions. Implementing shari 'a and establishing an 
Islamic state is considered as an obligation of every Muslim that is divinely justified. 
This non-negotiable religious righteousness is blatantly expressed in a statement made 
by Rizieq. "If defending Allah is a terrorist act, if defending the Prophet is a terrorist act, 
if defending Shariah is a terrorist act, then we say to the world that we are all 
terrorists. "294 
Eliraz notes that the fundamentalists compare their actions to achieve these goals 
with the act of spreading belief in God and making God's word supreme in the world.295 
As previously indicated, they often call it jihad which also means removing obstacles-
with violence if it is required--obstructing the establishment of the authority of God. 
The fundamentalists argue that jihad is an obligation of all Muslims.296 It is the essence 
of Islam, writes Muchtar Naim,297 is as old as Islam itself, and creates Islam as agama 
jihad (a religion of jihad). More importantly, however, they upgrade the status of jihad 
293 della Porta and Diani (2006: 176-8). 
294 Quoted in Batley (2003: 3). 
295 Eliraz (2004: 126). 
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within the Islamic doctrines from the level of collective obligation to the level of 
individual obligation. It means that jihad is as important and compulsory as the other 
undisputed individual obligations such as praying five times a day and fasting during the 
Ramadhan. The fundamentalists propose an interesting method of interpreting Al-
Qur'an to support this argument.298 They find the word kutiba (obliged) in verses that 
order Muslims individually to conduct, for example, prayers five-times a day, has the 
same meaning with the one in verses that ask for jihad. Consequently, the 
fundamentalists insist, those who abandon jihad are committing sins in the same way as 
those who abandon praying five times a day. 
In addition to this, a number of activists, especially those of JI, redefine and 
narrow the meaning of jihad and associate it with an act of war against the enemies of 
Islam. While a number of non-fundamentalist scholars will argue that jihad is broader 
than fighting infidels and can be achieved by peaceful means, Aziz criticises them by 
insisting that embracing the teachings of the Prophet should include copying His anger 
and the twenty-eight wars He waged.299 In so doing, he believes that Islam is not only 
the religion of peace but also the religion of war and violence. Aziz also argues that 
suicidal bombing is religiously legitimate. He points to a number of incidents in the 
history of Islam when Muslim fighters in different battlefields take actions that he 
categorises as suicidal attacks. 300 He further stresses that if suicidal bombing enhances 
the spirit of Muslim fighters and weakens that of enemies of Islam, it is highly 
recommended. 
The meaningful thing here is not the way the fundamentalists have 
misinterpreted Al-Qur'an as one might suggest. Since the interpretation tends to be 
subjective and will generally be driven by some sort of political interest, what is 
important is the way they have made use oflslamic teachings to valorise their actions as 
significant. By elevating the position of jihad within Islamic doctrines, the 
fundamentalists redefine their action as an important act of devotion to God's words. 
Should they refose to take action fundamentalists such as Thalib believe that they will be 
298 Aziz (2004); Al-Anshari (2003}. 
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punished by Allah. 301 Furthermore, blaming the misinterpretations oflslamic values and 
norms by activists such as Aziz is not helping because it assumes that they have failed to 
discover the true and original identity of the Muslim. Instead, he seems more concerned 
with expressing his identity by changing the label terrorist which is attached to him. As 
he invents the concept international mujahidin to call figures such as Osama bin Laden, 
it is logical that he portrays the Bali bombings as an act of jihad. 
Since taking part in actions is a matter of practising values and norms, the 
fundamentalists demonstrate their strong commitment to Islamic doctrines by expressing 
their willingness to run personal risk. Thalib and his fighters show this willingness when 
the sending of LJ troops to Maluku is strongly opposed by the Indonesian authorities. 
Although Thalib and LJ might have received political backup from within the 
military,302 he declares that he is more afraid of Allah rather than of the Indonesian 
authorities. He chooses to be in conflict with the government for what he believes as the 
ultimate religious duty. 303 Aziz clearly states that those who conduct jihad are those 
who are ready to kill and to be killed to uphold the words of Allah.304 Echoing this claim 
Rizieq describes the activists who are involved in jihad as the troops of Allah who 
readily welcome death with a smile.305 To put it simply, they are ready to die in the 
name of Islam. For FPI the options are either living with dignity or dying for the glory of 
Islam. Azis expresses his feeling of happiness that he will receive the death penalty.306 
Furthermore, sinee the fundamentalists consider strong commitment as an 
essential element in their actions, they also emphasise the importance of process. Na'im 
explains that what makes jihad so prominent is not what it achieves, but bow it achieves 
its goal. Ba'asyir also underlines the importance of process. By conducting jihad he 
believes that at least he has met his obligation as a Muslim. 307 Here, Na'im and 
Ba'asyir's argument implies that seriousness and loyalty to the cause of Islam is as 
significant as implementing shari 'a and establishing an Islamic state. 
30
' See Thalib (2001). 
302 See, for example, Davis (2002}. 
303 See Thalib (200 l ). See also Davis (2002); Shoelhi (2002). 
lll4 Aziz (2004: 48). 
305 Quote<l in Jamhari and Jahroni (2004: 155). 
306 Aziz (2004: 192). 
307 Interview \Vith Ba)asyir. 
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More than a matter of religious righteousness, this force of commitment enables 
the fundamentalists to accentuate their existence as representing the true and original 
Muslim identity. As discussed before, they not only do something, but more importantly 
are ready to be caught at serious personal cost such as being detained or being murdered. 
At the same time, this ready to die attitude paves the way for activists such as Ghufron, 
Aziz and Amrozi to purify their identity. These Bali bombers reportedly refused to ask 
for amnesty for their capital punishment. Since the ultimate amnesty only comes from 
Allah, Amrozi believes that it is forbidden for them to make a request to the government, 
that is, their fellow humans, to ease the penalty.308 Aziz relates the issue of amnesty to 
his very identity. Since his action in Bali is based on faith, it is unacceptable to ask for 
mercy.309 Should he decide to demand amnesty from the President, it simply means that 
he regrets what he has done, betrays what he believes in and justifies those who frame 
his action as an act of terror. In this sense Aziz has taken the issue as a question of his 
Muslim-ness and he clearly opts not to contaminate his identity by rejecting the use of a 
label, sueh as terrorist, to refer to himself. 
Moreover, the fundamentalists seem to believe that by being involved in jihad, 
that is, in aetions such as attacking Westerners and damaging the places of vice, they 
become better Muslims. Aziz claims that taking part in jihad makes him feel more close 
to Allah. As noted before, he identifies himself with others who are also involved in 
jihad and refers to this "international mujahidin" as ahluts-tsughur. He praises highly 
this ahluts-tsughur including as Mullah Omar, bin Laden and Abu Sayyaf and believes 
that because of their jihad that makes them closer to Allah and they are the best Muslims 
within the entire Islamic umma. In the process, Aziz promotes himself as a better 
Muslim and distances himself from those who do not take part in jihad as a low quality 
Muslim. 
30
' See Kompas, 20 October 2005. 
Y.J9 Aziz (2004: 198). 
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*** 
The focus of this chapter is the movement and its main organisations, the construction of 
the movement's "we-ness" and the logic of the movement's actions. I have demonstrated 
that Islamic fundamentalism is an organised collective action. The movement is based 
on specific individuals, groups and organisations which, despite some internal frictions, 
share similar goals and appeals. In fact, the movement itself is the product of how those 
who are involved in it develop the shared feeling of being one, of having the same 
problems, of facing the same enemies and of moving in the same direction. At the heart 
of the increasing Islamic fundamentalism, however, is the struggle for identity. I have 
shown how actions taken by the activists are aimed at accentuating their existence and 
valorising them as real and important. The actions are also a place where they 
demonstrate their strong commitment to what they believe as Islamic valnes and norms 
that, in conseqnence, allow them to experience some sort of personal transfonnation. 
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Chapter 3 
IDENTITY FOR FREEDOM AND CERTAINTY 
In the previous chapter I argued that the Islamic fundamentalist movement in 
Indonesia is involved in the struggle for identity. Violent attacks, being involved in 
communal conflicts and street protests are not merely instruments to achieve the 
movement's goals, but more importantly the media through which they valorise their 
identity as significant and real. In this chapter the focus is on "why do the 
fundamentalists struggle for their identity?" "\\'hat do the activists resist?" "What 
kind of oppression and domination is at work that provokes them to struggle for 
Muslim identity?" I wilt now provide a general answer to these questions, which is, 
broadly that the fundamentalist struggle for identity is to serve the desire for freedom 
and the desire for certainty in life. Following this, I will discuss their struggle in the 
context of their rejection of trends in everyday life such as those in fashions and 
lifestyle, their outrage about immora.lity and liberalism, and their concerns about 
hedonism. 
CONTROL, DOMINATION AND RESISTAJ'1CE 
As mentioned in the introduction chapter, my thesis is strongly influenced by studies 
on new social movements and identity politics.310 According to both groups of 
theories, the struggle for identity is an outcome that responds to control and 
domination that works at the level of self and everyday life. More specifically, it 
creates the problems of inauthenticity and disenchantment. That is to say, it makes a 
person become alien to one's fellow human beings and to one's own historically 
created human possibilities. Based on this, I treat identity in this study as the main 
site where the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Indonesia operates. Identity 
becomes the locus of resistance and empowerment because the control and 
domination takes away one's capacity to live the life that has been independently 
3
"
1 See Pizzomo (1978); Habermas (I 981); Touraine (1981; 1985); Offe (1985a; 1985b); Eder (1985; 
1993); Melucci (1985; 1989; 1994; 1996); lnglehart (1990); Pakulski (1991); Rutherford (1990); Hall 
(1992); Hall and du Gay(l996). 
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selected and to give meaning to it. Therefore, the fundamentalists' struggle for 
identity is, firstly, to serve the desire for freedom. Secondly, it is a bid to have 
meaning and goals in life that provide a sense of certainty. 
I argue that the problems of being inauthentic and social disenchantment are a 
result of colonisation of everyday life by what the activists understand as trends in 
lifestyles, immorality and hedonism. They look with concern at the fact that 
nowadays the decision on how to run one's daily routine-to having one's meal, 
dressing one's self up, filling one's spare time---is increasingly out of their hands. 
Instead, they find themselves being shaped by an anonymous social power that works 
mainly through trends such as those in fashions and in lifestyle. The activists of this 
movement are wary that the uniforming power of trends makes Muslims and non-
Muslims become less different in many aspects of life. They believe that similarities 
in fashions and lifestyle will in effect destroy their very authenticity, which I 
understand to be the basic substance of being a Muslim, that is being unique and 
unlike anyone else in society. The struggle for identity is to rediscover this authentic 
substance, to reach one's uniqueness. This struggle is in fact to serve the desire of 
freedom because it is an attempt to free one's self from being dominated and 
controlled by trends and to live one's life independently. 
The fimdamentalists are also concerned with their everyday life because they 
find it increasingly invaded by the rapid rise of immorality. They view daily immoral 
conduct such as promiscuity and pornography as a result of humans being controlled 
by natural instinctive impulses. Such control indicates the rule of one's basic desire 
over one's capacity to reason, where autonomous consciousness is at home. 
Understandably, they see immorality as symptomatic of the loss of self-autonomy. 
The struggle for identity in this sense is an attempt to restore the rule of reason over 
natural instinctive impulses. Reason for them operates according to the logic of right 
and wrong provided by Islamic doctrines. Here, the restored autonomous 
consciousness is reflected in one's ability to produce reasone<l thinking and actions, 
that is, the ability to follow correctly Islamic values and norms and, hence, distancing 
oneself from immorality. 
Inauthenticity is closely related to the problem of disenchantment. By this I 
mean that the bid to (re)discover one's uniqueness leads to questions such as who 
one is and which part of society one belongs to. These questions are raised in regard 
to the power of trends in everyday life that detaches the activists from their authentic 
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substance and, at the same time, reproduces them as a new person. As a result this 
uprooting process creates a feeling of uncertainty about one's self and one's life. 
Uniqueness is the cure for this anxious feeling. It tells the activists exactly who they 
really are, what kind of qualities they should possess to be an authentic Muslim, and 
what their position is in what are seen as relatively unfriendly social smwundings is. 
But the value of certainty and security in life are more than that. The fundamentalist.~ 
are highly obsessed with the more foundational questions, particularly related to the 
directions of one's life. What they are looking for is the real and true life which goes 
beyond living in the world and living in the present. They find instead the one 
provided by the invading hedonism in daily life which, for them, is untenable. Their 
rejection of the hedonistic lifestyle, as part of the attempt to accentuate their 
exclusive existence as a Muslim, indicates their desire to have some certain meanings 
and goals in life which are achievable and morally acceptable. However, one should 
bear in mind that hedonism does not include polygamy, which is from outside can be 
seen as a very hedonistic lifestyle. Instead, the fundamentalists strongly believe that 
Islam allows them (men) to have more than one wife. And polygamy is ironically 
taken as the best way to avoid Muslims from promiscuity. They regarded regarded 
promiscuity as the real hedonism one should fight against 
THE BID FOR UNIQUENESS 
Uniqueness is the first thing that appears in the fundamentalists' mind when they 
come to terms with the concept of identity.311 They simply see themselves as a 
Muslim, a specific type of human being, uniquely made by Allah, that is and must be 
different from the rest of humankind. A group within the movement even consider 
"muslim" as no longer an appropriate term because it is a too catch-all term that is 
widely used to include Muslims who have betrayed the very uniqueness of this 
identity, such as Shiites, the Ahmadiyah and the Liberal Islam. They instead prefer to 
"
1 In the interviews that I conducted during my fictdwmk I asked every respondent what Muslim 
identity means for them. The response to Lhis question is almost the same for everyone~ that is, being a 
Muslim is being a unique human being compared to others. 
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call themselves salafi, a shortened of salafus shalih, that is, the followers of a pious 
generation, to assert their exclusiveness to common Muslims. 312 
More importantly, however, the fundamentalists all agree that the uniqueness 
of being a Muslim is essentially based on the making of differences from what they 
call non-Muslims. By and large, the major distinction is in the way of life, religion, 
ideology and thoughts. Organisations such as HTI and MMI identify Muslim identity 
with Islamic doctrines, values and norms and claim that their fight for the 
establishment of an Islamic state is nothing more than an attempt to be a true 
Muslim. Ba'asyir points to shari'a as the unique element of being a Muslim and 
believes that the absence of Islamic law in Indonesia reflects the loss of identity of 
Indonesian Muslims. 313 But uniqueness also includes a more specific and concrete 
form of identity. Awwas made it clear to me that being unlike non-Muslims implies 
distinctions in the type of school, in the way of greetings, in the type of clothing and 
even in the type of hair-cut. Ba'asyir, in one of our conversations, included language 
and calendar. This implies that a true and authentic Muslim should speak Arabic and 
use the hijriah calendar.314 
Nevertheless, it is mainly through the more easily seen construct of identity 
that both the fundamentalist leaders and the rank-and-file declare and understand 
their unique being. Fashion is the most frequent item pointed out by activists 
regarding the form of Muslimness. They firmly believe that fashion is more than just 
a matter of covering and hiding aural, but should also be about the type of clothing 
that must be different from non-Muslims. Even though this explicit form of identity 
is indifferent to gender, it is how the woman dresses herself up that dominates their 
sense of uniqueness. Both the fundamentalist men and women repeatedly refer to the 
hijab as being essential. 
According to the most radical group of this movement wearing the hijab, and 
not wearing pantaloons, or at least blue jeans for the fundamentalist men, is essential 
for the activists mainly because they find this to be the least difficult sign of 
distinction to be grasped during their own process of becoming an authentic Muslim. 
312 The group explains in detail what salafi means in one of its leading websites. 
http://wvvw.dan1ssalaf.org/inodulcs in 2005 titled "Mengapa Kita harus Me1nakai Nama Salafy?" 
(accessed on 6 September 2007) and "Siapakah Alilus Sunnah?" (accessed on 6 September 2007) 
3u Ba'asyir provided this argument in his speech in a seminar on the politics of Islamic law in 
Indonesia on 25 November 2006, in Yogyakarta. 
314 Hi:friah calender is the Islamic calendar starting from the day the prophet Muhammad fled for 
Madinah. 
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One reason for this is that even among the leaders of the movement who produce and 
reproduce the abstract form of identity such as shari 'a, an Islamic state, Islamic law 
and an Islamic economy, it is difficult to find and to have a clear sense of what is the 
specific and easily seen construct of these abstractions of identity. They might have 
developed an original and uncomplicated form of the Islamic political system as 
identity. My concern is that to reach to that level an activist should not only have a 
feeling of being fully committed to what s/he understands as Islamic teachings, but 
also should invest sufficient time to contemplate, and to think carefully and 
thoroughly about the ideas, the concepts and the manifested structures of an Islamic 
system. The problem is that the question of identity as the question of uniqueness 
requires an immediate response since it is embedded in everyday activities when the 
fundamentalists meet others directly on the street, in the shopping centres and in 
other public venues, or indirectly through television, magazines and various types of 
mass media. As such a daily life leaves a limited time for immersion, it seems that 
the fundamentalists could only (re )define their uniqueness by distraction, that is, by 
making their appearance quite different to that of non-Muslims. 
The formation of authentic being through negating the most distractive 
elements of the other, in fact, explains why there is less depth and unsubtle ideas of 
shari 'a as a distinctive socio-political system. When the activists of this movement 
speak on behalf of Islamic doctrines to outline what shari 'a could tell about an 
Islamic state, for example, they commonly do this by simply negating the most 
distracting elements of democracy-seen as the contemporary opposite of an Islamic 
political regime-such as the ideas of people sovereignty, majority rule and civil 
liberty. It is argued that the supreme authority of an Islamic state is based on Allah 
(instead of people); in which collective decision is based on the truth and original 
reading of Al-Qur'an and hadith (instead of majority rule); and when strictly applied 
determines what is allowed and forbidden according for Islamic doctrines to all 
Muslims (instead of civil liberty). 
The Ruling Trends and the Desire for Freedom 
According to the fundamentalists, being unique is divinely justified and 
obligatory. They refer to a number of verses in Al-Qur'an and interpret them as an 
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instruction to be exclusive to non-Muslims, particularly to Christians and Jews.315 A 
student of Al-Mukmin, for instance, told me that wearing a belt is unacceptable 
because it is part of the Jewish tradition. The prophet Muhammad himself, claimed 
the fundamentalists, once reminded the ummah that should they follow and imitate 
communities of non-Muslims, they part of them, implying that they cease to be 
Muslim. However, becoming an exclusive being with uncompromising uniqueness is 
more than merely a religious duty. The fundamentalists complain about the hardship 
of their everyday life in modem society in Indonesia. They find it difficult to become 
an authentic being~in this case, to be an original and true Muslim according to their 
interpretation--free from the dominant culture in current Indonesian society. Instead, 
they discover themselves in the process of being shaped by an anonymous power of 
society that dictates to them in almost every aspect of life from what to eat, to drink 
and to wear, to what kind of education one should take, what kind of ideology one 
should embrace and what kind of political system one should fight for. In fact, they 
see themselves under control and continued surveillance to behave as society wants. 
Should they fail to meet the standard of normality inscribed by society, they will be 
penalised socially. 
An activist of HTI, Siti, told me her story when she first made the decision to 
wear the hijab. For her this decision was so important because it was about her own 
choice of what kind of person she wanted to be. But it was in the early 1980s in 
Indonesia where merely wearing a headscarf will provoke an uncomfortable 
response. She worried about how people surrounding her, those in her family, in her 
neighbourhood and in her school will react, as she learned two of her school mates 
who wore the hijab were harshly treated. She felt that she will be socially punished 
and expelled because her appearance will deviate to what was regarded normal by 
the community where she lived. Hence, it took several years for her to wear a 
headscarf and a few more years to wear the hijab. But once she was able to dress 
herself up in the way she wanted to be she felt relief that she could in the end stand 
for her own self and apart from the control of society. A similar story was told to me 
by a leading male activist from the salafi group, Ayip Safruddin. I asked him what 
kind of sensation he feels as he wears particular clothing that makes his appearance 
315 One of them is verse 116 from Surah Al-An 'am (chapter 6): "And if you obey most of those on the 
earth, they will mislead you far away from Allah's Path. They follow nothing but conjectures, and 
they do nothing but lie". See Awwas (1999); Al-Jawi (2004b). 
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uncommon. He replied by saying that he feels as if he has just been freed from 
kungkungan (oppression) in his life and his self. He also feels that he now has 
ultimate control over his own body as he decided to ignore social judgements about 
how one has to appear in public. Indeed, freeing oneself from social control is at the 
heart of the fundamentalists' struggle for an exclusive and authentic being. 
I use the term "social control" to suggest the submission of members of 
society to the existing values and nom1S.316 This control allows no deviance from, or 
alternative vision of, the current order. It encourages conformity and takes over the 
consciousness of the masses. In many ways each member of society is unaware of 
their submission to the dominant values and norms. For it goes through a 
spontaneous process by which individuals transpose the existing order into their 
inner self. The result is an immediate identification of the individual with her/his 
society.317 
The fundamentalists are largely uneasy about social controL They are 
concerned about the uniformity in lifestyle and appearance in current Indonesian 
society which makes it difficult to distinguish Muslims from non-Muslims. I asked 
them how important the issue of identity is nowadays and they advised that they 
perceive it as important not to be swallowed up by the uniforming power of the 
dominant culture. The main issue is that many Muslims have submitted their 
consciousness to the rule of the existing values and norms. They, like their fellow 
Indonesian regardless of religious background, follow the same trends in fashion in 
which the dominant model is largely seen as unislamic as it accentuates aurat; they 
have meals in fast-food restaurants; and they engage in social intercourse in whicb 
hanging around in shopping centres, for example, is the main way of socialising with 
friends. As put by the HTI' s spokesman, Islamil Y usanto, "one is Muslim but one's 
behaviour is similar to the Western artists. He adds tbat "one is truly the follower of 
the Prophet Muhammad ... but one's idol is Bon Jovi."318 When I did the interviews 
for this project, Valentine's Day was the main target of criticism by the 
fundamentalists. They were pained as they witnessed that the celebration of 
Valentine's Day had became a new trend that is socially accepted without any sort of 
316 f am inspired by the way the Frankfurt School theorises the emergence of mass society. See 
Horkheimer and Adorno (1972); Marcuse (1964); Adorno (2001). See also Strinati (2004). 
Jli Ivlarcuse (1964) uses tbe term "mimesis" for this immediate identification of individuals with 
her/his society. See also Adorno (2001). 
m Yusanto (1998: 6). 
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negative thinking by the majority of Indonesians, including, and more importantly, 
by Muslims.319 
The trends themselves, in this respect, are the social control. Following trends 
becomes commonsense, a socially constructed sense accepted and believed by the 
masses as logical and true in itself. Those who refuse and fail to follow trends will be 
stigmatised as either ketinggalan jaman (old fashioned), ketinggalan mode (out of 
mode), or kampungan (backwardness). This commonsense paves the way for 
individual Muslims to invert the existing values and norms into their inner being. 
The result is an immediate identification with society through the process of keeping 
up-to-date with the latest developments in trends in lifestyle and appearance. In a 
conversation with me another HTI activist, Desti, revisited her life in Jakarta before 
moving to Y ogyakarta and being registered to the organisation. It is described as a 
life of catching up with trends in fashion, such as women's handbags, perfumes and 
cellular phones. She once returned to Jakarta and found that her trendy friends 
looked and responded negatively to her wearing the hijab. At one point, she thought 
that she would never come back to this city, or, at least would never stay 
permanently. She said that she is tired of Jakarta's life of following trends; she takes 
it as an insurmountable challenge since trends change within days; and she rejects 
being manipulated and controlled by big corporations, which she believes are the 
main beneficiaries of this kind of lifestyle. Becoming a member of HTI helps to free 
her from social control as she no longer takes comments seriously by people 
surrounding her about, for example, her clothing and her behaviour, as she believes 
that what she does is an expression of her true and authentic being. 
In fact, the fundamentalists often express their feelings of being controlled 
and dominated. They largely point to cultural imperialism working through the 
trends discussed above and through the propaganda of what they perceive as foreign 
ideas such as democracy, human rights, pluralism, feminism, liberalism, secularism, 
and capitalism. Westernisation is, for them, identical to cultural imperialism and it 
makes Indonesians in general and Indonesian Muslims in particular become "inferior 
319 See "Gaul Remaja Generasai keledai atau Generasi Rabani" published on 3 February 2005in 
http://swaramuslim.net (accessed on I October 2007); "Remaja Muslim, Valentine's Day dan 
Perlawanan Budaya" published on 11 February 2004 in http://swararnuslin1.net (accessed on 24 
September 2007). 
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subjects", having no self-confidence and losing their uniqueness.320 And this 
westernisation, according to Ba'asyir, is more dangerous than a terrorist attack such 
as the Bali bombing. It will kill no lives but allow people to live without their soul 
and dignity.321 In this sense, showing and performing openly a Muslim identity, 
through various forms of collective action and in daily activities, is a big step 
forward in fighting cultural imperialism. For it frees Muslims from the prison of 
feeling ashamed to witness themselves in their original and non-westernised 
appearance. 
However, the activists of this movement do not complain explicitly about the 
loss of freedom as a human being. As I will discuss in the next part, the 
fundamentalists regard freedom and liberty as dangerous and contradicting Islamic 
doctrines. Rather, they frequently demand their rights as Muslims to choose the kind 
of life they want to live--that is the life in accordance with shari 'a~as a rejection of 
what they see as an inauthentic dominant way of life. Indeed, their rights as Muslims 
are essential. Awwas stated to me several times that shari'a and an Islamic state are 
matters of hak-hak demokrasi (democracy rights) of his and his fellow believers. It is 
an era of democracy in which everyone has the right to show publicly what kind of 
life one wants to pursue, even if it looks strange, claimed a teacher at Al-Mukmin. 322 
Disallowing him and his co-activists to bid for the implementation of Islamic law, for 
A wwas, must be condemned for two reasons. First, it denies the righteousness of this 
divinely legitimised system. Second, it is totally unacceptable in a country which 
proclaims itself to be democratic. 
Awwas might be manipulating democracy, making maximum use of the 
political freedom and civil liberty created by the broadening process of political 
inclusiveness following Soeharto's resignation in 1998, to elevate political leverage 
of himself and his organisation. Nevertheless, to speak of"democracy rights" equally 
suggests an obsession for an authentic self free from the domination of society's 
dictating power. In this case, this dictating power is the dominant discourse that 
perceives democracy as the modern, the best and the only system to be pursued by 
everyone and, at the same time, denounces an Islamic state as being out-of-date, the 
worst system and should be abandoned. Rather than merely a discursive problem, 
320 See Awwas (2004b); "Westemisasi" published on 7 November 2003 in http://swaramuslin1.net 
(accessed on I Oclober 2007); Al-Wa 'ie December 2006. See also Yusanto (2007); Al-Jawi (2004b). 
321 Interview with Ba'asyir. 
322 Interview with Darwis. 
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some might argue that this is the real shortcoming of (liberal) democracy as it 
permits no deviances and blocks critics--often in disguised undemocratic ways-of 
its very values and principles.323 But my concern is that the cry for "democracy 
rights" is a challenge to democracy and civil liberty as a commanding trend !hat must 
be followed, and a commonsense that must be uncritically accepte-0, by each and 
everyone in the society. Hence, the problem of democracy and civil liberty is hardly 
different from the problem of a (new model) cellular phone. As repeatedly expressed 
to me they felt being forced to accept democracy as the dominant trend in town. 
They, at least, demand equal treatment to demonstrate their disagreement the idea of 
democracy, just as !he proponents of democracy criticise them. They feel that what 
they receive is, in effect, an unfair judgement, a sort of social punishment, that 
sharia 'a is a backward and an unreliable system to deal with modern civilisation 
even before the idea of the system being negated is explained properly. 
Understandably, the bid to implement shari 'a is commonly fonnulated in the 
language of something alternative, of being unlike other human-made systems and of 
a uniqueness that reflects a rejection of being absorbed by the dominant discourse. 
For the Certainty in Life 
As mentioned above, the bid for uniqueness sets the fundamentalists free 
from the uniforming power of trends in everyday life. At the same time, the road to 
authentic being enables the activists of this movement to identify and associate 
themselves with their fellow unique being. For a young student at Al-M.ukmin, 
displaying identity publicly will help him to recognise his fellow believers. His 
teacher repeated the same argument and urged Muslims to always use Islamic 
greetings to allow other people to know their religious background. Other more 
extreme views insist that the hijab, the white kopiah, the beard and Arabic language 
are significant in order to make a clear and strict distinction between "friends" and 
"enemies."324 It means that the public display of uniqueness enables the like-minded 
Muslims to know for certain to which part of society they belong. By recognising 
m See, for example, Mouffe (2005}. See also Zizek (2004). 
324 AU views outlined above expressed to me when I did a number of 1ntt.'rViev; v..'Ith students and 
teachers at Al-Mukmin. 
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"friends" they find some certain, and supposedly secure, place within an unfriendly 
social environment. 
Siti told me how associating herself with Muslims of similar beliefs gave her 
a sense of security. When she first wore the hijab it was her like-minded friends that 
provided her with much-needed support to face the community and with self 
confidence to stand for her authenticity. I frequently heard similar stories narrated by 
younger activists about the friends, who help them not to feel lonely and isolated, 
and that not the only ones resisting social control. Indeed, accentuating exclusiveness 
that leads to association with others who share similar uniqueness creates a shelter, at 
least at the early stage in the process of becoming a fundamentalist. The importance 
of support by like-minded friends that creates a vhtual shelter has been taken 
seriously by a number of fundamentalist organisations. HTI, for instance, transforms 
it into a method of recruiting new members and sympathisers. Most of HTI's 
activists who spoke to me about how they were brought to and registered by the 
organisation told the same story. They started the process by meeting an unknown 
like-minded person, who at first is someone to share uniqueness and a feeling of 
being insecure. Later, the same person led them to be part of HTL Being involved in 
the movement in this respect is a process through which an activist is located in a 
well organised, secure space compared to a mainly informal and less structured 
connection with like-minded friends. 
In a discursive seose, however, uniqueness implies certainty in a different 
way. I argue that this is a path through which uniqueness moves from a mere f01m 
(signifier) of difference to a concept (signified) that produces meaning (sign).325 
Meaning might be either unstable and change continuously, or, simply a myth to hide 
and divert the real meaning. The important thing is that once uniqueness turns from 
the play of difference into a relatively stable meaning, at least for some period of 
time, it becomes a certain definition. At this point being unique is a matter of 
imitating and embracing characters and symbols attached to a definition of what 
uniqueness means. To be a unique being called a Muslim is to be able to tick all 
boxes available in the list of Muslim exclusive qualities. More than rejecting the 
existing value and norms and negating the non-Muslims, being a Muslim is being a 
certain kind of person. 
325 I borrow the terms signifier, signified and sign from the \vorks \vithin the tradition of semiology 
and poststructuralism. See, for example, Barthes (1957); Derrida (2002). 
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Indeed, becoming a specific person with a definite character attached to the 
personality is what Awwas told me about his view on identity. Association with like-
minded friends is cmcial because it helps activists to reach their real "me", that is, to 
discover the truest definition of being a Muslim and to meet the standard enlisted by 
the definition. In a more structured and regulated association with friends that forms 
the movement organisation and leads to collective action this real "me" appears in a 
more rigid definition of Mnslimness with a more rigid standard of lifestyle and 
appearance. This helps us as the outsider to make sense of their tmiqueness as the 
end product of the sign constructing process of fundamentalism. 
rMMORALITY AND .LIBERALISM 
The fundamentalists' bid for uniqueness and their rejection of the dominant existing 
values and norms is to serve the desire for freedom. They use the language of 
"cultural imperialism", "inferior subject" and "democracy rights" because they see 
themselves as an independent subject that must have the right to select the life they 
prefer to live. The struggle for identity in this sense is a struggle to control one's own 
mind and body and to reach one's agency, that is, capacity to control one's action 
through the act of will. However, the fundamentalists develop a conception of inner 
self as a de-centred and tm-unified entity. At least, it is divided into a sort of Islamic 
self-consciousness, which is based on Islamic teachings; and hawa nafSu, a sort of 
Islamic id, the general human natural instincts. The relations between the two are by 
no means harmonious and the results of this inner conflict shape the nature of 
subjectivity. For the fundamentalists an independent subject is a kind of subject 
whose actions are based on the value rationality provided by Islamic doctrines. On 
the other hand, the less independent subject is the one who is controlled by hawa 
nafsu. The inner battle between the Islamic value reason and hawa nafsu is at the 
centre of their protests against the growing immorality in society. I will show how 
they take the problem ofimmorality as an issue of identity. 
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The Growing Immorality 
Immorality is a generic term, which covers everything that contradicts 
Islamic teachings, as interpreted by the fundamentalists. Several activists, for 
instance, see the state, the republic of Indonesia, as an obvious example of 
immorality as it is based on values and norms other than shari 'a. However, blaming 
the absence of shari 'a is too vague to be easily absorbed by the fundamentalists 
sense of evidence of immorality. One reasons is that what shari 'a suggests about the 
specific political and economic system that is in accordance with Al-Qur'an and 
hadith remains debatable within the movement. The activists, for instance, have 
different views on democracy. Ba'asyir told me that taking part in the Indonesian 
general election is haram (forbidden). For him, the practice of elections is based on 
democracy teachings which are derived from non-Islamic sources. On the other hand, 
Farid, one of leading teachers at the same Islamic boarding school as Ba'asyir, Al-
Mukmin, expressed to me that taking part in an election is religiously justified as 
long as it will help Muslims to prevent, for example, a non-Muslim from becoming 
the president. 
Nevertheless, Ba'asyir and Farid as well as the rest of the activists in this 
movement have no disagreement in terms of immorality of, for example, the use of 
drugs and alcohol. It is clearly and strictly mentioned in Al-Qur'an and can be easily 
judged as immoral without too many dissenting views. In fact, the majority of 
fundamentalists are more concerned with the immorality found in their social 
surroundings and in the media. Apart from the illegal use of drugs and alcohol, this 
includes a range of, in their view, asocial behaviour such as gambling, promiscuity, 
prostitution, homosexuality and pornography. The activists demonstrate a grave 
concern at this micro level of immorality because they confront it on a daily basis. 
An HTI activist, Mamat, told me that nowadays being takwa (one's conscious 
awareness that one is watched by Allah)-and, hence, distancing one's self from 
immorality-is a delicate matter. For as soon as Muslims put a step outside their 
home, they wilL.."melihat wanita telarifang (see nude women)." He meant to say 
that what one will find in a public space as well as in the media is a number of 
women either without the hijab or with a fashion style that accentuates, rather than 
hide, their body. A woman without a hijab is, for him, not so different from a woman 
without clothing covering her body, More importantly, a woman without the hijab is 
107 
not only immoral in itself, but also potentially throws him into committing the sin of 
seduction through the temptation aroused by their appearance. 
In particular, the fundamentalists are extremely anxious about the rapid 
increase in what they perceive as sexual related-immorality. First, they wimess with 
anger the widespread of promiscuity among teenagers, youths and the older 
generation. Quoting reports published by a private national television station, 
Rajawali Citra Televl5i Indonesia (RCTI), on 25 May 2007-stating that 40-50 per 
cent teenagers, more than 60 per cent of senior high school students and around 90 
per cent of university students in Makassar have been involved in this immoral 
conduct--they believe that promiscuity has gradually become a new lifestyle in 
Indonesia's large cities.326 For them it is further evidenced by the growing number of 
pregnancies before marriage, abortions and divorces as well as the increasing number 
of people infected hy sexual related diseases. 
The picture of promiscuity in Indonesia presented by the fundamentalists 
might be accurate since non-fundamentalist sources also report a similar image.327 
But it is also important to note that they also exaggerate the issue and, by 
implication, make it look worse. They, for instance, consider pacaran-an 
Indonesian expression for having a Jove affair commonly between two members of 
the opposite sex-as the practice of promiscuity simply because they strongly 
believe that those who are involved in this type of relationship are, in the end, unable 
to stop themselves from having sexual intercourse. Interestingly, even though almost 
all activists take it as unislamic behaviour and discourage their fellow Muslims from 
taking part, there is disagreement within the movement on how to islamicly 
categorise pacaran. While several activists simply classify it as zina, that is, having 
sexual intercourse between a man and woman beyond the legal marriage bond, others 
argue that the Islamic legal standard for pacaran is more complicated. When talking 
about Islamic law on adultery, the teacher of Al-Mukmin, Farid, bluntly explained to 
me that zina suggests " .. . alat yang laki-laki itu ma.suk pada a/at yang perempuan 
( ... man vital organ [penis] enters woman vital organ [vagina])." For him, if it is only 
" ... peluk-pelukan, cium-ciuman ... ( ... hugging, kissing ... )" Muslims are not allowed 
to conde1m1 it as zina. In this respect, he would argue that pacaran does not 
necessarily mean and lead to promiscuity. 
"'See Al-Islam, May 2007. 
"' See, for example, Emka (2004). 
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Second, the fundamentalists are equally concerned with the rapid increase in 
the production and distribution of pornography in Indonesia and, what they call, 
pornoaksi-which literally means action-porn, especially following the fall of 
Soeharto. Using another source-this time a report published by a national weekly, 
Repub/ika on 17 July 2003---an activist of HTI, a former Indonesian rock star, Harry 
Mukti, claims that Indonesia is second only to Russia, in the list of countries 
considered as the heaven of pomography.328 Mukti and his fellow fundamentalists 
are certain that there is no other country in the world other than Indonesia where 
pornographic VCD are found at an extremely cheap price, pornographic and semi-
pomographic magazines and tabloids are sold on every street comer and the 
pornographic website is easily accessed through a vast number of relatively low rate 
priced internet-cares scattered throughout the hig cities. 
Pornoaksi is a relatively new term invented by the fundamentalists and like-
minded Muslims. It is defined as every type of conduct that displays aural to people 
other than those allowed by Islamic rules. This includes erotic acting, semi-nudity 
and nudity performed by artists in general during entertainment. 329 The term 
occupies the centre stage of public debate in the early 2000s following the rise of a 
female singer, Inul, who was nationally famous for her erotic dance, the so-called 
goyang ngebor, 330 that sparked a widespread condemnation by a large number of 
Muslims within the radical Islamic community. Later, pornoaksi became the heart of 
the debate on a new anti-pornography bill.331 The fundamentalists and their like-
minded Muslim associates support the bill because its definition of pornography 
touches upon their concerns about pornoaksi. A number of human rights activists, 
intellectuals and perfonners, on the other band, oppose the bill since the notion of 
pornoaksi implies that, among others, erotic acting and pictures for purely an artistic 
purpose, as well as nudity that remains legally attached to the traditional custom of a 
number of ethnic groups in Indonesia, will be unjustly considered as illegal. 
The fundamentalists outrage about promiscuity, pornography and pornoaksi 
is becoming stronger as they find themselves to be the only group left in the "morally 
ill society of Indonesia" who still hold on to the commitment and the spirit to fight 
328 Mukti (2004). 
329 See Al-Wa'ie, May 2006. 
330 See Kompas, l 0 lvlarch 2003; Suara Pembaruan, 9 May 2003; Tempo Interaktif, 17 May 2003. 
JJ 1 Sec Kompas, 25 February and 25 March 2006; Sinar Harapan, 14 March 2006; Detikcom, 16 
March2006. 
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this religiously unacceptable conduct. The government, the political leaders and the 
national figures have no sense of urgency regarding the issue. Instead, a number of 
national figures, including some former presidents, are accused of having been 
involved in sexual abuse. m As expressed to me, they were also at a loss to 
understand why Muslims are among those who oppose the new pornography bilL 
They blatantly denounce, for example, the fom1er president, Abdurrahman Wahid, 
the leading figure of the largest traditional Muslim group, for his support for goyang 
ngebor.n' 
Against the backdrop of this social condition, in the longer run, the 
fundamentalists are deeply worried that immorality will no longer receive negative 
response from the majority of population, but will cease to be seen as anti social 
behaviour and v.ill be regarded as normality. The worst scenario, from their point of 
view, would be that immoral conduct such as promiscuity is transformed into a trend 
in social intercourse; is taken as commonsense which is true in itself; and is 
transposed to the inner self of the masses through the process of immediate 
identification. To add credibility to this fear, they frequently point to the fact that 
instead of gaining support from the majority of the population regarding the 
righteousness of their fight against immorality, what they receive is public 
condemnation and a socially negative stigma. They bitterly discover themselves to be 
seen as strange and weird because of their support for morality. As the 
fundamentalists often identify themselves with morality itself, their isolated 
existence and uncommon presence understandably convinces them that in the eyes of 
the majority of the population morality is also increasingly taken to be abnormal. 
Condemning Liberalism 
The activists of this movement blame liberalism for the rise of immorality. 
HTI, for example, is certain that liberalism is the prime cause of the increasing 
amount of divorce, abortions, sexual deviation, homosexuality, AIDS infected people 
and sexual related-crime prevalent in the contemporary Western society. 334 This 
332 See Risa/ah Ml{iahidin, Febroary 2007; Al-Islam, May 2007. 
JJl See, for example, Jaiz (2006). 
334 Al-Wa 'ie, December 2006, p. 3-4, 13. 
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same damaging liberalism is, claim the fundamentalists, emerging in Indonesia and 
will turn the countly into a similar moral backwardness as in the West They look 
uneasily at the lifting of political oppression following Soeharto's resignation. TI1is 
political freedom they dreamt about for so long also paves the way for the 
proliferation of immoral conduct. A dozen activists told me how the blossoming idea 
of freedom of expression allows magazines, VCDs and movies full of pornography 
and pornoaksi to be distributed at ease. Freedom of expression also means freedom 
to perfomi erotic dances publicly without any fear of being socially penalised; 
freedom to have sex in a way that is not in accordance with Islamic teachings; and 
freedom to use alcohol and drugs.335 
In the midst of goyang ngebor controversy, lvfajelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI 
or Islamic Scholar Assembly of Indonesia) issues a fatwa that categorises this erotic 
dancing as haram. The fundamentalists are enraged as the fatwa is opposed and 
largely ignored, including by their fellow Indonesian Muslims. The opposing groups 
argue that the fatwa is in conflict with human rights and the idea of freedom of 
expression. Consequently, Liberal Islam and other groups who promote liberal ideas 
are accused of damaging Indonesian society from within by promoting immorality.336 
This accusation is strongly supported indirectly by MUI which officially categorises 
liberalism as a deviant doctrine from their Islamic point of view. This fatwa in effect 
provides the fundamentalists and like-minded Mnslims with a religious licence to 
assault the proponents of liberalism in the same measure as their violent attack on 
Ahmadiyah which is also categorised as deviating from Islamic values and norms. 
By and large, the fundamentalists understand liberalism to be an idea that 
promotes four types of freedom: freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of 
expression and freedom of ownership.337 Apart from the problem of freedom of 
expression outlined above, freedom of speech also strongly distracts the activists. 
This freedom, in their view, allows Muslims, whom they see as having no credibility 
in presenting the true meaning of Islamic doctrines, to reinterpret Al-Qur'an, hadith 
and Islamic history haphazardly and to speak freely on behalf of Islam. Above all, 
the fundamentalists take liberalism as something other than and contradicting Islam. 
335 See also "Hisbut Tahrir: Kebebasan Bcrokspresi Samber Kcbejatan Moral" published on 5 
September 2004 in http://swaramuslim.com; "Hisbut Tahrir: Mewaspadai Propaganda Kebebasan" 
rublished on 3 December 2004 in htrp:/l~Y;'.!Lc~im.com (both accessed on 4 Ocrober 2007). 
3
' See Awwas (2002; 2005a); Risa/ah Jvlujahidin, March 2007; Al-Wa'ie, September 2001. 
ms._,,,, Al-Jawi (2004c); Al-Wa 'ie, December 2006. 
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Liberalism is largely seen as the Western imported culture that works through the 
propaganda by Western indigenous allies such as the activists of Liberal Islam to 
contaminate the purity and exclusiveness of Muslimness. However, the elements of 
liberalism's damaging effect are more than that. For the activists of this movement, 
its main threat is located in its conception of humanity, which, in effect, lowers the 
quality of humanity to the level of animals.338 Here, the challenge oflibera!ism to the 
Muslim identity has nothing to do with the problem of being different to anyone. As 
will be discussed shortly, it is a matter of being a human with some mental properties 
as a subject represented by the identity being accentuated. 
A leading figure of HT!, Muhammmad Shiddiq Al-Jawi, explains that the 
basis of liberalism is permissiveness.339 He comprehends permissiveness as a sort of 
way of life that encourages every human being to abandon rules, especially the one 
that is derived from religion. It suggests that everyone is allowed to conduct 
whatever she1l1e loves to do without having to be afraid of being punished by social 
norms. During my conversations with a number of activists I found that the notion of 
permissiveness as the basic principle of liberalism is the common understanding 
within the movement. For the activists, living under liberalism implies that one 
should have to pay no attention to halal (permitted) and haram in having a meal, in 
dressing, in social interaction, in fact in every aspect of life. But, permissiveness is 
seen as by no means an end in itself. Its presence as a life principle is to serve the 
desire to fulfil human basic instincts such as sexual and aggressive impulses with no 
limitation. The unbridled fulfilment of desire is in fact the ultimate meaning of being 
a liberal. Understandably, Al-Jawi and his fellow fundamentalists classify conduct 
such as promiscuity and pornoak1'i as liberalism itself. 
At this point, in my view, the fundamentalists conceive liberalism as an idea 
that specifically redevelops the conception of a human being as a subject who is 
dtiven by instinctive impulses. The human subject is no longer seen as having the 
capacity to think and to act independently. Instead, a human being becomes the slave 
of its o¥m desires. For them the centrality of natural instincts makes humans no 
different to animals, which also depend on the fulfilment of natural impulses to stay 
alive. Being liberal, in this sense, means nothing more than being an animal called 
338 See Ba'as;ir (2006b); Al-Jawi (2004b). 
339 Al-Jawi (2004b ). 
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human. 340 Even, for Ba'asyir, under liberalism the human quality is lower than that 
of animal.341 He sarcastically notes that during his life he never find a homosexual 
couple within the world of animals. On the other hand, liberalism paves the way for 
homosexuality being officially legalised. 
However, why are the fundamentalists deeply concerned with unbridled 
human natural impulses and afraid of being compared to an animal? Part of the 
answer is their strong belief in the divine status of the human being as the best 
creature created by Allah who authorises her/him to be the leader of all creatures. 
The more significant answer is that they are obsessed by the idea of the human 
subject having autonomous consciousness. More to the point, the fundamentalists 
might have misread the idea of liberalism and misinterpreted it in a way that makes 
the idea look worse. What is important for me is that the conception of a human 
being who is driven by non-rational impulses denies that human is a subject who 
possesses the power to control one's own self and life. Their rejection of liberalism, 
in this respect, is an attempt to rescue the human being as an independent subject. 
The issue ofhawa nafsu 
To understand this obsession further, I will start by discussing hawa nafsu. It 
is an Indonesian term (borrowed from Arabic nafs) which literally means carnal 
desire. Hawa nafsu is a sort of Islamic notion for id, the site of natural instinctive 
impulses, which functions according to the pleasure-pain principle. The 
fundamentalists understand hawa nafsu as being part of one's inner self. The 
fulfilment of this carnal desire is seen as an inevitable consequence of being human. 
But, as mentioned above, they have no belief in the virtue of unbridled fulfilment of 
natural desire. Instead, the lack of control over human instinctive impulses is 
responsible for the rise of immorality in current Indonesian society. In the case of the 
erotic dance, goyang ngebor, discussed earlier, the fundamentalists claim that this 
dance is extremely popular because it serves the sexual impulses of its male fans. 
They also believe that uncontrolled sexual desire has led both Muslim and non-
Muslim teenagers to promiscuous behaviour. 
340 See "Iblis itu Bemama 'Homoseksual'" (part3) published on 15 December 2005 in 
http://swaramuslim.com (accessed on 9 September 2007) 
341 Ba'asyir (2006a; 2006b). 
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Moreover, hawa nafeu is, according to the activists, a place where shaytan-
an Arabic term for Satan-the evil spirit, works to tempt and control of human 
beings. The unbridled fulfilment of natural impulses suggests that the attempt by 
shaytan to take control of the human mind has been successful. Immoral conduct, in 
this sense, is no longer perceived as part of human behaviour, but taken as the 
presence of an evil spirit that operates through the human body. Here, humans, who, 
the fundamentalists believe, are located at the highest rank compared to all creatures 
created by Allah, submits their subjectivity as an independent and respected entity to 
the rule of the lower creature, shaytan. In secular terms, the evil spirit can mean 
various things. Ideas such as democracy and pluralism can be easily regarded as the 
presence of shaytan. The evil spirit is also omnipresent through trends in fashion and 
in social life in general as discussed in the preceding section. 
What is important though is that the notion of the rule of shaytan working 
through the unbridled fulfilment of natural desire accentuates their sense of having 
lost control of their own mind and body, as they feel that they are forced to accept 
the dominant ideas and lifestyle and to follow the ruling trends in social life. The 
existence of immorality is also significant because it allows them to show how 
human beings who are ruled by shaytan through the colonising power of hawa nafeu 
have ended up. At the same time, their own presence as the moral minority left in a 
largely ill society is saved from the prevailing sin simply because they remain human 
and that is supposed to be a subject with autonomous consciousness that possesses 
the capacity to control its natural instinctive impulses. 
During my conversation with key figures such as Ba'asyir and Awwas, they 
frequently spoke of menahan diri as the key to their success in avoiding immoral 
conduct. Menahan diri literally means self-restraint. In its broader usage by the 
movement it suggests the capacity to stir and control the fulfilment of hawa nafeu 
which is reflected in the capacity to think and to act reasonably. To think and to act 
reasonably, for the fundamentalists, suggests a rejection both to be guided by the 
pleasure-pain principle and the gain-loss calculation. In this regard, Ba'asyir claims 
that Muslims who question the originality of the Islamic state idea are simply "bodoh 
(stupid)" because they base their decision, according to Awwas, on " .. .like and 
dislike." By this, A wwas meant that many Muslims are uneasy with the idea because 
it will prevent them from having unrestricted pleasure by having unbridled fulfilment 
of human basic desires. Hasyim from MMI bluntly explained to me that those who 
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are against the implementation of shari 'a, which, for example implies a strict rule on, 
women to cover their bodies properly, are those who are driven by their sexual lust to 
always enjoy watching the beautiful body of a woman. 342 
From this claim, it seems to me that the fundamentalists accept the existence 
of the capacity to reason inside oneself, where autonomous consciousness, an entity 
through which one constructs reasonable thinking and actions, is at home. This 
substance functions mainly to lead the body, where hawa naftu is located. However, 
fundamentalist's thinking substance is different from that of "cogito ergo sum." The 
majority of the fundamentalists believe that the main function of the human mind is 
to receive wahyu, revelations from Allah, and to understand Islamic teachings 
properly. Therefore, aka/ is the site of Islamic doctrines. The doctrines work 
according to the logic of right and wrong and constitute a sort of Islamic value 
rationality that guides the fundamentalists' thinking and actions. When Ba'asyir 
categorises some Muslims as stupid, what he is referring to is their lack of 
knowledge of Islamic values and norms. Stupidity and being unreasonable both 
reflect a lack of the Islamic value reason and is a sign of being controlled by hawa 
nafsu. In this respect, the presence of God is beyond aka/ and is a matter of faith. It is 
Allah that provides the value reason through Al-Qur'an.343 
Nevertheless, this by no means implies that Islam, as interpreted by them, 
forbids the fulfilment of hawa naftu. Instead, the fundamentalists are certain that 
under the surveillance of the Islamic value reason Muslims can fulfil their natural 
instinctive desires in the right manner. The argument was widely proposed during 
two sexual related controversies in late 2006.344 The first controversy was a sexual 
affair involving a national female singer, Maria Eva, and a male member of national 
parliament, Y ahya Zaini. The second controversy was the decision by a nationally 
well-known Islamic preacher, Abdullah Gymnastiar, to conduct polygarny.345 Both 
incidents invoked public debate on issues ranging from male dominating power, 
women's rights, sexual abuse and the separation of public and private spheres. For 
the activists what these two controversies tell us is the difference between the human 
who is controlled by "syahwat (sexual lust)" and the one who is controlled by the 
342 Interviews with Ba'asyir, Awwas and Hasyim. 
343 See "Kedudukan Akal dalam Islam" published on 25 January 2006 in http://www.darussalaf.org; 
"Penyamaan Agama adalah Perbuatan Kufur" published on 26 June 2007 in http://www.darussalaf.org 
(both accessed on 29 September 2007). 
344 See Al-Anshari (2007); Risa/ah Mujahidin, January 2007. 
345 See Detikcom, 2 December 2006; 3 December 2006; Tempo Interakitf, 8 December 2006. 
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Islamic value reason. Should the male member of national parliament, who also 
happened to be Muslim, follow his "aka! sehat (mind)" he would choose polygamy, 
as Islamicly legal conduct according to them, rather than having a secret lover. 
In fact, the issue of polygamy was at centre stage at that time. President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was also affected as he ordered his assistants to tighten 
the non polygamy rule to include all state officials. Ba'asyir, on the other hand, told 
me that those who are against polygamy are, once again, stupid. He bluntly explained 
that polygamy is an Islamicly legalised answer to the problem of, among others, 
" ... laki-laki yang punya nafeu besar ... (man who possesses strong sexual lust)." For 
me it implies that there is nothing wrong in fulfilling one's sexual desires, despite 
abusing the rights of others··the rights of women in this case-~as long as it is 
conducted within the space permitted by the surveillance and disciplining power of 
Islamic doctrines, as interpreted by Ba 'asyir and like-minded Muslims. Later, the 
fundamentalists are enraged that the public paid more attention to the case of 
polygamy and complained little about the conduct of Y ahya Zaini. White Gymnastiar 
was accused of abusing his first wife, there is no similar charge against Zaini. For 
them this obviously means that the majority of the population take the side of 
immorality and, thank God, there remains the small number of the chosen minority 
who still consistently cling to Islamic values and nonns. 
THE MEANING OF LIFE AND HEDONISM 
I tum now mainly to the issue of certainty. The focus is the anxiety of the activists of 
this movement regarding the question of their original fonndation of life. Uncertainty 
and insecurity here indicates the feeling of being nnclear and indeterminate about the 
meaning of one's life and the goal by which one's life should be directed. It is also 
related to the question of a sort of eternal life that haunts the fundamentalists, that is, 
life that exists beyond both living in the present and living in the world. The struggle 
for identity is, in this sense, a cure for this anxiety. It is the basis through which they 
discover the answer to what their life is for and the path to reach the ultimate 
meaning of being human. Identity equally helps them to develop a logical connection 
between their life in the past, in the present and in the future through some 
conception of the afterlife, 
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Apart from immorality, the activists frequently condemn what they 
understand as hedonism, which, for them can also be regarded as immoral conduct 
itself. I will show that at the heart of this condemnation is their concern about the 
foundation of life. Tbe most often raised questions regarding these issues are related 
to the meaning of happiness. The answers lead them to a strong rejection of 
hedonism, which is seen as having turned their life meaningless and made it fail to 
reach the tmth and the real life. 
Hedonism and Anxiety 
The fundamentalists commonly believe in the virtue of having a clear goal in 
life. The good thing of having identity is that they start to have meanings and 
directions attached to their daily activities. An HTI leading figure in Y ogykakarta, 
Y oyok Tindyo Prasetyo, explains that without goals his life becomes useless. He 
recalls his life before becoming a member of the organisation; a life that he describes 
as falling under the sway of the social !tends previously discussed. When he was an 
undergraduate, he used to imitate what his friends did in order to become acceptable 
to his peers, by being involved in a music band and in a theatre group. But this ended 
up in a feeling of uncertainty about what kind of person he really was and what kind 
of future he wanted to have. His decision to register himself in the organisation and 
to find bis ov,11 self through his participation in the movement is part of his attempt 
to find a true meaning and direction in life. 346 
Likewise, Yoyok's fellow HTI's member, Desti, underlines the importance of 
objectives in life. Hers is a life which is marked by economic hardship. She used to 
consider it to be her fate that she came from a financially less secure family. She felt 
that she had a bleak future and decided to be involved in a number of student 
extracurricular activities as an escape from her anxiety about ber difficult life. It was 
HTI-througb its members wbo are closely associated with her-that helped her to 
regain her life by redefining its meanings and its directions, 347 Awwas echoes similar 
thoughts. He further adds that without goals and some hope of a better life in tbe 
future humans are no different to animal. He argues that an animal lives its life by 
foHowing the natural cycle from birth to death through the working of its natural 
346 Interview \vith Yoyok. 
347 Interview \\tith Desti. 
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instincts. Humans, on the other hand, should construct their lives according to a 
specific guide to reach some worthy future. And having a clear goal in the future is, 
for A wwas, part of Muslim uniqueness. 348 
But having a goal alone is not sufficient For Yoyok, becoming a member of 
a music band by no means implies that he has no goals in life. The difference 
between the identity of a band member and that of a member of the organisation is 
that the meaning of life provided by the latter is, he believes, the real one. His 
decision to join the movement is more than simply having guidance of how to live 
his life. More precisely, it is about selecting goals that provide him with a sense of 
certainty. The fundamentalists' rejection of hedonism discussed shortly should be 
understood in this way. It is a matter of negating the meaning provided by this style 
oflife that is seen as untenable. 
The term hedonism is used in its broader meaning as the pursuit of pleasure, 
particularly, body related-pleasure. The fundamentalists believe that this celebration 
of bodily pleasure is increasingly becoming the dominant way of life in Indonesia. It 
regulates people's minds not only in how to run their daily activities, but also in how 
to operate politics and the economy. They frequently point to the pursuit of luxury 
commonly seen as desirable by many Indonesians as a prime example of hedonism. 
They also use the term to refer lo the dominant trends in social habits such as 
hanging around in shopping centres, particularly for youth; regularly visiting the 
cinema and other public entertainment venues; and buying things ranging from 
cellular phones to cars for the sake of having something new. By and large the 
activists of this movement perceive hedonism as being part of cultural imperialism. It 
is an imported culture~.,from the West, as usual-that works through the media, 
particularly television and film, to take control over the consciousness of the masses. 
Sinema elektronik (sinetron or Electronic Cinema), a sort of local movie series on 
TV, is frequently mentioned as the channel through which hedonism as a style of life 
is disseminated and socialised. The activists are certain that sinetron has throwu 
many Muslims, especially the younger generation, under the sway of this lifestyle. 
As they see it daily through the glass screen, the style, behaviour, attitude and 
appearance exhibited by artists are taken as normal and as the model to be imitated. 
348 Awwas (1999). 
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More importantly, hedonism is seen as being closely related to the problem of 
hawa naftu discussed above. This radical Muslim group is enraged to discover that 
the pleasure-pain principle that is at the heart of a hedonistic lifestyle has been 
increasingly transformed philosophically into an ethical doctrine in everyday life. 
Many Indonesians are seen as largely accepting the seeking of pleasure in life, by 
every means available, as good and desirable in itself. A wwas, for instance, 
sarcastically notes that nowadays the majoiity of the population only live to work, to 
eat, to sleep and to reproduce before they conclude this cycle with mortality. People, 
he continues, have stopped to possess any idealism and progressive thoughts because 
what is important is how to please " ... isi perut (stomach)" and "keperluan syahwat 
(sexual needs)."349 The hedonistic lifestyle is, for him, a kind of life which is 
controlled by hawa najsu. 
Indeed, the main issue is the celebration of pleasure in life and the association 
of hedonism with immorality. It is widely believed that, as implied by Awwas 
argument above, a hedonistic lifestyle makes Muslims less critical toward social 
realities surrounding them. They pay little attention to their very existence as 
supposedly unique beings and to meanings and goals of life. Instead, Muslims are 
persuaded, through, among other things the media and the school, to enjoy life by 
allowing the fulfilment of desire. This closes the way for the emergence of an 
autonomous consciousness where the Islamic value reason is located, through which 
one can develop negative thinking toward hedonism. Consequently, for many 
activists, being part of the movement, being reborn as a new person with a unique 
identity, entails abandoning an easy going life. Life becomes more or Jess serious 
stuff as they start to make themselves busy with questions related to directions and 
goals in life. 
Mamat told me that before being registered as a member of HTI he used to 
associate himself with the celebration of pleasure. He rarely took part in religious-
related activities because he felt that he was only a teenager who still wants to have 
much fun in life. Religion was simply much too seiious and would become a matter 
of urgency once he gets older. Then, he decided to become an Islamic activist 
because found that his celebrating pleasure as a way oflife was untenable. 
349 Awwas (1999). 
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A similar story was also told by Desti. Prior to her involvement with the 
movement, she had a life full of fun. She used to hang around in shopping malls 
regularly, visit the movie theatre frequently, and spend most of her time with her 
friends sharing rumours and making fun of each other. She suddenly realised that this 
kind of life fails to answer a number of her fundamental questions such as why was 
she born in the current situation where she is? What is her life for? What does it 
mean to be happy? These questions lead her to give up her former life and to 
discover the new one provided by the movement.350 
Likewise, another young fundamentalist, Doriman, proudly claimed that 
joining the movement had cost him a girlfriend. This relatively good-looking young 
man expressed to me how becoming an Islamic activist has turned him revolusioner 
(a revolutionary person). When he did his undergraduate studies in Brawijaya 
University in Malang, East Java, he built a special relationship with one of his female 
friends. But, as he started to be involved in various religious activities, mostly 
conducted by Islamic radical groups, he determined to end his love affair. Having a 
girl friend gave no answer to what kind of life he wanted to pursue.351 Here, the 
revolutionary change he talked about is a drastic move in his everyday life from one 
which involves having as much pleasure in life as possible to one which is fully 
committed to pursuing specific meanings and goals. 
Giving away a hedonistic lifestyle is also part of the story when the older 
generation of activists started to participate in the movement. Awwas notes that 
being an Islamic activist implies that one should prepare to have a difficult life.352 
Awwas himself, in fact, spent part of his life in jail. Such a difficult life, for Aziz, is a 
life based on the virtue of patience, thrift, steadfastness and abstinence. As a 
teenager, Aziz selected the opposite lifestyle to hedonism when he accepted an offer 
to be part of the Islamic fighters in Afghanistan. 353 Both A wwas and Aziz believe 
that, despite of all the hardship, they have found the true meaning of life. 
350 Interview with Desti. 
351 Interview with Dorirnan. 
352 Awwas (1999). 
353 Aziz (2004). 
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Eternal and Meaningful Happiness 
The remaining questions are: why are the fundamentalists so allergic to 
hedonism? What kind of meaning of life do they find in their identity as Muslims? 
What we witness here is the discovery of one specific meaning of life as much as the 
negation of another. A hedonistic lifestyle for sure provides directions and goals on 
how to live one's life. But it is the rejection of the meanings of life enlisted by this 
lifestyle that leads the activists to struggle for identity. To begin with, the questions 
put forward by Desti outlined before might be useful. One issue that bothered her 
several times is the meaning of happiness. This is highly significant because it is 
crucial in helping her to define and set the direction of her life. Differently put, Desti 
and her co-fundamentalists also care about the pursuit of pleasure in life and perceive 
it as equally fundamental. Yusanto, underlined this as he strongly believes that every 
human being, including Muslims in general and people like himself, are deeply 
obsessed with the issue of happiness. The meaning of happiness and the way to 
achieve it is the major factor that shapes how he runs his life and how he and his 
fellow activists are different from the rest of society. 354 The key problem of 
hedonism is that the fundamentalists are less certain about the meaning of happiness 
provided by this lifestyle. Consequently, they attempt to look for a more secured 
fulfilment of pleasure, which, they think they have truly found when they 
(re)discover themselves as a unique being called Muslim. 
In general, the human body is the main locus of hedonism. The body is 
transformed into a vehicle to reach a happy life in which happiness is a matter of 
fulfilling basic desires attached to the human body that creates a sense of pleasure. A 
moment of happiness is a moment of pleasure sensation when the desire for eating, 
having sex or possessing (new) goods is met through, for example, consumption.355 
The fundamentalists have little objection regarding the association of happiness with 
the sense of pleasure. But, they strongly reject the human body as the main site for 
achieving happiness. They believe that being independent from the capacity to 
reason the human body will be guided by hawa nafau. As the unbridled fulfilment of 
hawa nafsu will end up in immorality, they tend to see the body as the vehicle for sin 
and, therefore, must be disciplined. The disciplining of the body is possible through 
354 Interview with Yusanto. 
355 See, for example, Featherstone (l99la; 199lb). 
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asceticism, by embracing the virtue of thrift, patience, steadfastness, abstinence and 
moderation. It is the control and the domestication of hawa nafsu through asceticism 
that brings happiness. The sense of pleasure is reached when one is able to put one's 
own natural desires under the rule of, what they perceive as, autonomous 
consciousness, the home of the Islamic value reason. 
But how can happiness be reached through an ascetic body? Is their rejection 
of the notion of the body as a vehicle for pleasure entirely for religious reasons? The 
activists beleive that even though the meaning of happiness associated with the 
fulfilment of desire is morally accepted, hence ignoring the notion of the body as 
vehicle for sin, a happy life could only be dreamed of and will never be attained. 
Ibnu Chanifah, a member of the leadership board of Al-Muk:min, brings the issue of 
kepuasaan (satisfaction) into the fore. Regarding the desire to have a life of luxury 
that leads to a sort of race among Indonesians in general for possessing as many 
goods as possible, he wonders what the final result of the race will be. Being wealthy 
might be morally acceptable, but he asks himself what is the standard for satisfaction 
and being pleased with what we possess. For him, satisfaction has no standard 
because human desire has no limits. Fulfilling one desire will be only result in a bid 
for another one, so possessing as many luxurious goods as possible will never be 
sufficient. 356 
For the fundamentalists, since desire and satisfaction have no limits, the 
meaning of happiness becomes unclear. One never knows whether one has already 
been happy because the sense of pleasure at one moment will only be the true 
meaning of life before the fulfilment of another desire takes place. This is exactly the 
issue that disturbs Desti before she joined the movement as she kept asking herself 
about what it meant to be happy. She wondered whether happiness should be 
measured either in terms of possessing new products sold in the department stores or 
in terms of luxury. In fact, Desti and her fellow fundamentalists discover that under 
hedonism life is more uncertain with unclear directions and goals, except for the 
unbridled fulfilment of hawa nafsu.357 Their obsession with controlling hawa nafsu is 
also a bid to have a certain meaning of happiness, to have certain directions and 
goals in life. 
356 Interview with Chanifah. See also Awwas (1999); Thalib, M. (2007a). 
357 See, for example, Awwas (1999); Al-Jawi (2005b); Thalib, M (2007a). 
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Furthermore, Chanifah's reflection on the issue of satisfaction suggests that a 
hedonistic lifestyle might bring happiness, but this happiness will be short lived and 
will suddenly disappear as soon as a new desire emerges. Between the disappearance 
of happiness created by the fulfilment of one desire and the fulfilment of the next one 
is a moment of waiting for the celebration of another bodily pleasure. This is the 
moment of anxiety as one is nervously concerned with possible success (or failure) to 
reach (new) happiness. The fundamentalists take the moment of anxiety seriously as 
part of their rejection of hedonism. While its proponents might argue that a 
hedonistic lifestyle brings a perpetual happiness, the activists of this movement 
would note that hedonism can be equally seen as creating infinite anxiety. The 
activists are preoccupied with rasa tenang (the feeling of ease) as an opposite of 
gelisah (anxiety). As happiness is a matter of having the feeling of ease, they tend to 
associate those who live in luxury as having an uneasy life.358 Safruddin expressed to 
me with confidence that being an Islamic activist helps him to achieve an ultimate 
feeling of ease, one that he is unable to describe in words. He feels that his life 
becomes more worthy and meaningful since he is totally free from the control of his 
own desire, most importantly, for having a life full of wealth. Safruddin also has a 
feeling of relief because he was once in a position to have a luxurious life. Should he 
pursue hedonism, he believes that his life would be full of anxiety.359 
Equally significant, however, feelings of ease and anxiety are related to 
purchasing power. From the point of view of the class basis of this movement, a 
hedonistic lifestyle is largely not affordable. I will discuss in length the relations 
between the rejection of hedonism, the social class background and the rise of the 
consumer culture in Indonesia in Chapter 6. Suffice here to note that for 
fundamentalists such as Desti and Chanifah the feeling of anxiety is as real as the 
fact that they are financially less powerful to possess, for example, the newest model 
of cellular phone. Desti told me how her identity as a Muslim, provides her with a 
sense of unique being, and this helps to ease her feeling of being embarrassed 
because of possessing an out of mode Motorola hand-phone.360 In this sense anxiety 
is related to the lack of material power. They have a feeling of insecurity because 
they know for sure that their financial power is a hindrance to have the happy life 
358 See, for example, Awwas (1999); Thalib, M. (2007b). 
359 Interview with Safruddin. 
360 Interview with Desti. 
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according to hedonistic values. Rejecting hedonism and seeing it as contaminating 
the uniqueness of the Muslim identity helps the activists to redefine the meaning of 
happiness as new directions and goals in life without having to take any financial 
impediments into account. 
Pilgrimage to Life After-Death 
The fundamentalists admit that hedonism creates a more colourful and 
attractive life. The so called perhiasan dunia-literally means worldly decoration--
such as fashion, cars and houses, is, according to the salafi group, deeply 
enjoyable.361 This hedonistic world is equipped, added Awwas, with a huge number 
of facilities to entertain and to please human beings so that every normal person can 
easily fall into its arms.362 The director of Al-Mukmin, Wahyuddin, further claims 
that arts (especially music and film), sports (particularly sporting events relayed on 
TV screen) and games such as video games and TV quizes are among the top 
facilities of entertainment that give people great pleasure.363 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, this radical Muslim group questions such 
a colourful and attractive hedonism. They believe that it takes away Muslims' 
attention from the much more fundamental issue concerning meanings and goals in 
life. More importantly, "world jewellery" and entertainment facilities make Muslims 
relatively vulnerable to suffer from a sort of social disease they called cinta dunia 
dan takut mati-literally means falling in love with the world and being afraid to 
die.364 This term is an Indonesian translation from an Arabic word wahn. The 
activists use this word to describe a kind of mental state of being highly obsessed 
with worldly related bliss, especially the one that is related to wealth, power and sex. 
Once a Muslim is suffering from cinta dunia dan takut mati, s/he will be at the stage 
of mabuk dunia-an Indonesian expression used by them to describe a mental state 
of losing autonomous consciousness because of wahn-as she/he uncritically accepts 
the hedonistic world as desirable and as providing the real virtue of life. Key figures 
361 See, for example, "Kemiskinan yang Kalian Takutkan?" published in 2006 in 
http://www.darussalaf.or.id!tnodules.php?1nodload&na1ne=News&file=article&sid= 15 5 (accessed on 
28 November 2007). 
362 Awwas (1999). 
363 Interview with Wahyuddin. 
364 See, for example, Awwas (1999); Thalib, M. (2007b). 
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such as Ba'asyir repeatedly remind his fellow Muslims of the danger ofwahn.365 He 
claims that the Prophet Muhammad Himself has warned His followers that at the end 
of the world His umma will badly suffer from wahn as they refuse to leave the world 
for a new life in the hereafter. 
Clearly, the notion of dangerous cinta dunia is simply another way of 
rejecting the hedonistic lifestyle. What is significant for me is the specific part of 
hedonism that is denounced by this negative religious campaign against worldly 
related bliss. I understand hedonism as essentially celebrating life in the world.366 
Life is simply here and now, is only once and, hence, must be used to achieve 
pleasure as much as possible, by, among other things, setting free the body from any 
type of surveillance and disciplining power, especially one that is produced by 
traditional values such as religion. One might be getting older and die, but that is the 
end of the "real" life. The issue is by no means that dying is inevitable, but how to 
avoid dying in pain, that is, passing away before fully benefiting from the hedonistic 
lifestyle. Later, I will show that celebrating living in the world is at the heart of, and 
obtains its full strength from, consumer culture-some might call it postmodern 
culture367 -that is emerging in Indonesia. My concern here is that the issue of 
inevitable death is taken seriously by the fundamentalists. More than simply an end, 
mortality is crucially seen as the limit of this hedonistic "real" life. And because it 
has limits, hedonism must by no means be the true one. Instead, the real life must be 
eternal transcending life and death. 
Another HTI activist, Nopri, metaphorically expressed to me that this eternal 
life is like a long line that connects being born, living in the world, dying and the life 
after death. This connection is the main basis through which he discovers the 
meaning and the goal of his life.368 It seems to me that, for Nopri, his life is a 
pilgrimage, a trip from one point to another certain point; with a clear distinction 
between the past, the present and the future; with inescapable suffering and pain 
during the trip; and a promised life of happiness at the end of the passage. The term 
pilgrimage used here is not so different from the one used by Bauman.369 He applies 
the term to describe the formation of modem identity. In the postmodern world, 
365 Interview with Ba'asyir. 
366 See, for example, Featherstone (l99la; l99lb). 
367 See, for example, Baudrillard (1983b; 1998); Jameson (1991); Bauman (1996; 1998a). 
368 Interview with Nopri. 
369Bauman ( 1996). 
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identity is less like a pilgrim and becomes more like a tourist, moving and changing 
continually, being fully in the present and with little sense of past and future, and 
without a solid basis attached to a specific culture as in the modem world.37° For me 
the worth of this term is that it helps me to understand the way fundamentalists 
distinguish the conception of their life from the one of hedonism. Celebrating life in 
the world, that looks more like celebrating living in the present of postmodern 
identity, is unacceptable because it abandons, particularly, the life after death, which, 
for the fundamentalists, is the real one. The very Muslim identity they struggle for 
reminds them that their worldly life is part of a pilgrimage to the true life in the 
hereafter. 
The idea of life after death is crucial. Departing from merely condemning 
hedonism, this idea suggests alternative meanings and directions in life. This afterlife 
consists of surga (paradise) and neraka (hell) representing eternal pleasure and 
eternal pain. Paradise is reachable, regardless, for example, how much money one 
possesses. One simply needs to follow the right directions in one's pilgrimage from 
birth to death and to the life after death and one will find the true and never ending 
happiness at the end of the trip. As they are certain that the goal of their life is also to 
reach happiness in terms of pleasure as promised by a hedonistic lifestyle, their 
feeling of pleasure, here in the world, should be delayed for a while to achieve the 
real and the eternal happiness (paradise), by nurturing their life correctly, through 
defeating, among other things, the power of hawa nafsu on their body and mind. 371 
Aziz, regarding this matter, claims that being accused as an evil terrorist, 
being imprisoned and being sentenced with capital punishment create no feeling of 
sadness or regret for him for not having sufficient time to fully enjoy a wonderful 
life. 372 Because of the pain he has suffered in his life, Islam promises an eternal 
happy life in the hereafter. According to a text in a website frequented by Aziz, the 
life injannah (paradise) is full of a joy none ever see, hear, or, think about. In this 
life no-one will suffer from disease, will be old or will die. How can one not be 
happy and be satisfied, it continues, since in jannah one will live in a palace made of 
370 See also Bauman (2005); Baudrillard (1983b); Jameson (1983). 
371 This way of presenting the importance of the afterlife is commonly found in sermons by key 
fundamentalist figures. Almost every sermon in Friday prayer, that I attended when I was in Al-
Mukmin, either starts or concludes with the importance of having an eternal life in paradise. 
372 Aziz (2004). 
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pearl with a fairy in each of its comers. 373 Indeed, Aziz expresses no sign of anxiety 
since he strongly believes that should he be syahid, that is, die because of jihad, 
Islam, as he understands, promises him, among other things, a beautiful fairy 
accompanying and serving him in the afterlife. Paridah Abbas, the wife of another 
Bali Bomber, Ali Ghufron, echoes Aziz's claim. She also believes that a beautiful 
paradise fairy will be the present from God for her husband should he syahid. 374 It 
seems to me that Aziz is equally obsessed by sexual bliss commonly found in the 
hedonistic lifestyle. The difference is that he wants to have it eternally and to obtain 
it through a divinely legitimised way. It might be the promise of a fairy in the 
hereafter and other promises of unimagined worldly pleasure that makes another Bali 
bomber, Amrozi, keep his famous smile. For these promises generate a sense of 
certainty of what they are doing and what future they are directed towards. 
Moreover, according to Safruddin, he does not have to wait for the afterlife to 
be secured from anxiety. As soon as he rediscovers his Muslim identity that guides 
him how to live his life correctly, he feels both happy and more secure in the 
unfriendly world where he lives. Safruddin, for instance, is less worry about the 
social judgements he will receive because of his clothing and his appearance.375 
Similarly, the younger activists such as Mama!, Desti and Doriman, experience a 
new sensation as they find their real "me." They share a feeling of ease and relief, in 
stark contrast to nervousness, fear and being in doubt that often haunted them before 
joining the movement. 
*** 
In this chapter I explain that the fundamentalists' struggle for identity is to serve their 
desire for freedom and for certainty in life. The struggle is a response to the problems 
of oppression, inauthenticity and social disenchantment. The invasion of trends in 
lifestyle, immorality and hedonism into their everyday life is largely seen as the main 
source of the problem. Their fight against trends, immoral conduct and a hedonistic 
lifestyle involves resisting social control, to secure their own unique being and to 
373 The title of this text is "Bantahan atas Alasan Orang-orang yang Enggan Berjihad." The text was 
originally posted at http://www.istirnata.com. When I accessed it on 24 August 2007, it was posted at 
http://v.rww.gcocitics.conVbush clek/bantah.TXT. The same text was also posted at 
http://perangsalibOl.cjb.net 
374 Ahas, P. (2005). 
375 Interview with, Safruddin. 
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restore the meanings and the goals of their life. Trends in fashion and in lifestyle in 
general are taken as a form of social control. The fundamentalists' emphasis on their 
uniqueness mainly reflects the attempt to free themselves from being absorbed by the 
uniforming power of trends. In the process of securing their authenticity, the bid for 
uniqueness helps the fundamentalists to (re)discover secure place within unfriendly 
social surroundings, to discover their real "me" and, hence, to serve their desire for 
certainty in life. The fight against immorality is predominantly about the issue of 
autonomy. They take the rapid increase in immoral conduct prevalent in society at 
large as a sign of the emergence of hawa nafsu as the ruler of the human mind and 
body. Since humans who are dictated to by hawa nafsu are no longer independent 
subjects-even no longer humans-rejecting immorality is nothing more than 
restoring the rule of autonomous consciousness under the guidance of the Islamic 
value rationality. Finally, the resistance to hedonism is by and large related to the 
question of certainty. The activists are deeply concerned about the meanings and 
goals of their life. They reject hedonism because they find the meanings and goals 
provided by this lifestyle as unreal and untenable. 
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Chapter4 
RESISTANCE, BOUNDARIES AND IDENTITY SPACE 
In the preceding chapter, I argued that the fundamentalists' struggle for identity is a 
response to the problerns of oppression, inauthenticity and disenchantment. The 
primary sources of these problems are the commanding social trends in everyday life, 
the rapid rise of immorality in society at large and the popularity of a hedonistic 
lifestyle. The struggle for identity is at once to fight against these "social ills" and to 
serve the desire for freedom and the bid for certainty in life. In this chapter I will 
examine the identity that has been discussed thus far. What is the fundamentalists' 
identity9 How can the process of adopting their identity be understood in terms of 
rejecting oppression, inauthenticity and disenchantment? How does it serve the 
desire for freedom and autonomy on the one hand and the bid for certainty and 
security in life on the other hand? 
Dra'Wing on the type of identity politics outlined in the Introduction, I argue 
that the fundamentalists' identity is invented, rather than discovered. The 
construction of this identity depends upon its difference from, and its negation of, 
other tenns and identities. Following Castells, at the heart of this construction 
process is the act of resistance and of making boundaries. Their identity is 
constructed through the act of resisting the social ills and the domination of other 
identities. The identity is also produced through the making of boundaries, a sort of 
signifying process aimed at accentuating the difference between the activists and 
their others. Through resistance and boundaries, the construction of fundamentalists' 
identity ends up in the creation of what I call identity space. This space is initially the 
empty signifier of the actual identity under scrutiny. It is such a blank sign of being a 
fundamentalist because, through the play of difference, its meanings and substances 
are nothing other than the negativity of its others. 
Nevertheless, inspired by Butler and Turner, I argue that this emptiness is 
filled in with real actions tbat create substance and qualities of their identity. Its main 
content is in fact new subjectivities produced through tbe materialisation of new 
practices and performances implied by the constructed identity. The invention of 
fundamentalists' identity and the filling in of the space created by resistance and 
boundaries then results in the formation of the fundamentalist subject, which is 
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supposedly free from oppression originating in trends, immorality and hedonism. 
Furthermore, the new subject is transposed into, and in effect remakes, the 
fundamentalists' inner self. The remaking of self is a decision the activists make to 
adopt the new subjectivities through the process of learning and understanding new 
parctices and making routine the physical skills implied by new practices. 
In the following pages, I divide my discussion into two main parts. The first 
part focuses on the production of the fundamentalist identity. The next one examines 
how this identity produces the fundamentalist subject and remake fundamentalist 
self. 
DISCOURSE, BODY LANGUAGE AND MOVEMENT SITES 
The fundamentalists' identity is constructed through the practice of discourse. It is 
further present in body language and in places associated with the movements. At the 
heart of this identity construction process is negation of modernity and the West. The 
process also creates boundaries that allow the activists to enjoy a sense of freedom 
from being controlled by social ills and to acquire more certain meanings and goals 
of life. 
The Politics of Representation 
As previously noted, the fundamentalists were deeply concerned about the 
issue of authenticity. Ironically, the originality they are looking for is skilfully 
manufactured and uncritically taken up through writings, statements, public speeches 
and sermons conducted mainly by the movement's elite. There are, at least, two 
cultural identities, Islam and Indonesia, that predominantly present in both their 
writings and oral statements. Nevertheless, Islam is the most important one. In fact, 
Indonesia as a cultural identity is also adopted because, for the activists, it does not 
negate the Islamic identity. 
The construction of the fundamentalists' identity by making difference and 
negation of others highlights their uneasiness with and scepticism toward modernity. 
Modem life, in the way they understand it, is the site of the colonising trends, 
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immorality and hedonistic lifestyle already discussed. Producing one's identity by 
making a difference of modernity is a form of resistance that responds to the 
oppression and control by these social ills. It is also an attempt to draw the line that 
will keep the purity of self and everyday life from being contaminated by modem 
life. However, the construction of their identity is based upon their rejection of 
identities of, most notably, the West, but also the Christians and the Jews. As 
mentioned previously, for the activists of this movement, Christianity and Judaism 
represent the hostile religions. The West is seen as the embodiment of the crusade-
cum-zionist international as expressed by some activists. 
Islam as the main cultural identity presents in almost every type of writing 
and speech.376 Its presence can be found in the subject position inside the discourses 
that speak. Almost every fundamentalist who occupies this position, no matter what 
organisation she/he comes from, will speak--or, I should say, hail their audience-
from the standpoint of what they believe as the true Islam. Frequently, the activists 
even see and present themselves as Islam itself and take any response to their 
discourse as a reaction to Islam. In a debate between MMI and some elements of 
Liberal Islam, opinions that questioned their interpretation of Al-Qur'an verses were 
easily taken as an insult to this religion. 377 Islam also presents in the point of 
reference identified by the activists of this movement to divinely justify her/his 
subject position. Al-Qur'an, hadith and the view of medieval Islamic scholars are 
always the main source of quotations. 
Islam further appears in the style of language. I found many parts of their oral 
and verbal presentations look more like a projection of the Al-Qur'an language style 
into their own discourse. The language style that grounds, for instance, the way they 
occupy the subject position and the way they want audiences to listen to them 
resembles the one in Al-Qur'an that clarifies the presence of Allah. I attended a 
number of public sermons provided by various fignres from the movement elite. On 
many occasions the preacher spoke and used the language as if it was Allah or, at 
least, Al-Qu'ran itself that was speaking. This is hardly surprising. As I have just 
noted, the fundamentalists often and too confidently feel that they are the 
embodiment of the true Islam. 
376 I borrow the term "present" and "'presence" in such usage as " ... the presence of Islam ... " and 
" .. .Islam presents ... " from Stuart Hall's Cultural Identity and Diaspora ( 1990). 
377 See Thalib, Met al (2004). 
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Part of the language style is the usage of jargon, terms and concepts mostly in 
Arabic. During our conversation, Y oyok interestingly drew a line between the 
identities of him and the one of, what he thought, was mine. I asked his opinion on 
modem items such as computers and shopping malls. He felt that it would help me to 
understand his position on the issue better, if he could give his opinion in terms and 
concepts which are part of my identity. So, he nicely tried to explain his view by 
using a few English words and expressions because he took English as part of the 
identity of people like me who study in a foreign country. But then, after facing some 
language difficulties, he decided to retain his identity, by using several Arabic terms 
and concept, in outlining his view on modernity. And, yet, I could fully understand 
his views. Even, without both Arabic and English, I could still follow perfectly what 
he said. But, for Yoyok, Arabic and English, whatever cosmetic role their function 
was during the conversation, are significant as the language tells his audience, 
including myself, who he is and is not. 
The fundamentalists believe that the Islam they represent is the original and 
the true one. Its meanings and substance has existed for some fourteen-hundred 
years, when the Prophet Muhammad was still alive and received divine revelation 
from Allah. 378 They claim that what they are trying to do, and have been partly 
successful in so doing, is to excavate Islamic history, especially the period of 
Muhammad and the three Muslim generations after Him, and to rediscover an 
authentic Islamic self. The meaning and the content of Islamic self, they further add, 
is not something that needs to be interpreted. It is already there and ready to be 
adopted. 379 
But is there some original Islamic self hidden inside Islamic history waiting 
to be excavated? To begin with, the fundamentalists invented their identity by 
making use of Islamic teachings and history. This invention should be understood as 
just another way of interpreting, for instance, Muhammad's life, though in a less 
innovative manner. Surely, the activists of this movement will insist that their 
interpretation is the only true and legitimate one. Putting aside this bizarre claim, the 
interesting thing for me is that the fundamentalists do not only interpret, but also 
select the type of Islamic self they want to adopt. Copying literally Muhammad's 
way of life is at once the result of interpretation and the making of preference. I 
378 See, for example, Risa/ah Mujahidin December 2006. 
379 Aziz (2004). 
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argue that making preference involves a process of identification, of how the activists 
identify themselves with something else that will valorise their presence as real and 
significant. Referring to the logic of identification discussed in chapter 2, the 
positivity of Islamic self they think they have discovered inside Islamic teachings 
and history should have been produced through the negativity of others. Specifically, 
the presence of Islam and their preference of copying literally Muhammad's life as 
the true and the original identity occurs in the absence and the rejection of modernity. 
The Islamic identity might have existed in the past as they claim, but the past that is 
constructed through the activists' location in the present. 
In chapter 6 I will show that their relationship with modernity is more 
complicated than a simple blatant rejection, as they demonstrate a strong desire to be 
some sort of modem human being. They also propose a different way of 
understanding modernity and what modem life should be. At this stage, it is 
sufficient to say that copying literally Muhammad's life might lead them to become 
some sort of traditionalist Muslim. Nevertheless, this invented tradition is now an 
innovation that, kind of, turns the modem life up-side-down. And this is just one step 
in an attempt to ridicule and mock the world outside the identity space, the world 
which is seen as being dominated by trends in lifestyles, immorality and hedonism. 
As will be discussed later, turning the existing modem world up-side-down is one of 
the most important parts of resistance and of making boundaries. For by doing that 
they are able to purify and re-nurture their self and everyday life in their attempt to 
fulfil the desire for freedom and for certainty in life. 
The predominant presence of Islam in their discourse is made more notable 
by the fact that Islam, they believe, is absent in modem life. For Awwas, unless they 
promote and fight for it, Islam ... "hanya akan menjadi catatan pinggir saja (will only 
become a footnote)," suggesting its marginality in contemporary Indonesia.380 This 
marginality is more painful as they found that in the absence of Islam the identity of 
the West took centre stage. The West is present everywhere, in fashions and lifestyle, 
in names and words, in education, sports and arts, and in economy and politics. 
Therefore, the presence of Islam in their writing and speech always tends to be the 
site of the inferior, the defeated and the dominated. Islam, nicely put by 
Awwas ... "bagai sosok lelaki tua, terbaring tidak berdaya, papa, sakit-sakitan, 
380 Interview with Awwas. 
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diza/imi; tidak dilindungi hukum, dituduh teroris pula (looks like a figure of an old 
man, lying down and frail, poor, sickly, oppressed; without legal protection, also 
being accused of being a terrorist).''381 The personification ofislam into the body of a 
weak, old man has a long history. The activists of this movement believe that Islam 
used to be superior and dominant. Referring to the glorious days of the Islamic 
caliphates of the Umayyah (661-750), Abbasiyah (750-1517) and Utsmaniyah (15 J 7-
1924) dynasties, they told me that there was a time when Muslims were really the 
khayru ummah (the superior umma) as informed by Al-Qur'an.382 They were the 
most modem civilization, the centre of development and progress in philosophy, 
science and technology and, consequently, the world leader in almost all aspects of 
life. But it was a long time ago. At present, Muslims are divided into hundreds of 
nation states; are poor and backward; are involved in conflicts and wars; and have no 
power to fight against imperialism. 383 
On the other side is the West, which they see as the united civilization, the 
rich and the progressive, the peaceful, and, also, the imperialist. They argue that it 
took another long history before the West assumed the current superiority. Within 
this history they bitterly witnessed how Islam was defeated by the incoming new 
world super power. It all started with the Crusades that, they believe, were initiated 
by the West with the aim, among the others, to plunder the fruits of progress of 
Islamic civilization, especially in science and technology.384 Even though the 
caliphates survived and won the wars several times, this did not prevent Islam from 
being severely demoralised and, eventually, defeated. The fundamentalists often 
consider the rise ofKemal Pasha in Turkey in the early 1920s and the resignation of 
the last caliphate of Utsmaniyah dynasty as the day when Islam was finally put into 
the drawer of history. What they inherited is an inferior Islam; Islam as in the body 
of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who is also old, weak, sickly, poor and accused of being a 
terrorist. Now, it seems that this defeated Islam wants to take revenge when its 
presence is so pervasive in the fundamentalists' writing, statements, pub lie speeches 
and sermons. 
"'Awwas (2005a: 135). 
3
"' Interviews with Yusanto, Yoyok, Oni, and Nopri; Amhar (2004); Al-Wa'ie March 2004; Al-Wa 'ie 
March2005. 
'"See Amhar (2004); Al-Wa'ie March 2004; Al-Wa'ie March 2005. 
'"'See Amhar (2004); Al-Wa 'ie March 2004; APVa 'ie March 2005. See also Annstrong (2000) for a 
tnore balanced and fair account of Islamic history. 
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The fundamentalists also see themselves as Indonesian. In his plea, for 
instance, Ba' asyir blamed the US and its allies for pressuring the government to 
charge him with anti-terrorism. For him, the charge was a challenge to the 
sovereignty of Indonesia by the US administration. Ba' asyir, a Yemeni descendant, 
asked his fellow Indonesians to rebuff the charge and to fight against the US 
intervention because it was the dignity of Indonesia as an independent nation-state 
that was at stake.385 Ba'asyir, as well as his fellow fundamentalists-including those 
of HT! who look to be more interested in the issue of a world caliphate-had no real 
difficulties in combining the presence of Islam and Indonesia in their discourse. This 
is partly because they very often took for granted the fact of Indonesia being a 
majority Muslim country and, hence, regarded Indonesia as a Muslim country in 
itself. 
The other important thing is that, for them, Islam was the main backbone that 
fought Dutch imperialism. All major figures of the Indonesian national heroes, they 
claim, were Muslim. They also tried hard to convince Indonesian audiences that such 
figures as Thomas Matulessy, a national hero from Molluccas-a part of Indonesia 
where the number of Christians of the total population equals the number of 
Muslims-who was a Christian was in fact a Muslim. Consequently, they often 
arrogantly proclaimed themselves as the ones who have the sole right of leadership 
of Indonesia. Others, particularly the Christians, have contributed nothing to 
Indonesia's independence and, therefore, should not be given the same opportunities 
to lead the country.386 
More importantly, the presence of Indonesia is the site of hope. It is the site 
where they construct themselves as a man on a mission, an agent of change for a 
better Indonesia. I frequently found in their writings and speeches that they present 
themselves as someone who wants to contribute to the prosperity of Indonesia, to 
solve the current crisis that is damaging the country and to develop this nation-state a 
better future. 387 They are confident enough since they have Islam in their hands 
which they see as the divinely justified system. It is then hardly surprising that they 
portray their struggle for the implementation of shari'a and the establishment of an 
Islamic state as their answer to a better Indonesia. More than just religious duty, 
385 See Al-Anshari (2002); Awwas (2004a); Ba'asyir (2004). 
386 See, for example, Risa/ah Mujahidin September 2007; Risa/ah Mujahidin February 2008. 
387 See Awwas (1999, 2005a); Yusanto (2001; 2007b); Abdurrabman (2007); Al-Khaththath (2007); 
Thalib, M (2007b ); Risa/ah Mujahidin, May 2007 
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A wwas and Shobbarin told me that implementing Islamic teachings in every aspect 
of life will bring prosperity, progress and happiness to all Indonesians regardless of 
ethnic and religinus backgrounds. At the same time, it is, for them, a big chance to 
show the world what Islam---the inferior and the defeated---can actually do. 
The Look of the Body 
The resistance shown towards modem life and the West is more apparent in 
body language. Islam that is adopted through the practices of discourse presents in a 
distinguishing look of the fundamentalists' body. The boundaries, that are supposed 
to safeguard the fundamentalists' self from being contaminated by other identities, 
appear in such form as the hijab, the kopiah, the turban and the beard. The hijab, in 
particular, dominates the image of Islam as presented by this radical Muslim group. 
In this section, my discussion will focus mainly on the hijab as the look of the 
fundamentalist body. 
As already noted, Islamic fashion is more than just Islamic rule on how to 
dress. More than anything else, it is also about rejecting, and distancing oneself from, 
any non-Islamic dress code. This is a very important issue for the fundamentalists. 
Should they fail to present themselves in a completely different body language, their 
existence of a supposedly unique being called a Muslim will be in doubt. This will be 
taken as a sign of being controlled-as usual, by the West-and of losing one's 
autonomous consciousness. Unsurprisingly, the activists discovered not only 
originality, but also autonomy and freedom, in Islamic fashion, 
Chanifah made an interesting point regarding the issue. He wondered why 
people often question the hijab and rarely question the bikini. A wwas shared the 
same concern. He was hurt when he found out that people frequently associate items 
such as a beard and the hijab with terrorism, but are rarely critical of the bikini and 
what he mentioned as "budaya telanjang" (literally "the culture of nudity"). For 
Awwas and his co-activists this is just another form of domination by the identity 
that is represented in the bikini and the culture of nudity-·that is, the identity of the 
West and of the Americans in particular according to Awwas. This is further 
evidenced, they argued, in the popularity of the Western fashion style among 
Indonesians. Instead, we should be fair by leaving these two types of dress as a 
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matter of preference and allowing people to make their own choice, insisted 
Chanifah.388 Questioning Muslim dress contradicts one's rights as a human being, 
added Shobbarin, to freely select the style of clothing one wants to adopt.189 
The issue of one's rights was also raise<l by the HT! activist, Desti. She told 
me that it is her right to protect her body from being controlled by either the media, 
advertisements, or, simply, the comments made by people surrounding her. 
Understandably, a female student in Al-Mukmin, Qisthi, concluded that those who 
do not wear the hijab, particularly non-Muslims, would easily become "korban 
mode" (the victim of trends). They will simply lose their freedom as a human being 
because they will always submit their bodies to the rule of, for example, trends in 
hair styles. Interestingly, I asked her opinions on trends in Islamic fashion, trends in 
the hijab and headscarf that are also presented by a number of Indonesian top models 
and are widely published in dozens of magazines and tabloids. Her first reaction was 
not a rejection of trends in fashion itself, but a rejection of the type of Islamic dress 
worn by the models that she believed was not properly in accordance with shari 'a. 
She later added another view, questioning the very public appearance of a female in a 
picture inside magazines that, she thought, contradicted Islamic teachings. However, 
based on her first reaction, it seems to me that Qisthi will not have a problem with 
trends in fashion as long as it is presented in the context of Islamic values and 
norms~articularly, the one that is interpreted by them. By implication, rather than 
rejecting them altogether, trends can become another site where Islam is presented. 
The presence of Islam will arguably challenge the domination of, what Chanifa see 
as, the bikini and, wbat Awwas takes as rhe culture of nudity in fashion. In fact, it is 
a matter of presenting Islam in a covered (female) body that is at stake. 
The way that the hijab symbolises and accentuates the autonomy that works 
through the body can also be seen in another way. Hijab literally means curtain. 
According to the activists of this movement, the curtain symbolises the boundary, the 
strict line of a less direct contact between men and women in everyday life. The aim, 
among other things, is to protect a woman's body from the gaze of a man. Here, the 
gaze of a man is taken as a form of domination. At first, the gaze itself is a form of 
exploitation. Then, such exploitation becomes more real when the female body-
under the control of the gaze of man-is transformed into an object that has a price. 
38g Interviews with Chanifah and Awwas. 
3ll9 Interview \Vith Shobbarin, 
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In short, the body is commodified. At the worst end of this dominating process 
through the eyes of man, a woman's body is nothing more than the slave of man's 
carnal desire.390 The dominating man's eyes present in every aspect of life. It does 
not necessarily mean the eyes of a real man standing in front of a real woman and 
uncovering her privacy by passionately looking at and enjoying her body. More 
importantly, it is about the way the female body is presented in public, by the arts, by 
the media and by teenagers in shopping malls, that always goes through the 
dominating man's eyes. This makes a woman lose her freedom as her appearance is 
dictated by man's desire. The hijab is a look of the body that has successfully 
escaped the dictating gaze of man. By wearing the hijab one does not have to worry 
about one's appearance, whether one is slim and one's skin is white enough, as 
demanded by the man's eyes through, for example, advertisements. 
The Movement Sites 
In the introductory part of this chapter I noted that the positivity of resistance 
and boundaries is the production of identity space. This space is most easily seen in 
the physical places associated with the movements. They include the headquarters 
and the branch offices of organisations; educational institutions such as pesantren 
and Islamic schools; the activists meeting points such as mosques, various parts of 
university campuses and book shops; and sites of actions such as areas of conflict, 
military camps and public venues where protest are staged, or sermon are provided. 
These movement sites are a sterilised space, to use Aziz's expressions when 
he described the military camp he attended in the borders between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan in the early I 990s.391 "Disitu aku memulai kehidupan yang sama sekali baru 
(There [in the borders between Afghanistan and Pakistan] I started a totally new 
life)," claimed Aziz, ''kehidupan yang betul-betul bersih sekalipun tidak ... steril JOO 
persen (a life which is truly clean though not 100 per cent sterile)." 392 In fact, for the 
majority of activists, these are the places where no one will find social ills. In places 
390 See "Di Balik Kelembutan Suaramu" published on 5 July 2003 in http://www.asyasvariah.com 
(accessed on 7 November 2007); "Mene!YJT Pesona, Menuai Petaka" published on 30 October 2007 in 
http://;;ww.damssalaf.or.id (accessed on 7 November 2007); "Bereskan pakian Sebelum Shala!" 
r,ublished on 8 January 2008 in http:if\Nww.<lamssalaforg (axessed on 26 February 2008). 
·" Aziz (2004: 46). 
392 Aziz (2004: 46). 
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such as organisation's offices and pesantren contacts with the outside modem world 
are strictly monitored usually by the leaders and the elite. In Al-Mukmin, for 
example, television and radio are prohibited because, in the view of the school 
leaders, both media could encourage students to participate in various trends in 
lifestyle, immoral conduct and hedonism into. When I visited Al-Mukmin for the 
first time, it was initially very difficult for me to talk with the students. As an 
outsider some teachers took my presence to be no different from television and radio. 
They thought that I would be an intrusion and contaminate their sterilised students. 
Even one of them broke into one of meetings that I had with the male students, 
persuaded me to leave and talked angrily to the students as if he just turned off the 
TV. 
In these places, while the identities of the Jews and, particularly, the 
Christians are mostly absent, the identity of the West still presents. However, its 
presence is no longer in as a dominating and superior force as usually projected by 
the fundamentalists. By and large, the West presents in two ways. First, it presents in 
items which have been ideologically neutralised and are seen as less dangerous. 
English, for example, exists strongly within this space. Even though it remains less 
important than Arabic, in Al-Mukmin there are certain days when the students are 
obliged to speak English in their daily conversations. I asked the pesantren director, 
Wahyuddin, who also has relatively fluent English, why the language is compulsory. 
He explained that English is only a tool to communicate, a tool, for instance, to 
present Islam to those who can only speak the language. He also added that it can 
help the students to acquire knowledge, as many scientific books are written in 
English. For him, English no longer belongs to the West and has now become a 
universal language. Rather than being suspicious of its universal character as just 
another form of disguised domination, he even proudly told his story to me of how 
he mastered English mostly through a self-learning process and by attending a few 
English courses provided by activists of the Church of Mormon back in his village in 
West Java some four decades ago. Second, the presence of the West in these places is 
the site of the defeated and the inferior. The West appears in, for instance, an 
American flag which is engulfed in flames during an anti-West mass demonstration. 
The West also appears in concepts, theories and ideas which are carefully learned, 
but severely criticised as untenable and treated as second best compared to the one 
provided by Islam. The HT! branch office in Y ogyakarta, for example, was the main 
139 
meeting point where the activists of this organisation discussed and shared their 
knowledge about democracy and capitalism. The aim is to prove the inferiority of 
both systems to shari'a. 
The places associated with the movement also have strict boundaries that 
separate this space from its surroundings. In sites of actions where protest is staged 
the boundaries are very obvious. As I mentioned in chapter 2, the activists can be 
easily distinguished from bystanders by looking at their customs, the colours and 
styles of their fashions, the flags and the banners with specific symbols. More 
importantly, however, the boundaries provide the activists with a sense of security 
and certainty in life. These are the places where they belong. Places such as 
pesantren, the organisation's offices and mosques are like a home where they feel 
most secure, and safeguarded from unfriendly surroundings. There is always 
someone to share with and a friend to give help.393 These are also the places where 
the activists ensure that they will have a life which is true and original. Every aspect 
of life, every act, form of behaviour and attitude, is attached to specific values and 
nonns and is always in accordance with Islamic teachings. 394 This is where they find 
the real meaning of life they are earnestly seeking. 
THE PRACTICE OF PIETY 
Nevertheless, the activists by no means turn fundamentalist by simply producing and 
adopting an Islamic identity in writing and speech, wearing Muslim dress, or, being 
part of places such as pesantren, organisation offices and military training camps. 
Instead, resistance and boundaries implied by this identity construction process 
initially create only the identity space. It is then through this space they start the real 
process of becoming fundamentalist. At this point, I can understand why wearing the 
hijab or being involved in actions is just the beginning of a new life for the majority 
of activists. What exactly the new life is involves the new practices implied by the 
form and the expression of Islamic identity. Muslim dress, for instance, implies that 
one must conduct compulsory ritual practices regularly. It also means that one has to 
393 lntervie\v with Abbas. 
394 Group iliscussion with the Al-l\.1ukmin's male students. 
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stop being influenced by trends in fashion styles. The new life, in this sense, is the 
lifo of committing oneself to the practice of piety. 
More importantly, the new life, the very practice of piety, leads to the 
construction of a new personality. Tiie h!iab, kopiah, beard and Arabic language are 
equally a part of the process of becoming a new person. However, the new 
personality is not something that is learned from Islamic teachings. Nor is it an 
outcome of one's knowledge about Al-Qur'an and hadith. The new personality is 
instead grounded in the practice of piety implied by the constructed identity 
mentioned above. This is why the changing personality is a matter of new conduct, 
behaviour and attitude attached to, for example, pesantren. In fact, it was these 
consequences at the level of conduct, behaviour and attitude that initially prevented 
the parents of HTI activist, Dian, from giving her permission to wear a headscarf. 
They were hesitant to allow her to wear it because they thought that her behaviour 
was too far from and contradicted the identiry represented by the headscarf.395 
In the following pages, I will discuss two issues. First, the changing of life 
and personality is a long process involving discipline, surveillance and punishment. 
Second, such a long process is confirmed by the fact that becoming fundamentalist is 
a matter of learning a great deal of new things and of trying to make them enjoyable. 
Pietism and the Production of the Fundamentalist Subject 
How do they fill in the identity space? Whal does it mean to have a new life? 
Speaking about the time he spent in a temporary pesanlren during Ramadhan when 
he was at high school, Aziz sensed the beginning of a new life that was completely 
different from the one he had before. 396 Des ti echoed this sentiment. She took some 
time to think carefully and thoroughly before she made the decision to join the 
movement and, hence, to adopt Islamic fashion, because she knew for sure that once 
she wore the hijab there would be consequences that would radically change her life. 
It meant that she could no longer do such things as visiting the cinema, hanging 
around in shopping malls, and having fun with both her male and female friends by, 
for example, sharing gossip. The Al-Mukmin' s students became aware of the new 
395 Interview with Dian. 
396 Aziz (2004: 32-3). 
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life through such things as the absence of television, as well as radio, tape recorders 
and VCD players, in their entire daily activities. For some male students this meant 
tbey stopped watching tbe matches of tbeir favourite soccer teams. They told me how 
they missed the likes of Frank Lampard and Steven Gerrard, two soccer stars in the 
English Premier League. 
The process of the beginning of a new life is referred to by A ~:was as islah, 
which is an Arabic term which he translated into Indonesian as reformasi (literally 
reform). He selects tbe word reformasi because, for him, it is a process to improve 
one's life, to fix one's wrongdoings in the past by adopting the right and true way of 
life for a better future, not only here in the world, but also in the life after death. 397 
More importantly, the activists must change their life as they are no longer the same 
person they used to be. In fact, the first reaction commonly made by people 
surrounding them, their friends and their family, is notice to their new personality. 
The activists were simply seen as a different person to tbe one they were before. Aziz 
noticed this when he went back to the school after finishing the temporary pesantren. 
He remembered how his friends reacted uneasily to his new personality. Some were 
even upset and insulted him as Aziz's new personality seemed to create a gap 
between them. He, for the first time, refused to be physically touched by his female 
friends. 398 For Dian, it was her parents who looked strangely at the hijab and 
wondered about her personality implied by tbe fashion she was wearing. From then 
they realised, particularly her father, that she was no longer the same daughter they 
used to know. Mamat' s parents also noticed that his personality has changed. 
However, unlike Dian's parents, his father seemed to be uncomfortable with his new 
look as it led to tensions and a number of conflicts between tbem. 399 
The view of Dian's parents, that tbe headscarf implies specific behaviour and 
attitudes, is indeed the common view among Indonesians. It has been widely 
believed for some time, particularly among the Muslims, that those who wear the 
jilbab (another te1m commonly used by Indonesians for headscarf) and the baju koko 
must be the faithful ones. Their mere appearance confirms that they are more pions 
than other Muslims who do not adopt this dtess code. The fundamentalists take this 
very seriously. They also believe that the form and the expression of Islamic identity 
391 Awwas (1999). 
'" Aziz (2004: 34-5). 
399 Interview with Matnat. 
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they produce and adopt have to be associated with the practice of piety. Later I will 
explain how this twns into a surveillance system that disciplines the activists to be 
always consistent with the (new) subjectivity. What I am going to discuss at this 
stage is the importance of being pious as the primary foundation of the 
fundamentalist subjecL 
The disciplinary practices 
To begin with, what does it mean to be faithful? The simple answer, as we 
would expect from the fundamentalists, is to follow strictly and literally Islamic 
teachings as stated in Al-Qur'an and as conducted by Muhammad. However, in 
practice, following Islamic teachings is not that simple. This is not because the 
meanings of Al-Qur'an and badith depend on interpretation and, hence, tend to be 
relative, as the Liberal Islam would argue. Rather, for the activists of this movement, 
it is due to the fact that the human subject is an entity that is divided into value 
reason and hawa nafsu. As discussed in chapter 3 a full commitment to Islamic 
teachings indicates the rule of value reason over hawa naftu. The problem is that it is 
not always the case and, as a matter of fact, hawa naftu often wins the battle. In this 
situation, the fundamentalists argue, a Muslim does not only fail to follow Islamic 
teachings correctly, but also loses her/bis autonomous consciousness. In this sense, 
defeating hawa najrn is the key element of being faithful. Becoming the person 
implied by, for example, Islamic fashion is basically a matter of putting one's natural 
instinctive impulses under the guidance offslamic value rationality. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that taming one's basic desires is as simple 
as an outcome of the inner battle between Islamic value reason and Islamic id 
discussed above. Nor does the ability to menahan diri as frequently claimed by 
figures such as Ba'asyir and Awwas, reflects one's better understanding of Islamic 
teachings, as the activists of this movement would have us to believe. Instead, to 
defeat hawa nafsu the fundamentalists take the battle to the level of the body and 
daily practices through which their natural instinctive impulses are safely managed 
and, during the process, the fundamentalist subject is created. More to the point, 
controlling hawa nafsu implies some regulations of the body: The body must be 
disciplined to prevent it from being too preoccupied with pleasure sensation, by 
applying some prohibitions and/or limitations on the fulfilment of basic desires. 
Prohibitions and limitations often mean control of several parts of the body: control 
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of eyes, control of ears, control of mouth, control of stomach, and, perhaps the most 
important one, control of the sexual organ. The battle against hawa nafeu in this 
respect is a battle on almost every inch of the humru1 body. The fundamentalists 
believe that they can win the battle by virtue of steadfastness, abstinence and 
moderation, among other things. 
I frequently heard an interesting claim made in the sermons provided by 
several figures of this movement, mostly during tbe Friday prayer, that during our 
life here in the world, we are always under the surveillance of our own organs such 
as the hands Md legs. Later, on judgement day, when every human is questioned by 
Allah about one's conducts in life, it will be the organs that reply. While humans 
might mislead God by manipulating the answers, the organs such as legs will 
respond honestly to every question being asked. To be fair, I also often heard the 
same story about the talking human organs in the hereafter explained in sermons by 
Muslims without a radical Islamic background. The important thing is such claims 
connect logically to the entire project of controlling hawa nafeu through real actions 
at the level of the body. By telling their audiences the story of talking organs they 
valorise the regulated body as significMt and real. 
The view of the male activists on the hijab is another example of how the 
activists underline the importance of discipline and control. Both the top figures such 
as Ba'asyir, Awwas and Safruddin as well as the rank-and-file take the hijab as 
equally significant for regulation of the body of male activists.400 They claimed that 
the hijab, which protects the female body from being publicly displayed, helps the 
Muslim male to control his eyes. The hijab, which they thought makes the woman 
unattractive, will then help the Muslim male to discipline his sexual organ. I tried to 
debate this issue by arguing that sometimes male sexual desire could be a matter of 
imagination about, rather than seeing directly, the female body. But even female 
activists such as Desti reject this view. She strongly believes that disciplining the 
male sexual organ must start first and foremost with controlling a ='s eyes.401 
The regulation of body is manifested in a series of religious practices. There 
are a number of compulsory and highly recommended ritual practices that the 
activists must fulfil. The activists have to conduct prayers five times a day and fast 
during Ramadhan. The Islamic daily prayer, for example, is not only a matter of 
40-0 I asked about the hijab when talking to almost all activists. 
.tot Interview with f)esti. 
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worshipping Allah, but also about specific actions and movements of the body. From 
the secular point of view, the praying is more like a physical exercise that must be 
conducted at a specific time. During the praying~or, I should say during the 
exercise--the body is assumed lo be detached from worldly affairs by symbolising 
every movement as the embodiment of human submission to Allah. The body 
movements will help to empty the human mind from any worldly influences and 
allow the mind to be fully focused on worshipping Allah. The praying then is the 
time when the body is freed from the influences of such things as modern trends, 
immoral conduct, a hedonistic lifestyle and materialism found in everyday life and, 
hence, the control of hawa naftu. 
Such regulation of the body is more apparent during fasting. This ritual is 
about not having food and drink for a certain period during the day for one month. 
However, fasting is more than a simple starving exercise. During the fasting it is also 
compulsory for Muslims to behave in a certain way. For example, one must be able 
to manage one's temper and, most of all, to discipline one's sexual desire. Even 
controlling emotion and the sexual organ is often seen as the most essential aspect of 
fasting. The activists said to me that they often conducted puasa sunat (non 
obligatory, but highly recommended .. fasting) as part of the exercise to menahan diri. 
Mamat, for example, told me how he struggled almost every day to fight the 
temptation arousing from the appearance of his female university mates with tight T-
shirts. He said that his only defence was the recommended fasting which he 
conducted regularly and which he believed helped him to suppress sexual desires. 
These ritual practices are the main features of the new life experienced by the 
activists. Living in places such as pesantren, organisation oflices and military 
training camps, for example, makes them become more committed lo daily prayer 
and fasting. Another feature involves practices that are less connected directly to 
worshipping Allah and more about human-to-human relations. However, the 
regulation of the body is not symbolical. Prohibitions and limitations are real and 
direct, aiming at controlling the body in everyday life activities. Here, the body is 
disciplined through a list of things to avoid. The list includes all daily routines seen 
as susceptible lo the unbridled fulfilment of human natural instinctive impulses. The 
things to avoid may vary in different fundamentalist organisations. In Al-Mukmin, as 
mentioned previously, TV and almost every type of electronic media is prohibited. I 
also hardly ever found popular magazines and tabloids, including those of the major 
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national weeklie". When I talked to both female and male students J asked them why 
they are not allowed to have access to the media, at least, as long as they are inside 
the pesantren surroundings. The common answers were that the media was 
prohibited to safeguard the students from temptation and seduction brought about by 
its sounds and pictures. Similar responses were given to me by the teachers and the 
elite. The media must be banned because most of its contents are the celebration of 
hawa nafsu. 
It seems that the fundamentalists might be right in saying they prohibit TV 
and other media in their everyday life. But it is equally true that this is merely a 
simple regulation ofthe body. In this sense, turning off the TV is a form of control of 
fundamentalists' eyes, on what to see and what not to see. Hence, turning off the TV 
is no different to putting the hijab on the female body. Prohibiting TV could also be 
seen as a way to discipline the sexual organ. Both the students and the teachers in Al-
Mukmin seemed to believe that by preventing themselves from enjoying its sounds 
and pictures, they will be Jess sexually stimulated. In this regard, a female teacher, 
Khotijah, claimed that she will do whatever she thinks necessary to protect the 
students from bad influences, even if it means imprisoning them.402 This claim is 
echoed by another FPJ figure, Almascaty. He argues that the life of a Muslim who 
wholeheartedly commits it to a life for Allah is like a prison. This life is full of rules 
and limitations. However, rules and limitations on how one has to behave, in the end, 
will bring happiness.403 
However, it is the regulation of how a woman and a man have to interact with 
each other, perhaps more than anything else, which is the most important issue in the 
entire edifice of controlling hawa nafsu through a disciplined body. By and large, all 
fundamentalist groups apply a strict rule on separation between their male and 
female activists. In the praying congregation, in a religious discussions, in religious 
mass rally, in seminars and in street protests, the male and female activists are never 
in the same area. They are never allowed to be together except for some very good 
reason, and one can easily see the definite boundaries that separate them. The 
contacts between both sexes are allowed, but firmly regulated. Physical contact is 
prohibited and eye contact is limited. Communications are permitted for activities 
402 This '\Vas comment made by Khotijah in the group discussion v.•ith the Al-Mukmin's female 
students she attended. 
403 Almascaty (200!: 49). 
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such as religious discussions and seminars, but there are a number of rules on how to 
behave when talking with and listening to each other. The main reason for strict 
separation and limited contact is that both men and women, the activists believe, are 
prone to be sexually tempted by each other.404 Desti explained to me that a man 
easily falls in love by simply looking with his eyes. For a woman, she added, the 
physical touch is more important. The primary aim of regulating the male and female 
activists' interactions hence is to discipline the sexual organ.405 
Regulation of the body and daily practices end up in behaviour and attitudes 
attached to piety. Now, the beginning of a new life is more than just prohibitions and 
limitations. It is also a matter of how a pious person should become and what kind of 
attitude one should adopt. In general, the activists frequently claimed that they 
become more committed to Islamic ritual practices. They considered themselves as 
persons who loves praying and fasting. An Al-Mukmin's student, Rifki, told me how 
he deeply regretted and felt sorrow because he once missed the time for conducting 
sholat dhuha (dhuha prayer)--which is not compulsory and he need not be 
considered as committing a sin for abandoning it. For Rifki and his school mates, this 
should be the way a true Muslim behaves regardiug religious practices. Regret and 
sorrow represent the correct attitude of a pious person. Indeed, the majority of 
activists would not challenge Rifki 's claim. They also strongly believed that enjoying 
the religious practices is the correct attitude of the faithful. It will also bring positive 
influences to bear on one's day-to-day behaviour. For Doriman, this implies that he 
should behave properly in speaking and talking to others. Doriman, for example, felt 
that since becoming a new person with his gamis, he always wanted to talk about 
Islam. He started to frequently quote the Al-Qur'an verses to support his views when 
discussing a range of socio-political issues. He also planned to apply an "Islamic 
point of view" as the theoretical basis for his master's thesis. Doriman's friends 
apparently took the change in his style of speaking seriously as they started to 
nickname him ustadz (religious teacher).406 
404 See, for example, An-Nabhani (2001 ). 
405 See, for example, Awwas (1999). 
406 Interview with Doriman. 
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Surveillance and punishments 
Nevertheless, insisting on the importance of conduct, behaviour and attitude 
is one thing, adopting them is another issue. The activists told me how long and 
difficult the path is that they have gone through to become, in their mvn 
interpretation, a true and original Muslim. And, yet, they felt that they are still in the 
process of becoming such a being.4°' Regulation of the body and daily practices were 
not undertaken easily, at least, in the earliest stage of becoming the new person. 
Some honestly told me that abandoning the old way of life, including beloved 
hobbies and favonrite things, was initially very painful. 
It seemed to me that the remnants of those painful years are still with 
Chanifah. He used to be extremely interested in art and possesses some talents. He 
was and remains a skilled guitar player and a good singer. He was also formerly a 
theatre artist During the conversation we discussed the current Islamic music in 
Indonesia, particularly, the popularity of nasyid. Even though his students in Al-
Mukmin loved it very much and took it as representing Islam, Chanifah did not like 
nac.yid because of "kurang nilai seninya (its lack of artistic value)." But these were 
all things in the past With a glimpse of sorrow in his eyes and a sound of sadness in 
his voice, he explained to me that he simply had to leave it behind. He also decided 
not to transfer his artistic skills tQ his children, not to teach them how to play gnitar 
and how to sing, because it was not allowed in Al-Mukmin. Then he quickly sounded 
more optimistic by claiming that, despite the hardship aod the pains, he was thankful 
and felt happier with his new life. After all, for activists such as Y oyok, Siti and 
Desti, this difficult life was a result of free and independent choice. It was one's own 
decision, they claimed, consciously made without being imposed by someone else, to 
select the life and the kind of subject they want to be. Furthermore, it is the certainty 
of having happiness, at least, later in the afterlife that strongly motivates them to 
permit restrictions of their body and everyday life. 
More importantly, the difficulties of a new life imply that regulation of the 
body and daily practices were by no means uncomplicated. The fundamentalists, 
particularly the younger generations, did feel like they were living in a prison. There 
was a time, though 11ot often, when they wanted to escape from all prohibitions and 
limitations. Dian, for example, was still struggling to strictly regulate her body. She 
4
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made it clear to me that she was sometimes still influenced by trends in fashion. It is 
natural for women, she tried to argue, to be easily tempted by afashion style. Her 
fellow HT! member, Siti, shared a similar experience. Even for her age-she was in 
the early 40s-and for the time she spent in the organisation-more than fifteen 
years-the difficulties of regulating the body and freeing one self from being 
tempted by worldly influences were still around the comer.408 Therefore, Dian, Siti 
and the majority of activists believe in the virtue of surveillance and punishment of 
their daily conduct and behaviour. Surveillance might not make the activists less 
vulnerable to such temptation faced by Dian, but it will prevent them from easily and 
deliberately breaking the prohibitions and limitations on the body. In particular, 
punishments will discourage the activists to break the rules of being a true Muslim. 
Surveillance, first and foremost, is conducted by every individual 
fundamentalist of their own acts and thoughts. Almost every activist I talked with 
claimed that once they changed, for example, their physical appearance, they 
automatically become vigilant about their own behaviour. Awwas, for instance, had 
always looked after his own conduct carefully since he adopted the Islamic identity. 
He always tried to make sure that his actions were in accordance with shari 'a and 
with the identity he represented. 409 The feeling of regret and guilt, sometimes 
followed by deep sadness, is the type of punishment available in this self-
surveillance system. Aziz, for example, claims how he cried throughout the whole 
night when he first realised all his wrongdoings in the past. He was in deep sorrow 
and considered punishing himself further by quitting the high school he attended. He 
then decided to continue his studies to please his parents, though by making his days 
in the school less enjoyable than they used to be.410 
The question, however, is "how effective 1s self-surveillance for the 
regulation of the fundamentalist body?" Self-surveillance is more complicated than it 
looks. This is by no means as simple as an activist watching her/his own self. 
Instead, they have to do that because they are extremely certain that Allah is always 
watching. The story of the watching human organs noted above, for the 
fundamentalists, is basically the surveillance of Allah at work. Hence, this kind of 
surveillance is taken to be as close as one's skin and bone and no-one will ever 
408 Interview with Siti, 
409 Interview with Awwas. 
410 Aziz (2004: 32-6). 
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escape from it. The activists frequently use the term ikhsan to describe their state of 
awareness of being continuously watched by God. Y usauto explains that ikhsan 
means one worships Allah as if one could see Him. Yet, even if one cannot actually 
see Allah, then one should believe that He always watches.411 For me, Yusanto's 
explanation of this term makes the surveillance of Allah appear more like a sort of 
panopticon.412 The state of awareness of being constantly watched by Allah is no 
different to the state of permanent visibility experienced by the disciplined body. 
Unsurprisingly, for the majority of activists this surveillance system is very effective. 
Furthermore, Allah possesses a range of severe punishments for the 
wrongdoers that no-one could ever imagine. The story of the painful torture one will 
re'-'eive after one dies and waits for the Judgement Day and, later, in hell should one 
die having sinned is frequently told to prove the credibility of Allah's punishments. 
Kurnia, by quoting a hadith, notes that the softest punishment in hell for a sinner will 
be a slipper made of fire on one's feet whose heat will boil one's brain.413 Surely, 
this unimaginable punishment will make Aziz spend the night crying. He must be 
deeply sad knowing how much he has to pay in the afterlife for sins he conducted 
during his life in the world. It might also be the fear of such divine torture that has 
inspired him to do things such as the terrorist attack in Bali, which he thinks could 
help him to escape Allah's punishment for his sins in the past.414 Indeed, for Kurnia, 
the nature of the relationship between good Muslim and Allah is a mixture of love 
and fear. The fear of Allah could be more important. It makes Muslims always feel 
guilty and, hence, always want to do something good and extraordinary and to 
maintain consistency with the type of personality they have chosen. 
Surveillance also works collectively. At this level ir takes several forms. In 
organisations and educational institutions such as pesantren, surveillance is the main 
part of the disciplinary apparatus-~the rules, the norms and the code of conduct~ 
that regulate the body of activists or students. Should one fail to meet the standards 
of the organisation, there are always a range of punishments available in the system. 
In Al-Mukmin, for example, the student who missed the compulsory prayer could be 
punished physically. They could also be compelled to pay the price physically should 
they transgress the division that separates male and female sections within the school 
"' Y usanw ( !998). 
412 See Foucault (1991). 
m Kurnia (2007). 
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area without proper permission. Wahyuddin told me how he punished a student who 
was found drunk. The student was isolated and was forced to do heavy work (without 
pay) in the school tofu home industry. 
However, for the fundamentalists in general the presence of their fellow 
activists is more significant. An M'vH activist, Abbas, claimed that he always needed 
a like-minded friend who watched his conduct and corrected his wrongdoings. His 
decision to register himself in the organisation was partly to be in a place where he 
could meet someone who would watch him. The Al-Mukmin teacher, Farid, shared 
the same view. He said that as soon as someone already declares her/himself as a 
Muslim, she/he comes under the responsibility of the whole Muslim community. The 
community should not leave her/him alone and should always look after her/his 
conduct, behaviour and attitude.415 The significance of the term saling mengingatkan 
(reminding each other in terms of correcting misconduct) frequently mentioned by 
the activists now becomes apparent I did experience this sating mengingatkan 
attimde myselt: as I was several times reminded and corrected on how to behave 
properly. 
The surveillance of fellow fundamentalists partly explains why the activists 
tend to keep their entire lifo·--family, work, school, free time--close to the 
community where they belong, that is the community of Islamic fundamentalism. In 
the previous chapter I demonstrated that being part of the community of like-minded 
friends is part of an attempt to find and to be settled in a secure space that is 
supposed to safeguard them from unfriendly surroundings. Now, it seems that being 
secure is also about always being under the guardianship of like-minded friends, who 
will help them not only in fighting the dominant culture, bnt also in reconstructing 
their "real me" through disciplinary practices. Exclusion from the community is the 
real threat for the wrongdoers. Failing to meet the prohibitions and limitations on the 
body and practices could result in losing the secure space. Fear of the outside world 
and the guarantee of a secure feeling inside the community are apparently effective 
enough to discipline tbe activists to always meet the standards and the rules of the 
community. 
Surveillance could also work at the level of society as a whole. I mentioned 
before that there is a sort of pre-conception in the mind of Indonesian society, 
415 Intervie\vs \.vith Abbas and Farid. 
151 
particularly the Muslim one, about what and how a person with Islamic dress should 
be. This person is predominantly seen as the faithful. A range of socially desirable 
behaviours and attitudes of a pious person is attached to those who wear the baju 
koko and the hijab. Society will condemn the wearers of Islamic dress who do not 
meet the desirable standards. The fundamentalists are very much part of this society, 
They also believe that the person who represents an Islamic identity should comply 
with the code of conduct of a pious person. A number of fundamentalist figures, for 
instance, frequently underlined the importance of Islamic fashion to safeguard 
Muslims from committing sins.416 This basically means that, because of their very 
public presence and expression of their identity, the activists are always visible on 
the street, at the market, in university campuses, in fact in all public venues. They, 
therefore, could hardly escape the surveillance of society that works through, for 
example, a dress code associated with piety. Y ahya explained to me how his fashion 
protects him. He said that he would feel embarrassed to do such things as gambling 
because of the baju koko he wears. Not only is gambling prohibited in Islam, but 
more importantly, Yahya was concerned with people's reactions. He believed that 
should he commit such a sin, society will denounce him. He imagined that people 
will be shocked and ask "ustad kok ngono (how come a religious teacher behaves 
like that)?" Indeed, the activists always behave as if they are watched by society. The 
surveillance of society, through socially desirable conduct attached to the personality 
of the faithful, is also similar to a panopticon, the state of permanent visibility of a 
disciplined body, The fundamentalist hardly knows for sure whether society is really 
watching. But the fear of social condemnation and of being accused of hypocrisy for 
misconduct that contradicts the fashion will not allow them to take a risk by 
committing sins and pretending that no-one will notice. 
The Remaking of Fundamentalist Self 
In the previous section I demonstrated how the activists fill in the space 
created by the construction of the Islamic identity by producing the fundamentalist 
subject through disciplinary practices. Not only is the (new) subject supposed to be 
416 Interviews with Ba'asyiri Farid, Awwas, Yusanto and Safruddin, 
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free and independent, but also to be the uniqueness they are looking for. In the 
following discussions, my focus is mainly on the nature of freedom and autonomy. 
What does it mean to be free and to be independent when it comes to the formation 
of a fundamentalist subject through prohibitions, limitations and controls on the 
body? As I will shortly explain, being free and independent is a matter of one's 
capacity to take action on one's self. I call the capacity to take action on self as 
agency. 
A useful starting point might be the statements made by the activists 
themselves. As mentioned above, they claim that it is one's own decision to allow 
one's body and everyday life to be strictly regulated. Snrely, we could not understand 
the meaning of this statement without referring to their resistance of modernity and 
the West. However, in doing so, we could be trapped in the dilemma of the identity 
construction process through the play of difference. That is, freedom and autonomy 
tend to be seen as purely discursive and, hence, hardly exist in the real life of 
fundamentalists. Instead, if we take these statements as equally representing their real 
actions in life as fundamentalists and attach the actions to some process within the 
inner formation of fundamentalist selt: then we might sense some kind of agency at 
work. 
However, it is important not to forget that the sonrce of agency is not the 
mind of fundamentalists. The action on self instead originates in embodiment 
actions, in regulations of the body and daily practices. Hence, self, and to some 
extent the way of thinking, ls more an effect of embodiment actions. The question is 
"how exactly do regulations of the body and practices imply action on self?" The 
action on self, I argue, takes place through the learning process of becoming a 
fundamentalist. First, it is part of an attempt to transform the feeling of being forced 
to conduct such things as ritual practices into the feeling of wanting to do, for 
example, the daily prayer because one just loves to do it. Once the activists start to 
enjoy praying they no longer see it as merely regulation but an action which they 
willingly perform. This involves a learning process, because to reach the point of 
willingness they have to understand, for example, the meaning of praying, how it 
affects their life and how it benefits them. Second, agency is also part of a process 
that transposes disciplinary practices into one's inner self. This is a process of how 
the activists adopt new subjectivities implied by regulation of the body and daily 
practices which result in the formation of a new self. The adoption goes through 
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learning the disciplinary practices and, then, exercising and making them routine. 
\\'hat is learned is (new) skills of body movements associated v.1th regulated 
conduct, behaviour and attitude. 
Agency on regulated body 
Allow me to reiterate that becoming a fundamentalist is a relatively painful 
process. The activists, at least at the earlier stage, went through some difficulties as 
they permitted their body and daily practices to be strictly regulated. However, just 
as Chanifah said, the activists largely claimed that at the same time they felt happier. 
Regulation of the body and practices also created a positive sensation that is hard to 
describe and explain in words, insisted Safruddin.4l7 Similarly, when I asked the Al-
Mukmin's students about their feelings about the compulsory daily prayer, they told 
me that they did not know the best words to describe how good it makes them feel. 
How can this sort of masochism, a sense of pleasure derived from pain, be better 
understood? Part of the answer, as previously, has to do with the feeling of anxiety 
they are suffering from. Prohibitions and limitations cure this feeling by creating a 
sense of certainty and security of self and everyday life. Here I am concerned with 
the issue of agency. The feeling of pleasure derived from the regulated body 
indicates some form of action on self. 
By and large, the fundamentalists take religious practices such as the daily 
prayer and the fasting as compulsory first and foremost. From a religious point of 
view compulsory means that one has to conduct it and will be rewarded by Allah. 
Should one abandon it, one will be punished by Allah. Aside from its religious 
meanings, compulsory, more importantly, implies that, for the activists, Muslims 
simply have to conduct the prnctices without looking for any reason why they have 
to prny and fast. It is all about obeying Allah's rules. Muslims should not debate the 
rules. For what has been ruled by Allah must be good for all mankind. Instead of 
reason, Muslims will find hikmah (wisdom). It is a sort of worldly reward from Allah 
to those who are fully committed to worship Him. Hikmah, the activists argue, is not 
the reason why one has to conduct religious practices. It implies that should one find 
hikmah, she/he is still obliged to follow the practices. For example, conducting the 
daily prayer regularly could prevent Muslims from \'<Tongdoings such as stealing and 
417 Intervie\V with Safruddiu. 
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murdering. If all Muslims in a country such as Indonesia are fully committed to this 
religious practice, it will presumably end up in the creation of a healthy society with 
a low criminality rate. However, if the hikmah of a low criminality rate is the reason 
why the daily prayer is important, Muslims would think that they do not necessarily 
have to do it For the rate of criminality could be reduced, perhaps more effectively, 
by other means. 
Nevertheless, hikmah, the activists argue, will help Muslims to acquire better 
understanding of religious practices. It tells Muslims that behind those firm 
regulations there ate invaluable meanings and philosophies of life. Better 
understanding about meanings and philosophy of practices such as praying and 
fasting will then ease the feeling of being forced to conduct those rituals. Better 
understanding means that one is aware of one's own doings. One starts to realise the 
real significance of praying and fasting and therefore becomes more enthusiastic in 
pursuing these rituals. At this point, we now can make sense of their excitement, the 
feeling of happiness and enjoyment of practising the daily prayer and the fasting. 
More importantly, understanding through awareness of one own doings, creates a 
sense of autonomy. In this regard, the activists often talk about ikhlas. This is an 
Arabic modified term which literally means sincere. However, for them, it is more 
like a state of mind when one conducts religious practices out of one's free will to 
dedicate one's self to Allah. They believe that ikhlas is at a higher level than merely 
conducting religious practices. It signals a movement of Islamic values and norms 
from external regulation of the body into an internal part of the fundamentalist's self 
through the process of awareness. !kh/as is achieved when this inner transfonnation 
results in the formation of a new subjectivity through the process of transposing 
Islamic rituals into the fundamentalist's self. 
This line of argument is a conclusion I make based on my conversations with 
top figures such as Ba'asyir, Wahyuddin, M. Thalib, Awwas and Safruddin. The 
phases of obligation, hikmah and ikhlas, in conducting the Islamic rituals were also 
frequently presented in their writings and sermons. It is interesting to note how the 
same argument is reiterated when they talked about shari 'a, Ba' asyir said to me that 
implementing shari'a hardly different from common Islamic rituals: it is an 
obligation applied to all Muslims. Muslims are not allowed to compare shari'a with, 
for instance, democracy and decide which one is better for Indonesia. Shari 'a is "the 
direction of use" (English in original) of life issued by Allah, who created humans 
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and the very world in which we live, stated Wahyuddin. Hence, the idea that humans 
can make their own decisions about life without taking the guidance provided by the 
sole creator of humans, Allah, into consideration, he continued, is simply illogical. 
And Allah knows what is best for humans, added Awwas. He insisted that Allah will 
never order human beings to do things that will harm themselves. 
Ba'asyir told a story to me. When he was in prison, he was visited by a 
Buddhist monk from Thailand. The monk, he said, wanted to thank him for his 
struggle in attempting to implement shari'a. Ba'asyir explained that the monk 
happened to Jive for a while in Kelantan, Malaysia, where there was a sort oflslamic 
law. The monk found this Islamic law was far better than he had expected, as his 
religion was fully respected and the amount of immoral conduct was significantly 
reduced. Ba' asyir was then quick to conclude that Indonesians should take this story 
to be the real historical hikmah of Islamic law: that shari'a would create a better 
society, even from the point of view ofa non-Muslim. He further added that Muslims 
should learn from lifo experiences like this to enhance their understanding about 
Islamic values and norms. He ended his story by insisting that there will always he 
something positive about shari 'a we humans have yet to discover. 
The process of transforming praying and fasting from a religious obligation 
into conducting these rituals out of ikhlas might look easy and smooth. Instead, as I 
have frequently noted, this is a learning process that involves a number of trials and 
errors and takes quiet a long journey. Therefore, it is very important to know exactly 
how the activists experience this transformation and how they navigate their real 
lives as fundamentalists. Forthermore, I did find in their explanation of transforming 
obligation into ikhlas some forms of action on self. It confirms the making of the 
fundamentalist self as an effect of regulation of the body and daily practices, I have 
noticed. However, in the argument outlined to me by the key figures mentioned 
above, the form of action on self seems more as a result of a solely inner process, on 
how hikmah leads to ikhlas through better understanding and awareness of one own 
doings. The question remains how, particulatly, hikmah relates to actual disciplinary 
practices. The answer will help us to understand the way the fundamentalists cope 
with the difficulties they face in the process of becomiog new person. 
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The majoriiy of activists were n-0t as comfortable as we might think when, for 
example they first looked at their new appearance in gamis and hijab.418 There was a 
feeling of defiance as one realised this is not who one is. This is simply somebody 
different. It took some time for them to adopt this type of dress and to accept their 
new look as something normal. They undertook some trials privately in front of a 
mirror and publicly when attending events provided by the movement before being 
registered in the organisations. Some also chose a gradual process by, for example, 
wearing a headscarf sometimes, before replacing it with the hijab. Others still felt 
uneasy with the baju koko and gamis and only wore them at specific events such as 
at the Friday prayers. At the same time they also fully realised that they are obliged 
to wear Islamic fashion. It is part of ibadah as adopting Islamic dress, they believe, 
is explicitly mentioned in Al-Qur'an and, hence, a direct order from Allah. Should 
they fulfil this obligation, they will have a happy and better life here in the world and 
later in the afterlife. Therefore, they were initially both "crying" and "excited" when 
they allowed their body to be regulated: "crying" at being uncomfortable with the 
new personality and "excited" about the promise of a new life. 
However, the feeling of being uncomfortable did not disappear following the 
passage of time. It was not also erased by the excitement of a new life, nor by the 
promise of heaven. As expressed by Chanifah, this uncomfortable feeling was still 
with him even after some twenty-five years that he had spent in Al-Mukmin and will 
remain inside his heart for some time to come. Siti, who has been in the movement 
for more than a decade, also could still recall with some excitement the time when 
she was actively involved in hiking with her fellow university students.419 
Unsurprisingly, the younger generation, those who have been registered with the 
organisations for less than ten years, have spent most of their life as an activist to 
fight this uncomfortable feeling.420 
The activists often told me that the key difference between their old life and 
the new one is in the role of hawa nafeu. They had to leave the old life behind 
because it was the life controlled by hawa 114feu. Indeed, the notion of control of 
hawa nafeu reveals why it is extremely difficult for them to cure the pain of 
418 lnterviews with Siti, Desti, Doriman, :tvlarnat and Nopri; group discussions \.Vith the Al~Mukmin's 
male and female students. 
419 Interview with Siti. 
420 Interviews with Dian, Dortman, Mamat and Desti; group discussions with the Al~Muklnin 's male 
and female students. 
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abandoning one's old favourite habits and hobbies which are seen as immoral from 
the point of view of the new personality. It indicates that the very basis of the old life 
is the uncontrolled fulfilment of one's basic desires. As desires remain attached to 
one's body, the feeling of being uncomfortable, created from the regulation of human 
instinctive impulses, will be in place as long as they are alive. In other words, the 
uncomfortable feeling is a sort of unconscious resistance to regulation of their body 
and daily practices. This partly explains why they consciously permit the 
surveillance system to work on their life. Surveillance and punishments will strongly 
discipline their body and, at the same time, push their unconscious resistance into 
less dangerous zones, such as in the expression of sorrow when they spoke to me 
about their previous life. 
Nevertheless, surveillance was not the only way they coped with the 
uncomfortable feeling. To make it more enjoyable, they had to identify themselves 
with the new life, they had to accept and enjoy the discipline and control. One way of 
doing that is by creating positive values on new conduct, behaviour and attitude. For 
example, to signify his Islamic fashion, Fikri claimed that he had not worn blue jeans 
since he was in high school. At first, he explained that the positivity of adopting the 
baju koko and of not wearing blue jeans was that the price of the former is cheaper, 
Then, he added that blue jeans is the type of clothing for a cowboy who, he thought, 
was not an intellectual person. Finally, he talked about not wearing blue jeans as part 
of his effort to counter Western cultural domination.421 Desti also inscribed the 
positive value of her new appearance by insisting that she was no longer influenced 
by trends in fashion. It basically meant that she was not interested in possessing a 
new dress using money that she did not have. Not buying a new dress, she continued, 
implied that she would not enrich capitalists who, she said, were already wealthy.422 
Clearly, the positivity of a new life and of a new personality is produced 
through the negativity of other terms (blue jeans, trends in fashion and hedonism). 
More importantly, this positivity is hikmah, the worldly rewards for the regnlated 
body, that the activists were seeking. Hikmah is nothing more than justification of a 
new life and of a new personality because everything else other than, for example, 
wearing Islamic fashion, cannot be afforded. Such justification significantly 
functions to relief the pain of abandoning the old life. It also helps the activists to 
421 Interview with Fikri. 
422 Interview with Desti. 
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accept regulation of the body and daily practices as the only and the best altemative 
left for them in life. 
Hikmah in this sense is an invention. It is produced through the process of 
inscribing worldly values on 1itual practices. Such worldly values are, for instance, 
saving one's money as the benefit of not wearing blue jeans, of not buying a new 
dress and of not having a hedonistic lifestyle. A healthy body was also frequently 
noted as the worldly benefit for those who pray and fast regularly. In fact, the 
worldly benefits are many, claimed the activists. They told me that it was better for 
me to seriously conduct Islamic ritual practices and to find hikmah by myself instead 
of asking them about it. It is as if hikmah is already there and is waiting to be 
discovered. For me, they would rather say that if I could practise Islamic rituals, I 
would be able to create my own hikmah. Nevertheless, inscribing worldly values is a 
key step in transforming religious obligation into activities which are done willingly. 
With hikmah, practising daily prayer is not only compulsory, but also a need. It is 
both obligation and a reasonable form of action. 
I use the term "worldly values" because hikmah is always relevant to 
everyday life affairs. The benefits mentioned above are a matter of daily concern. 
Not only ordinary people, but also fundamentalists want to save money and to have a 
healthy body. Hikmah in this sense is a way to signify the regulated body as a better 
way to live everyday life. In contrast to those who see activists as both traditionalists 
and more preoccupied with the afterlife affairs, I argue that hikmah paves the way for 
them to engage with the modern world. It makes their new life and the new 
personality more real and contextual. Wea.ring the hijab, for example, becomes a 
form of action that is contextual. It deals with a number of issues they come across in 
everyday life; a matter of preventing oneself from consuming trends with money one 
hardly possesses, according to Desti. 
In fact, according to key figures such as Ba'asyir, Farid and Safrudin, hikmah 
is proof that a total commitment to Islamic values and nonns will not prevent 
Muslims from having a happy life here in the world. To be happy, one should not 
have to wait for paradise in the hereafter, as hikmah seems to bring a taste of joyful 
heaven here in the life before death. This explains Safruddin's peace of mind and the 
ecstasy experienced by the Al-Mukmin's students, when I asked them how it felt to 
perfonn Islamic ritual practices. This was further confirmed by younger activists 
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such as Desti, Doriman and Y!amat.423 Desti, for example, told me that wearing the 
hijab was not as bad as she first thought. After all, she could still enjoy her life, 
though in a different way of understanding and experiencing it. Even the happy life 
in this world enjoyed by fully committed Muslims, they insisted., is the better one as 
it is achieved in a divinely justified way. 
Learning and adopting the new self 
Transposing a regulated body and practices into one's inner self is not 
achieved through the work of hikmah only. The process of learning and exercising 
new skills to master new conduct, behaviour and attitudes implied by discipline and 
control also brings significant internal transformation. Indeed, through this process 
the regulation of the body and daily life result in the production of a new self. What 
is transposed into the fundamentalists' inner self is (new) subjectivities implied by 
the disciplinary practices. The new subjectivities are a number of noble 
characteristics highly valued by the fundamentalists. In the last part of this chapter, I 
will focus my discussion on how the activists master new skills of body movements 
associated with regulated conduct, behaviour and attitudes; and through which they 
take up the noble characteristics as part of their (new) self 
According to Kurnia, a Muslim must have akhlak mulia (noble character), 
particularly one who takes responsibility to propagate Islamic values and norms---in 
this case people like him and his co fundamentalists.424 For him, akhlak mulia 
includes such characteristics as shyness, patience, good-temperedness and kindness, 
honesty, being prudent and cautious in speaking, modesty and humbleness, always 
smiling, and always keeping one's promise. Awwas focuses on "sabar" (patience).425 
He believes that patience is the finest characteristics that Muslims like him and his 
fellow activists must adopt. Being patient, he claims, is more difficult than 
conducting jihad. The highest quality Muslim, he concludes, is someone who 
conducts jihad and who is always being patient. Other activists, particularly those of 
the salafi gronps, are also concerned with akhlak mulia. They claim that akJ1/ak mulia 
is in fact the v subjectivity of Muhammad which Muslims must imitate. They also 
insist that noble characteristics such as those outlined by Kurnia above are literally 
423 lnterviews \.Vith Desti, Doriman and Mamat. 
424 Kumia (2007). 
425 Awwas (1999), 
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mentioned in Al-Qur'an. By implication, being patient, for example, is part of 
ibadah.426 Even, for them, these noble characteristics could tell us about the faith 
quality of a Muslim. They believe that shyness is an essential peculiarity of the 
faithful. 427 
This akhlak mulia is generally good in itself. Many Indonesian Muslims 
without radical Islamic influences would also value highly these noble 
characteristics. Patience, for example, is often taken as the most significant 
characteristic that should be adopted by all Muslims regardless one's organisational 
and ideological backgrounds. However, it is hard to believe that the fundamentalists 
do actually adopt these noble characteristics in their real life. It is blatantly ironic that 
those who highly praise the characteristic of being kind to others should launch 
bloody attacks that kill hundreds of innocent people. Rather, following the first Bali 
bombing, I frequently noticed that activists such as Ghufron, Amrozi, Aziz, Azhahari 
and Top were publicly condemned by their fellow Indonesian Muslims for 
contradicting akhlak mulia and, hence, falsely representing Islam. Even within the 
movement itself, those who did not see the use of terrorism as divinely legitimate, 
particularly the salafi activists, supported this condemnation and sarcastically 
qnestioned the Islamic credentials of those who were involved in the atrocities.428 
Nevertheless, I did observe several noble characteristics mentioned above 
when 1 met the movement's leaders and rank-and-file. The most common and 
apparent characteristics, among the others, were shyness, moderateness and 
simplicity. They also insisted that other characteristics such as patience and kindness 
were equally significant, though more difficult, and hence take time to be adopted. 
More importantly, these characteristics were entirely new for the majority of 
activists. Desti, for example, was not that shy when she first joined the movement. 
She declared herself as cablak. Cablak, a slang expression among the youth in large 
cities in Java, means someone who speaks uninhibitedly. A woman who always 
speaks tbat way, within the cultural context of where she lived, is hardly regarded as 
a shy person. When she started to wear the hijab, her being cablak contradicted the 
426 Sce1 for example, '"Saudaraku, Koreksilah Pergauianmu," published in http:i/vv~'w.darussalaf.org 
on 21 December 2007 (accessed on 26 February 2008). 
427 
"Pernbatal-pcmbatal Keimana:n," pubtished in ll!!!l:ilwww.damssalaf.or.id on 12 October 2007 
(accessed on 7 November 2007). 
428 See, for example, Ba'abduh (2005). 
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subjectivity of her dress.429 Likewise, Nopri was not a shy young man initially. He 
used to interact freely and without any psychological baniers with all sorts of 
friends, with both male and female. Since becoming a member of HTI, Nopri was 
obliged to imitate different types of characteristics in associating himself with his 
friends and his social surroundings. 430 Aziz also recalls his days in primary and high 
school. It is the time when he considered himself as not being a moderate and 
humble person. Aziz saw himself as an ambitions young boy. He was always among 
the top ranking students in his class. He always wanted to work hard to present 
himself prominently as the best student. He also always wanted to win all academic 
competitions both at his school and at the town level where the school was located.431 
Unsurprisingly, for Desti, Nopri and Aziz, as well as for the majority of activists, 
being part of the movement implies that one is prepared to remake one's self by 
abandoning one's old personalities. This is the essential implication as they decide to 
allow their body and daily practices to be strictly regulated. 
It is important to understand that shyness, moderateness, simplicity, 
humbleness and other noble characteristics are deeply attached to the disciplinary 
practices. The activists rarely spoke about akhlak mulia in terms of some abstract 
concepts and theories. Instead, the noble characteristics, for them, were very often 
about the real embodiment actions, the actual body movements. Shyness, for 
example, is more physically bounded with a specific type of body movement such as 
avoiding direct eye contact. In fact, akhlak mulia is not an outcome of learning 
carefully Islamic values and norms. It is significantly more an effect of new conduct, 
behaviour and attirudes implied by regulation of the body and daily practices. It is 
produced through the process of adapting oneself to new conduct, behaviour and 
attitudes. The main way of adaptation is learning and exercising a number of new 
skills implied by, for example, new behaviour such as staying at a proper distance in 
interaction with one's opposite gender. Through learning and exercising, one's inner 
self will foci, learn and understand-in fact through a similar process of 
transformation from hikmah to ikhlas explained before-a new way of being a 
Muslim and of experiencing life. The end product of this process--when learning 
and exercising turn into normal daily routine---is the construction of akhlak mulia. In 
429 Interview with Desti. 
450 Interview with NoprL 
431 Aziz (2004). 
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this sense, more than merely a result of interpretation of Islamic teachings, 
fundamentalism is a matter of embodiment action. Being a fundamentalist is not only 
about what practices one physically conducts, but also about how one physically 
moves one's body parts. Being a fundamentalist implies being a skilful person in 
specific body movements and actions. 
As previously noted, being pious implies that the activists are obliged to 
conduct religious praetices. There are a few activists, however, who never participate 
in praying and fasting throughout their whole lives.432 The rituals are entirely new 
and they have to start from scratch. Most activists, on the other hand, have already 
practised them. They knew, for example, how to do the praying physically and 
memorised perfectly the praying recitations. The problem is they have not done it 
consistently and have not taken the practices as the genuine obligation one must 
fulfil. Another group of fundamentalists also already possessed the physical skill of 
praying. They even seriously took the praying and the fasting as compulsory for all 
adult Muslims and conducted them regularly. Yet, they have not found the real 
meanings of praying and fasting. They have done the rituals merely as part of a 
social habit because they, for instance, were born in a family who has an Islamic 
committed background. 433 Regardless of these differences, the praying and the 
fasting are relatively new for the majority of activists. They all have to learn and to 
exercise the rituals, should they want to master them. For the activists who have to 
start from the very beginning, the learning and exercising might be more extensive, 
as they have to, at first, master the simplest things such as the body movements in 
praying. The praying then becomes more like a routine physical exercise. For those 
who belong to the third category mentioned above, the learning process is more 
focused on advanced things such as the skill of being simple and humble while 
conducting the rituals. 
According to the Al-Mukmin's students, even through the simple fact of 
physical exercising, the praying reconstructs their very selt~ 434 They claimed that the 
noble characteristic of a good Muslim is, among others, self-discipline. They pointed 
to the way the daily prayer helps them to develop this subjectivity into their inner 
self The praying, for example, has specific rules on body movements and recitations. 
430 I met a numlx>r of FPI activists who belong to this category, 
433 See, for example, Aziz (2004 }. 
434 Group discussion with the Al-Nlukmin ~s male students. 
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It must be conducted at a specific time. The body also has to be literally clean before 
conducting the ritual. Following rules, washing several parts of the body regularly, 
being on iime, and doing difficult things such as waking up in the early morning to 
conduct the morning-prayer were seen as the main basis through which they learned 
to be self-disciplined. 
This view was supported by several Al-Mukmin's teachers.435 For Fikri, 
sholat (praying) might be seen as merely how to move one's hands and legs. Hence, 
just like other Muslims view the hijab and Islamic fashion in general as less 
substantial and less significant, what is important about sholat is its meanings and 
values rather than its physical exercise. On the contrary, he insisted that these merely 
physical movements " ... ado pengaruhnya ke kejiwaan seseorang (have influences 
on one's psyche)." The acts of bowing during the praying, for example, express 
literally a Muslim submission to the authority of Allah. One thing for sure is that a 
Muslim could still submit her;him self to the rule of God inside her/his heart without 
bowing physically. However, for Fikri and other fundamentalists, only by kneeling 
and touching one's forehead on the floor can one feel the real meaning of 
submission. From this physical submission, one then learns what it means to be 
humble. In this regard, Fikri would not disagree that being humble is part of the 
noble characteristics highly recommended by Islamic teachings. But he would 
equally insist, I argue, that one will be able to fully adopt the characteristic of being 
humble as part of oneself by physical movements such as bowing during the praying; 
by looking down while walking; and by becoming more quiet thereby lowering one· s 
profile. Unsurprisingly, for Fikri fellow teacher in Al-Mukmin, Taufiq, sholat was 
the key factor in shaping one's subjeciivity. He told me that, should a Muslim remain 
arrogant or demonstrate other low personal characteristics she/he just has to improve 
her/his daily prayer. 
The remaking of fundamentalist self through embodiment actions can also be 
seen in the non-ritual practices. As previously discussed, part of the disciplinary 
practices is prohibitions and limitations on interactions between a woman and a man. 
The main rule is that a woman and a man have to stay at a proper physical distance 
when they engage in daily social interactions. Staying at a physical distance implies a 
number of skills in how to move parts of body. The act of avoiding direct physical 
435 Interviews with Fikri, Taufiq, Yahya and Farid. 
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contact was always mentioned as the most important way of maintaining a proper 
distance. This means, for instance, that the fundamentalists are not allowed to shake 
hands with the opposite sex. The activists also very often pointed to avoiding direct 
eye contact as another good example of appropriate interaction between both 
genders. Hasyim, for example, explained that, if he meets a woman on the street, at 
the market or in other public venues, he will either swing round his face to avoid eye 
contact, look down, or pretend that he has not seen her.436 Since he will always meet 
women who are not his relatives in his public activities, Hasyim continued, it is 
better for him to master the skill of looking down and of pretending not to see people 
around him while walking. 
The fundamentalists largely acted in the same way as Hasyim. This was 
equally true and more significant when it comes to the female activists. They seemed 
to be always looking down wherever they are. The female fundamentalists were also 
persuaded to lower their voice when talking to men. They were asked to use a regular 
tone and not to speak melodiously as if they are attempting to charm the person who 
is listening to them. 437 Verbal conversations with men were frequently restricted. 
For Siti, Dian, Desti and Nurul this range of new skills that have to be 
adopted was extremely challenging.438 Before joining the movement, they used to be 
either cablak, a tomboy or simply a naughty young girl. They had to double their 
effort to master these skills. They have to learn and exercise a different way of 
speaking and walking, and get used to the new skills, so that they conld become a 
new person. They initially felt they were being forced to do this. However, they later 
noticed that the skills not only taught them how to be shy, bnt also explained why 
shyness is such an impo1tant noble characteristics attached to a good Muslim. The 
process took time, added Dian, as her inner self was still leaming to be shy. Hence, 
for Dian, mastering the skills was one thing, and seemed to be the easiest part, while 
transforming them into her inner self was the next and more difficult step. She told 
me that she still felt some resistance within herself when these new skills were about 
to install the subjectivity of shyness. It was very difficult for her to restrict, for 
436 lntervie\v with Hasyiln. 
4n See, for example~ "Menebar pesona, Menual Petaka" published on 30 October 2007 in 
http://wv.w.darussalaf-or.id (accessed on 7 November 2007); "Wanita-wanita yang Tidak Panias 
Dinikahi" published on 21 ocrober 2007 in (ac~essed on 7 November 
2007); "Di Balik Kelembutan Suaramu" published on 9 August 2006 in http:i/www.darussalafor.id 
(accessed on 28 november 2007). 
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example, verbal communications with her male friends. Nevertheless, Dian fully 
understood why her fellow activists were uneasy with the way she interacted with the 
opposite gender. She truly acknowledged that staying at a proper distance from her 
male friends in talking and in other types of social interactions is the proper way to 
be shy. She just still needed time to transpose the changes in the physical movements 
of her body parts into her inner self. 
Aside from shyness, strict regulations on how a woman and a man engage in 
social interactions also result in simplicity as another new subjectivity adopted by the 
fundamentalists. Included in regulations about interactions between both genders is 
the rule on fashion. The basis of Islamic dress is to prevent both genders from 
viewing aural. However, merely covering aurat, for the activists, is not enough.439 I 
have mentioned before that the dress must not accentuate the body. More than that, 
the cloth, the type and the colour of the fashion should not also attract the opposite 
gender's attention. A highly attractive dress, even though in the form of the hijah, 
would be seen as seductive. 440 Therefore, to avoid being the focus of attention and, 
potentially, of temptation, the dress must be simple. The primary character of the 
hijah, for example, is its simplicity. It is a very simple model of a loose-long dress 
and very often in one colour such as black, dark blue, dark green or dark brown. 
Unsurprisingly, the activists told me that the hijah tells them a great deal of how and 
what it means to be simple in life, in the way they behave and speak, and in 
purchasing goods aud conm10dities for daily survival. 
For the male activists, there is no specific dress code such as the hijab. 
However, apart from hiding aural, simplicity is strongly emphasised. They always 
stated that there is no point in using clothing as a medium to celebrate one's material 
abundance. After all, they insisted, should one die, one will simply take a two metre 
length white kain kafan (a white cloth used to wrap up the deceased body of a 
Muslim before being burie<l) as the one and only personal belonging during the time 
in alam kubur.441 For Safruddin, it was this simplicity that he had taken into his inner 
self The white gamis he wore, he claimed, taught him a lot about being simple. 
4
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9 Group discussions with the ,'\l-Mukmin's female students and the MMJ female activists, 
440 Interviews with Safiudin, Yoyok and 1'opri. 
441 Alain kuhur literally means the realm of the grave. It is the time one spent after death, asa 
transitional period experienced by every individual who dies, before being resurrected to face the 
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*** 
In this chapter my focus is on the Islamic identity. The fundamentalists' struggle 
takes the form of the politics of representation in which the Islamic identity is largely 
produced through the play of difference. At the heart of this process are the 
resistance and the making of boundaries that allow the activists to fill in the space 
created by the construction of identity with specific practices. The practices are based 
on regulation, limitation and prohibition on the body and on daily activities. Through 
the materialisation of such discipline and control the fundamentalist subject, which is 
supposedly free from the ruling trends, the growing immorality and the dominating 
hedonism, is produced. The subject is also endowed with specific values and norms 
that give the activists some sense of direction, goals and security in life. 
However, the production of subject, the very identity practices and 
performances, implied some form of action on self. In fact, the fundamentalists 
become fundamentalist through a long process of learning and adopting a regulated 
body as something desirable and arising out of one's free will through the 
mechanism of hikmah. They also have to learn, exercise and master a range of new 
skills in body movements related to new subjectivities implied by the invented 
Islamic identity. This entire process results in the remaking of the fundamentalist 
self. 
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Chapter 5 
AGAINST THE RISING CONSUJ\iER CULTURE 
What is the source of the ruling trends, immorality and the hedonistic lifestyle? What 
are the origins of the problems of oppression, inauthenticity and disenchantment? I 
argue that the fundamentalists' struggle for Islamic identity is understood against the 
background of Indonesian capitalism over the last three-to-four decades. In 
particular, the problems of oppression, inauthenticity and disenchantment originate in 
the increasing consumer culture in the country which is closely related to the 
capitalist development The overproduction of images and signs that have saturated 
the fabric of Indonesian everyday life since the 1990s is a significant development in 
the increasing consumer culture. It is through these saturating images and signs that 
the activists have become aware of the ruling trends, the growing immorality and the 
pervading hedonistic lifestyle, which gives them a sense of being dominated, of 
losing uniqueness and of experiencing doubt and uncertainty in life. I will start by 
discussing the saturating images and signs and will demonstrate how the activists 
find them threatening. My focus then turns to consumer culture. I try to understand 
how it relates to the centrality of images and how the struggle for Islamic identity can 
be understood against it. In the final section, I will sketch the capitalist developments 
in Indonesia since the late 1960s and how these produce, and are reproduced by, 
consumer culture. 
THE HAUNTL"'IG IMAGES 
In chapter 3 I noted that the fundamentalists were strongly against the ruling trends 
in everyday life, the growing immorality in society at large and the dominating 
hedonism in almost every aspect of life. They often quoted data presented in several 
writings and/or reported by the mass media to support their argument of the 
increasing social ills. The publication ofMoamar Emka's book, Jakarta Undercover: 
Sex n' the City, for instance, had sparked an outrage within the radical Islamic 
community. The book was a report on promiscuity in a number of entertaimnenr 
venues in Jakarta which was based on the author's field-research. The 
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fundamentalists were quick to conclude that the book proved that immoral conduct in 
the major cities is increasing. Other fundamentalists spoke of evidence they also 
found. A number of MMI activists, for example, claimed that they found used 
condoms scattered in several public venues in Y ogyakarta on Sunday mornings. 
Even though it was never clear how they found these--whether they were walking in 
those venues when they spotted the condoms, or whether they took a deliberate 
action to look for evidence that could support their clairn--the story was said to me 
several times as proof that immoral behaviour in this city was a real issue.442 They 
also talked about the growing prominence of trends, immorality and hedonism they 
witnessed directly through persons and communities they were closely attached to, 
such as neighbours, university friends and work colleagues.443 A few even found the 
social ills inside their own family.444 
The problem is that this sort of evidence was not credible as confirmation of a 
serious threat. The concern about increasing immorality in the major cities was not 
new. For many years it has been an issue which worried a number of parents who 
decided to send their children to continue their studies in cities such as Jakarta, 
Bandung and Y ogyakarta. One did not have to read Emka' s piece and to spot 
scattered used condoms to make sense of promiscuity as a problem and to be fearful 
of the growing immorality. Furthermore, this hard evidence lacked intensity. The 
activists talke-0 about their immoral neighbours, but the fact was that they did not 
have to meet them every hour or every day. They could also decide to mind their 
own business and, as most of them did, to withdraw from public life where 
immorality was prevalent and find a safe haven in places such as pesantren and the 
organisation's offices. Finally, one was not really scared of, for example, one's 
hedonist university friends because one did not lose a sense of control over the 
situation. Mama!, for instance, was concerned about his little brother who always 
tried hard to keep up with the latest trends in fashion. He was worried, but remained 
calm, because he still had opportunities to talk to his little brother, to remind him 
about his wrongdoings and to encourage him to choose independently his way oflife 
442 Interview \Vith 1\\vwas, Shobbarin, fiasyim and Harun. 
443 Interview with Siti, Yoyok, Dorimru1; Nopri and L11kman, 
444 Intcrview \.Vlth Desti and Mam.at. 
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if necessary.445 Surely, with this sense of control Mamat would not see his little 
brother as being threatened by the ruling trends in everyday life. 
Here, it is interesting to note that this radical Muslim group were more 
anxious about trends in lifestyles, immoral conduct and hedonism that they found in 
images and signs that saturated Indonesian everyday life. The activists of this 
movement were deeply concerned about pictures, displays, spectacles and festivals 
presented in the media such as television, magazines, tabloids and the internet, and in 
public venues such as shopping malls, cafes, fast food restaurants and by the side of 
roads. This by no means implied that the social ills were more prevalent in the 
"unreal" world. Rather, for them, the saturation of images and signs was the "real" 
world of trends, immorality and hedonism itself.446 It was the picture of a young 
executive with a cellular phone and smart clothing standing in front of a luxurious 
car in an advertisement in a weekly that created a sense of the ruling trends. The 
dominating hedonism was largely about sinetron and reality shows such as 
Indonesian Idol and Akademi Fantasi Indonesia. Similarly, when they protested 
vehemently about the increasing immorality in society at large, the image of a female 
singer who performed an erotic dance often came to the fore. 
In this sense, the real world where they lived was frequently taken to be the 
projection of images.447 They were uneasy, for example, with the behaviour of 
teenagers in shopping malls and in university campuses which they described as 
inauthentic. But they took this more as a simulation of images they found in films 
such as Buruan Cium Gue and Virgin: Ketika Keperawanan Dipertanyakan. The 
issue was more about the films and less about the real teenagers in public venues. If 
films like these were banned they believed many Indonesians would adopt a proper 
way of behaving.448 Moreover, the very existence of images was frequently seen as 
immorality in itself. Consequently, the non-existence of images was illusively taken 
445 Interviews \Vith Mamat and Nopri. 
446 See "Potret Buram Umat Islam clan Upaya Membangkitkannya" published on 3 February 2005 in 
http:i/majelis.mujahidin.or.id (accessed on 23 march 2006); "Hisbut Thahrir: Mewaspadai Propaganda 
Kebebasan" published on 3 December 2004 in lmJ:l;l/swararnuslim.com (accessed on 4 October 2007); 
"Hisbut Tharir: Kebebasan Berekspresi Sumber Kebejalan Moral Masyarakat" published on 5 
September 2004 in http://swarnnmslim.com (accessed on 4 October 2007). 
447 See, for example, Al-Jawi (2005b); Mukti (2004). lnterviews with Saftuddin, Chanifah and Hafid; 
group discussion with the Al-Mukrnin's male students. 
443 See Husaini (2004'!). See also "Hisbut Thahrir: Mewaspadai Propaganda Kebebasan" published on 
3 December 2004 in http://swarnmuslim.com {accessed on 4 October 2007); "Hisbut Tharir: 
Kebebasan Bereksprcsi Sumber Kebejatan Moral Masyarakat" published on 5 September 2004 in 
htto:/iswaramuslim.com (accessed on 4 October 2007i; "Akibat Ulah Guru Besar" published on 2 July 
2007 in http://www.damssalaf.org (accessed 0118 November 2007). 
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as the absence of social ills. As discussed in the foregone chapters, in places such as 
A!-Mukmin, almost all types of pictures, displays and spectacles were strictly 
prohibited. This has made those in the pesantren feel that this school was free from 
the dangerous trends, immorality and hedonism prevalent in the rest of society. 449 
This explained why the activists were so worried about the shopping malls. 
Even though they commonly took shopping malls to be hardly different from a 
market, the place to buy things, they could not accept being in venues where there 
were images and signs as far as eyes could see.450 They feared being controlled and 
dominated. As usual, they then expressed this anxiety by claiming that their 
presence, which supposedly represented the world of morality, simply did not match 
the overloading pictures, displays and spectacles that, for them, spoke for the world 
of immorality. In other words, the true morality and the real immorality should not 
and could not be in the same room. Their presence in shopping malls could be easily 
seen as supporting, and by implication being part of, the immoral world of images 
and signs. Their uniqueness would then be in question and their Muslimness would 
be contaminated.451 For Safruddin, this also implied that he should doubt the Islamic 
credentials of national Islamic leaders who still possessed television in their home. 
For him, Islam and televisions, which shows, for instance, an image of the pop star, 
Madonna, were two separate worlds. One could not be a Muslim and a Madonna-
type person at the same time. 452 
From the fi.mdamentalists' point of view, the other significant issue was the 
mobility and the malleability of images and signs.453 Images could easily move from 
one place to another and lake various fonns. Hence, the problem was not only the 
ubiquity of pictures, displays and spectacles in public venues such as the shopping 
malls which are out of their control, but also their presence in what are supposed to 
be sterilise areas such as schools, and in private spaces such as hed rooms. The 
booming mass media over the last decade has exacerbated the situation. The 
emergence of several private TV stations with their predominantly entertainment 
programs, in particular, increased significantly the availability of images to almost 
449 Group discussions with the Ai-Mukmin is male and femaie students. 
450 Group discussions with the MMl's female activists and the Al-Muk111in female students. 
451 Interviews with Safruddin, Yahya and Nopri, 
452 Interview with Safruddin. 
453 Interviews with Safruddin and Mamat. See also Yusanto (1998); Al-Jawi (2005b); a report on an 
interview with the HTl's figure Rochmat S. Labib published in http:/ihizbut· 
tahrir.or .idi2008Jl 0/30Justadz-r0<:mat-s-labib-kelompok-l iberal-itu-1nengada-ada (accessed on 6 
November 2008). 
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twenty-four hours a day. Wahyuddin, for example, complained about the intrusion of 
television into the Muslim's daily routine. Its presence, with its own time schedule 
and with such intensity, could potentially prevent Muslims from having their O\.VU 
life free from the influence of images.454 
Understandably, the activists felt they were being haunted by the images and 
signs that had started to colonise the everyday life of many Indonesians. Another 
HTI figure, Labib, insisted that Indonesians had been increasingly encircled by 
displays and spectacles, which were, for him, hardly different from pornography. 
"How can parents be able to provide religious education properly to their children in 
a situation like this?" he asked himselfhopelessly.455 Yusanto feared for the future of 
Muslim youth. Since they were living in era of a booming media that brought about a 
process of deislamisasi ( de-Jslam-isation), these young Muslims could end up living 
in the age ofjahiliyah (ignorance).456 This had in fact created a sort of"moral panic" 
within the radical Islamic community in general.45; The rapid proliferation of 
pictures, displays and spectacles in the last ten to fifteen years made the 
fundamentalist feel that their lives had now begun to be dominated by foreign and 
dangerous values and norms. The issue of promiscuity among the youth that had 
been aired in public for years became more real and urgent. The ubiquity, proximity 
and continuity of images intensified their anxiety. Unless they did something, this 
would only bring further deterioration to their identity and uniqueness. 
It was this fear, among other things, that led the fundamentalists to respond in 
the various ways discussed earlier: the banning of television, the support for the anti-
pornography bill and the attack on the so-called places of vice. Perhaps the most 
important thing about this reactionary attitude was the expression of anger and of 
disgust. Such expression could help to ease the anxiety. The reactionary responses 
also revealed a feeling of powerlessness. How many types of media could they ban? 
How many cafes could they destroy? The answer, as some of them knew for sure, 
was that this kind of reaction would hardly block the invasion of images in their 
454 Interview with Wahyuddin. See also "Bunuh Diri Bersama TV" published on 26 December 2004 in 
http://swaramuslinrnet (accessed on 28 September 2007); "10 Alat Penting Ghazwul Fikri" published 
on 21 September 2004 in http://swaramuslim.net (accessed on l October 2007). 
455 The report on an interview with Labib 
4
><> Yusanto (l 998: 35). See also "Booming Media 'Merah' di Tengah Atmosfer Kehidupan Kita" 
published on 5 August 2004 in http:ilswaramuslim.net (accessed on 28 September 2007). 
457 The idea of moral panic was presented by Arief Aries Mundayat and Amrih Widodo in a seminar 
on the film "Ayar-ayat Cinta" on 17 April 2008 at the Australian National University. See also 
Widodo (2008). 
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everyday life.458 Yet they continuously took this kind of attitude because it could 
create a feeling of having done something and, hence, of having some control over 
the situation. Being angry about immorality, explained to me by Ba'asyir, was the 
least thing one should possess as an indication of one's Islamic credentials. 
Images Seduce, Control and Normalise 
Within the tradition of postmodern theories outlined in the Introduction, it is 
argued that the rapid proliferation of images and signs tends to blur the line between 
reality and fantasy. The saturating images and signs have put an end to what we used 
to know as reality and turn everything inside its space into merely simulation. I have 
mentioned that the fundamentalists tended to take the ubiquitous presence of 
pictures, displays, spectacles and festivals as the real world. Their concern about the 
emerging inauthentic way of life was more a response to images and signs that they 
suddenly found everywhere and that they could hardly escape from. They also took 
the actual life, the actual practice of promiscuity, for example, as largely a part of the 
images. It was nothing more than the transformation of images in the media such as 
film into real life. But, "how did images come to rule over their lives?" 
By and large, the activists believed that the proliferation of pictures, displays 
and spectacles was dangerous. The beauty, the fascination, the dream world and the 
spectacular produced by, for example, films had the power to invade and influence 
the hnman mind. Images, they insisted, could force one to submit oneself to its 
rule.459 It took over one's autonomy and forced obedience. It also celebrated hawa 
najsu and destroyed established values which provided meaning in life and goals for 
one's life. Furthermore, pictures, displays and spectacles were, for them, not only 
terrorising, but also propagandising. They were not a passive presence of social ills 
that one could avoid by, for example, not visiting shopping malls and turning off the 
TV. They were instead more alive as they actively tried to occupy oneself and 
458 Interviews with Oni, Yoyok and Lukman; group discussions with the MMI;s female activists. 
459 Interviews \Vith Safruddin and Ba'asylr; group discussions with the AlrMukmln's male and feinale 
students. See also "I 0 Alat penting Ghazwul Fikri" published on 21 September 2004 in 
hUn:!iswaramuslim.net (accessed on I october 2007); "Bumm diri Bersama TV" published on 26 
December 2004 in bttp:ilswaramus!im.net (accessed on 28 September 2007). 
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everyday life, in order lo reshape one's identity, subjectivity and personality,460 But, 
how did images and signs celebrate hawa nafsu and shatter their meaningful life? 
Above all, these radical Muslims were very sure that images would bring 
fitnah (in this case temptation). The images of men and, particularly, women in, for 
example, advertisements, which could be easily spotted on billboards by the side of 
roads in large cities, were always sexually provocative. Whoever saw the pictures, 
they thought, would hardly be able to control their carnal desires.461 Unsurprisingly, 
almost all types of human images for them became little different to pornography. 
They tended to see pornography no longer in terms of which parts of the body were 
being displayed. Rather, the image of a woman, for instance, even though with a 
fully and properly covered body, could be regarded as pornographic if its beauty and 
its attraction aroused one's sexual desires. Labib, for example, complained about the 
ubiquity of pornography as there was no longer any space left without its presence. 462 
The strong support for the anti-pornography bill could also be seen as arising from 
this sort of anxiety, from a feeling of being surrounded by pornographic images. 
While Indonesia did experience a sort of pornographic boom in the last ten years, to 
say pornography was everywhere was exaggeration. It seemed that Labib's concern 
was more about displays and spectacles, which were not necessarily pornographic, 
but could be regarded as sensual and seductive. His concern, as well as the anti-
pornography campaign, reflected the fear of being controlled and dominated by the 
beautiful and fascinating pictures, displays and spectacles. 
In this sense the saturation of images was threatening because it challenged 
the rule of value reason. As discussed before, this rule was based on the discipline 
and control of hawa naftu. Through this rule, the fundamentalists made sense of 
having an autonomous consciousness. The problem was that the saturation of images 
could free hawa nqfsu from the control of value reason. They felt they were being 
persuaded by images to celebrate hawa najm and to liberate the body, particularly 
the sexual organ, from any sort of discipline and surveillance. Should this persuasion 
be successful, they were fully certain that they would Jose their uniqueness as a 
4
w ln!erviews with Ba'as;or and Safruddin. See also Al-Jawi (2005b); Husaini (2004a, 2004b); 
Yusanlo (1998). 
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' See Mukti (2004); Al-Jawi (200Sb). See also "Menebar Pesona, Menuai Petalcu" published on 30 
October 2007 in (accessed on 7 November 2007); "Serangan Media 
lnformasi" published on l 0 May 2006 in http:iiwww.darussalaf.or.id (accessed on 28 November 
2007). 
464 See the report on an interview with Labib 
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supposedly autonomous being called a Muslim. This was perhaps the most basic 
element of the dangerous nature of images that they were worried about. 
The saturating images and signs that seduced the viewers also had another 
meaning. As noted above, the activists found pictures and displays in the mass 
media, for example, dangerous because it was always enjoyable to have a look at 
them for the sake of the beauty and the dream world that they presented. The 
seducing images, in effect, drove the attention of the young Muslim generation, in 
particular, away from the other important things they had to care about in their lives. 
HTI, for instance, were enraged because they witnessed how images had emptied the 
minds of Indonesian teenagers. They were mindly brainwashed, with their heads 
filled up with entertainment, sex and everything other than Islamic teachings.463 As a 
result, according to the salafi group, the Indonesian Muslim teenagers nowadays 
increasingly paid less attention to the importance of religion, not to mention their 
being disinterested in the value of jihad. They had even lost their souls-which is 
supposed to be a sacred place where one's faith in Islam is located-as well as their 
purity and dignity (as a Muslim).464 
In place of serious attention being given to Islam, jihad and Allah, there was 
fun and pleasure. Displays and spectacles in public venues and in the mass media 
encouraged Muslims to celebrate and enjoy life. For this radical Muslim group, the 
images-inspired-celebration oflife implied that one should abandon, for example, the 
daily prayer,465 because the prayer restricted the body and prevented it from having 
immediate satisfaction. This was Wahyuddin' s main concern when he complained 
about "permainan" (literally game) which he found in sport, music and quizes on 
TV. These TV shows were too entertaining and could make Muslims, especially the 
young ones, think that (actual) life could also be entertaining and easy; that real 
happiness was here in this worldly life full of fun; and that the life after death, the 
463 
"RUU Pomografi: Pertarungan Islam vs Sekularisme," published on 30 October 2008 in 
http://hizbut-tahrir.or.id/2008/10/03/ruu-pomografi-pertan1ngan-islam-vs-sekularisme ( accesssed on 6 
November 2008). See also "10 Alat penting Ghazwul Fikri," published on 21September2004 in 
http://swaramuslim.net (accessed on 1 October 2007). 
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"Hukum Gambar dan Patung dalam Islam,'' published on 30 January 2006 in 
http://www.darussalaf.or.id (accessed on 28 November 2007). See also "Akibat Ulah Guru Besar," 
published on 2 July 2007 in http://www.damssalaf.org (accessed on 8 November 2007). 
465 Interview with Safruddin; group discussion with the Al-Mukmin's male students. See also "Akibat 
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promise of heaven and hell, seemed unreal and mythical.466 Therefore, everything 
that was entertaining, including the sound of music coming out from a tape-recorder, 
which could lead one to move one's body parts in rhythm, was regarded as 
dangerons.467 
The seduction paved the way for the control and domination of images. More 
tban simply attractive, the images on TV and in the tabloids, for example, started to 
occupy everyday life. Initially, it could be just addictive. But, then, as one spent more 
time enjoying displays and spectacles provided by the mass media, one's life 
gradually became organised around, for example, the importance of having time for 
one's favourite TV shows. 468 At this point, Muslims would be on the brink of being 
fully controlled by the media in particular and by the saturation of all the images and 
signs in general. Images' were no longer a mere source of enjoyment as Muslims, 
who had been drawn by the images attractiveness, began to emulate the beauty and 
the dream world that they found.469 The emulation could be of the physical 
appearance of figures seen inside the images; it could also be of behaviour and 
attitude. More importantly, the emulation was a process of identification. The 
audiences tried to identify themselves with the images. The result was the formation 
ofa (new) identity as the old one was stripped away. Yusanto noticed the emergence 
of a new Muslim generation who were .suffering from "a split personality." They 
were both sinful·~for being influenced by the media-and faithful-for being born 
as a Muslim-at the same time.470 
This line of claims outlined by the fundamentalists could make us think that 
there existed some sort of original Islam before the explosion of pictures, displays 
and spectacles occupied the fabric oflndonesian everyday life. The saturating images 
and signs could then be regarded as challenging and disrupting the existing Islamic 
values and nonns. Islam is the main victim and their struggle is to purify their 
Islamic identity which is under threat. We should bear in mind that the real issue is 
instead what the activists themselves refer to as an "empty mind" and "lost soul". 
This tells us vividly the most important thing, that is, their feeling of being controlled 
466 Interview with Wahyuddin. 
467 Group discussion with the Al-Mukmin's female students; Abas, P. (2005). 
Mi& Interviews with Safruddin1 Darwis and Chanifah. See aiso "Serangan lvtedia Inforrnasi," published 
on lO May 2006 in http://www.darussalaf.or.id (ae.cessed on 28 November 2007). 
469 See "Televisi: Guru Setia yang Ajarkan Anak Amoral, Borju dan Kekerasan," published on 29 July 
2004 in http:/lswaramuslim.net (accessed on 28 September 2007); "Bunuh Diri Bersama TV," 
~ublished on 26 December 2004 in http://swaramuslim.net (ae.cessed on 28 September 2007). 
'
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and dominated by the proliferation of images and signs. Islam comes later and is 
used to reclaim both the empty mind and lost soul. At first, they construct and define 
Islam in terms of negating the saturating pictures, displays and spectacles. The result 
is an Islam according to their interpretation that significantly functions as a safe 
shelter for their united, original and substantial self. This shelter protects the self 
from being tom apart, disauthenticised and uprooted by the haunting images. Then, 
this newly constructed and defined Islam valorises their existence and speaks on 
behalf of their feeling of being oppressed and alienated. It is hardly surprising that 
they point to Islam, rather than their own self, as the victim of images and signs that 
overload their everyday life. In this sense, Islam is there to help them cope with the 
problem of losing c-0ntrol of producing one's own unique identity. 
This anxious feeling of a shattered self can be seen in the way the activists of 
this movement discovered what they took to be the power of images to socialise and 
to educate the masses. \\'bile the producer of "Virgin" insisted that the film was 
trying to portray what was happening in the real lives of the urbanite, modem and 
young Indonesian teenagers, the activists had a different view. They were more 
concerned with its spectacles, rather than its supposed substantial message about the 
social problems among youth. The spectacular expressions and acting of one of the 
film's main figures, Ketie, who was seen as vulgar and too direct, were taken as a 
kind of propaganda as, they believed, it taught the Indonesian younger generation 
how to be modern and to be cool in a strictly unislamic way of behaving in public 
and private life. Instead of reporting about the issue of promiscuity, they accused 
"Virgin" and other films such as "Buruan Cium Gue" of promoting and educating 
people on how to have sex outside marriage.47 ! 
The task was mounting as the power of images to socialise and educate had 
apparently developed into its finest form of domination. The fundamentalists 
witnessed anxiously how images had started to normalise things which were either 
sinful from an Islamic point of view, or socially unacceptable from the Indonesian 
cultural perspective. 472 The heavy presence of an image of a woman in a bikini easily 
spotted in various advertisements found in public venues, for example, was 
attractive, but also confusing. Which one was normal, was it the (images of) a bikini 
"'Sec "Hisbut Tahrir: Mewaspadai propaganda Kebebasan," published on 3 December 2004 in 
http:!/swaran1uslin1.com accessed on 4 October 2007)" See also Husaini (2004a). 
472 Interview with Darwis; group discussion with the Al-Mukmin's felflllle students; Al-Jawi (2005b). 
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or what they took as the widely accepted normal clothing of an Indonesian woman? 
However, the spectaenlar and fascinating images could solve this confusion. The 
attractiveness of the advertisements and movies, the activists insisted, successfully 
persuaded the audiences that the normality was the images. This was the main 
problem of films such as "Virgin", "Buruan Cium Gue", "Ada Apa dengan Cinta?" 
and "Eifj'el ... J'm in Love". For this radical Muslim group, these films simply 
normalised promiscuity and hedonism. 473 
The Appearance is the Substance 
The images I have discussed thus far are produced through the stylisation of 
what we (used to) know as the real life, of how everyday life is turned into an 
aesthetic field. As the images are increasingly dominating our surroundings, the 
stylisation of life becomes important. So as the images become the reality, the 
aestheticised becomes the substance. This line of argument noted in chapter 1 is 
useful to describe how the fundamentalists were against other aspect~ of the haunting 
images. They were concerned with the presence of images that in some subtle ways 
seemed to have been successful in persuading everyone to turn themselves into an 
image too. Since the images were the real and the aetsheticised was the substance, 
people started to think that their own self and everyday life should also become the 
main objects of stylisation. Then came the importance of penampilan (physical 
appearance), of how to present in public, by recreating the image of oneself through 
fashions, hair styles and demeanour. At the same time, what the fundamentalists 
believe is the real substance-the faith and the intellectuality--was gradually 
disappearing from the scene and rarely taken into account. 
For the activists of this movement the main thing they learned from the rapid 
flows of images was the predominance of the body, particularly, the aurat.474 
Advertisements, the mass media and films, they claimed, were nothing more than the 
arena for pamer aurat (literally displaying aurat). Apart from displaying aurat which 
473 
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is itself sinful, an HTI activist, lta, discovered that the implication of the overloade-0 
images of the body in public spaces was more serious for Muslims. She believed that 
the images were telling us what was and was not valuable. She could see how, for 
instance, that the media played a big role in accentuating the importance of having a 
beautiful body. Being beautiful, in terms of physical presence, was smoothly 
presented as the main foundation of being a woman. For their part, the women, 
claimed Ita, then tried to aestheticise their appearance by, for example, working hard 
on whitening their skin. Being attractive physically was increasingly seen as the first 
thing a woman had to care about. 
The fundamentalists claimed that the importance of physical appearance was 
in fact a sort of cultural plague that had became an epidemic. The Indonesians who 
suffered from this did everything to stylise their body. The boys painted their hair 
and wore earrings and necklaces. The girls wore mini skirts, had tattoos on their skin 
and showed their navel.475 In the late 1980s, this became further associated with the 
emergence of the culture of mejeng (literally means hanging out) and ngeceng 
(literally means viewing). Both became the culture in public venues such as shopping 
malls and fast-food restaurants, mainly among the urbanite Indonesian youth. While 
mejeng was about how to present the image of self in these public venues, ngeceng 
was about viewing the images of others. 
In fact, this youth culture apparently told us that the importance of 
appearance made everyday life look more like a living and moving show, a site to 
perform and to act in accordance with a specific image being presented. Places like 
shopping malls were simply a big stage where people tried to be looked at and to 
enjoy beautiful scenes. The fundamentalists were confused. They were uneasy with 
the shopping malls because of the heavy presence of images and signs. The problem 
was that the images were not only in the pictures and displays, but also portrayed by 
the men and women who visited the site. And the images of these two different 
objects were almost the same. Every single thing in the shopping malls then looked 
like part of a big spectacle. This could perhaps explain why they combined the terms 
pornography and pornoaksi. Pornography was loosely used to label any images that 
were seductive. Pomoaksi was more like an active and lively pornography, which 
475 
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was a label attached to the real appearance of human beings in everyday life. \\That 
appeared in reality was an aestheticised body which the fundamentalist saw as 
seductive and, hence, hardly different from what they understood as pornography. 
Their support for the anti-pornography biH meant that they were not only against the 
seductive images, but also the seductive physical appearance of real men and women 
they found in public venues. Their exaggerated sense of being under siege· from the 
invading pornography was understandable because the haunting images were not 
only the pictures, the displays and the spectacles, but also the actual human beings in 
their surroundings. 
More importantly, the Indonesian teenagers, in particular, according to the 
activists of this movement, seemed to have taken physical appearance as being the 
real substance of being a human. The teenagers started to think that popularity-
similar to the one enjoyed by their new heroes, that is, the celebrities-was a great 
achievement. It often meant being the centre of public attention, being in the media 
and being mentioned and discussed by people in public and in private. Yet, the 
popularity was achieved through the body being presented in its aestheticised form. 
They had to emulate their heroes, try to be beautiful and handsome, or, at least, as 
attractive as the celebrities, in order to be well-known. For the activists of this 
movement, it was hardly surprising that many Indonesian teenagers wanted to be a 
"cover boy/girl". There was a long queue in the auditions for TV shows such as 
Indonesian Idol and Akademi Fantasi Indonesia. The rating of these shows was very 
high and millions of people were involved in the show through sending an SMS to 
select the idol.476 The issue was serious even for the Al-Mukmin's students who 
rarely watched TV. Their teacher, Chanifah, had to calm them down by firmly 
explaining to them that physical appearance was less significant than one's faith.477 
Here, their emphasis on faith and their rejection of the beautiful body 
presented by the saturating images was more about the issue of certainty. The 
fundamentalists seemingly worried that the abundance of images of the body, which 
led to the importance of physical appearance in everyday life, was liberating the 
'
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body from any meaningful values and nonns.478 The body became the tool for hura-
hura {having fun) and for a hedonistic lifestyle. The activists never saw hedonism as 
real life. Its emphasis on bodily pleasure and its drive for immediate satisfaction was 
not only endless, but also made life full of anxiety. The life itself became 
meaningless, except for the unbridled celebration and satisfaction of the body. 
Furthen11ore, the saturating images and signs were oppressing. This is not because of 
the preoccupation with style and appearance, because the fundamentalists themselves 
are also preoccupied. But more it is because they promote and socialise a specific 
body image, they make the image dominant through its ubiquitous presence, and turn 
it into the real and the only choice left that everyone should adopt. 
THE RISE OF CONSUMER CULTURE IN INDONESIA 
The rise of consumer culture in Indonesia smce the 1990s has contributed 
significantly to the proliferation of images and signs into the fabric of everyday life. 
To understand this, I have argued in the Introduction that we should refer the term 
consumer culture to, at least, two cultural aspects of mass consumption. First, it is 
about the cultural dimension of consumer goods in which the commodity is used as 
the "message". Consumption is no longer understood as consuming the material 
utility, but more as playing with, and manipulating, the cultural meanings and signs 
of commodities. Second, consumption is also a leisure activity. To consume is not 
only to communicate, but also to have pleasure and more fun in life. Therefore, 
consumption is not only a sort of language, as suggested by Baudrillard, but also a 
form of celebration. In this regard, the rising consumer culture is always strongly 
associated with the production of images. Such production represents the importance 
of sign-value, the style and the appearance. It also socialises and normalises 
celebrating and playing with commodities. Hence, the fundamentalists' fear of 
seduction, the importance of appearance and the power of images and signs to 
'"See A!Jawi (2005b); Yusanto (1998. See also "Hisbut Tahrir: Mewaspadai Propaganda 
Kebebasan," published on 3 December 2004 in http://swaramustim.com (accessed on 4 Oetober 
2007); "RUU Pornografi: Pertarungan islam Vs Seku!arisme," published on 30 October 2008 in 
http :J ihizbut-tahrir. oL i4L2008! l 0/ 30/ruu-oornografi-pertarungan-is1am-vs-sekuJaris1ne (accessed on 6 
November 2008); "Gaul Remaja Generasi Keledai atau Generasi Rabani," published on 3 February 
2005 in http://swaramuslim.net (accessed on I October 2007). 
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control and dominate are better seen as the expression of anxiety against this rising 
consumer culture. 
I did not ask the activists their views on consumer culture, but I did bring the 
issue of consumerism into the conversations. I understand consumerism as an 
expansion of consumption as a leisure pursuit. Shopping in particular becomes the 
most popular leisure activity. This is associated with the visibility of various forms of 
shopping in particular and the increase in sites of purchase and consumption in 
general. More importantly, in consumerism we witness three aspects closely related 
to consumer culture: First, the growing importance of packaging and promotion of 
commodities; secodn, the grwoing pervasiveness of advertisement in everyday life; 
and third, the growing significance of the style, appearance and design of goods.479 
In general, the fundamentalists presented the common view that tended to be 
suspicious about consumerism because it was a bad habit of going on a shopping 
spree, of consuming for the sake of consuming more. They were also concerned that 
many Indonesians had started to abandon the utility aspect of consumer goods. 
People's decisions to purchase commodities increasingly became more influenced by 
advertisements and the desire to keep up with the latest trends.480 They knew for sure 
that advertisements and the trend propagantla were manipulating forces. Chanifah 
told me that, should people think again about the function of goods as the most 
important driver of consumption, they would not buy, for example, a new cellular 
phone every time the old one (because of the advertisement manipulation) looked out 
of date. Instead, consumerism, argued Yusanto, had created a "throw-away society" 
(English in original). And the out of tlate things that could be easily dumped were not 
only consumer goods, he continued, but also one's partner.481 Thank God, claimed 
the relatively well-to-do HTJ activist, Oni, he was not addicted to consumerism. By 
this he meant that, even though his earnings were more than enough to purchase the 
basic needs, his decision to buy tirings, especially the tertiary consumer commodities 
such as cars and motorcycles, was always based on the utility aspect.482 
This brought a number of consequences. For Yusanto, consuming for the sake 
of consuming became the goal of life. It illusively promised happiness. People 
worked hard to earn as much money as possible so that they could fulfil their desire 
479 See, for example, Lmy ( 1996: 29-36). See also Sassatelli (2007). 
480 lntervie\VS with Oni; Chanifah, 'Y' oyok and Safruddin. 
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to consume.483 As discussed in chapter 3 this would only tum one's life into a vehicle 
to pursue pleasure, which becomes the ultimate aim and the main basis through 
which the meaning of life was understood. In this respect, according to another MMI 
activist, Lasti, consumerism represented the general cultural tendency in Indonesian 
society nowadays. She used the term budaya instan (literally "instant culture") to 
refer to a culture of having a life full of as much fun as soon as possible. Strongly 
influenced by the media, in particular, many Indonesians no longer saw happiness as 
a result of hard work, discipline and a long process of seriousness and hardship.484 
\Vhy should one bother to go through hardship and discipline if one could be happy 
without a painful process on the body. Lasti told me that consumerism was among 
the best and easiest ways to have a plentiful life full of endless leisure. 
At the same time, the celebration of hawa nafeu, as mentioned several times 
previously, was the sign of a less autonomous consciousness. Consumption for the 
sake of having more pleasure implied that humans were controlled by basic desires. 
Instead of reasonable consideration, the decision to consume was based on the 
pleasure-pain principle. This was alam1ing from the fundamentalists' point of view. 
It indicated that the value reason was put aside and its rule over the human body and 
everyday life was challenged. As the value reason was always taken as the source of 
independent thinking and actions, the celebration of bodily pleasure through 
consumerism was viewed as a form of domination. 
The abandoning of the utility dimension of consumer goods had another 
implication. For Oni, not being consumerist also implied that he would not buy 
things because of the image presented in advertisements and/or constructed by the 
public. For example, he decided to keep his old motorcycle even though it did not 
look as "sporty" (English in original) as the latest model in the market. The old one 
might look out of date, less attractive and "not sporty" at all, but the most important 
thing, for him, was that it was still fully reliable. 485 Here Oni and his fellow 
fundamentalists were concerned with a range of cultural association and illusion 
attached to the mundane consumer goods in images presented in the media and 
pnblic venues. They frequently spoke of pamer (in this case showing,ofl) and gengsi 
483 Yusauto (1998: 195). 
484 Intervie\V vvith LastL 
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(prestige ).486 II meant that consumerism was a matter of demonstrating lo others who 
one really is. What is demonstrated is illusion rather than the real substance of one's 
self. Consumption, in this respect, was for the sake of prestige, of declaring one's 
social status. 
However, the fundamentalists were largely inconsistent regarding this aspect 
of consumer culture. On the one hand, as implied by what I noticed about their 
rejection of the importance of physical appearance, the cultural association of 
consumer goods was simply taken as another fonn of manipulation by, for example, 
advertisements. On the other hand, the cultural image of Muslim dress was extremely 
significant for them not only as a symbol of their Islamic identity, but also and more 
importantly as a medium through which they constructed, produced and made sense 
of who they were. Here, Muslim dress implies that what one wears and in what 
venues one spends one's leisure time, is always important. In other words, just like 
mundane consumer goods, the dress also has its sign-value, its own cultural 
association and illusion. The activists who adopt the Muslim dress code are fully 
aware of these cultural and symbolic dimensions. In this sense, they do not entirely 
reject the importance of the cultural image of physical objects which is what they 
would have us believe. 
Hence, in the case of consumer culture, the fundamentalists seemed to reject 
the sign-value of a commodity but they hardly escaped the play of the symholic 
dimension of consumer goods. I asked the HTl activist, Nopri, whether a Muslim, 
like him, was allowed to have a meal in a fast-food restaurant such as KFC. His first 
response was that it was legally acceptable from the Islamic point of view. Later, I 
will discuss more about this response as a type of cultural strategy to cope with the 
(dominating) consumer culture. At this stage, his second response was more 
interesting. He told me that, even though it was islamicly legal, he decided not to 
have a meal in KFC. He was concerned with the image of the KFC restaurant as not 
a proper place for an activist like him. He was certain that, should he eat there, 
people, including his fel!ow fundamentalists, would question his credibility as an 
Islamic activist. In Indonesia, the KFC restaurant, as it is an American-imported 
cultural item, is commonly associated with the rich and with the West. He believed 
that an activist like himself should be more distant from the rich and the West. In this 
486 Interviews with Cha11ifah, Hafid, Saftuddin, Oni, Hasyim, Desti and Lasti. 
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sense, Nopri and the fundamentalists like him might question the images of 
commodities. Yet, in some ways, they took them seriously and were involved in the 
play of cultnral meanings and symbols of consumer goods even when they rejected 
them. 
Consumerism and the Indonesian New Rich 
Consumer culture is relatively new in Indonesia and is still in the process of 
developing. Although the first sign of its development had emerged as early as the 
mid 1980s, as can be seen in research on the growing middle class conducted by 
Kompos,487 it was not until the first half of the 1990s that Indonesia wimessed the 
steady rise of consumer culture. Various reports suggested that the consumer culture 
was largely an urban phenomenona. 488 It emerged mainly in the major cities in Java, 
Sumatra and Sulawesi. In 1997 and 1998 Indonesia experienced the greatest financial 
meltdown in its modern history. The rise of consumer culture seemed to be put on 
hold as the crisis rendered the income of many Indonesians into less than a quarter of 
its pre-crisis value. Certainly, the financial debacle had reduced the power to 
purchase. Nevertheless, the desire to buy things, I argue, was often stronger than the 
money in one's pocket. Since consumption had turned into a medium to 
communicate and to celebrate life, the size of income was less of an issue. The crisis 
only led to the modification of consumption. Unsurprisingly, as soon as Indonesia 
recovered from the financial meltdo·wn, the c-0nsumer culture c-0ntinued to develop. 
Two main processes allowed the rapid development of consumer culture in 
the 1990s. The first was the increase of consumerism, particularly, the consumption 
of the secondary and tertiary commodities. The se"ond was the formation of 
Indonesian new rich. The rise of consumerism, especially in its earlier phase, was 
largely associated with the increasing demand of consumer goods made by those 
who had incomes far above what they needed for meals, clothing and housing. It 
could be argued that consumerism was to serve the purchasing power of this class. At 
the same time, the emergence of the new rich was easily spotted in what they 
"' Tanter and Young (1990: 167·174). 
48
' See Tanrer and Young (1990): Robison (1996); Heryanto (1999); Priyono (l 999}; Young (1999); 
Gerke (2000). See also Forum Keadilan, special edition, April l 996; Kompas, 30 September 1996; 
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consumed. In fact, they deliberately used their above-average power to purchase 
beyond the daily hasic commodities not only to accentuate their existence to other 
classes, but also to make their own sense of who they were. To this class it might be 
correct to use the expressions "I consume, therefore I exist". 
The most discernible indication of consumerism was the mushrooming new 
housing estates. The housing ranged from the comfortable to the luxurious, equipped 
with security guards and surrounded by vaiious types of enclosure.489 In one of the 
luxurious housing complexes in Jakarta, Vila Kelapa Gading, the price of one house 
and land package in the mid 1990s was estimated between Rp6 billion and Rp7 
billion (around US$3 million).490 In Bukit Golf Utama the estimated rate was more 
than Rp!O billion.491 The mushrooming housing estates were everywhere in Java's 
major cities. fn many places the rapid increase of housing had contiibuted to 
problems such as shortage of land for agricultural prnposes, floods and an increasing 
temperature. 
The other visible sign of increasing consumerism was the ubiquitous 
shopping malls, which were large, multistorey and fully air-conditioned. While the 
highest growth was in Jakarta,492 the malls were also built in relatively smaller town 
such as Solo. Not far from Ba'asyir's Al-Mukmin were two shopping centres, Grand 
Mall and Solo Square, Compared to their surroundings, the centres, particularly 
Grand Mall, looked so exclusive and luxurious. Indeed, the malls were commonly 
characterise<! by their interesting design and construction. The buildings used 
attractive colours and designs to create a sort of mall identity and to tempt as many 
visitors as possible.493 Plaza Indonesia was an interesting case. It was opened in 
1990 in central Jakarta and set a new trend in the importance of attractive building 
design. The most distinguishing aspect was its luxurious interior features which 
aimed to give an impression of calm and elegance,494 
The iise of consumerism could also be seen in tenns of consumer spending. 
As reported by Robison, in the mid 1990s the increased expenditure was evident in 
489 Robison (!996); Priyono (l999); Kenichiro (2001); Forum Keadilan, special edition, April 1996; 
Wardhana and Barus l 998. 
490 In ihe 1990s, particularly before the financial crisis, the value ofUS$ l was around Rp2000. 
491 Wardhana and Barus (]998: 68). See also Kenkhiro (2001); Young (!999). 
492 Kenichiro (2001; 499), 
493 Kenichiro (2001: 500). 
494 Kenichiro (2001: 498, 500). 
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almost all sectors of production.495 Aside from luxurious houses, many Indonesians 
spent their money on purchasing apartments, cars, cellular phones, electronic 
appliances, clothing and cosmetics. In 1985 the total number of apartments was 7 53 
units. In less than ten years, follov.ing the growing demand for nrban housing, the 
number increased more than 1000 per cent.496 In the 2000s the demand for 
apartments seemed to accelerate even further, as living in supposedly modem urban 
housing had gradually become a new trend. The same cao be seen in the level of 
vehicle sales. The sale of sedans during the decade, for example, was estimated to 
have jumped from 30,321 units in the early 1990s to around 60,000 in 2000.497 
Unsurprisingly, in the 2000s traffic jams, car accidents, noise and air pollution were 
common scenes in the large cities across the Archipelago. Likewise, the scale of 
cellular-phone sales was extremely high. In the medium-sized cities such as 
Bandung, Yogyakarta and Solo, cellular phones were sold like chips. Its outlets were 
everywhere, often by the side of the road. 
The increased consumer spending was also found in other sectors. Kompas 
reported that a number of Indonesian consumers had started to spend their holidays 
travelling overseas.498 Some, especially the so-called "super rich", even made the 
trip, sometimes in their private jets, just to go shopping, and Singapore, New York, 
London and Paris were among the favourite destinations.499 For those who were not 
so rich, Kuta and the Legian area in Bali were the perfect place.5°0 The conspicuous 
consumption was also evident in entertainment and sport. Hosting international pop 
stars had become a new phenomenon in the early 1990s. 50 ' Similarly, the number of 
applications to join golf clubs with their skyrocketing administration fees, seemed to 
increase significantly, as the number of golf courses in Jakarta rose dramatically 
during the l 990s. 5°2 
Accompanying the rising consumerism was the formation of the Indonesian 
new rich. They were mostly the new members of the urban upper class and upper-
midd!e class. Their structural occupations ranged from middle and high ranking 
bureaucrats to managerial, professional and technical workers; artists and 
495 Robison (1996). See a!so Priyono (1999). 
496 Robison (I 996; 80). See also Priyono (1999). 
497 Priyono (1999; 224). 
"' Kompas, 30 September !996. See also Wardhana and Barus (1998). 
499 W ardhana and Barus ( 1998) 
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intellectuals; large capitalists and petty bourgeoisie.503 The Indonesian term for the 
new rich was orang kaya baru (OKB). Commonly good-looking, mainly because 
their purchasing power allowed them to stylise and improve their physical 
appearance, people started to call them Indonesian yuppies. They were largely 
described as individualist, socially insensitive, ambitious, preoccupied with material 
things, and hedonistic. They were often condemned for being politically 
conservative. The issues of democracy, civil liberty and social justice were barely 
considered; their primary concern was their personal life and fun. 504 
The new rich were also characterised by other things. In terms of educational 
backgrounds, this class had higher qualifications compared to other social classes. 
They even had a better education than their parents as more than 50 per cent were 
university graduates. Higher quality education, combined with political connections 
and nepotism, seemed to have helped them to find better jobs with large incomes. 
More than 70 per cent earned more money than their parents have ever done. 505 
Therefore, like their counterparts in other Asian developing countries, the new rich 
were not only well-educated, but also economically better off. They lived a life with 
a scale of income far beyond what people generally needed to secure the daily basic 
commodities. 506 According to surveys on the emerging middle class in Jakarta 
conducted in the mid 1990s, the income of 46 per cent of the new rich was between 
Rp400 thousand and Rpl million (around US$200 and 500). The rest had more than 
Rp I million per month. Some even earned more than Rp4 million. 507 In addition, 
they had access to another source of purchasing power. They, for instance, had more 
freedom to benefit from bank credit facilities and used their credit cards mostly for 
retail purposes. 508 With such a discretionary financial base, the new rich were in a 
perfect position to enjoy consumerism and to exercise consumer choices in ways that 
the majority of the lower class could only aspire to. 
In fact, their presence was mostly visible through the consumer goods they 
purchased and through the facilities where they spent their leisure time. The new rich 
"'Robison (!996); Kompas, 30September1996. 
5°' Forum Keadilan, special edition, April !996; Kompas, 30 September 1996; The Jaluirta Post, 29 
June 1997; Priyono (!999). 
505 Kompas, 30 September 1996; Priyono (1999). 
506 See Robison and Goodman ( l 996); Pinchus ( 1999); Beng-Huat (2000). 
sw Kompas, 30 September 1996; The Jakarta Post, 29 June 1997. Certainly USS500 might not be that 
much. However, against the standard of living costs for average Indonesians during that period1 Rpl 
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were, for example, the occupants of luxurious housing complexes and apartments. 
TI1ey played golf and loved car races. They strolled through shopping malls, with a 
baby sitter who looked after their children walking a few step behind. They wore the 
latest model of popular brand shoes such as Nike and Kickers and had meals in the 
fast-food restaurants such as KFC and McDonald's. 509 Together with the so-called 
modem heroes, such as artists, entertainers and celehrities, the new rich w~'re the real 
trendsetters in fashion, housing and entertainment. This group was the main agent of 
consumer culture who taught others not only what and how to consume, hut also 
consumerism itself. 
Compared to developed countries, the rising consumerism in Indonesia was 
still in its early days. Even by the standard of neighbouring countries such as 
Malaysia and Thailand, not to mention Singapore, the purchasing power of the 
Indonesian new rich was relatively weak both before and after the financial crisis. 
Yet, through the increasingly significant role of the media, which experienced a 
boom during the early 1990s and then another rapid growth spurt following 
Soeharto's resignation, the new rich habit of consumption and the culture of 
extravaganza attached to their lifestyles was easily present in the homes of the 
majority of Indonesian households. The media images, which were often beautiful 
and spectacular, seemed to have been successful in persuading the Indonesian 
audiences to imitate the urbanite enclave cultnre of the rich. It was not surprising that 
consumerism slowly, but steadily, spread to the entire social ranks across the nation. 
Regardless of the size of income, many Indonesians apparently had become 
consumerist. 
For the lower class, their relatively weak financial base, rather than a 
hindrance, allowed them to be more creative in pursuing consumerism. As suggested 
by Gerke, "resource pooling" was the most popular strategy to get access to 
sufficient financial resources for consumerism.510 Stndents who shared a house, for 
instance, or, teenagers who lived in ihe same neighbourhood depended on this 
strategy. They basically put together any limited resources-money, clothing, 
footwear, etc--they possessed so that they could share either the big brand items or 
take a visit to a fast-food restaurant. At the same time, the lower class did not have to 
go to the luxurious malls mentioned above. To serve their desire to consume, plenty 
S-09 Wardhana and Barus ( 1998); The Jakarta Post, 29 June l 997. 
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of low priced shopping centres were waiting for them. They could still fmd Nike 
shoes with its perfect swoosh even though it was a skilfully made local imitation. 
They could also select other consumer goods that misused, but made them look 
similar to, the big brand names and logo such as Cravil (for Carvil), adudas (for 
adidas) and SUl'IY (for SONY). Should they really want the brand name articles, the 
second band market was always reliable. 511 
Celebrating Consumption 
The new rich were the children of the Indonesian developmental state. As 
will be discussed further in the next section, they were a product of successful 
economic modernisation, particularly during the three decades before the financial 
turmoil, in which the state played a decisive role in supporting capital accumulation. 
However, the Indonesian capitalist state was not a rational actor. State-capital 
relations were mostly based on networks of patronage, rather than on a purely free-
market principle. The important factors were political connections, loyalty, nepotism 
and corruption. Therefore, even though they were more educated compared to their 
parents, the emergence of the new rich was rarely a result of fair competition, 
accurate and rational planning, expertise and skill, seriousness and hard-work. The 
network of patronage was the key to their success. 
This significantly affected the way the new rich treated consumption. Since 
the path to wealth and prosperity they went through was less challenging, to use 
Heryanto's words, "what comes easily, goes away easily."512 Becoming wealthy and 
sustaining prosperity was no longer an issue, he continued, as the main concern of 
the new rich was how to use the discretionary purchasing power at their disposal to 
have a life full of as much fun as possible. It was not surprising that they were more 
preoccupied with excessive consumerism. They had used consumption beyond the 
logic of use-value. They turned it into a medium of pleasure and of celebrating life in 
ways that defied economic logic. Saving and other fonns of future investment were 
si i In Yogyakarta, the second hand market, which used to be a nun1ber of outlets located on the main 
street around 500 metres to the south ofTugu, was always full of visitors, mostly fro1n the lower-
middle class and lower class. It was rumoured that the original articles of big brand names sold here 
v.,'ere most probably stolen goods. 
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rarely taken into account. They seemingly preferred to maximise and expand the 
scope of enjoyment and to live life in the present. 
At the same time, I argue, that the majority of the new rich spent their adult 
life in a different cultural milieu to the one that older generations of the upper class 
and upper-middle class used to be part of. The new rich had adopted a culture of 
celebrating life, of having as much pleasure as money could buy. In a culture that 
was increasingly global and dominating, hard work and discipline remained 
important In fact, this was the culture of a "Puritan by day and a playboy by night," 
to borrow Danis:.le Bell's expression.513 However, enjoyment and pleasure were no 
longer seen as serving the world of work. Rather than signalling the paradox of the 
modern consumer, as Bell would argue, this was the time when work had become 
auxiliary to pleasure. In this sense, the Indonesian new rich not only had a relatively 
easy path to wealth and prosperity, but also lived in a particular time in history when 
enjoyment and fun were the keywords. The combination of a big income, a strong 
desire for pleasure and the culture of having fun easily resulted in consumerism. 
What did it mean to have pleasure through consumption in real life? How 
much money did the new rich have to spend? As discussed previously, consumption 
for fun was evident in the increasing amount of consumer expenditure on secondary 
and tertiary commodities. However, it was not the act, for example, of buying a new 
sedan that mattered. Rather, it was the desire to possess new things that was the 
issue. Consumption became a moment of pleasure because it was an act of fulfilling 
the desire to possess. The desire to possess new things could not be rigidly attached 
to either specific products, brand names, or, models. lt was unlimited and always 
demanded immediate fulfilment. In addition, desire could always be skilfully 
manufactured. In the contemporary capitalist world, the roles of the media and 
advertisements were crncial in cultivating the desire to consume. Increasingly, many 
people decided to buy things more because of image propaganda, rather than because 
of reasonable calculation of the utility dimension of the commodities being 
purchased. As the invasion of the media and advertisements overloaded Indonesian 
daily life with spectacular, beautiful and fascinating images and signs, the new rich 
in particular and the Indonesian consumers in general were easily seduced and 
controlled by the new culture of celebrating commodities. 
513 Quoted in Featherstone (l 99la: 21). 
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Consumption for pleasure could be seen in the purchasing of common 
consumer goods such as electronic appliances, clothing, footwear and food. As 
mentioned above, travelling overseas for shopping had been common among the 
Indonesian new rich for some time. Repmtedly, a business woman admitted that she 
could spend Rp200 million (around US$100 thousand) during a shopping trip and 
this amount was normal, She then returned to Indonesia with several suitcases full of 
new clothing and would do the same thing on the next trip, which could be in a 
matter of weeks and months. 514 One wonders whether she had enough time to wear 
all the new clothing between the trips and why she purchased more when she had not 
tried on every single piece that she possessed. For this business woman, I argue, we 
miss the point The most significant thing was not wearing, but buying, that clothing: 
buying was the main and real fun. 
Consumption for the sake of celebrating the pleasure of possessing new 
things created a moment of joy. It was joyful because consumption seemed to have 
the power to cure stress, anxiety and sadness. The new rich often insisted that they 
needed consumerism to have some fun in their lives. Otherwise they would be 
internally damaged by stress. The reason for their habit of frequenting cafes, in this 
-11 
sense, was to keep themselves mentally healthy.' - They travelled overseas on 
holidays and sailed far away from their daily modem life for deep fishing in order to 
free their minds and bodies from the discipline and control they experienced at work. 
Certainly, it was expensive, but they would say that happiness, however limited, is 
the thing that money cannot buy. After all happiness was the greatest reward they 
were looking for after all tbe hard work they had done. 
One thing that made consumption joyful was the fact that consumption was 
also entertaining. The power of places such as cafes to heal anxiety and sadness and 
to create fun was not through the soft-drink that was consumed, but through the 
atmosphere, the scene and the sounds that were entertaining. Having a meal was in 
fact secondary, as the majority of the new 1ich visitors were looking for this 
entertaining dimension of the cafe.516 This type of consumption was probably more 
visible in the night entertainment venues.517 However, the interesting thing was that 
in the latter, entertainment was the use-value to be consumed. Caf6s on the other 
51
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hand were basically a place to have drink. And, yet, the majority of cafes in the 
Indonesian large cities that were built in the last five-to-ten years were more 
preoccupied with a stylised appearance, through beautiful and colourful designs and 
sounds, in order to create an entertaining and lively atmosphere. As cafes tried to 
attract consumers by using fascinating and spectacular images to manipulate their 
desires, the new rich and other visitors started to consume more of this entertaining 
atmosphere. 
The entertaining dimension was strongly present in shopping malls. The 
malls appeared more like indoor amusement parks equipped with a range of lovely 
and outstanding pictures, displays and spectacles. Many Indonesian, not only the new 
rich, went to the malls to enjoy this saturating images and signs.518 Strolling through 
the mall corridors was in fact a cheaper form of consumption, but full of fun. The 
strollers were charmed by the spectacular interior design. They took pleasure in 
viewing attractive and enticing advertisements and pictures. They were fascinated by 
the beautiful consumer goods inside the shop windows. They also enjoyed seeing 
other beautified and stylised visitors who passed by. As insisted by another MMI 
activist, Nur, the shopping centres were no longer just the places to buy things. 
People still purchased personal and daily needs in the malls, but she explained, 
something that only needed less than five minutes shopping time was in stark 
contrast to another five hours afterwards spent walking through the corridors of the 
mall. 519 In fact shopping centres had become the favourite place for cuci mata 
(literally "eye cleaning"). This metaphor meant that in these places people could 
refresh their sight by allowing their eyes to enjoy the pleasure of beautiful images. 
Being joyful and entertained implied that discipline, limitation and control on 
the fulfilment of bodily pleasures were, at least, partly released. One could hardly 
take pleasure from the beauty of any seductive images if one's eyes and/or sexual 
organs remained strictly regulated. Since discipline and control of the body could be 
understood as a significant part of (the formation of) culture and civilisation,520 the 
consumption of the entertainment dimensions of places such as shopping malls and 
cafes signalled the presence of cultural disorder.521 It could be further argued that in 
shopping centres, just as in the fairs and carnivals traditional in Europe a few 
518 Gerke (2000); Kenichiro (2001). 
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centuries ago, the dominant culture and civilisation was actually being turned-up-
side-down. 522 In a later section I will demonstrate how the activists have their own 
moment of cami val, of inverting their outside world. What is important here is that, 
from the fundamentalist point of view, the culture and civilisation that regulated and 
basically oppressed tbe body was tbe main source of autonomous consciousness. The 
cultural disorder meant that autonomous consciousness had no order in places such 
as shopping malls and cafos and so was turned on its head. Specifically, as discussed 
in the foregone chapters, the basis of regulation of the body was the control of hawa 
naftu by value reason. The control was achieved through strict discipline of various 
body parts. For them, the notion cultural disorder indicated that in shopping malls 
people were encouraged to free their body and to celebrate hawa naftu. The 
established values and norms were turned up-side-down as in these places hawa 
nafau, not the value reason, was the rule. 
Consumption is the Message 
The nse of consumer culture in Indonesia, as elsewhere, was also 
characterised by the use of consumption as a sort of communication tool. The 
importance of sign-value implied that consuming a specific coll1lllodity could be seen 
as an act of not only adopting the cultural meanings associated with it, but also 
coll1lllunicating the meanings to others. In particular, the adopted sign-value could, 
and was meant to, tell us the identity of those who consumed the coll1lllodity. 
Consumption therefore was a statement of who one is and which social group one 
belongs to. Nevertheless, as put by Heryanto, consumption has never taken place in 
either universal, nor, in a purely natural and biological context.523 Not only does he 
underline the fact that use-value has become less significant, but more importantly 
the cultural meanings and signs associated with consumer goods are also locally 
bounded. Heryanto himself noticed tbat eating a McDanald 's hamburger in Los 
Angeles hardly equates to the same meaning as eating the same hamburger in 
Y ogyakarta. 
522 Featherstone {1991a); Sta!lybrass and White (1986); Bakhtin (l 984). 
"'Heryanto (1999; 159-60). 
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In this sense, advertisements, for example, play a crucial role. Advertising 
associates mundane consumer goods with cultural images and illusions. 
Unsurprisingly, consumer spending is increasingly intluenced by cultural 
associations and meanings of commodities people have found in the media and in 
various consumption facilities. At the same time, over the last two decades, some big 
corporations have radically changed their production strategy by focusing more on 
manufacturing the image--or, rather illusion-instead of the utility dimension of 
their products. Jn the most extreme case, it was believed that Nike, for example, had 
ceased to sell shoes, but were selling Nike itself. People who no longer consume the 
use-value of Nike's products started to buy the so-called Just Do It lifestyle.524 
However, just like AfcDonald's hamburgers in Los Angeles and Yogyakarta mean 
different things, the image of Nike does not necessarily mean the same for the 
consumers in Jakarta, Surabaya and Medan. In fact, the sign-value of any commodity 
can be defined by consumers themselves. The role of the cultural image as 
constructed by the owner of a brand name, or advertisements in general, in shaping 
the cultural meanings and illusions of commodities was only one among many 
factors. How consumers percieve the origins of the commodity was equally 
important. Whether it was made in Indonesia, or, made overseas-and in what 
country-was always part of the construction of the sign-value. How consumer 
goods were associated with whom was also important. 
One thing is for sure, the majority of Indonesian consumers, notwithstanding 
socioeconomic backgrounds, used consumption to construct and improve their 
appearance. Specific goods were put on in order to create ce1tain impressions on 
their friends, colleagues and/or the common people they met on the street.525 This 
was even more so in the case of the new rich. They blatantly admitted that they spent 
a lot of money on their physical appearance. For them, the big brand commodities 
they possessed with passion, the expensive hobbies they loved, and the beautiful 
goods they collected were not for daily needs, but more for enhancing their self-
image. 526 The cultural signs and illusions attached to the images of commodities in 
advertisements provided much needed support in improving their self-image. One 
could easily notice through the images in the media and public venues that a good 
524 See Klein (2001). See also Kellner (1995). 
525 See Gerke (2000) 
526 The Jakarta Post, 29 June 1997. 
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and enhanced self-image was largely associated with the illusion of being young, fit, 
beautiful and smart. As this was taken for granted, people competed to look smart, 
for example, by possessing the latest model of cellular phone. For their part, the big 
brand names such as Nokia and Sony Ericsson were in ceaseless contest to present 
their respective phones as the smartest one. Many consumers were also obsessed by 
the image of being young and fit For the new rich, any sporty type car or motorcycle 
would enhance their image. 
The power of consumer goods in reshaping one's self-image was more than 
just the propagation of these illusions by images and signs. The HTI activist, Ila, 
argued that advertisements not only taught many Indonesian women that being 
beautiful was highly important, but also told them how being beautiful should be 
defined.527 She noticed that within the world of the media beauty was commonly 
represented by slimness and a white skin. Unsurprisingly many young women did 
whatever they could to be slim and to be white. Even, in one of the salafi group's 
websites the issue of whitening one's skin was hotly debated. 528 This is ironic 
because the majority of female activists of this group wear not only the hijab, but 
also a veil. Yet, they did care about beautifying their skin. For Ita, the association of 
beauty and slimness was simply a media delusion. She insisted that there was a time 
when fatness was instead the sign of beauty. She concluded that these illusions were 
only meant to persuade consumers to spend more money on cosmetics. 
At the same time, Indonesian consumers in general had their own illusion of 
self-image, relatively free from the intervention of the media and advertisements. 
Instead of adopting directly the cultural associations attached to the image of 
consumer goods by the media and advertisements, the Indonesian consumers 
invested their own construction of self~image on various commodities that they 
consumed. By and large, the illusion of being modern had often been the most 
important image in the rising consumer culture in Indonesia. 529 While it could be 
associated with ideas such as progress, innovation and rationality, for many 
Indonesians a modern man is defined by what he wears. Benetton, Hammer, or, 
Levi's would certainly do. Nokia and Sony were also very useful. A number of public 
527 Interview with lta, 
523 See, for example, "Kosmetika Pemutih Wajah," published on 30 August 2007 in 
http:/iwww.a.sysvariah.com (accessed on 4 September 2007); "Hukum tato," published on 5 August 
2007 in http:_i/Vw'\V\v.asvsvariah.com (accessed on 4 September 2007). 
529 See Gerke (2000). 
196 
venues equally symbolised modernity. As reported by the SWA magazine, since the 
late 1990s, cafes had become a popular venue frequented by young teenagers who 
wanted to be seen modern. 530 
Other than the illusion of being modern was the illusion of being a member of 
an elite. In the rising consumer culture in Indonesia, in order to be seen as, for 
example, a rich man, one would invest energy and money in perfecting one's 
outfits. 531 The brand name articles mentioned above would surely help. For the new 
rich, these articles might be expensive, but their discretionary financial base made 
the price hardly a hindrance. For those from the lower classes, their level of income 
could prevent them from having a self-image of being a member of an elite. Yet, 
sharing commodities through the strategy of resource pooling argued by Gerke was 
the answer to their desire for Nike and Levi's.532 
However, there was another way to be looked elite through the consumption 
of expensive and luxurious commodities. It was not the price that mattered, but the 
association of specific commodities with national and international popular figures. 
The business woman discussed in the previous section was an interesting case. 533 She 
was once on a trip to New York and stayed at one of the Four Seasons hotel's 
president suites. She then realised that just before her visit the room had been rented 
by Sharon Stone. On another night she met Sylvester Stallone when she was having 
dinner in the hotel's restaurant The most unforgettable thing, for her, was not the 
price of this accommodation which was far beyond the reach of ordinary 
Indonesians, but the fact that she had shared similar facilities with stars such as Stone 
and Stallone. Because of sharing the same luxurious hotel, she felt as if she was at 
the same level socially with these movie stars and with other prominent figures like 
them. Similarly, the McDonald's director in Indonesia, Bambang Rachmadi showed 
how proud he was to possess an F50 Ferrari. 534 The car was very streamlined and 
extremely expensive, yet, that was not the reason for him to be so delighted. He 
explained that the F50 was a "sedan /angka" {rare sedan). The Ferrari factory, he 
claimed, only produced 349 units of this type and he was the 77'" owner. In Asia, he 
continued, there were only two F50 owners, him and the sultan of Brunei, Hassanal 
530 Quoted in Kenichiro (200 l: 502}. 
511 See Gerke (2000). 
"'Gerke (2000: 147). 
533 Wardhana and Barus (1998: 19-20). 
534 Wardhana and Barus (1998: 183). 
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Bolkiah. lt seemed that being at the same level with Bolkiah in terms of owning the 
same F50 was one ofRachmadi's proudest moments. 
It is important to note that to use consumption as a medium to accentuate 
one's identity, the act of consuming commodities should be publicly visible. 
Consumption can be a declaration of identity if one's friends, neighbours and people 
in public places generally witness what one eats and wears. This explains why the 
key characteristic of many fast-food restaurants in Indonesian large cities, for 
instance, is a wall of glass that encloses the main building. The design allows 
consumers to be seen in the restaurant and having an "international" and "modern .. 
meal. As reported by Gerke, the consumers would often take the empty meal bag 
with them as they left the restaurant. The bag was to let their neighbours and others 
know where they had had their meals.535 It was through this kind of communication 
that the consumers in fast-food restaurants socially classified themselves. 
THE INDONESIAN CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 
The rise of consmner culture in Indonesia is better understood against the backdrop 
of the capitalist economic development in this country following Independence. The 
development had provided the socioeconomic basis for the rise of consumerism and 
the formation of the new rich. It is important to note, however, that real economic 
development with a significant effect on the emergence of consumer culture had just 
started in the late 1960s, which was around two decades after Independence had been 
marked by tensions and conflicts. This political turmoil culminated in 1965 when a 
failed revolution by PK.I was crushed by a coalition of members of army, 
technocrats, businessmen, religious leaders, intellectuals, journalists, artists and 
students. Accompanying the rampant mass killing of those who were accused of 
being PKI members and sympathisers was the formation of the New Order. It was 
the New Order that rehabilitated and restructured the economy. It was based on a 
firm belief in the prominent role of capital accumulation in modernising the conntry 
and paved the way for development and growth for the next thirty years. However, 
"' Gerke (2000). 
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development and growth is only one part of the story. The other part is about 
oppression, a wide social gap and misery. 
The New Order inherited not only the political instability of the previous 
regime, but also a stagnant economy. In 1965 the inflation rate was 635 per cent; the 
budget deficit was around 14 per cent; the deficit in the balance ofpa)wentjumped 
to USS248 million and the value of exports slumped from US$924.4 million in 1956 
to US$705.9 million in 1965.536 Under the tutelage of liberal technocrats Indonesia 
underwent shock-treatment. Thanks to foreign support and political repression, 
which enabled the technocrats to implement the rehabilitation program without 
significant opposition from those who would suffer under the policies, the crisis was 
successfully neutralised and the economy was better prepared for further 
development. As one of the oil-rich countries, the dramatic increase of this 
commodity price in the early 1970s could only help the New Order to realise its 
dream of developing Indonesia into an industrialised nation. The capitalist economic 
development was, in fact, in full-speed. From the beginning tbe state had always 
played a significant role both directly by investing a huge amount of capital in a 
range of economic sectors through various state owned companies and indirectly by 
providing regulation and a legal framework for capital accumulation.537 
In the mid 1980s the dramatic fall of the international oil price severely 
damaged Indonesian capitalism because the oil sector had previously contributed 
more than 60 per cent of the country's exports. The growth slackened, the balance of 
payments was devastated, state revenues ran into deficit and domestic savings dried 
up. The New Order was forced lo restructure the economy and to pursue reform 
policies. 538 The most significant effect, however, was the decline of state direct 
involvement in capital accumulation. This paved the way for the private sector to 
emerge as the "new engine of development". 539 Indonesia soon recovered and tbe 
economy grew around 7 per cent annually. The manufacturing sector increasingly 
became prominent and its annual growth surpassed the economic growth. 540 In the 
second half of 1997 Indonesia was hit by another economic crisis. This time it was 
the financial meltdown that ruined the country's economy and politics. The financial 
536 Mas'oed (1989); Hill (2000). 
537 Robison (1987), 
535 Robison (1987); Hill (2000), 
539 Hiariej (2003 ). 
S4-0 Hill (2000). 
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debacle provided more opportunities to restructure and reform the economy. 
Following the political demise of the most powerful figure in the New Order, 
Soeharto, the crisis led to a further decline of state participation and a significant 
increase of the private sector in economic development. Since the early 2000s, the 
most prominent state sectors have been either fully or partly privatised. 
The size and scope of change brought about by the New Order capitalist 
development was extraordinary. Before the 1997-98 financial crisis the annual 
economic growth had been rarely less than 7 per cent. In the three decades since the 
1970s, GDP had almost doubled. The dramatic transformation was more evident in 
the growing prominence of the industrial sector. In 1960, the contribution of 
agriculture to GDP was more than 50 per cent. Since the 1990s its share had sharply 
declined and constituted less than 20 per cent. In stark contrast was the 
manufacturing sector. In 1960 its contribution to GDP was less than I 0 per cent, but 
in the next three decades its share increased dramatically.54 ' It was within this newly 
industrialised and relatively prosperous Indonesia, for the upper and middle classes 
in particular, that the consumer culture emerged. 
Consumer Culture and Capitalism 
Nevertheless, I by no means intend to exaggerate the impact of capitalism on 
the rise of consumer culture in Indonesia. My argument is that the New Order's 
capitalist development provided the necessary conditions that helped and accelerated 
the emergence of a consumer culture. Many Indonesians have used material things to 
demonstrate who they are for some time. However, capitalism significantly created a 
range of social infrastructure, facilities, tools, equipment and goods through which 
this cultural habit became not only visible, but also increasingly dominant. Therefore 
we could find a sort of birth date of the consumer culture in Indonesia which, I argue, 
was in the first half of the 1990s. This was the time when the New Order's capitalist 
development had reached the point where the wealth it produced allowed and gave 
more freedom to Indonesian consumers and, in particular, the new rich to celebrate 
consumption and to use consumption as a medium for communication. At the same 
541 See Hill (2000). 
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time, the expansion of capitalist production started to depend on the act of 
consuming commodities other than its use-value. Through the strategy of promotion, 
packaging and advertisements, commodities became associated with spectacular and 
beautiful images and masked with cultural associations and illusions. The aim was to 
persuade consumers to consume for the sake of consuming more. The same strategy 
also encourages people to consume sign-value, instead of use-value. Hence, we could 
also witness the emerging culturalisation of things as a result of a constant attempt to 
accentuate the cultural image of consumer goods and to hide their utility dimension. 
What was created by the New Order's capitalist development that led to the 
rise of consumer culture? Consumer culture only emerges in society where mass and 
modem consumption takes place. The modem mass-consumption is made possible, 
among other things, by the increase in consumer demand as a response to changes in 
capitalist production. These include the availability of consumer goods; different 
ways of purchasing things; different locations for pursuing consumption; as well as 
the growing importance of style, design and appearance of goods. 542 In the case of 
economic modernisation in Indonesia, the capitalist development in the last four 
decades did lay the foundations for this production-led consumption, that 
consequently led to the acceleration of the consumer culture. The most important 
factor, as mentioned in the Introduction, is commodification. The sheer size and 
scope of commodification in the last forty years has indeed been extraordinary. The 
pace of industrialisation, especially in the manufacturing sector, has significantly 
increased the number and availability of consumer goods. Not only in large cities 
have people become more dependent on what is being sold in the market to survive 
their daily lives, but also increasingly in smal! towns and in the countryside where 
people used to rely partly on some sort of subsistence mode of production. It has 
become more and more common for the middle-class households in large cities, for 
example, to buy, rather than cook their own, meals. In other words they preferred to 
ask someone else to cook for them. It could be either a nearby warung (a traditional 
and relatively small restaurant), a fast-food restaurant, or, pembantu rumah tangga 
(PRT or household assistance). As they now did not have to do the hard work of 
cooking, the process of having a meal could be more fun and more open to various 
symbolic uses. Even the fundamentalists admitted to the growing importance of the 
542 See, for example, Lury ( 1996). 
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supermarket in their life. They find it easy, handy and much more efficient to 
purchase their daily needs here. 543 
The other important factor is consumption facilities. Closely related to the 
process of commodification, the facilities are public venues where consumption 
occurrs, where people buy and consume commodified things, processes and social 
relations. This includes venues such as shopping malls, supermarkets, fast-food 
restaurants and cafes as well as amusement parks and tourist resorts. The growth of 
shopping centres in particular has been remarkable. Until the mid 1980s, shopping 
centres, including in the biggest cities, were hardly noticed. Jakarta, for instance, had 
less than ten malls, and each mall was relatively small as most of them occupied less 
than 25,000 square metres. However, the number has rapidly increased since the late 
1980s. In the ten years between 1988 and 1997 at least twenty-nine shopping centres 
were built in Jakarta alone. Eleven of the new malls occupied more than 50,000 
square metres and a few were more than 100,000 square metres. 544 In the medium 
cities the growth was much more moderate. However, over the last decade five 
shopping centres in Y ogyakarta, not including a couple of hyper-markets, have 
provided even more opportunity for the city consumers to enjoy and celebrate 
consumption with ease. The growth of fast-food restaurants and cafos has also been 
significant.545 The fast-food restaurants, in particular, seem to have accompanied the 
rapid increase in the number of shopping malls. Almost in every mall in the large 
cities one could find at least three of the most popular fast-food franchises: KFC, 
McDonald's and Pizza Hut. The cafe boom has been the most recent phenomenon. 
While in Jakarta it had started to grow in the early I 990s, in other major cities the 
number of cafes expanded swiftly in the 2000s. 
Finally, it is also important to note the emerging sign of culturalisation of 
commodities. I use this term to describe a process through which the cultural images 
of consumer goods are accentuated. At first, beautiful and fascinating pictures, 
displays and spectacles accompany the introduction and promotion of various 
consumer goods. Then, cultural meanings, values, signs and illusions·--the sign-
value in short-attached to the image of commodities are not only strongly 
emphasised, but also deliberately manufactured to hide the real and mundane 
54J Intervievv with Oni; group discussions with the YttvfI's female activists. 
544 Kenicbiro (2001); Priyono (l999). 
545 See Kcnichiro (2001). 
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function of the daily commodities-the use-value so to speak. Within the story of the 
New Order's economic development, the growing importance of appearance, style 
and design of consumer goods indicated the culturalisation process. The process 
seemed to have started in the early 1990s. The media boom, particularly the 
emergence of several private TV channels, during the same period, I argne, 
significantly influenced the production-led consumption. Television basically turned 
into a new public spact7-which could be present in private-through which 
consumer goods were introduced and promoted. In fact, the new private TV channels 
were crucial in helping consumer goods to saturate the everyday life of many 
Indonesians with their cultural images and signs which were largely manipulating. 
At the same time, the sudden availability of a large amount and wide variety 
of consumer goods rendered the new space created by the media boom as the most 
important arena of competition. However, the competition between different types 
and models of commodities was no longer about substantial content and qualities, or 
different functions and abilities, of respective goods. It was more about style, design 
and appearance. As the images of consumer goods became more important, the 
competition between two similar items produced by two different brand names 
became more a competition between physical strength and smartness, exotica and 
modernity, or, romance and rationality. 
The media boom had its own logic. Even though the capitalist development in 
Indonesia, especially following the mid 1980s economic reforms, significantly 
contributed to the rapid growth of the media industry, factors other than the direct 
effect of capitalism, such as cultural globalisation and political openness, also played 
important roles.546 For me, the most important thing about the media boom in the 
1990s, and later in the 2000s following Soeharto's resignation, was that it allowed 
promotions and advertisements of consumer goods on au unprecedented scale. 
Before it was banned by the New Order's political regime, advertising on television, 
for example, only existed on the TV channel owned by the state. Now, it was not 
only allowed, but seemed to dominate TV programs. The main distinction between 
the advertising which used to be on the state's TV and the one on the current private 
TV satious, however, was that promotion of commodities was no longer stuck within 
the few seconds slot available during specific programs such as news, movies, quiz 
'"'See, for example, Sen and Hill (2000), 
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shows or sinetron. In recent years, we can easily see how a significant number of TV 
programs, particularly the entertainment-related shows, have turned into 
advertisements themselves. In these specific TV shows, one sees not only the singer, 
but also the brand name of a specific commodity that allows the show to happen. In 
the music entertainment program sponsored by the cigarette, Sampoerna A Mild, on a 
private TV channel an intriguing question arises: "which one is the real star, the 
musician or the cigarette?"547 
We should bear in mind the importance of the mid 1980s period of the New 
Order's capitalist development for the rise of the consumer culture in Indonesia. l 
have mentioned above that in this period Indonesia was hit by the fall of the 
international oil price which dried up state revenues. The slate was forced to reform 
policies and to be more open to international capital inflows. The most crucial effect 
was that the state had to withdraw from direct involvement in economic 
development, sell part or all of its entire shares in various state owned corporations 
and allow the private sector to take on more investment and industrialisation. This all 
ended up in the emergence of the private sector as the "new engine" of development. 
The private-led development brought significant implications for the production-led 
consumption. Different from the state-led development of the 1970s when 
industrialisation focused more on producing capital and intermediate goods, the 
private sector invested more money in producing consumer goods. This sector also 
gave more attention to social and physical infrastructure and the property sector. 
Together with the release on imports and foreign capital inflows, the private-Jed 
development increased the number, variety and availability of consumer goods, 
created more consumption facilities and provided the stimulus for the growing 
importance of style, design and appearance of commodities. The private-led 
development also contributed significantly to the emergence of the new rich. As will 
be discussed shortly, it created investment and job opportunities that were to result in 
enlarging the size of the Indonesian upper and middle classes. 
547 See, for example, the broadcast of this type of music entertainment on RCTL 
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The Politics of the New Rich 
Wealth generated from three decades of capitalist economic development was 
reflected not only in the mushrooming sky scrapers, shopping malls and housing 
estates, but also in the increasing number of people who could be categorised as 
upper and middle class. 548 The new rich earned more than they needed for daily 
survival and, therefore, had more freedom to celebrate and play with consumption. It 
was reported that in the mid 1990s the consumer spending of these classes 
constituted more than 30 per cent of national income. They also made use of no less 
than Rp2 l trillion of bank credit for consumption. 54Q 
When the New Order began economic modernisation in the late 1960s, the 
size of the upper and middle classes was a tiny fraction of the wealthy, modem and 
urbanite social groups. After three decades of growth and industrialisation the 
number did increase dramatically, though remained relatively small and constituted 
less than 20 per cent of the population.550 During the 1970s and the early 1980s, the 
growth of these classes was moderate. The state's pervasive involvement in 
economic development created the public sector as the most reliable path towards 
higher social and economic status. However, this sector was strongly dominated by 
civilian aud military officials. Unsurprisingly it only provided a narrow access for 
non-state individuals and groups to enjoy the fruits of the early economic growth. 
The exception was a few capitalists who benefited from the network of political 
patronage.551 In the mid 1980s this condition changed. The oil shock forced the state 
to withdraw from direct and extensive participation in economic development and to 
allow the private sector to assume a significant role in promoting growth aud 
industrialisation.552 The private-led development in effect enlarged the size of the 
capitalist class. A significant number of the new capitalists were politically 
connected to the New Order's prominent figures, either through blood, or, brihery. 
They took advantage of refonns such as privatisation of fruitful sectors such as 
transportation and the media. 555 The private-led development also increased the 
number in the middle class. It expanded job opportunities outside the public sector 
548 See Robison (1996). 
549 Priyono (!999). 
550 Robison (1996); Priyono (1999). 
"'See Robison (1986; 1990); Hiaricj (2003). 
552 Hiariej (2003). 
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for skilled managerial, technical and sales staff as well as professional financial and 
legal experts. In the mid 1990s Indonesia witnessed the boom of the new rich.554 
As mentioned in the preceding pages, the new rich were widely seen as 
politically passive at best and less-progressive at worst.555 They commonly restrained 
themselves from being directly involved in political activities. They tended to prefer 
gradual and moderate political change if it was possible and to maintain the current 
socio-political order if it was too risky. For them, economic welfare seemed to 
always come first before democracy and civil liberty. It was understandable that they 
were widely accused of being too greedy, selfish and individualist, too preoccupied 
with material things and lifestyles and too socially insensitive. As noted before, their 
huge incomes then easily resulted in excessive consumerism. Part of this claim is 
true if we consider the path through which the new rich emerged. They benefited the 
most from the New Order's capitalist development, which achieved remarkable 
economic growth and industrialisation through harsh political oppression. Their very 
apolitical attitude was in fact a significant political support to the New Order regime 
that created, nurtured and produced them. Nevertheless, not all upper and middle 
classes were politically inactive and conservative. Some fractions of these classes, 
for example, were heavily involved in the opposition that led to Soeharto's fall. 
There were also elements of radicals and revolutionaries who since the late 1980s 
had worked with peasant and labour movements in the country. 
However, [am more concerned with their excessive consumerism that is seen 
as reflecting their apolitical stance. As also been noted by a number of scholars,556 I 
argue that it is instead through their excessive consumerism that we might 
understand what and how politics could have meaning for them. To begin wi~ the 
very newness of the new rich could be significantly political. The newness implies 
that they were still in the process of being part of the rich. It meant that their 
existence within the group remained fragile and yet to be fully acknowledged. The 
established faction within the upper and middle classes might feel uncomfortable 
with the newcomers and find some way or another to maintain the social distance 
that they had before. For their part, the new rich wanted to assure others that they 
were no longer part of the large group of Indonesian poor. They also knew that they 
554 See Heryanto (1999). 
555 See Priyono (1999); Forum Keadilan, special edition, April 1996; Kompas, 30 September I 996. 
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had to learn a lot of new things and use symbols and various social tokens. 
Consumerism in this sense accentuated their collective existence. It was the best way 
for them to show off publicly how much money they possessed and how their new 
financial power had taken them to a new social status. 
Furthermore, the new rich could use the same excessive consumerism to 
challenge the position of the old members of the upper and middle classes and to 
assert their own domination. A wide range of consumer goods masked with cultural 
images and illusions provided them with new resources. In fact, what they wore and 
ate and to which place they went and spent their leisure time had been increasingly 
imitated by the majority of Indonesians. They, together with artists and celebrities, 
were widely seen as the trend-setters.557 At this point, it is interesting to note how the 
new rich acquired domination not through politics in a conventional sense, through 
political parties, parliament and elections, for example, but through the politics of 
consumerism. They used their spending sprees to distance themselves from the lower 
class, to challenge the old members of the upper and middle classes and to build and 
enhance their domination in society. 
The politics of consnmerism could also be seen from another point of view. 
Reportedly, a large nnmber of new rich were born after the 1950s. In the mid 1990s 
the so-called Indonesian yuppie was commonly recognised as young professional, 
wealthy and educated. 558 It seemed that they spent most of their adult life, as 
previously mentioned, within the increasingly global cultural milieu that emphasised 
the celebration of life. Their parents and grandparent~, as well as the old upper and 
middle classes, might have live.cl in an era when the dominating established values, 
either from religion, or, from "High Javanese Culture", stressed the value of 
discipline and control of the hody and everyday life. Within the historical period of 
the new rich adult life, on the contrary, the new culture tended to portray discipline 
and control as old-fashioned. Nothing was wrong with bodily pleasure and having 
more fun in life. After all, they fully had the right to enjoy life with all the 
discretionary financial power at their disposal. Being happy and remaining so, for the 
new rich, was as significant as working hard to earn more money.559 And happiness, 
I have demonstrated before, could mean spending a large amonnt of money, in order 
557 See Gerke (2000); Kenichiro (2001). See also Young (1999); Heryanto (1999). 
"'The Jakarta Post, 29 June 1997. 
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to possess cellular phones, cars, clothing and yachts. In this respect the excessive 
consumerism was no different to the liberation process. 1t was an attempt to free 
one's self form any type of regulating values and norms and to allow the body to 
enjoy the pleasure. 
The new rich grew under a political regime that was repressive. Even though 
they might support the regime for the political stability it created which was 
conducive to a good "business·climate" and, hence, for investments and growth, 
repression could also hurt. Harsh oppression of political opponent~. limitation on 
freedom of expression, intimidation and illegal arrest were among the most favourite 
fonns of repression conducted by the New Order. But repression could equally work 
directly on the body through ideological means. In the name of (economic) 
"development", it was the habit of the New Order to persuade Indonesians to work 
and study hard; to put one's self, one's material interests and personal pleasures, after 
one's obligation to the state and the community; to be disciplined and obey the rules; 
and to have a simple life.560 On the one hand, the new rich might have little problem 
with the former for it was more like a necessary evil for a successful economic 
modernisation through which they benefited the most. On the other hand, they hardly 
escaped the latter form of repression. Instead, they grew within a culture of self-
restraint and discipline officially promoted by the political regime they supported. It 
was this official culture that was under serious challenge by the increasing alternative 
one that celebrated life and allowed more freedom of the body. Here we could say 
that the excessive consumerism was perhaps the price of political repression. It was 
through the celebration and the play of consumption they could free themselves from 
the virtue of discipline and control officially preached by the regime. 
Jn this respect, the rising consumer culture, to a very important extent, both 
accentuates the emergence of the new rich and, more importantly, the domination of 
this class. Tbe resistance against consumer culture can hardly be understood without 
taking this domination into consideration. In the next chapter, I will show how the 
fundamentalists' response to these dangerous social ills is strongly influenced by the 
fact that they are not on the dominating side of class division within current 
Indonesian society. 
56° From my own experience these series of regulations of the body rhrough ideological means could 
easily be found in school rules. 
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*** 
To sum up, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia is better portrayed as a 
fonn of resistance against the rising consumer culture in the country. I have 
demonstrated that, to explain the resistance, we should at first understand the way the 
activists take the overproduction of images and signs that saturate the fabric of 
Indonesian everyday life as the real world of dangerous trends, immorality and the 
hedonism that they worry about It is no longer seen as imagery and fantasy because 
pictures and displays found in the media and in the public venues have the power to 
control and dominate the human mind and, in the process, socialise and normalise 
values and behaviour. These seductive spectacles also accentuate the importance of 
appearance, style and self-presentation at the expense of any substantial content and 
qualities that might hide deep inside one's self. The saturating images and signs 
represent the rise of consumer culture in Indonesia. It is a logical consequence of the 
rapid increase in the production of attractions and spectacles associated with the 
introduction and promotion of commodities. It is also largely part of the growing 
prominence of sign·value, the cultural associations and illusions attached to 
consumer goods. In Indonesia two factors give rise to consumer culture: 
consumerism and the formation of the new rich. 
The capitalist development pursued by the New Order played an important 
role in the emergence of consumerism, Through the process of commodification, it 
increase<l significantly the availability of a wide range of consumer goods and 
created various types of consumption facilities, This led to the importance of 
advertisements and promotion, on the one hand, and appearance, style and 
packaging, on the other. Capitalist development also produced the new rich, who rely 
on their excessive consumerism to make sense of who they are, to challenge the 
established elite and to imprint their ovm domination, and to oppose any fonn of 
discipline and control of the body. 
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Chapter6 
RECLAI!"1ING AND CLASS 
This chapter focuses on two particular questions. First, how do the fundamentalists 
resist the rising consumer culrure that presents to them through the haunting images? 
Seeond, how exactly do capitalism and the rising consumer culture provoke the 
fundamentalists' resistance? I have previously argued that, to protect themselves 
from dangerous trends, immorality and a hedonistic lifestyle, the activists allow their 
body to be strictly regulated. Jn this chapter I will show that discipline and control 
help them further to resist these social ills by reclaiming their life from the consumer 
culture occupation. They do this by "sacralising" everyday life in place of celebrating 
and playing with commodities. I understand the "sacra!isation" of everyday life to be 
an attempt to transform the mundane daily practices into the sacred sphere. The 
simple activity of eating, for example, is no longer a matter of serving one's basic 
need, let alone a celebration of having a meal, but a daily ritual. It is a ritual because 
specific Islamic values and norms are attached to the very act of eating. There is a 
strict prohibition and limitation on what to eat. There is also a divinely justified 
guideline on how to eat correctly. Eating in fact becomes an integral part of one's 
obligation to worship Allah. One only eats in the name of Allah and eating is to 
demonstrate how one is grateful for His Blessings. 
In this regard, reclaiming everyday life might look like a withdrawal from the 
modem world, the place where the consumer culture is located. It seems to support 
the argument that tends to associate Islamic fundamentalism with a retreat to 
traditionalism. However, regulation of the body provides the activists with the 
freedom and certainty they are longing for, the "sacralisation" frees their everyday 
life from being controlled by consumer culture and, at the same time, creates more 
certainty by providing directions and goals in life. More importantly, as I have 
indicated in the Introduction, the reclaiming helps the activists to live with the rising 
consumer culture. It gives them strategies to deal with and, even, to appropriate 
various elements of consumer culture. lt is hence ironic that, instead of radical 
transformation, the resistance in the form of reclaiming tends to preserve the existing 
dominant order. 
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I argue that the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia reflects 
some sort of contradiction within the capitalist development in this country. The 
resistance infom1s us that not everyone benefits from the consumer culture and/or 
enjoys it on the same terms. Based on Marxist conventional analysis, income can be 
easily seen as the source of contradiction. For the poor the rising consumer culture is 
a luxury that is hardly affordable. Therefore, the logic behind the rejection of the 
consumer culture lies within the class division originating in the process of 
production. The resistance is part of a general response to the issues of exploitation, 
misery and poverty. Even though income and the production-based class division are 
crucial, I have argued in the Introduction that the consumer culture has its own logic 
of contradiction. The rising consumer culture contributes significantly to the 
problems of oppression, inauthenticity and disenchantment. One rejects the 
celebrating and playing with commodities because one wants to save one's 
lllliqueness and one's autonomy. If the oppression of consumer culture appears in the 
form of seduction springing from the saturating images and signs, we might say that 
the contradiction is not only between the poor and the rich, but also between those 
who are strongly seduced and those who are not or less seduced. Nevertheless, the 
production-based class division remains significant. Jn fact, the way people react to 
the colonising consnmer culture depends on their position within the class division. 
In the following section I will discuss the fundamentalists' attempt to reclaim 
their everyday life. I will show how this attempt can he seen as a form of resistance 
against the rising consumer culture. Then, I will sketch the class tensions within 
Indonesian capitalism and the rising consumer culture. My aim is to demonstrate that 
the combination of exploitation, misery and poverty, on the one hand, and 
oppression, inauthenticiy and disenchantment, on the other, are important 
foundations through which we can understand their resistance. 
TURNING THE CONSUMER CULTURE UP-SIDE-DOWN 
The Islamic fundamentalism discussed in this project could be easily seen as the 
otherness or opposite of the rising consumer culture. In the place of celebrating and 
playing with life, the fundamentalists emphasised the virtue of discipline and control. 
Style, appearance and aestheticisation were also negated and were substituted with a 
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regulated body and asceticism. This simple play of negation is usefol as it 
accentuates some correlations between the two. However, it is hardly sufficient 
because the negation cannot explain why Islamic fundamentalism emerges in the first 
place. It also fails to tell exactly how the emergence of Islamic fondamentalism has 
anything to do with the rising consumer culture. At this point, it is important to 
understand how the consumer culture could be a real threat from the Islamic 
fundamentalists' point of view. 
Clearly, the consumer culture is dangerous because it could create a sort of 
cultural chaos. It tends to challenge and discard established values and norms. What 
is challenged and, then, rejected is discipline and control of the hody and everyday 
life, as the consumer culture promotes the importance of having fun and more 
pleasure in life. This could be frightening for the fundamentalists because established 
values and norms are a matter of order and certainty. People discover meanings and 
goals that give their life clear and right directions and, hence, make it feel more 
secure. As already discussed, the activists' main concern was the certainty in life, of 
having an original, true and meaningful life. The rising consumer culture just did the 
opposite. It renders obsolete and, in the process, discards the people's source of 
meaning and uniqueness. The bid for the implementation of shari 'a is an attempt to 
reclaim the obsolete and discarded sense of substance and autonomy. This became 
more urgent since the new values and norms brought about by the consumer culture, 
the importance of immediate satisfaction and bodily pleasure, for example, was seen 
as untenable. They though that it only turned their life into a more miserable journey. 
Perhaps, the most alarming aspect is the fact that the consumer culture, 
especially in the major cities, has struted to dominate people's everyday life. It might 
be originally attached to the new rich, but with the power of the media and the 
attractiveness of advertisements and places such as shopping malls, more and more 
Indonesians, regardless of class, ethnic and religious background, seem to have fallen 
under its spell. The rising consumer culture is threatening not because it discards 
established values and makes substantial content and qualities irrelevant, but more 
significantly because it makes the act of denouncing established values as highly 
acceptable and desirable. The rising consumer culture has the power to influence and 
control, so to speak. I have mentioned several times before, that apart from certainty, 
the activists of this movement were also deeply concerned with freedom, autonomy 
and authenticity. Many of them decided to join the movement because they thought 
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that by doing this they could free themselves from being dominated and oppressed by 
various kinds of evil, whether it was called secularism, capitalism, materialism, or, 
Western culture. The rising consumer culture was just the opposite of what they were 
trying to achieve. 
Nevertheless, the fundamentalists' response to the rising consumer culture is 
110! that simple. The activists did express significant rejection of the growing 
consumerism, but they hardly spoke of the concept The activists were more deeply 
concerned with the ruling trends, the growing immorality and the popularity of 
hedonistic lifestyles. The so-called enemies of Islam, particularly the West, were 
often accused of being behind all these social ills. The West was commonly seen as 
conspiring against the Muslims both through military means and, more increasingly, 
particularly in the case of Indonesia, through cultural means such as ideology 
(secularism, liberalism, capitalism, democracy, pluralism, feminism and so on), 
lifestyles and fashions. I use the term consumer culture to describe and refer to the 
current socio-cultural context in which, I argue, activists see the problems of trends 
in lifestyles, immorality and hedonism originating. The consumer culture also 
represents the increasing dominant values and norms, especially in the major cities 
that, l believe, have been mistaken by the fundamentalists for the West as conspiring 
to culturally destroy Indonesian Muslims. It seems to me that their anger toward the 
social ills looks more like an expression of anxiety, of being oppressed, controlled 
and dominated by something more powerful than themselves that they are yet to 
know more accurately than simply the enemies of Islam. Under these circumstances, 
how can we understand the fundamentalists' response lo the rising consumer culn1re? 
I argue that the fundamentalists' response was largely part of the attempt to 
reclaim their everyday life from being dominated by these social ills. Reclaiming 
means that the activists not only rejected these social ills, but also tried to regain their 
control and meaning of their everyday life. One way of doing that was the struggle 
for Islamic identity. As discussed in chapter 4, the resistance and the making of 
boundaries implied by the struggle resulted in the fomiation of identity space. This 
was a sterilised space, was supposedly free from any traces of social ills, through 
which the fundamentalists produced their own subject and remade their own self. 
This same place was also the starting point through which the activists attempted to 
recapture their own life, which had been severely contaminated by the ruling trends, 
the growing immorality and U1e prevalent hedonism. The way they reacted to the 
213 
consumer culture in this regard is evident in the new life navigated by these radical 
Muslims who continue to be in the process of learning and becoming fundamentalist 
The practice of a new life involved behaving in the same way whenever they were, 
regardless of whether they were in pesantren, at home, on a city bus, or, even, in a 
shopping mall. The new life, as will be explained soon, is more a matter of how they 
have new meaning and understanding of what life-including the one they already 
navigated before joining the movement--should be. 
But, how exactly was the new life, together with the new identity, subjectivity 
and self, a response to the consumer culture? To answer this question I am inspired 
by the seminal work of Mikhail Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, particularly on the 
concept of "carnivalesque". Bakhtin studies the medieval European popular culture 
and its influence on Rabelais, His main intention is to develop the concept of 
carnivalesque and use it to describe the roles of festive rituals such as carnivals, 
comic shows and popular feats in inverting the official culture. For example, the 
carnival celebrates sexual promiscuity, fattening food and intoxicating drink The 
celebration indicates that this festive ritual is more preoccupied with the material 
body as opposed to the ideal, classical and official body of beauty, symmetric and 
elevated. In fact, the carnival and the material body represent the otherness which is 
negated within the forniation of the cultural norms of society.;60 However, 
carnivalesque is more than just the otherness to official discourse. The important 
thing for me, as put by Stallybrass and 'N'hite, is that "carnival.. .is both a populist 
utopian vision of the world seen from below and a festive critique, through the 
inversion of hierarchy, of the 'high' culture."56l Bakhtin himself insists that 
",,.carnival celebrates temporary liberation from the prevailing tmth of the 
established order; it marks the suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms 
and prohibitions."562 In other words, the culture of carnivalesque, very often 
associated with the market and the fair, not only turns the social order up-side-down, 
but also resists oppressions and constraints put by the official and dominant culture 
on individuals. 
Following the translation of Bakhtin into English, carnivalesque emerged as 
an attractive model and analytical category, especially in cultural studies. I am more 
'"'Featherstone (l99Ja: 79). 
'
61 Stallybrass and White (1986: 7). 
562 Bakhtin (1984: 10). 
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interested, however, in the idea of resisting the official culture by turning it on its 
head. I find the idea very helpful in describing how the process of becoming an 
Islamic fundamentalist can also be seen as a form of resisting and inverting the 
increasingly dominating consumer culture. However, the conflict here is not between 
the popular/low culture and the official/high culture. The tensions are instead 
between Islam as interpreted and produced by the fundamentalists and the rising 
consumer culture. Interestingly, one could argue that the emergence of the consumer 
culture is itself an outcome of a cultural process through which traditional values and 
norms such as religion is mocked and inverted.563 Perhaps it happens during those 
times when the religion is the official and dominant culture. One might wonder 
whether ii is the time for traditional values and norms to adopt the carnivalesque, 
when the consumer culture that used to be paii of the subordinated and the unofficial 
starts to represent the social order. 
In fact, the production of identity, either through discursive practices, Islamic 
fashion or physical places, is politically crucial in itself. Its existence was a real 
challenge to the consumer culture, and challenging could mean various things. The 
presence of the hijab, for example, quite similar to theatrical performances in the 
carnival, is destabilising and disrupts the dominant culture for a couple of reasons. 
Above all, the hijab represents the disciplined body as opposed to the liberated body. 
It mocks and ridicules the beautification of the body and the importance of self-
presentation by being preoccupied with asceticism, and instead emphasises the 
centrality of faith. More importantly, the hijab tells us that a world other than the one 
already conquered by the consumer culture still exists and remains possible. There is 
a genuine alternative to type of body being projected by advertisements. At the same 
time the hijab accentuates the limits of consumer culture. Its power to control and 
dominate seems to have significai1tly failed to touch the body of the fundamentalist 
women. And those who wore the h{jab, I have previously demonstrated, did celebrate 
freedom and liberation from the established order created by the domination of 
trends in lifestyles, immorality and hedonism in everyday life. 
Nevertheless, critics have long been sceptical of the power of the 
camivalesque to transform the oppressive social order tbat it wants to challenge. It 
has been widely argued that camivalesque is more a festive celebration than political 
"'See, for example, Featherstone (l99la; l991b). 
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criticism and is often licensed by the official authority, which seems to allow a 
restrictive space of protest and liberation, so that it can establish a firmer grip on the 
people.564 The Islamic fundamentalism proves the merit of this scepticism. Although 
they seem to have inverted trends, immorality and he<lonism and replaced these 
social ills with Islam, the new life pursued by the activists ironically paves the way 
for them to touch upon and enjoy some parts of the consumer culture. As I will 
explain later, the new identity, subjectiviiy and self equally help them to appropriate 
what they seem to have strongly rejected. In the process, the fundamentalists, in my 
view, serve and enhance the rising consumer cul!ure. This is perhaps mostly evident 
in the issue of style and image of the person. The Muslim dress, for instance, 
apparently represents the fundamentalists' rejection of the importance of style and 
appearance strongly and excessively promoted by the consumer culture. Yet, the 
hijab also tells us vividly that the activists hardly reject the importance of physical 
appearance and just want to have the one which is Islamic and/or in accordance with 
Islamic teachings. Here, they by no me.ans challenge the consumer culture 
preoccupation with style and image. They are absorbed by this preoccupation and, in 
effect, support it, as they are also involved in the aestheticisation of body and self. 
The only differences are two. First, the hijab provides them with a sense of control 
and certainty, as if they have autonomy in producing their own self-image within the 
image-saturated everyday life. The second is the form of style in which the consumer 
culture is flawed mainly because it has promoted an incorrect-or they would say 
unislamic~fashion style. 
The Sacralisatlon of Everyday Life 
How did the activists of this movement reclaim their own everyday life? The 
reclaiming was a matter of how the fundamentalists-now with the new identity, 
subjectivity and self-redefined the meaning of life according to certain values and 
nonns. The outcome was a new perception of how one should treat one's own life 
and a new 1.mderstanding of what life is meant to be. More importantly the redefined 
meaning was the deep structure that gives life some stability and order for a certain 
564 The critics of camivalesque are listed in Stallybrass and \Vhite (1986: 12-7) 
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period of time. It also provided a life with pure qualities and tumed life into a 
medium through which some substance materialised. In addition, certainty and 
substance created a sense of control. As they often told me, everything in life, from 
waking-up in the morning to sleeping at night was always within the reach of their 
niat (intention}. The everyday life was not happening because of something other 
than their intention to preserve specific values and goals. 
Since they always associated oppression and domination with any sort of 
unislamic elements, the reclaiming in this sense was purification. Prior to the 
involvement with the movement the activist regarded their life as full of sin. 565 This 
unholy life was controlled by Satan, which was called by its various contemporary 
nicknames such as liberalism, materialism and hedonism. The reclaiming was a 
process to cleanse one's contaminated life. It is achieved during the course of 
inverting the dominant treuds in lifestyles, the immoral conduct and hedonism by 
placing greater emphasis on discipline, control, prohibition and limitation. This range 
of regulatory practices was, on the one hand, a camivalesque sort of turning of the 
world outside the movement. l am fully aware that the term carnivalesque might be 
problematic. However, what l find useful is the way camivalesque is portrayed as a 
fonn of resistance to the official and dominant culture.566 In this sense, hijab, for 
instance, is not carnivalesque, which tends to be on the short term basis and to be 
wild. But surely, it is a form of resistance by turning its outside world up-side-down. 
On the other hand, it was also like a passage of rituals associated with life 
changes. 567 The regulatory practices were to separate the activists from the society 
where contamination (trends, immorality and hedonism) originated and to remove 
any previous identity attached to the old unholy life. Becoming involved with the 
movement was then hardly different from a passage from unislamic space to more 
Islamic one. As a consequence the reclaiming is nothing more than an attempt to tum 
one's everyday life into a sacred sphere. Religiosity ceased to be confined within 
such rituals as the daily prayer and the fasting dnring Ramadhan. Every single thing 
in life, every move, act and speech, became ibadah. In this sense, the reclaiming was 
nothing more than the sacralisation of everyday life. 
565 Interviews \Vith Desti, Dian, Doritnan, Nopri. Man1at, Yoyok, Hasyin1, (:ahidar and Lukman: 
group discussion with the FPI's male activists. 
566 Bakhtin (1984). See also Stallybrass and White (1986); Featherstone (199la). 
Sfi! See, for example, the work of Tul'ner, The Centre Out There: Pilgrim's Goal, quoted in 
Hetherington (1998: J 07, I !0-3 ). 
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The sacralisation can be seen in the way the fundamentalists commonly 
redefined life as a pilgrimage, a sort of holy path to the life after death. 568 The life 
here and now was not the real one and only a tool-which very often required hard 
work·-to achieve the real happiness. The hereafter was more important and the place 
where one would find the eternal life. Every human, claimed A 11<was, including the 
most evil one, wants to spend the afterlife in paradise where the real happiness 
rules. 569 However, he insisted, heaven is only for those who have miftahul jannah (an 
Arabic tetms for the key of paradise) and shari 'a is the one and only key. With 
shari 'a life was redefined as an enterprise of abdication to Allah. It means that 
Muslims must follow His orders without either reasoning or reservation. What 
exactly the divine orders might be are a matter of contention as different Muslims, 
for sure, have different understandings. But for the fundamentalists the meaning of 
shari 'a was as clear as their own interpretation. 570 
This by no means implied that the life here and now was iJTelevant from the 
fundamentalists' point of view. On the contrary, human beings are blessed by Allah 
with reason, science, wealth and health so that one is able to undertake good deeds as 
much as possible during one's time in the world. The good deeds help one to pay the 
entrance fee to life in heaven. Therefore, it was extremely useless to indulge in this 
unoriginal worldly life,571 which was, I argue, propagated by the rising consumer 
culture. Despite painful regulations, prohibitions and limitations, one was better 
prepared for the life after death. After all, life is relatively short. Using a Javanese 
proverb, Wahyuddin insisted that life is nothing more than a short stop to have a 
drink He did not understand why so many Indonesian Muslims wasted this limited, 
but precious, time to watch movies, frequent shopping malls or accumulate wealth, 
instead of zikir (remembering Allah by mentioning and praising Him), sholat and 
jihad. He believed that they would be later sorry for this wasted life as it could not 
save them from the torture in hell. 572 
Unsurprisingly, the activists found the life here in the world as more 
complicated than it really was. Reflecting the feeling of being controlled and 
dominated, they saw the majority of Muslims nowadays as living under non-Islamic 
56s Intervie\vs witl1 Ba'asyir, Wahyuddin, Farid, Safruddin and Yusanto. 
569 Awwas {2005a: 33-4). 
570 A "was (2005a: 34-5) 
s7 i See Risalah A-iujahidin~ June 2007. 
572 interview \vith V,/ahyuddin. 
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rules. They lacked authoritative and divinely justified guidance on how to navigate 
life. Hence, how could one accwnutate good deeds and be sure that one would reach 
heaven if there was no guidance. Instead, Muslims' lives had been largely structured 
by non-Islamic teachings. They had increasingly depended more on this illegitimate 
guidance to engage in interchanges with their material surroundings and to have 
symbolic exchanges with their fellow human beings. The whole Muslim life was 
probably on the bad, wrong and unislamic side. And if this indicated the scale of 
contamination, reclaiming the everyday life certainly needed a huge purification 
effort. However this heavily contaminated life could not just be abandoned. The 
fundamentalists admitted that Muslims had lived this life for generations. Few 
aspects were found useful and not all things, relations and processes were bad in 
themselves even though they existed under non-Islamic rules. The reclaiming in this 
regard required not only correct guidance, but also creativity. The creativity in 
particular could help the activists to take the few good things and processes out of 
this contaminated life. 
At this stage, it is important to understand how the fundamentalists used 
Islam as a religion to help them in dealing with the rising consumer culture. To 
explain this, allow me to start by arguing that religion is an admission of human 
insufficiency. Humans need religion because they believe there are things bigger, 
stronger and more invincible which are beyond their control.573 These transcendental 
things represent domination, uncertainty and insecurity, the sphere which is out of 
the reach of the best hwnan mind to comprehend. The presence of religion is crucial 
because it helps humans to have some understanding of--and, hence, more certainty 
of---this uncertain area of life.574 Traditionally, death is the transcendental thing. 
Religion is hence more preoccupied with the questions of death and the life hereafter. 
However, for the fundamentalists, death is no longer the uncontrollable and uncertain 
area. This is not because the technological progress in the area of health and 
medicine has made death more predictable; but because they know for sure that 
everyone will die and death is nothing more than a shmt interval before the eternal 
life in the hereafter. And the life after death, as discnssed in the previous chapters, is 
comprehensible, It consists of paradise or hell and is within the reach of all humans. 
Even though Allah has the final word, they strongly believe that humans are blessed 
573 Bauman (!998b). 
514 Bauman (I 998b ). 
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with all the power they need to shape their own fate and to decide whether they will 
end up in unimaginable happiness in paradise or in eternal horror in hell. 
The transcendental on the other hand is more about the life before death. The 
life here in the world is more complicated and is becoming less understandable. The 
scale of change and technological development, for example, often leaves humans 
with less power to control and to make a reasonable sense of what is really going on. 
But the problem, for the fundamentalists, was not only in material progress and 
modernisation. They were more concerned with the fact that the majority of 
Indonesians nowadays live in an era of rapid change of cultural values and norms, 
which I argue, have been brought about by the rising consumer culture. They lacked 
authoritative and divinely justified guidance to navigate life with a sense of 
autonomy and some certainty. Hence, how could one amass good deeds and be sure 
that one would be on the right direction to a meaningful life if there was no guidance 
on good and bad, right and wrong, and Islamic and unislamic. 
Islam was used by this radical Muslim group to deal with these 
circumstances. It provided them with the wit and muscle to have a closer grip on this 
worldly uncertainty. Islam was to help them ensure that they were on the right path 
on their pilg1image to the most meaningful and eternal life. As a consequence, the 
fundamentalists treated Islam more as a manual sort of"how to navigate one's life". 
Through their interpretation of the meaning of shari 'a, Islam was turned into the 
primary source of detailed and specific guidance on how to use things, how to 
engage in social relations and how to spend daily life. This materialised, for example, 
in a number of "Islam for beginners" articles on websites, in magazines, bulletins and 
leaflets. At the centre of this constructed divine life manual is an attempt to negate 
the rising consumer culture by promoting discipline and control in opposition to 
celebration and play. It should be remembered that the fundamentalists were not 
alone in turning the everyday life into a sacred sphere. The Muslims in general also 
tended to believe that their mundane life could be related, at least indirectly, to the 
fulfilment of values and norms enlisted in AI-Qur'an and hadith. The main difference 
was that the activists attempted to transform the eve1yday life into a rigid and tightly 
structured Islamic ritual similar to the daily prayer and the fasting. 
The way their interpretation of shari 'a produced Islam as a sort of life manual 
can be seen in various ways. Above all, as insisted by Yusanto, the Islamic world 
caliphate he was fighting for was only a medium, and not the goal, through which 
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Islamic law could be implemented. With the law, he argued, Muslims could easily 
purify their contaminated everyday life and turn it into a sacred space through which 
their entire life was nothing more than a constant dedication to Allah's rule.575 The 
Islamic law, for Yusanto and his fellow fimdamentalists, was largely based on the 
rules that permitted and forbade Muslims to use or engage in a wide range of 
activities. Specifically, it comprised at least five different rules: wajib, sunat, mubah, 
makruh and haram. 576 These mies were highly important because they allowed 
Muslims to restructure their life according to certain meanings and goals. In practice, 
the notion of Islamic Jaw turned Islam into a divine manual for daily activities such 
as how to have meal, how to sleep, how to take a bath, how to dress and, even, how 
to have sex.577 Islam, the activists stated, taught them how to accumulate wealth and 
spend the money.578 There was also guidance on how to be a leader, to be a father 
and a mother and to be a mujtahid (Islamic scholar).57~ In the manual for having a 
meal, for example, the fundamentalists believed that Islam ordered them to sit while 
eating, to use the right hand, to start eating the meal located at the edge of plate first, 
and to wash hands before eating. 
Furthermore, Islam was also reinvented as a primary source through which 
the activists could know for sure the legality or iHegality of new things found in 
modem life which were rarely mentioned literally in Al~Qur' an and had never 
existed in Islamic history. In fact, this was one of the most popular issues discussed 
in several websites published by the salafi group. Two of the websites, 
w'-'w.asvsyariah.eom and www.darussalaf.org. not necessarily accessed by the users 
from within the group only, often became an online forum for debate, consultation 
and fatwa on issues such as tattoos, skin whitening cosmetics, hair painting, 
perfume, dmgs, rock music, western fast food, shopping malls, test tube babies and 
pitating computer software. For HTI, the new things that required Islamic legal status 
also included cu!Tency, bank interest, the stock exchange and financial markets.5"" 
A wwas claimed that it was his duty as well as that of his fellow activists to respond 
quickly and provide Islamic legal status for these new issues. This would prove, he 
175 Interview with Yusanto; A/-Wa 'ie, March 2004: 9L 
176 Interviews with Farid, Wahyuddin, Safruddin and Ba'asyir. 
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htm:/lwww.darussalaf.org (accessed on 26 February 2008); "Adah Makan dan Minum, bag-2," 
l'.ublisbed on 19 January 2008 in hltp:llJYWw.darussalaf.org (accessed on 26 February 2008). 
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579 Awwas (!999); Rahman, A.MJ.A (2006); Risa/ah Mujahidin, May 2007 
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said, that Islam was not an old and out-of-date way of life as it was capable of coping 
with the latest issues and developments in modern life. At the same time, the 
response would assist his fellow Muslims to have certainty and an Islamicly cmTect 
attitude towards new technology, material progress and cultural change.581 
However, in my view, the real issue is that A wwas and his fellow 
fundamentalists wanted to have a firmer grip on their uncontrolled and fast changing 
surroundings. They adopt Islam, and then promote it in a certain form so that they 
will not drown in the reality of daily life, which is full of new and incomprehensible 
things. They can then create their own life, which is, they think, original, meaningful 
and free from domination and oppression. 
The Strategy of Appropriation 
For the fundamentalists, reclaiming means that their everyday life did not 
occur other than through their own will. Instead, every single thing was under their 
control, through their intention to preserve specific values and norms. More 
importantly, this agency of selt~intention to do things paved the way for the next step 
of reclaiming everyday life. At this stage, the fundamentalists not only had more 
control on their life, but also could modify, improve and constantly restructure it by 
creatively appropriating items and elements of modem life, which were largely seen 
by them as being part of the non-Islamic world. This appropriation further allowed 
them to possess some sense of autonomy in making use of the rising consumer 
culture. The key is shari'a, or more precisely the divine law that permits and forbids 
Muslims to engage in various things as interpreted by the activists. At first, shari 'a 
based rules look quite rigid as they were applied to everything, and every process and 
relation in worldly life. Then, as long as these worldly elements pass the legal 
scrutiny of shari 'a based rules, the activists are free to use them and can take their 
action as a result of autonomous consciousness. For example, as long as eating KFC 
is legally acceptable from the point of view of their interpretation of Islamic 
teachings, those who eat this fried chicken cannot be seen as acting under, for 
instance, the influence of American cultural domination. Rather, eating KFC is a 
581 Interview \Vith A\\n,..vas. 
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result of deliberate and autonomous choice based on careful thinking about Islamic 
values and norms. 
To discuss the issue, I will first outline the fundamentalists' view on 
modernity and how they treat and relate to modem life. The reasons for this are two 
folds. First, the main target of appropriation is modem life. Its appropriation allows 
the activists to live with and adopt various elements of modern life, including the 
consumer culture. Second, modernity, as discussed in the foregone pages, 
increasingly becomes identified with items such as shopping malls, cafes, cellular 
phones and big brand named clothing. Unsurprisingly, the appropriation of modern 
life easily ends up in the appropriation of consumer culture. 
The fundamentalists commonly associated modernity with development and 
change that represent the quality improvement of society as a whole. 582 They 
understood development and change in, at least, two ways. The first was the progress 
in science and technology and in the production of material things. The second was 
the improvement at the level of the individual and society in the sphere of morality. 
By and large, the fundamentalists rarely demonstrated any substantial reservations 
about modernity. 583 Even though modem lifo might be under the domination of the 
West and seemed to be identical with the Western culture, they found it useful and 
unavoidable. The developments in science and technology, for example, helped all 
kind of human beings, regardless of colour and of faith, to improve their life in areas 
such as communication, transportation and production. 584 Although the technology 
was invented and developed by the West and the unbelievers, Muslims did not have 
to reject it. After all, the cloth that was used to make the hijab, for instance, was 
probably produced by a machine which was invented by the unbelievers. Similarly, 
Al-Qur'an was printed by a machine which was unlikely to have been produced by 
the Muslims themselves. 585 Instead, material things such as cellular phones, 
computers, cars and aeroplanes were universal equipment and did not represent any 
specific cultural background. Both Muslims and unbelievers who study and work 
hard could produce and develop these things. Hence, Muslims should not be 
582 Intervie\\'S with TaufiqJ Nopri1 Safruddin, Ba'asyir and Yusanto. 
583 Interviews with Yusanto; Sattuddin, Ba'asyir, Taufitt Yahya, Yoyok; Nopri, Lastii Sid and DestL 
584 HT! (2002). 
'"Risa/ah l•fujahidin, May 2007: 47. 
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sanctioned for making use of this equipments and/or for purchasing it from the West 
as the Prophet Himself did use things produced by the unbelievers.580 
More importantly, modernity was not just about material progress. Morality 
was more significant than the most advanced science and technology.587 Being 
modem meant becoming morally a better person. Hence, for Taufiq, how could one 
be seen as modem if one's aurat was not properly covered. The label of modernity, 
he added, could not also be attached to those who were promiscuous and used dmgs. 
Instead, displaying aurat publicly, promiscuity and dmgs represented the age of 
jahiliyah, commonly described as the period before the coming of Islam. This was 
the age of backwardness when humans were yet to believe in God or at least in one 
God and mixed up right and wTong. Islam came to improve this backwardness, to 
modernise so to speak, by teaching humans to believe in one and only Allah and to 
separate the right from wrong. In this sense, the activists would argue, Islam was 
much more modem and advanced than the West. They claimed that since the 
beginning Islam had taught humans how to civilise their physical appearance by 
hiding aurat and their sexual life by having sex with one's legitimate partner(s) only. 
Therefore, although it was useful and unavoidable, navigating modem life 
required strategies to adopt the good things and reject the vice elements. One of the 
strategies was a sort of ideological scmtiny applied to various aspects of modernity. 
Commonly adopted by the HTI activists, the strategy was based on the classification 
of all material and cultural things according to the concepts of madaniyya (largely 
understood as material products) and hadharah (largely understood as 
civilisation).588 ,l,,fadaniyya was the progress in science and technology discussed 
above. Hadharah was ideology, thoughts and concepts and/or what they claimed as 
hadharah inspired material and cultural goods. While Muslims were legally 
permitted to engage in madaniyya, they were asked to be cautious with hadharah. 
Yoyok provided me with this example. Bill Gates was clearly a non-Muslim, but 
Microsoft which he invented and produced was halal. Hence, the issue, for the salafi 
group, was more about whether Muslims are allowed to pirate the software. And the 
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answer, for thetR was that Muslims must comply with the copyright. 589 On the other 
hand, democracy, explained Y oyok, was hadharah. He insisted that Muslims must 
carefully investigate the ideological and cultural base of the concept before deciding 
its legal status. And for Y oyok, as well as the majority of activists I spoke with, 
democracy was a secularism-cum-Christian-inspired cultural phenomenon that was 
haram. 
Nevertheless, with some creativity, even those categorised as ideology-
inspired materials, could be transformed into being islamicly legaL This creativity is 
illustrated in the following cases. Parida Abas, the wife of the Bali bomber, Ali 
Ghufron, spent her educational formative years in Malaysia under the influence of 
western culture.590 She had good English, used to sing songs such as Twinkle Twinkle 
Little Star aod memorised well stories such as Hanzel and Gretel. She knew for sure 
that part of these were, to use HTI's term, hadharah. Yet, it did not prevent her in 
using Hanzel and Gretel to teach Islam to her children. 591 She just had to modify the 
story by praising-~rather than demonising as in the original story-~the virtue of 
having a stepmother. She thought that, by doing this, she could prevent her children 
from being anti-polygamy. 
The other more common strategy of modification was in the use of the bank 
The fundamentalists largely believed that the interest rate applied by the bank on 
both savings and credit facilities was hardly difforent from a usury, which is strictly 
forbidden in Islam. And, yet, for the HTI' s Siti, this by no means implied that she 
could not save her monthly salary in the bank or borrow money from the bank to buy 
a house. 592 To do that, she had to first select the so-called bank syariah (literally 
shari 'a bank). She said that the difference between the common banks and the bank 
syariah was similar to the difference between promiscuity and marriage. Both 
promiscuity and marriage was, among other things, about having sex. The main 
difference was that the former was illegaL She told me that she was about to buy a 
house. Rather than borrowing money that has to be paid back in a larger amount 
through the islamicly illegal interest rates, bank syariah a~ked her to adopt the 
following procedure. The bank would first buy the house she wanted to purchase. 
589 
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The house would then be sold to her at a higher price and she was allowed to pay in 
instalments. The higher price would almost certainly be the same amount of money 
plus interest that she could have borrowed from the common banks to buy the same 
house. But Siti believed that she was not using a modified credit facility of the bank. 
She saw her relations with the bank as more like a buyer-seller transaction which is 
allowed by Islam. While ignoring the fact that the higher price could be the same as a 
loan plus interest for the same period of time, it was normal and divinely acceptable, 
she argued, for the seller to seek a profit by selling the purchased commodity at a 
higher value than its original price. 
However, the most important thing was, according to Ba'asyir, the man 
behind the gun (English in original).593 He meant to say that with the good intentions 
of Muslims whose Islamic credentials had been proven-certainly from his point of 
view--the use of various unislamic-inspired things could be morally justified. The 
context of this statement was my question on his opinion about democracy and the 
role of Islamic parties which had won parliament seats. His first reply was that 
democracy was simply haram. As for the Islamic parties, he said that as long as the 
parties were headed by those who had a strong faith in Islam and used democracy for 
divinely justified purposes, we might expect something good to come from this 
illegal cultural action. Indeed, in the name of divinely legitimised intention, Muslims 
were strongly recommended to adopt science, knowledge and concepts that might 
~ 
look unislamic. For Almascaty, even though it may have been invented by non-
Muslims, all useful knowledge must have from Allah. 594 In his own words he 
declared that "Although the Islamic economic system, for example, has been 
discovered by Karl Marx who was an atheist, Muslims scholars still have the right to 
adopt it without the feeling of inferiority." Since, he continued, "all types of systems 
that are useful and correct are [part of] the science of Allah that He grants to those 
who try hard even though they are unbelievers, atheists or secular." 
The creative appropriation of modernity has significant implications for the 
way the fundamentalists treat the rising consumer culture. First of all, the consumer 
culture was commonly seen as part of modem life itself. More importantly, as long 
as they passed the madanz-yya and hadharah tests, were nsed by good Muslims and 
with good intentions, either with or without modification, items and elements of the 
5
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consumer culture could be islamicly aeceptable. Yoyok and Oni, for instance, found 
nothing wrong with having meal in KFC and AfcDonald 's restaurants because the 
fast-foods were not hadharah.595 The only problem for Nopri was that eating in these 
relatively expensive restaurants for many ordinary Indonesians contradicted his very 
existence as an activist who was supposed to defend the rights of kaum dhuafa-
tbose who were economically and politically oppressed.596 \Vhile the main concern 
for Desti was the price of this commodity, Farid added that Muslims just had to make 
sure that KFC, for instance, was produced from chickens which were slaughtered 
correctly according to the Islamic guidelines for killing animals.597 
Similarly, the aetivists took the shopping centres originally to he nothing 
more than markets, a place to buy and sell things. 598 As mentioned above, they were 
fully aware of the celebration and the play with life associated with the malls. 
However, it all depended on "the man behind the gun". Should they have to go to 
these places, they believed that the faith and the Islamic credentials that they 
possessed would prevent them from using malls other than as venues for purchasing 
goods. To put it differently, it was only the fundamentalists and certain others that 
could use shopping malls and all items and elements of the rising consumer culture 
in the right way and with legitimate intentions. The other Muslims, whose Islamic 
quality was still in question, were surely from the point of the activists' 
understanding of what tslam should be, in danger of being dominated if they engage 
in the consumer culture. Therefore, such Islamic credentials allowed Y oyok and his 
HTI fellow activists to continue their habit of listening to Metallica's songs. The Al-
Mukmin's students did not agree with this. Initially, it seemed that they simply took 
the songs as representing the enemies oflslam. Later during conversation with me, it 
was revealed that music groups such as Metallica and Slipknot were denounced 
because their songs were, for the students, hardly understandable and no more 
enjoyable than common popular songs. 599 
595 Intervie-.vs with Yoyok and Oni. 
596 Interview with Nopri. 
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The Question of Beauty 
The Islamic fundamentalists are often regarded as conservative. Nevertheless 
their conservatism, I believe, has nothing to do with any attempt to revert Muslims to 
the golden age of Muhammad, His Companions and the Islamic caliphates. Instead, 
conservatism is more about bow they deal with the socio-cultural context they want 
and are supposed to change. We can call them conservative because the reclaiming 
of everyday life as a carnivalesque sort of resistance seems to have ended up in their 
efforts to live within, rather than change and transform, the dominating and 
contaminating culture they strongly opposed. As mentioned before, nothing is 
perhaps more illustrative than the case of the hijab. In the following pages I will try 
to explain how the hijab that was supposedly a revolutionary movement at the level 
of the body has resulted in preserving the rising consumer culture. 
The rising consumer culture, as discussed previously, emphasised and played 
with style, design and appearance. It turned not only goods, but also humans, social 
relations and social processes into the sphere of art. The aestheticisation of body, self 
and everyday life then became important. The self-image and self-presentation had 
increasingly taken over any meanings and values that might be attached to some 
substantial content and qualities of being a human. Initially, the fundamentalists 
seemed to oppose the impmtance of style, design and appearance. The faith, in 
particular, was for them the most pivotal element of humanity that could not be 
manipulated by stylisation of body. However, I have previously explained that the 
faith was more a result rather than the starting point. It was mainly through 
regulations, controls, prohibitions and limitations on the body that the activists 
learned and understood how to believe in Islam. Specifically, the ascetic body helped 
them to be what they took as a unique being called Muslim. The hijab as a form of 
discipline and control created an ascetic body because those who wear it were 
obliged to follow strictly certain rules of conduct and of body movements. The hijab 
in effect produced and reproduced the Islamic identity, the Islamic subject and the 
Islamic self. 
Even though this works under the rubric of discipline and control, it can 
hardly be ignored that the h(jab is also a form of image creation process. Discipline 
and control was also some kind of stylisation that re-formed and re-constructed the 
body to create specific culturnl meanings, values and images attached to those who 
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adopt Muslim dress. The activists themselves admitted the importance of cultural 
associations and, perhaps the illusions attached to the hijab. Deliberately adopted, the 
hijab helped them not only to enhance their faith, but also to aestheticise appearance 
and to represent a specific self-image. Muslim dress in this sense was nothing more 
than simply another sign add to the already image-saturated everyday life. It 
competed with other signs produced by the consumer culture to take centre stage in 
an age when aestheticisation dominates. Therefore, the hijab might disrupt the 
dominating consumer culrure that produces a different type of body. But the 
disruption hardly challenged the consumer culture preoccupation with 
aestheticisation. This proves the inability of the hifab as a camivalesque form of 
resistance in transforming the oppressive culture because the aestheticisiation, the 
importance of image and sign-value, is elementary to the very foundation of the 
consumer culrure, and it is this consumer culture which produces the dangerous 
trends, immorality and hedonism. 
It is then understandable that several female fundamentalists regarded the 
hijab as a symbol of beauty. The Hijab is not only disciplined and controlled, but 
also beautified. They compared it with jewellery that could make those who wear it 
look pretty.600 Siti, for example, frequently described herself as "gundulan" 
(Javanese expression for being bald) when she referred to her image on the 
photographs taken before she started to wear a headscarf regularly.601 For her, a 
woman who did not adopt the hijab was as ugly as the women who lost their hair. 
When she first wore the dress, she claimed that her university mates praised her new 
appearance as they saw her as looking more beautiful. This view was shared by the 
Al-Mukmin's teacher, Yahya.602 He insisted that the Muslim women were strictly 
obliged to cover their whole body except for the face and the hands. How the body 
should be covered was left to the Muslims to decide. One could just use any kind of 
clothing as long as it prevented the body from being publicly displayed. However, 
for Y ahya, since being attractive was equally significant, one could not just take any 
kind of covering. The Hijab was an aesthetical way of covering the body that made 
those who wear it look attractive. It allowed the Muslim women to follow the divine 
rule without having to sacrifice their beauty. 
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In fact, as I have mentioned above, other radical Muslims such as the salafi 
group were concerned with issues such as skin whitening cosmetics, perfume and 
hair styles.603 The activists were looking for a fatwa regarding these matters. Tbe 
group officially announced that Muslims are allowed to beautify their appearance as 
long as in doing so they do not permanently alter what had been created by Allah. 
Dian herself told me that she was not influenced by the images of beauty produced in 
the advertisements and the media. White skin and a certain hair cut was no longer an 
issue for her. And, yet, it by no means implied that she could escape from the image 
of beauty that impacted on her everyday life. Dian's fellow HTI activist, Ita, for 
instance, stated that she rejected advertisements because they associated being 
beautiful with slimness and white skin.6-04 Wnat she rejected was white skin and 
slimness. !ta, however, hardly questioned the idea of being beautiful and did not see 
it as being part of media manipulation. She tried instead to appropriate the idea and 
reconstructed it by promoting an alternative meaning of being beautiful. 
lta's view represented the common attitude towards the importance of being 
beautiful within the movement. The activists seemed to compete with the rising 
consumer culture in shaping the meaning of, and promoting the alternative image of, 
beauty. One way of doing tl1is was the play of difference. For the activists., the hijab 
was more beautiful because it covered the body and the covered body represented 
nobility, dignity and high culture.6-05 On the contrary, the less covered body of the 
consumer culture, and nudity, were the illusion of beauty. It represented instead low 
culture, ignorance and backwardness. The fundamentalists commonly argued that 
before the coming of Islam humans were not obliged to cover their bodies properly. 
It was also claimed that during some festive rituals within the community where 
Muhammad was born, those who attended the rituals often did not wear any clothing. 
!slam came, the activists insisted, to civilise this low culture. Islam taught humans 
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how to behave normally, among other things, by cove1ing their bodies properly. 
Islam was, from the fundamentalist viewpoint, in fact a kind of modernising force 
that brought some sort of progress. 600 In this respect, the h!iab symbolised beauty 
because it also represented what the activists understood as modernity. 
THE CLASS TENSIONS 
I argue that the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia is better 
understood against the background of the socio-historical context where the 
movement was born and is developing. The movement is a response to the problem 
of oppression, inauthenticity and disenchantment significantly caused by the rising 
consumer culture explained earlier. I now want to take the discussion a step further 
by investigating the type of contradictions created by Indonesian capitalism in 
general and the rising consumer culture in particular. This contradiction paves the 
way for the resistance, which takes the fonn of the reclaiming everyday life. 
The Contradictions within the New Order's Capitalist Development 
The emergence of the New Order and the subsequent economic development 
it pursued was based on and reproduced the class divisions. 111e formation of the 
New Order's political regime was in fact a result of conflicts between Soekamo, PK! 
and the military, particularly, the army.6m The conflict, in a very significant sense, 
was an outcome of class struggle. Even though they were not committed seriously to 
class struggle, the three parties often spoke on behalf of the broad-based social 
classes. Soekarno and PKI were commonly seen as representing the interests of the 
emerging revolutionary subordinated classes, especially the peasant and working 
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classes, and received significant support from progressive intellectuals. ws The army 
was strongly associated with a grand coalition comprising domestic capitalists, 
foreign capital, the urban middle class and the rural upper class.6-09 The struggle 
resulted in the emergence of the military and its grand coalition as the new power 
bloc, the dominant class, which established the New Order's regime and dominated 
the lndonesian's socioeconomic life for the next three decades. The legitimacy of the 
regime was largely based upon a combination of harsh repression and a relatively 
moderate and persuasive strategy of corporatism to control the subordinated 
productive classes and to prevent any sort of class struggle from emerging. At the 
same time, the New Order protected and nurtured the interests of its supporters 
mainly through economic modernisation. 
This class division is the main basis of the New Order's capitalist 
development. The production of an economic surplus occurred following the 
appropriation of the production process in sectors such as natural resources, 
agriculture and manufucture by the most prominent elements of the grand coalition: 
bureaucrats, technocrats, economic planners, foreign capital and national business.610 
Assisted by factors such as the oil boom and the political and economic support of 
the governments of Western countries, the appropriation, as discussed before, 
produced economic growth and industrial development and a significant increase in 
national production and income. 
The fruit of the New Order's capitalist development mostly benefited 
elements of the dominant class. The capitalists, in particular, took fol! advantage of 
being protected and nurtured by the state. In the initial stages, for example, the state 
provided them business opportunities, credits and fiscal concessions. In the later 
stages the state continued to serve them by restructuring the economy which 
stimulated further capital accumulation.611 The urban middle class was another lucky 
group. They benefited from various types of job opportunities, with relatively high 
salaries, in both the state and the private sectors. They also received a better 
education, health services and housing facilities. 612 The new rich discussed in the 
preceding pages came from these classes. Not everyone though was happy with the 
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New Order's economic pertormance. Even within the grand coalition, various groups 
were gradually marginalised as the economic growth and industrialisation rarely did 
them any favours and often contradicted their interests. The petty bourgeoisie was 
among the first casualties. As early as the 1970s they had started to realise that 
economic development was more for the benefit of large business and foreign 
capital.613 A wide range of progressive and radical elements of middle class was also 
increasingly becoming upset with the New Order. They were initially c.oncemed with 
issues such as human rights, civil liberty, democracy and corruption which seemed to 
have become the victims of development. Later they were also alarm to find that 
poverty was increasing and largely being ignored by the regime. 614 
However, the worst process of marginalisation occurred on the other side of 
the grand coalition. The subordinated productive classes, and their subsequent 
generations, were not only defeated, but put under strict regime control.615 Their 
political energy and dynamism at a high level, which allowed and nurtured by 
Soekamo and PK!, was rechannelled to serve of economic development and to 
support the New Order's regime. From the regime point of view, it did not really 
matter if they did not receive fair material compensation, let alone enjoy the frnits of 
capitalism on the same terms as the grand coalition. After all, exploitation and the 
miseiy suffered by these classes was functional for capitalist development. The 
peasants, for instance, were the victims of either the green revolution, the expansion 
of property sector or infrastrncture development. They were forced to leave their 
lands by force if necessary or had to accept a cheap price decided unilaterally by the 
authorities. They often ended up in the big cities and lived the life of unemployment 
or various forms of semi and disguised unemployment. The workers shared the same 
fate. At first, it seemed that they were in a position to benefit from the trickle down 
effect of the rapid rise of the manufacturing sector following the mid 1980s. The 
truth was that they received almost nothing for a pair of shoes they produced that 
could be valued at hundreds of thousands of rnpiah in the mushrooming department 
stores in the large cities. They were also forced to work under poor working 
conditions and with no rights to express their grievances, not to mention to be 
involved in political movements, This should not come as a surprise, since the low-
613 See 'v!uhaimin (1990); Robison ( 1990). 
614 See Heryanto (1996); Aspinall (1996). 
615 See Hiariej (2003); Hadiz (1997); Aspinall (1999). 
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wage workers were m fact the backbone of the Indonesian export-oriented 
industrialisation. 
As predicted by Marxist theories, the contradiction resulted in unrest. The 
New Order witnessed the rise of opposition from within its own supporters and, more 
importantly, from within the classes it had brutally oppressed. Between the 1970s 
and the early 1980s the opposition was largely led by smdents and human rights 
activists and confined to the major cities in Java. In the late 1980s, it continued to 
escalate following the rise of the peasant and working class movement and 
contributed significantly to Soeharto's resignation. 
The rising consumer culture initially seemed to only reflect this classical 
production-based class division. Consumerism was widely seen as for the rich and 
the exploiter. As mentioned before, it was the emerging new rich who introduced and 
popularised a new way of treating and participating in consumption by emphasising 
the importance of celebrating and playing with commodities. However, it became 
clear that the consumer eulture did not simply extend the production-based class 
division, but also added its own logic of oppression. Above all, the rising 
consumerism appeared as a cultural sort of force that brought physical changes, 
allowed Indonesians to learn many new things, socialised specific values and 
meanings and persuaded the people to take part in it It was a force in the sense that it 
had the power to restructure the life of Indonesians. It could influence how people 
survived their material surroundings and how to interact with each other to produce 
meanings and shared understandings. As noted above, the consumer culture then 
provoked reactions and resistances. Nevertheless, it was through different paths of 
reaction to consumer cnlture we can understand how the production-based class 
division is significant. 
Articles and reports produced by a number of scholars on the emerging new 
rich and consumerism in Indonesia and several other Asian countries illustrate 
various dimensions of what I understand as the consumer cultnre power to dominate 
and oppress.616 At the level of physical change, the consumer culture was described 
as having created a new face of large cities such as Jakarta, with attractive-designed 
sky scrapers, luxurious housing estates and expensive cars. This seemingly less 
important transformation in fact brought more snbstantial effects. The nbiquitous 
"' See. for example, Robison (l 996); Heryru1to (1999); Gerke (2000); Kenichiro (2001); Young 
(1999). See also Robison and Goodman (1996); Beng-Huat (2000); Pinches (1999) 
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shopping centres, for example, had become not only public parks, but also the new 
temples for consumption worshippers, Before their arrival, the people must have 
gone to different public parks or probably had no idea what a public park was, 
Consumer goods were mostly treated according to its functional dimension aod the 
authority of God had yet to be challenged by the seductive of advertisements of 
commodities. The consumer culture simply changed all this, 
The chaoge, however, was not a simple process. Following Young,617 the 
rising consumer culture required learning and education. It successfully persuaded 
people to learn many new things such as how to visit and stroll through the shopping 
malls, how to use cellular phones and how to live in ao expensive house, Clearly it 
was highly crucial to know exactly how to operate, for instance, a cellular phone. But 
it was more important to know what kind of behaviour and attitude one should have 
toward the commodities. Put differently, the consumer culture educated the people in 
practising a new way of consuming goods. I have noted above that celebrating aod 
playing with commodities were at the centre of the new way of consumption. The 
effect, however, was far more serious than the excessive acquisition and display of 
consumer goods. At first commodities started to occupy the everyday lite of many 
Indonesiaos, regardless of one's socioeconomic background, mainly in the form of 
cultural images. Thanks to the multitude of pictures, displays and spectacles, the 
saturation of consumer goods images, according to Gerke, altered many Indonesiaos 
understanding of the real, the possible and the fictional, 618 As a consequence, 
celebration and play seemed to have spilled over into various aspects of life. .For the 
H1Ts Yusanto it had successfully made the people think that everything c-0uld be 
regarded in the same way as consumer goods.6;9 As commodities, through their 
cultural images, looked more alive, they were probably not too different from 
humaos. Hence, Yusanto found that humaos were increasingly treated as 
commodities by their fellow human beings. He said that, by implication, one could 
celebrate having a wife or a girl friend aod then dispose of them for a new one; just 
like one could have a TV aod abandon it as soon as the new and more attractive 
model arrived on the market 
""Young (1999), 
618 Gerke (2000: I 46). 
619 Yusanto (1998: 195), 
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The celebration of and the playing with commodities and, even, increasingly 
human relations aud processes had other implications. On the one hand, as outlined 
above, it opposed any types of restriction that could prevent the enjoyment of bodily 
pleasure. On the other hand it undermined the importance of any substantial 
meanings attached to goods, humans and social interactions. The celebration of and 
the playing with commodities hence basically challenged the established values and 
norms regarding the vittue of a regulated body and substantial meaning in lifo. This 
was the place where one's identity, subjectivity and self were once defined and 
constrncted. Unsurprisingly, being uprooted from shared cultural foundations, the 
people who lived under the influence of consumer culture, found their lives 
increasingly becoming more uncertain and insecure as they lost direction and goals. 
It also became apparent that one had lost one's uniqueness and originality following 
the disrnption of established values and norms. It is through this process of 
oppression and domination that we can treat the rising consumer culture 
independently as source of alienation. 
The new rich had already suffered from the problems of inauthenticity and 
disenchantment. Their very newness meant that they were in transition. Whether it 
was described as a movement from poverty to wealth, rnra! to urban or tradition to 
modern, it implied the process of departing from what used to be one's socio-cultural 
location. Consequently, since life in the city was different to the one in the 
countryside, for example, the new rich realised that their lives were now in a process 
of learning and adaptating to various new things. 620 This often forced them to discard 
the cultural habits, values and norms they used to possess. They could also maintain 
their former cultural foundations and, frequently, suffered the consequences of being 
confused for standing in between rather thau on either side of the established values 
aud nonns. A number of commentators who were fully aware of the in-between 
phenomenon tended to use terms such as split mentality and double identity to 
describe the psychological condition of the Indonesian new rich.621 The term. new 
rich itself, or OKB in Indonesian, could sometimes be seen as a mockery of this 
condition. The term was used to ridicule those who had became wealthy but were yet 
to understand and adapt to the culture of being rich. 
620 See, for example, Young (l 999). 
621 See, for example, Sutanto (1999); Jatman (1999). 
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The rising consumer culture aggravated this problem for two reasons. First, it 
increasingly dominated what people had in their minds about the urbanite, modern 
and luxurious way of life. I have previously demonstrated that being modem, for 
instance, was not only associated with the level of education and the type of job, but 
also and more significantly with items such as shopping malls, cafes and big brand 
name consumer goods. The movement from traditional to modem experienced by the 
new rich in particular and the people in general was in fact a movement from the old 
values and norms to the new establishment set by the rising consumer culture. 
Second, the consumer culture was seductive. The beautiful and spectacular images 
and signs found in the media and in the venues such as shopping centres and 
downtowns had the power to draw people under its spell. At first, the saturating 
images created confusion between the reality and the fantasy. Gradually, the fantasy 
took ascendance and turned into the only reality available to the people. At this stage, 
they were easily persuaded to adopt, for instance, the identity implied by the cultural 
associations and illusions attached to the image of commodities distributed through 
the media and to abandon the one they used to identify with. 
The difference between the Indonesian dominant class and the rest of society 
was in the way they responded to the life that had been increasingly dominated by 
the celebration of and the playing with commodities. Their location within the 
classical production-based class divisions contributed significantly to the way they 
responded to the problem of alienation. In particular, their income provided them 
with more freedom and choice to select the most comfortable way of dealing with the 
issues of inauthenticity and disenchantment. To rediscover the lost uniqueness one 
could identify one's self with a specific brand name. They could also find new 
meaning in life in places such as shopping malls. However, I do not intend to say that 
all members of the Indonesian upper and middle classes responded to the consumer 
culture and behaved in lhe same way. There was a significant number of new rich 
who still clung tightly to some substantial values and idealism. They were the group 
who constantly believed in the virtue of values such as democracy, human rights and 
civil liberty and/or continued to base their life on directions and goals provided by 
religion and cultural tradition. There was also a group of upper and middle classes 
who were in between. They were both democrats and consumerists, frequenting 
mosques as mnch as shopping malls. This fact instead underlined the amount of 
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freedom and choice available to the new rich in dealing with the rising consumer 
culture. 
The contrast was found in the majolity of the Indonesian lower classes. In 
particular, for those who had moved to the big cities, lived and worked under poor 
conditions, the lost memory of their villages could hardly be replaced by fast-food 
restaurants. Not only were the restaurants in stark contrast to the paddy fields, but 
also they simply did not have the money to go there. The price of the simplest meal 
in KFC in Yogyakarta, for example, was more than half the wage of one day's 
labour. Even the labourer who worked in the restaurant could hardly afford the meal 
they produced. They had to live with the lost memory of their established values and 
nonns but could perhaps rediscover it in other places such as the mosque. However, 
this was not the only option left to the lower class. As previously stated, to deal with 
the seducing consumer culture, second hand and the low price shopping centres with 
the imitation consumer goods were also available. In addition, they could use 
strategies such as resource pooling and share the signs of modernity within their 
peers. Nevertheless, they did not have the same freedom and choices available to 
them were more limited. In other words, their income prevented them from being 
part of the consumer culture on the same terms as the dominant class. 
The Fundamentalists' Class Backgrounds 
Indeed, the outcast of Indonesian capitalist development was the group that 
formed the majority of the radical Muslim community. They came from the lower-
middle and lower classes, which suffered from exploitation, poverty and miseiy and 
were further alienated by the Jising consumer culture. A significant number of 
fundamentalists could be categorised as petty bourgeoisie.622 They were involved in 
small scale trading in goods such as Islamic fashion, footwear, basic daily needs, 
honey, perfume and traditional medicines. The goods were not produced by big 
brand names, were largely bought from local and usually small producers, and were 
sold at prices that were within the reach of the people from the same classes. Several 
activists also ran small businesses in various sectors such as education, printing and 
622 Interviews with Safruddin, Lulanan~ Yoyok; Shobbarin, l:Iasyim and Chaidar; group discussion 
with the MMl 's female activist-;. 
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publishing and transportation. Often, the main market, the place where commodities 
were produced and distributed, was the radical Muslim community itself This was 
evident in the case oflv1ML Nur and her husband had a small shop in their hometown 
in Southeast Sulawesi. 62l One of the main suppliers of the Muslim dress they sold 
was their fellow MMI member, Shobbarin. The other MM1 activist, Chaidar, ran a 
business of producing and distributing traditional medicines.624 His main distributors 
were his fellow members, particularly those who were under his command in the 
Laskar Mujahidin. The production and distribution of commodities within the same 
community was more apparent in printing and publishing. Organisations such as HTI 
had their own publication house that printed and published books on a wide range of 
issues, mainly representing the organisation's views, and they produced their own 
weeklies. The main consumers were the HTl activists and their sympathisers. 
The other prominent category was intellectual. This gorup includes the 
activists who worked as university lecturers, religious teachers and preacher, and also 
students.625 Only afew university lecturers were from the major universities in Java. 
The majority worked in private and small universities. The contrast was in the 
number of student activists in the group. As demonstrated in chapter 2, in its earliest 
days HTI was associated with Muslim students in the big cities such as Bandung, 
Bogor, Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Surabaya. In recent years, the organisation still 
gained significant support from the students of these cities. The salafi group was 
another example. During the heyday of LJ, the group drew a large number of 
sympathisers from the students of the natural science faculties in Gadjah Mada 
University, Diponegoro University and Airlangga University. The inclusion of 
religious teachers and preachers in this category might be debatable. The majority of 
fundamentalist~, or at least their prominent leaders, often saw and proclaimed 
themselves as religious teachers. They wanted to be called ustadz and claimed that 
they were always preaching Islamic teachings. A Muslim is considered a preacher 
from birth, insisted Safruddin. At least, one should teach Islamic values and norms to 
one's own family, he continued.626 However, being ustadz could also be a job that 
generated money. First of all, a religious teacher is a specific kind of job in both 
623 Group discussion with the MMI's female activists; interview \:Vith Rohani. 
624 Interview with Chaidar. 
625 Interviews wHh Wahyuddin~ Taufiq1 FikrL Yoyok, Oni, Nopri and Siti; group discussion with the 
MMl's female activists. See also Saraswati (2007). 
626 Interview \vith Safruddin. 
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public schools and Islamic boardiug schools. Those who taught at Al-Mukmin, for 
example, were not only part of the attempt to establish an Islamic state, but also 
taught there for the money they earned each month. Preaching, in its generic term as 
teaching Islamic values and norms to others, could also produce wealth from another 
source. Some fundamentalist prominent figures admitted that they received money 
after the sermons they provided for Muslims outside their community. They claimed 
that they did not ask for it, but neither did they reje~t the offer. Even though the 
amount of money was rarely large, it was enough to supplement the income from 
their regular job either as a petty bourgeoisie, university lecturer or school teacher 
which was relatively smalL 
Finally, a large number of fundamentalists were unemployed and/or involved 
in various disguised and semi-unemployment Most common were the activists who 
did not have a permanent job. Some of them had temporary casual work in places 
such as traditional markets and bus stations. A few others had formerly used various 
types of crime to earn money. Unsurprisingly, the activists from this category 
committed themselves largely to casual work related to organisation activities. The 
work ranged from printing and selling organisation publications to mail delivering, 
cleaning the office and cooking. In return, they would receive a small amount of 
money if the activities were profitable, such as those related to publishing. But if 
they were not involved iu wealth producing activities, they were at least allowed to 
enjoy organisation facilities, such as haviug lunch or dinner, or using the office 
building as a place to stay should they have no other home to go to. 
Certainly, not every fundamentalist lived in poverty and misery. I visited the 
houses of several prominent figures. Some houses could be categorised as expensive 
and the owners could be viewed as the new rich. I was also told, for example, that 
two MM! members were very rich.627 One of them owned a hospital and ran a 
successful gasoline station. The other was rumoured to have built a house priced at 
RplO billion. However, the majority of activists found themselves more as the 
victims of economic development. They were on the losing side, the people who had 
worked hard night and day, but had hardly escaped poverty.628 They rarely paid a 
visit to the shopping malls and frequented traditional markets. The latter was 
627 Interviews with Awwas. Shobbarin, Hasyim and Hamn. 
621 Risa/ah Mujahidin, December 2006: 24-5. 
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preferred because they could find a lot more bargain prices. 629 Economic 
development was blamed for failing to provide them with a better e<lucation and 
jobs. It was often too late to realise, they argued, that those who were marginalised 
could ended up in violence and crime. 630 The successful economic growth was also 
blamed for widening the social gap.631 
The fundamentalists' reaction, however, was more complicated. On the one 
hand, they found exploitation, poverty and inequality as incorrect and urged their 
fellow Muslims to fight against it. On the other hand, they also seemed to be more 
preoccupied with being poor. They tended to valorise and even celebrate the situation 
of being poor by identifying poverty with some high standard oflslamic values. The 
prophet Muhammad and His Companions, for instance, were often described as 
economically less fortunate. Although one of the Companions was widely known for 
being extremely rich, it did not prevent the activists from associating poverty with 
Islam.632 It was understandable that Awwas considered it was not possible to 
seriously believe that shari 'a went hand in hand with expensive cars, luxurious 
houses and excessive wealth.633 For money and wealth, according to Taufiq, could 
distance oneself from Allah. 634 Those luxurious things, insisted Ba' asyir, would 
easily tum Muslims into unbelievers. He urged his fellow Muslims that it was better 
to Jive in poverty and remain Muslim, rather than vice versa.635 
This view could be projected as a way to escape from the misery they 
suffered. By identifying poverty with Islam and salvation, they could forget about the 
hardship of their real lives. Nevertheless, valorising being poor could equally tell us 
something much more real. The comments made by several Al-Mukmin's teachers 
• • 636 I · . ..,_.. d 
were mterestmg to note. n particular, Chamrnu and Darwis admitte that, 
compared to their friends and colleagues who lived and worked outside the 
pesantren, they had relatively less material benefits. The reward for being poor, 
however, was a pure and less contaminated life. The Al-Mukmin was a place, they 
claimed, where their uniqueness is safely guarded. They did not have to worry about 
the influence of other values and nonns as everything there had been strictly 
629 lnterviews with Chanifah and Fikri. 
630 Risa/ah lvfujahidin, December 2006: 24-5. 
631 Yusanto (!998). 
632 Interviews "~th Hafid, Hasyim and Abbas. 
"' Awwas (2005a: 238). 
614 Intervi~~ with Taufiq. 
635 lnterview with Ba'asvir. 
636 Interviews with Ch.,;ifah, Darwis, Wahyuddin, Fikri, T aufiq and Nurhadi. 
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regulated under the divinely justified guidelines. Poverty in this sense is celebrated 
because it was taken as a virtual form of confinement that could prevent them from 
being part of the uncertain world outside the movement. The power of being poor to 
protect their meaningful and original life was based on the fact that it prevented them 
from enjoying places such as shopping malls. Fikri, Chanifah and Safrnddin, for 
instance, felt more comfortable in the traditional market.637 Comfortable for Fikri 
meant that he belonged to the same culture with those in the traditional market. He 
could speak the same language and be involved without any psychological barriers. 
Fikri in fact found the market more as community in which he was independently 
part of, and certain about its rules and norms. 638 In contrast, although the shopping 
malls were basically a place to buy and sell things, the activists found it more 
difficult to deal with. The place was simply not for them as it was associated with a 
different, and to them a foreign culture.639 They might even be persuaded to abandon 
items that were associated with their very uniqueness such as the Muslim dress 
should they have to go there. Visiting shopping malls could then be a threat to their 
autonomous consciousness. Clearly, the preference of traditional markets, in a very 
significance sense, reflected their fear of being controlled and contaminated by the 
shopping malls. They loved being poor because it could protect them from being 
oppressed, and losing their authenticity through this specific element of consumer 
culture. As I noted before, it is the rising consumer cullure that leads to their 
resistance, while their level of income shapes the fonn of resistance. 
* * * 
In this chapter, I have argued how the rise ofislamic fundamentalism is a response to 
the problem of oppression, inauthenticity and disenchantment originating in the 
rising consumer culture in the country. By and large, the response takes the fonn of 
reclaiming everyday life by transforming almost every aspect of their daily practices 
and activities into a sacred sphere. This process of sacralisation lhat turns the 
consumer culture up-side-down interestingly paves the way for them to appropriate 
and to enjoy some elements of the world outside the movement In the end, the 
"37 Interview with Fikri, Chanifah and Safruddin. 
638 lntervie\\1 with Fikri. 
oJ9 Interviews wHh Fikri and Safruddin. 
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reclaiming ironically allows them to live with and, in a very important sense, to 
preserve the existing social order they fight against. 
The class divisions and the way the fundamentalists adopt and relate to Islam, 
which produces a sort of class consciousness, play an important role in the 
emergence oftbe movement as a form of resistance. The activists are largely part of 
the lower class that bas badly suffered from the exploitation, poverty and misery 
created by Indonesian capitalist development. They are further alienated by the rising 
consumer culture, which takes away their autonomous consciousness and shatters 
their established source of meaning and direction in life. In contrast to the new rich, 
their limited income was a hindrance to re discover their lost uniqueness and 
certainty in life by the celebrating and playing with commodities. 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSION 
My study is an attempt to explain the recent rise of Islamic fundamentalism in 
Indonesia. Departing the existing works on the subject, I try to understand its 
development in the context of a larger social structure and historical change 
associated with the way contemporary Indonesian society is instituted. With the help 
of theories developed within the studies of social movements, identity politics and 
consumer culture, my answer is that fundamentalism is a form of resistance that 
seeks to transform the existing social order. The appeals for an Islamic state and 
shari'a, the religious mass rallies and the violent attacks are ihe result of resistance. 
More importantly, Islamic fundamentalism is not an abnonnality. Actions that take 
the path of deadly assaults such as terrorism are wrong, but the resistance itself is 
legitimate, unless we take the cunent Indonesian social and cultural order as 
unchallengeable and tme in itself. In fact, ihe fundamentalists' resistance is a 
response to the problems of oppression and domination. Becoming a fundamentalist 
is to fight against this problem. And rhe fighting is produced within contradictions 
and social antagonism originating in the dominant structure. 
This leads me to describe Islamic fundamentalism as a social movement. The 
five groups discussed in the foregone chapters are well structured organisations with 
clear goals, policies, programs and strategies, at least until some are either disbanded, 
paralysed by ihe Indonesian authmities or internally divided. They have significant 
followers and receive important support and sympathy from a wider community 
outside the given organisations. More importantly, the Islamic fundamentalist 
movement is not a given reality. It is a result of how the fundamentalists construct an 
internal coherence, of how they build the movement's "we" -ness. This sense of 
collectivity is achieved through two framing processes. The first is by recognising 
who they are and by identifying their enemies. The second is by defining the 
problems they are facing and how to deal with them. The fundamentalists prefer to 
see ihemselves simply as Muslims who share the feeling of being divinely chosen, of 
being the only hope left in society and, hence, of having a huge responsibility to 
uphold the honour of Islam. They are willing to take responsibility for establishing 
an Islamic state based on the full implementation of shari 'a through jihad and 
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dakwah. However, this is not an easy task since the enemies of Islam will always 
stand in the way of their effort to uphold the God authority in the world. The most 
prominent enemies constructed by the fundamentalists are the Christians, the West, 
the Communists and the local Liberal Islam. 
At the heart of fundamentalists' resistance is a struggle for identity. I explain 
this kind of struggle by making a simple distinction between instrumental and 
expressive dimensions that we can apply to any form of collective action conducted 
by the fundamentalists. Focusing on the second dimension, I have proposed a 
different logic to understand the fundamentalists' actions. The first is the logic of 
performing and symbolism. The fundamentalists have used their actions to produce 
their identity by using their appeals, physical appearance, body movements, colours 
and banners. The second is the logic of identification. By this I mean that actions 
have become a medium through which they valorise their identity as real and 
important by identifying themselves with top Muslim figures and heroes, and with 
the defence of the rights of marginalised Muslims around the globe. The third is the 
logic of bearing witness. I use this particular notion to describe the way actions have 
become a site for them to adopt certain Islamic values and nonns, to demonstrate 
their strong commitment to Islamic teachings and, as a consequence, to experience 
some sort of transformation at the level of personality. 
Why should we take into consideration the issue of identity and why is 
identity political. For the activists of this movement identity is largely a matter of 
how they see themselves as divinely obliged to display publicly their Muslimness 
without being afraid and ashamed of doing so; and to treat this Muslimness as the 
sole basis of their acts, behaviour and attitude. However, I discover that identity for 
them is more lively and dynamic than simply such an underlying structure that 
produces and commands every fundamentalist as a human subject By this I mean 
that, apart from representing what they take as an original and true Muslim, the 
adoption of Muslim dress is, for instance, a response to their social surroundings and 
is a decision made under a specific socio-historical situation. 
Specifically, the expression and accentuation of their existence through the 
movement's cultural symbols and images is important because the fundamentalists 
firmly believe that their uniqueness as human being called a Muslim is in danger and, 
even in some cases, has badly deteriorated. They are deeply concerned with trends in 
fashion, in physical appearance and in lifestyles in genera! that seem to have ruled 
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the way ordinary Indonesians live their daily routines. Trends in fashion, for 
example, create unifo1mity and make Muslims hardly different from non-Muslims in 
terms of physical appearance. The bid for uniqueness is a rejection of conformity, of 
being shaped by the existing cultural order that works through trends. Therefore, 
uniqueness is about having an autonomous consciousness and the capacity to act 
independently, The growing immorality for them only brings more threats to 
autonomous consciousness. To understand this I have demonstrated that the 
fundamentalists tend to associate immorality with liberalism. The latter for them is 
based on permissiveness, which they further see mainly functions to serve the 
unbridled fulfilment of human natural instincts. Liberalism that lies at the heart of 
immorality hence produces a human subject who is driven by hawa naftu, instead of 
Islamic value reason. Since the latter is taken as the place where autonomous 
consciousness is at home, the rule of hawa nafsu for them signals how the growing 
immorality denies that the human is a subject who possesses the power to control 
her/his own self and life. 
However, the bid for uniqueness is not only to restore the rule of autonomous 
consciousness based on Islamic value rationality, but also to fulfil the desire to have 
security and certainty in life. Uniqueness in this respect means being part of the 
group of individuals who share the same unique qualities which serve the need to 
have some roots. More importantly, the desire for certainty requires them to have 
meaning, goals and directions in life which are real and true. The growing 
immorality is alarming because liberalism and permissiveness, as they understand it, 
tend to celebrate life. That is to say, people are encouraged to have more fun in life 
by fulfilling their basic desires as much as possible. Life has ceased to be a journey 
to some meaningful end with the promise of eternal happiness. It becomes merely a 
sequence of perpetual releasing of desires with perpetual short-lived happiness. 
Hedonism is the term I use to describe this kind of life that the fundamentalists find 
as destroying the true and real meaning of life without any clear direction, other than 
having fun. 
The fundamentalists frequently point to the overproduction of images and 
signs when they express their anxiety about the ruling trends, the growing immorality 
and the dominating hedonism, The activists were deeply concerned about the 
pictures, displays and spectacles presented in the media such as television, 
magazines, tabloids and the internet, as well as in public venues such as shopping 
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malls, (refurbished) downtown and by the side of roads. Their resistance is a 
response to the multirude of images and signs that colonise the fabric of Indonesian 
everyday life. 
Above all, the flowing images are seductive. The beauty, the fascination and 
the dream world produced by, for example, films and advertisements, they believe, 
invade and influence the human mind and force one to submit oneself to its rule. The 
attractive spectacles celebrate hawa ncifSu and, through that celebration, take over 
one's autonomy and force obedience. The feeling of being controlled and dominated 
can be seen in the way the fundamentalists view the power of the saturating images 
to socialise and to educate the masses. This ends up in a sort of "the end of the real" 
as they discover how the behaviour and attitudes of Indonesian teenagers, for 
example, are nothing more than the projection of images. Worse than that, such 
power has allowed images and signs to normalise things that were formerly seen by 
them as either immoral, unislamic, or unlndonesian. 
In addition, images are produced through the aetsheticisation of the real. The 
activists of this movement are concerned with the aestheticisation because it seems to 
have crowned image as being the most important aspect of life. This includes the 
way people pay more attention to their self-presentation and physical appearance 
instead of their substantial content as human beings. In this regard, there are two 
things that the fundamentalists perceive from the colonising images and signs. First, 
the body, particularly the aurat, is predominant, is celebrated and, in the process, is 
freed from discipline and control. Second, any form of substance, underlying 
structure and inner reality, that provides fixed and stable meanings and directions, is 
significantly undermined. It is replaced with the importance of being beautiful, 
young and energetic. As I have discussed before, the liberation of the body and the 
importance of image, self-presentation and physical appearance are not welcomed by 
the fundamentalists. The less disciplined body and the lack of snbstantial meanings 
have turned their lives into a more uncertain journey. 
The rapid flows of images and signs that saturate the fabric of everyday life 
in contemporary Indonesian society are produced by, and reproduce, the rising 
consumer culture in the country. Two factors contribute significantly to the growing 
dominance of celebrating and playing with commodities in the major cities. "The first 
is the rapid increase in consumerism. Its most discernible indications are the 
mushrooming new housing estates, the ubiquitous shopping malls and the dramatic 
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increase in consumer spending. The second is the gro\\1h of the upper and middle 
classes, particularly the fonnation of the Indonesian new rich who have access to 
income and credit beyond what they need to buy their basic commodities. 
I understand the rise of consumer culture against the backdrop of capitalist 
development in the Archipelago. In the last three decades it has generated a 
significant amount of wealth, goods and facilities necessary for modern mass 
consumption. The process of commodification has significantly increased the 
number, variety and availability of consumer goods. We also witness the rapid 
development of consumption facilities such as shopping malls, supermarkets, fast-
food restaurants, cafes and tourist resorts. This is accompanied by the growing 
importance of promotion and advertising of commodities through style, packaging 
and appearance. Wealth generated by the capitalist development is reflected not only 
in the mushrooming sky scrapers, shopping centres and housing estates, but also iu 
the increasing number of the new rich. They are well·cducated and are willing to 
consume excessively with the financial power at their disposal beyond the logic of 
economy and the utility dimension of a given consumer good. In addition, they have 
used their excessive consumerism to accentuate their presence and to challenge the 
established privileged classes. They also rely on consumerism to free themselves 
from any type of regulating values and norms and, in effect, to allow their bodies to 
enjoy more pleasures. 
The struggle for identity is the answer to all these problems. The struggle 
takes the form of practices of representation in which the Islamic identity such as the 
hijab is produced through its negation of other fashion styles. The hijab, beard, and 
movement sites such as pesantren then imply specific practices and performances 
which are based on regulations, limitations and prohibitions on the body. During the 
course of implementing identity practices and performances, the fundamentalist 
subject is constructed. The subject can be regarded not only as being free from the 
ruling trends, the growing immorality and the dominating hedonism, but also as 
being firmly anached to an inner core, which is Islamic values and norms. In this 
sense, becoming a fundamentalist is a matter of adopting new subjectivities implied 
by the Islamic identity practices. The process involves learning and mastering certain 
behaviour and attitudes such as humbleness and shyness that require specific skills of 
body movements. It then brings implication to one's inner self and, in tum, remakes 
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the self. What we see in this entire process is a form of action on self through the 
centrality of the body which ends up in the formation of a new personality. 
In this sense, the Islamic fundamentalism discussed in this project can be seen 
as the opposite of the rising consumer culture. In place of celebrating life, the 
activists emphasise the virtue of discipline and control. Style, physical appearance 
and beautification are negated and are substituted with the regulated and ascetic 
body. Indeed, regulation, limitation and prohibition of the body helps the 
fundamentalists not only to protect themselves from trends, immorality and 
hedonism, but also to reclaim their lives from being occupied by the consumer 
culture. This is achieved through the transformation of daily routines into ritual 
practices by attaching Islamic values and norms to mundane processes such as 
eating, sleeping and buying things. Islam is turned into a sort of life manual on how 
to do things and to engage in various activities. Such a process then creates a sense of 
having control of oneself and autonomy in everyday life. At the same time it 
provides the activists with a firm basis in these times of worldly uncertainty. 
Furthermore, this sacralisation allows them not only to reclaim their everyday 
lives, but also to modify, improve and constantly restructure life by creatively 
·appropriating items and elements of modernity, which were largely taken by the 
activists themselves at some stage as being part of the non-Islamic world, including 
those coming from the rising consumer culture. The radical Muslim group believes 
that it is divinely permitted to engage in those things as long as they pass the scrutiny 
of shari 'a based rules; are taken as forms of madaniyya; are under the control of 
those whose Islamic credentials are justified; and are part of legitimate modern life as 
defined by the fundamentalists. Therefore, even though Islamic fundamentalism is 
certainly a form of resistance that brings dramatic changes at the level of personality 
and everyday life, the movement fails to transforms the established social and 
cultural order it challenges. Instead, the movement seems to only bring the 
transformation within, rather than beyond, the rising consumer culture. The adoption 
of Muslim dress is the interesting case. For sure, the dress undermines and, as a 
matter of fact, turns the consumer culture celebration and liberation on the body up-
side-down. However, the hijab itself is a form of aetsheticisation of the body which 
ends up in the production of specific images attached to the fundamentalists. The 
adoption of the Muslim dress in this regard is not a rejection of the consumer culture, 
but merely a challenge to the meaning of the beauty it defines. 
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The rising consumer culture tends to alienate everyone regardless of financial 
power. Nevertheless, how people react largely depends on one's location within the 
existing class divisions. While the new rich are able to fight the alienation by 
celebrating and playing with commodities, the fundamentalists who mostly come 
from the lower middle and the lower class can hardly do the same. The latter have 
less freedom to enjoy the consumer culture and very often have to distance 
themselves from shopping malls, fast food restaurants and cafes and to leam how to 
discipline the body properly. 
Islamic fundamentalism and democracy 
Regarding the Islamic fundamentalists, one could wonder "am I with or 
against them?" Since the movement has been frequently seen as a serious threat to 
democracy in the country "does it mean that we should oppose them at all cost and, if 
necessary, disband the organisations?" How do my studies allow me to answer these 
questions? What kind of academic investigation is further needed? 
First of all, I find the very notion "with or against them" problematic because 
its logic barely touches upon my position. As mentioned several times, this thesis 
treats Islamic fundamentalism as a result rather than a cause. Should we regard the 
movement as dangerous, the real problem we need to deal with lies within the social 
structure that allows and provokes its emergence. Instead, the following questions, 
which require another project of investigation, should be raised. Is fundamentalism 
or the social structure that produces such religious radicalism a hindrance to the 
ongoing process of democratisation in the Archipelago? Is it the failure of the 
democratisation process to take into consideration the problems of oppression and 
domination at the level of self and of everyday life that have led many of us to focus 
our attention more on the fundamentalism, instead of on the structure that produces 
it? How should the democratisation process be better understood against this largely 
ignored social structure and historical change? What does democracy mean if we 
take into account the issue of oppression, inauthenticity and disenchantment? 
In so doing, as a form of resistance that responds to the problem of 
oppression and domination, Islamic fundamentalism is a normal social movement 
that tries to bring a dramatic change at the level of personality. In fact studying this 
movement can help us to understand similar forms of resistance conducted by other 
contemporary groups in the country such as feminist movement, the environmentalist 
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movement, the student movement and the counter-culture movement. It is interesting 
to know how these latter movements are involved in their own struggle for identity; 
how their respective identities denote and connote their respective desires for 
freedom and certainty in life; and how they differ from Islamic fundamentalism. 
What is unacceptable, however, are two things. First, the fundamentalists' 
preoccupation with resistance fails to transform the social structure they oppose. It 
seems that they are not really against the rising consumer culture. They just want a 
certainty in life and a sense of having autonomous control over things and activities 
they engage in. Their fight against the consumer culture and liberalism, for example, 
is more about accentuating their existence and valorising their identity. In this sense 
the Islamic fundamentalist movement is hardly an agent of change. No-one should 
rely on them for a meaningful social transformation that brings emancipation to all. 
Instead, the fundamentalists tend to be both pragmatic and conservative. Social 
transformation for them is nothing more than having a different approach, a different 
understanding and different relations to the world surrounding them without the real 
and significant change of that world. How the movement ended up in this kind of 
reactionary tendency and conservatism will need further investigation. 
Second, while the fundamentalists' resistance to oppression and domination 
might be legitimate, the way it has rejected pluralism, tolerance, liberty and 
democracy should be denounced. Nevertheless, we should be cautious not to be too 
quick to jump to the conclusion that what is needed is educating the activists about 
pluralism, tolerance, liberty and democracy as well as replacing their established 
understanding about Islamic teachings with one that is more closely associated with 
these universal values. In my view, the fundamentalists are to think what they like, to 
make their own interpretations and to express them just as I have the same right to 
have a different understanding and to reject their way of thinking. However, they 
should not try to force others to agree with them and to treat other views as simply 
wrong, containing elements of evil or being part of a conspiracy against them. They 
cannot treat other groups and individuals, particularly those who are opposing the 
fundamentalists' way of thinking, as enemies that must be vanquished, but as 
adversaries that have the right to live, to think and to speak differently. To borrow 
the expression of Deleuze and Guattari, we might think about the relations between 
the fundamentalists and other groups and individuals in terms of" ... fragments whose 
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sole relationship is sheer difference-fragments that are related to one another in that 
each of them is different without having recourse to any sort of original totality ... "639 
One could easily argue that it is the fundamentalist way of thinking that leads 
them to treat others as the enemy. As demonstrated in the foregone chapters, the 
fundamentalists rely not only on the making of difference, but also on the negating of 
others, in making sense of who they are. It seems that rejecting others, treating others 
as a dangerous entity that must be eliminated, is ironically constitutive to their 
identity. Here, we might be tempted to ask a question: "Is fundamentalism the only 
entity which produces its identity by rejecting and sometimes demonising others?" 
Does democracy itself, regarding the notion "with or against them", rely on a similar 
logic of difference? If the answer is yes, "is it possible for democracy to end up in 
some form of undemocratic attitude toward others, including the religious radicalism 
it strongly denounces?" 
In this sense, we can equally approach the issue from another direction with 
the following question. "Is it possible to think about the logic of negation as social 
construction?" If the answer is positive, borrowing Mouffe,640 the way individuals 
and groups in contemporary society treat others as illegitimate enemies is perhaps 
produced within a specific historical context where politics and, in particular, 
democracy have ceased to be about antagonism· between legitimate adversaries. It 
seems that what happens is not the end of antagonism as some would love to occur, 
but instead, antagonism is merely transformed into a new form of conflict. This time 
democracy, which has abandoned antagonism, is not the realm of conflict, but part of 
the conflict against other systems and identities, including religious radicalism, 
which is ironically regarded as the illegitimate enemy which has no right to live. 
Simply put, we are right to reject the fundamentalists for violence, intolerance 
and the anti-democracy stand they are preoccupied with. However, we should not 
lose sight of the oppression, domination and contradictions that produced the rise of 
such religious radicalism in the first place. For this could lead us to maintain, rather 
than question, the established socio-cultural order. Moreover, our rejection of Islamic 
fundamentalism should not also allow us to treat the fundamentalists in the same way 
they treat us as the illegitimate enemy. This could turn us into the same monster we 
condemn. 
639 Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 42). 
640 Mouffe (2005; 2000). 
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